In re Micah Jared Smith

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

In re Micah Jared Smith

197 A.3d 507

CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals

DecidedDecember 6, 2018

Docket17-BG-881

StatusPublished

This text of 197 A.3d 507 (In re Micah Jared Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re Micah Jared Smith, 197 A.3d 507 (D.C. 2018).

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Opinion

Per Curiam:

In this case, the Board on Professional Responsibility has recommended that respondent Micah Jared Smith be disbarred from the practice of law after he was convicted in the state of Delaware of one count of Continuous Abuse of a Child, 1 one count of Sex Abuse of a Child by a Person in a Position of Trust, 2 and three counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, 3 urging that at least one of these convictions is a crime of moral turpitude per se . Neither respondent nor Disciplinary Counsel filed any exceptions to the Board's report. However, in response to a previously imposed suspension pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 10 (c), respondent filed his D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14 (g) affidavit on November 17, 2017. 4

Under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9 (h)(2), "if no exceptions are filed to the Board's report, the [c]ourt will enter an order imposing the discipline recommended by the Board upon the expiration of the time permitted for filing exceptions." See also In re Viehe , 762 A.2d 542 , 543 (D.C. 2000) ("When ... there are no exceptions to the Board's report and recommendation, our deferential standard of review becomes even more deferential."). While we have never decided whether violations of these specific statutes are crimes of moral turpitude per se , we have held that convictions under other child sex abuse statutes, especially where the respondent exercised authority or a trust relationship, are crimes of moral turpitude per se . See In re Sharp , 674 A.2d 899 (D.C. 1996) (finding a conviction of child molestation under *508 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-370.1 (1950) was a crime involving moral turpitude per se ); In re Wortzel , 698 A.2d 429 (D.C. 1997) (relying on In re Sharp held a conviction for child abuse under Md. Code Ann. art. 27 § 35C constituted a crime involving moral turpitude per se ). In this case, respondent's convictions on one count of Continuous Abuse of a Child and one count of Sex Abuse of a Child by a Person in a Position of Trust were based on his instances of sex abuse of a relative who was a minor and over whom respondent exerted control and authority; therefore, these convictions, at a minimum, constitute crimes involving moral turpitude per se . Therefore, having found respondent committed crimes of moral turpitude per se , the required sanction is to disbar him from the practice of law. See In re Colson , 412 A.2d 1160 , 1165 (D.C. 1979) (en banc); D.C. Code § 11-2503 (2012 Repl.).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Micah Jared Smith is hereby disbarred from the practice of law, nunc pro tunc to November 17, 2017.

So ordered.

Del. Code § 11-776.

Del. Code § 11-778A.

Del. Code § 11-769.

This matter was stayed while respondent appealed his convictions. His convictions were affirmed on May 29, 2018.

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Per Curiam:

In this case, the Board on Professional Responsibility has recommended that respondent Micah Jared Smith be disbarred from the practice of law after he was convicted in the state of Delaware of one count of Continuous Abuse of a Child, 1 one count of Sex Abuse of a Child by a Person in a Position of Trust, 2 and three counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, 3 urging that at least one of these convictions is a crime of moral turpitude per se . Neither respondent nor Disciplinary Counsel filed any exceptions to the Board's report. However, in response to a previously imposed suspension pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 10 (c), respondent filed his D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14 (g) affidavit on November 17, 2017. 4

Under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9 (h)(2), "if no exceptions are filed to the Board's report, the [c]ourt will enter an order imposing the discipline recommended by the Board upon the expiration of the time permitted for filing exceptions." See also In re Viehe , 762 A.2d 542 , 543 (D.C. 2000) ("When ... there are no exceptions to the Board's report and recommendation, our deferential standard of review becomes even more deferential."). While we have never decided whether violations of these specific statutes are crimes of moral turpitude per se , we have held that convictions under other child sex abuse statutes, especially where the respondent exercised authority or a trust relationship, are crimes of moral turpitude per se . See In re Sharp , 674 A.2d 899 (D.C. 1996) (finding a conviction of child molestation under *508 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-370.1 (1950) was a crime involving moral turpitude per se ); In re Wortzel , 698 A.2d 429 (D.C. 1997) (relying on In re Sharp held a conviction for child abuse under Md. Code Ann. art. 27 § 35C constituted a crime involving moral turpitude per se ). In this case, respondent's convictions on one count of Continuous Abuse of a Child and one count of Sex Abuse of a Child by a Person in a Position of Trust were based on his instances of sex abuse of a relative who was a minor and over whom respondent exerted control and authority; therefore, these convictions, at a minimum, constitute crimes involving moral turpitude per se . Therefore, having found respondent committed crimes of moral turpitude per se , the required sanction is to disbar him from the practice of law. See In re Colson , 412 A.2d 1160 , 1165 (D.C. 1979) (en banc); D.C. Code § 11-2503 (2012 Repl.).