In re Michael M.

156 Misc. 2d 98, 591 N.Y.S.2d 681, 1992 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 549
CourtNew York City Family Court
DecidedSeptember 17, 1992
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 156 Misc. 2d 98 (In re Michael M.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York City Family Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Michael M., 156 Misc. 2d 98, 591 N.Y.S.2d 681, 1992 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 549 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1992).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Myrna Martinez-Perez, J.

CHRONOLOGY OF CASE

On April 9, 1991 the Commissioner of Social Services (hereinafter CSS) filed the instant proceeding alleging that respondent Leonard M. sexually abused his sons, Michael and Dennis, ages 10 and 8, respectively, by fondling their genitals and buttocks in violation of Penal Law § 130.65. The Commissioner also alleges that the children are psychologically and emotionally impaired as a result of the pattern of domestic violence witnessed in the parental household. The petitioner additionally asserts a claim of educational neglect claiming that the children are excessively absent and do not attend school regularly.

Fact finding was commenced on November 18, 1991 but had to be adjourned on December 20, 1991 and February 6, 1992 because the mother claimed illness. On February 26, 1992, fact finding was again interrupted to consider a joint application by the Law Guardian and the Commissioner pursuant to Family Court Act § 1027 for a removal of the children from the mother based upon the mother’s failure to cooperate with prior court orders that the children be brought for psychological counseling, the children’s continued absenteeism from school and observed unsafe and unsanitary condition of the home. The Law Guardian informed the court that the mother missed most of the scheduled appointments with the psychologist and refused to bring the children as ordered, stating that as a nurse she did not see the need for the children to attend.

Based upon the Law Guardian’s representation, the court’s [100]*100own observation of the mother’s demeanor and oftentimes erratic behavior in court, the court directed a psychiatric evaluation of the mother. At the hearing, Dr. Michael Sullivan testified that the mother suffered from a psychotic disorder characterized by marked disturbance in her thinking pattern. He believed the mother was unable to think rationally, and he further opined that respondent mother was incapable of carrying out the court’s prior orders directing that the children undergo psychological counseling.

Andrea Dickerson, the caseworker, testified that on several days she observed the condition of the home as chaotic and in a constant state of disarray with doors off hinges, broken staircase banisters, broken glass picture frames, dog feces in the bedroom and the smell of urine. The children reportedly were observed on the roof of the house; they refused to attend school and do not respond or listen to their mother.

At the conclusion of the hearing this court issued an order of removal, finding that the children’s emotional, psychological and physical well-being was then in imminent danger of being impaired because of the mother’s refusal to bring the children to counseling and therapy. The fact finding was then continued on April 30, May 8, May 18 and concluded on May 23, 1992 after which counsel was directed to submit memoranda of law. All memoranda was submitted by July 22, 1992. After consideration of the relevant and material evidence presented, and weighing the testimony and assessing the credibility of the parties and witnesses, the court makes the following findings of fact.

FINDINGS OF FACT

(a) Sexual Abuse

The court finds that the allegations of sexual abuse have not been proven by the quantum of proof necessary under article 10. In order to sustain a finding of sexual abuse, this court must make a threshold finding that the father’s acts were done for the purpose of sexual gratification. Because sexual abuse is predicated upon the sex offenses defined in the Penal Law,1 evidence of "intent” is an essential element under [101]*101article 10. (Matter of Ruth L., 126 Misc 2d 1053,1057 [Fam Ct, Monroe County 1985].)

Dr. Anne Meltzer was the Commissioner’s only witness on the sexual abuse charge. Dr. Meltzer was the validator chosen to access the children’s allegations of sexual abuse. She has been qualified as an expert. Dr. Meltzer testified that Michael and Dennis both confirmed several instances over a period of two years where the father had fondled the boys’ genitals both over and under their clothing and had squeezed and rubbed their buttocks when sitting or reclining on the sofa. The incidents usually occurred when the mother was out of the house.

The children could not specify the number of times such touching occurred or the amount of time that elapsed between such touching. However, the boys did relate that the touching was usually brief and that long periods of time would pass between such instances. According to Dr. Meltzer, the children denied any other form of sexual contact such as having to touch their father’s genitals, or digital penetration.

While conceding the acts alleged, the father strenuously denies that the touching was done for sexual gratification. He related to Dr. Meltzer that he touched the boys and pulled or grabbed their genitals and buttocks when he hugged them or played with them, and it was his way of being affectionate with his sons. He also related to Dr. Meltzer that during that period of time he sometimes showered with the boys. However, no allegations of improper touching while in the shower have been made against the father.

Testifying on his own behalf, the father admitted that he grabbed the boys’ genitals and buttocks during times he wrestled with them on the floor or on the sofa. He stated that as a child, he had been similarly touched on the buttocks and had not considered it wrong. He acknowledged that he has now come to realize that such touching transgresses proper parental boundaries.

Although the court is urged to infer sexual intent from the factual circumstances surrounding these incidents, the court finds unpersuasive that the actions described present an unequivocal and unambiguous showing of sexual abuse. It is certainly not beyond the bounds of reasonableness to find that the father’s actions were misguided attempts to demonstrate affection, or that his behavior demonstrates a lack of understanding of child development.

[102]*102The Commissioner’s own witness, Dr. Meltzer, could not confirm that the acts described by the children were done for sexual gratification. In her report she stated "It is [sic] difficult to say with great certainty that these children have been sexually abused by their father, although at the very least they have been exposed to inappropriate parental boundaries”. This court is not disposed to adjudge the touching described as sexual abuse. Normal interplay between parent and child, particularly in the early stages of a child’s development often involve acts of touching, squeezing, patting, and pinching various parts of a child’s body including buttocks and at times genitalia. The difference is that what might be socially acceptable when a child is an infant or toddler, becomes less so as the child grows older and becomes more aware of himself as a separate human being. Thus, a parent’s respect for the child’s right to the privacy of his person should increase as the child grows and matures.

Some parents, however, lack this understanding in child development and persist in dealing with an older child with the same kind of intrusive handling as when the child was an infant.

This is a grey area in the parent/child relationship where claims of sexual abuse must be seriously examined, and extreme caution exercised, lest normal interaction be reported as sexual abuse.

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Bluebook (online)
156 Misc. 2d 98, 591 N.Y.S.2d 681, 1992 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 549, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-michael-m-nycfamct-1992.