In re Miller

139 So. 3d 993, 2014 WL 2177800, 2014 La. LEXIS 1228
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedMay 23, 2014
DocketNo. 2014-B-0538
StatusPublished

This text of 139 So. 3d 993 (In re Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Miller, 139 So. 3d 993, 2014 WL 2177800, 2014 La. LEXIS 1228 (La. 2014).

Opinion

[994]*994ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

| This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Kenner 0. Miller, Jr., an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana, but currently suspended from practice.

PRIOR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY

Before we address the current charges, we find it helpful to review respondent’s prior disciplinary history.

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana in 1983. In September 2007, the ODC filed three counts of formal charges against respondent, alleging that he neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with his clients, failed to properly withdraw from the representation of his clients, engaged in dishonest conduct, and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Prior to the formal hearing, respondent and the ODC stipulated to the allegations of the formal charges. The matter then proceeded to a hearing in mitigation. During the hearing, respondent presented evidence suggesting that his misconduct was caused by cocaine abuse, for which he had been treated. Respondent also claimed that he had abstained from the use of cocaine for more than one year prior to the hearing. However, the ODC received information from the Lawyers Assistance Program that respondent’s January 27, 2009 drug screen [2was positive for cocaine. Consequently, the ODC filed with this court a petition seeking respondent’s immediate interim suspension from the practice of law. Respondent filed a response to the ODC’s petition agreeing to the entry of an order of interim suspension. Accordingly, we ordered that respondent be placed on interim suspension. In re: Miller, 09-0271 (La.2/11/09), 2 So.3d 418.

Thereafter, the ODC proceeded with the prosecution of the formal charges originally filed against respondent in September 2007. In May 2010, after considering the charges, we suspended respondent from the practice of law for eighteen months, retroactive to the date of his interim suspension. In re: Miller, 09-2680 (La.5/21/10), 34 So.3d 839 (“Miller I”). Respondent has not been reinstated from this suspension and, thus, remains suspended from the practice of law.

Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at issue in the instant proceeding.

FORMAL CHARGES

Between December 1, 2005 and February 27, 2009, respondent commingled, con[995]*995verted, and/or misappropriated to his own use the sum of $208,260.83. This amount consisted of funds due to various clients and third-party medical providers from the proceeds of settlements in personal injury cases.

The ODC’s auditor documented the details of respondent’s commingling, conversion, and/or misappropriation of the funds in a report dated March 20, 2012. Specifically, the report indicated that respondent deposited $13,100 of his personal funds into his client trust account. He also paid certain operating expenses, such as payroll and rent, directly from the trust account. Additionally, he overpaid his attorney’s fees and costs from settlement funds in several client matters, resulting in deficient funds to pay clients and third-party medical providers their portions of lathe settlements. Finally, respondent’s trust account was overdrawn in July 2007 and January 2008.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In January 2013, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct as set forth above violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.15(a)(b) (safekeeping property of clients or third parties), 1.15(d) (failure to timely remit funds to a client or third person), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Respondent failed to answer the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report

After reviewing the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee found that, between December 1, 2005 and February 27, 2009, respondent commingled, converted, and/or misappropriated $208,260.83. The funds were owed to various clients and third-party medical providers as a result of settlements obtained during this time period in personal injury cases. The committee further found a factual basis for the report prepared by the ODC’s | ¿auditor. Based on these facts, the committee determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the committee considered the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and the ease of Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Hinrichs, 486 So.2d 116 (La.1986), wherein the court set forth guidelines for sanctions in cases involving an attorney’s conversion of client funds. The committee found no mitigating factors present and did not address the presence of any aggravating factors. However, it did determine, based on the serious nature of the misconduct and respondent’s failure to answer the formal charges, that permanent disbarment was the only viable sanction.

Accordingly, the committee recommended respondent be permanently disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation.

[996]*996 Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined the factual allegations of the formal charges were deemed admitted and have been conclusively established. The board also found that the hearing committee correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct to determine respondent violated the rules as alleged in the formal charges. Accordingly, the board adopted the committee’s findings of fact and law.

The board determined respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to his clients and the legal profession. His conduct caused harm to his clients and third-party medical providers by depriving them of their funds. Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined that the baseline sanction is disbarment.

|fiIn aggravation, the board found the following factors: a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency,1 refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1983), and indifference to making restitution. The board determined that no mitigating factors are supported by the record.

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Related

In Re Banks
18 So. 3d 57 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2009)
In Re Miller
34 So. 3d 839 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2010)
In Re Miller
2 So. 3d 418 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2009)
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Whittington
459 So. 2d 520 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1984)
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Reis
513 So. 2d 1173 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1987)
La. State Bar Ass'n v. Hinrichs
486 So. 2d 116 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1986)
In re Donnan
838 So. 2d 715 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
139 So. 3d 993, 2014 WL 2177800, 2014 La. LEXIS 1228, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-miller-la-2014.