An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-999
Filed 1 July 2026
Pitt County, Nos. 25JA000019-730, 25JA000020-730
IN THE MATTER OF: M.H., D.C.
Appeal by respondent-father from order entered 17 June 2025 by Judge Mario
E. Perez in Pitt County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 June 2026.
Miller & Audino, LLP, by Jay Anthony Audino, for the petitioner-appellee Pitt County Department of Social Services.
Ward & Smith, P.A., by Mary V. Cavanagh, for the Guardian ad Litem.
David A. Perez, for the respondent-appellant-father.
TYSON, Judge.
Respondent-Father appeals from the trial court’s order finding his minor
children, “Matt” and “David” to be neglected. See N.C. R. App. P. 42(b) (pseudonyms
used to protect the identity of the minors). We affirm.
I. Background
Mother and Respondent-Father are the parents of Matt and David.
Respondent-Father was determined to be their biological father by court order in
2019. Matt and David have four additional minor siblings born of Mother and two IN RE M.H., D.C.
Opinion of the Court
other fathers. Mother and those four children are not part of this appeal.
Matt and David were adjudicated as neglected juveniles in 2019 and placed
into the custody of their maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). Grandmother was
awarded legal custody of them in 2021. Mother was not permitted to have
unsupervised contact with the children, but she was permitted to live at
Grandmother’s home with the children. Mother was unable to parent her children
independently due to an intellectual disability.
On 6 February 2025, the Pitt County Department of Social Services (“DSS”)
filed petitions, which alleged Matt and David were neglected and dependent. The
children were ten and eleven years old. The petitions alleged: (1) an incident in 2022
when Grandmother could not handle the children and had called the police; (2) a 2024
allegation asserting Mother had punched an older sibling; (3) Mother’s physical abuse
of David; (4) interviews and examinations at a child advocacy health clinic where
David and another sibling had admitted to being choked and hit by Mother and had
observed siblings also being hit by Mother; and, (6) Grandmother’s failure to
supervise Mother around the children and to protect them from abuse by Mother.
The petitions further alleged the fathers, including Respondent-Father, were not
involved with the children’s lives, and DSS had been unable to contact them.
On 6 February 2025, the children were removed from maternal Grandmother’s
care and placed into the non-secure custody of DSS. An adjudication hearing was
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held before the trial court on 8 May 2025. Prior to the start of the hearing, a “Consent
Agreement” was prepared and signed by Respondent-Father and his attorney. The
Consent Agreement states the parties stipulate “clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence” supports allegations numbered 1 through 19 in the petitions. The Consent
Agreement further states Mother did not admit to specific factual allegations, but
she had acknowledged “sufficient facts exist to allow the [c]ourt to conclude . . . the
juveniles are neglected by clear and convincing evidence.” The Consent Agreement
specifies Respondent-Father “is a non-offending parent.” It states: “Based upon the
above stipulation of the parties, the Court concludes as a matter of law . . . the
foregoing factual findings are sufficient to adjudicate the juvenile(s) named above as
. . . Neglected, within the meaning of N.C.G.S 7B-101(15).”
The Consent Agreement was signed by DSS, counsel for DSS, Mother and her
counsel, Respondent-Father and his counsel, another father and his counsel, the GAL
Attorney Advocate, and the GAL Program Supervisor and/or Volunteer. Respondent-
Father’s attorney was absent during the 8 May 2025 afternoon hearing due to an
appointment, but he and Respondent-Father had both signed the Consent
Agreement. The Adjudication Order states, “Respondent-Fathers via their attorneys
took no position.” The court accepted the Consent Agreement “based on all the
signatures and the consent on the record.”
DSS also entered documentary evidence of the child advocacy health clinic
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reports, local police department records, and education records of Matt, David, and a
sibling. On 17 June 2025, the court entered a written Adjudication Order pursuant
to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-807 (2025), which set forth twenty-one findings of fact
purportedly established by “clear, cogent, and convincing” evidence. The court’s
conclusions of law based on the findings of fact found Matt, David and their siblings
were neglected juveniles. The Adjudication Order provided DSS with discretion to
place Matt and David with Respondent-Father, if appropriate.
The trial court held a disposition hearing on 26 June 2025. By order filed on
25 July 2025, the court granted custody of Matt and David and their siblings to DSS.
DSS was ordered to continue to make reasonable efforts to reunite the children with
family members. Respondent-Father was represented by counsel but was not present
at the dispositional hearing. He was ordered to develop a case plan with DSS and to
submit to drug and mental health testing and evaluations. Respondent-Father
appeals.
II. Issue
Respondent-Father argues the trial court erred by adjudicating Matt and
David neglected when he did not consent to the order and there was no other proper
foundation for any conclusion of law the juveniles were neglected by him.
III. Jurisdiction
This Court possesses jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
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§ 7B‑1001(a)(3) (2025).
IV. Standard of Review
The role of this Court in reviewing a trial court’s adjudication of neglect and abuse is to determine (1) whether the findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence, and (2) whether the legal conclusions are supported by the findings of fact. If such evidence exists, the findings of the trial court are binding on appeal, even if the evidence would support a finding to the contrary. The trial court determines the weight to be given the testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. If a different inference may be drawn from the evidence, the trial court alone determines which inferences to draw and which to reject.
In re T.H.T., 185 N.C. App. 337, 343, 648 S.E.2d 519, 523 (2007), aff’d as modified,
362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008) (internal citations, quotations, and brackets
omitted).
V. Consent Agreement
Respondent-Father argues he did not properly consent to the adjudication of
neglect. We disagree.
“Article 8 of the Juvenile Code provides two procedural paths for an
adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency: an adjudicatory hearing or an
adjudication by consent.” In re J.S.C., 253 N.C. App. 291, 294, 800 S.E.2d 126, 128
(2017).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-801 governs the adjudicatory hearing and permits the
trial court in an abuse, neglect, or dependency hearing to enter a “consent
adjudication order,” so long as: (1) all parties are present or represented by counsel,
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who is present and authorized to consent; (2) the juvenile(s) are represented by
counsel; and, (3) the court makes sufficient findings of fact. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
801(b1) (2025). A valid consent adjudication order requires “no additional evidence
of neglect need[] be introduced at the adjudication hearing and no further substantive
findings of fact by the trial court establishing neglect [are] necessary to support its
adjudication.” In re R.L.G., 260 N.C. App. 70, 73, 816 S.E.2d 914, 917 (2018).
Here, Respondent-Father conflates the stipulation of facts entitled “Consent
Agreement” with a consent adjudication order, which would be made under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-801(b1) (2025). In contrast to a true consent adjudication order, the
Consent Agreement entered in this case was not the only evidence relied upon by the
court to enter the Adjudication Order. The trial court held a hearing in which
additional evidence was presented to support the findings of fact by clear and
convincing evidence.
A stipulation of facts “made by a party [can] be used in support of an
adjudication.” In re R.L.G., 260 N.C. App. at 73, 816 S.E.2d at 917. This is one form
of evidence the trial court may consider. As part of an adjudication hearing under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-807(a):
If the court finds from the evidence, including stipulations by a party, that the allegations in the petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall so state. A record of specific stipulated adjudicatory facts shall be made by either reducing the facts to a writing, signed by each party stipulating to them and submitted to
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the court; or by reading the facts into the record, followed by an oral statement of agreement from either party stipulating to them.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-807(a) (2025) (emphasis added). The trial court’s Adjudication
Order specifically states it is entered pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-807(2025). Id.
Respondent-Father argues the stipulated adjudicatory facts were not properly
reduced to writing and signed. The stipulated facts were clearly identified and
incorporated by reference into the Consent Agreement, which identified “the
following facts, as alleged and/or amended in the verified Juvenile Petition(s):
ALLEGATIONS: #1-19.” The Consent Agreement, reviewed and accepted by the trial
court, most closely resembles a consent judgment, which “is a contract,” and “[t]he
rules which courts have evolved for the interpretation of contracts are applicable to
consent judgments.” Yount v. Lowe, 288 N.C. 90, 96, 215 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1975)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
A contract results when there is a meeting of the minds for the settlement or adjustment of asserted or disputed rights and obligations. The words chosen by the draftsman selected to reduce the agreement to writing are merely vehicles to make visible the mutual intention of the parties. Interpretation is, therefore, the ascertainment of that intent. To do so, the entire agreement must be examined with an understanding of the result to be accomplished and the situation of the parties at the moment the contract is made.
Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). The referenced allegations, numbered
1 through 19, are clearly set forth in the petitions filed on 6 February 2025, and the
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intent of the parties was to stipulate to the numbered facts contained within.
The adjudication order “shall be in writing and shall contain appropriate
findings of fact and conclusions of law.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-807(b) (2025).
“[S]tipulations are judicial admissions and are therefore binding in every sense, . . .
relieving the other party of the necessity of producing evidence to establish an
admitted fact.” In re A.K.D., 227 N.C. App. 58, 60, 745 S.E.2d 7, 9 (2013) (citation
and quotation marks omitted).
“However, stipulations as to questions of law are generally held invalid and
ineffective, and not binding upon the courts, either trial or appellate.” Id. (citation
and quotation marks omitted). While the signed Consent Agreement stipulates the
facts are sufficient to find Matt and David neglected under N.C. Gen Stat. § 7B-
101(15), ultimately, the conclusion of neglect is made by the trial court based upon
all evidence. N.C. Gen Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2025).
In addition to the nineteen stipulated allegations, the trial court relied upon
additional admitted clinical health care records, police records, and school records to
conclude the children are neglected. Respondent-Father argues no specific exceptions
to the trial court’s findings of fact, simply asserting the Consent Agreement was
ineffective as the basis of a consent adjudication order. “Where no exception is taken
to a finding of fact by the trial court, the finding is presumed to be supported by
competent evidence and is binding on appeal.” Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93,
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97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991) (citations omitted).
VI. Conclusion
The evidence supports the trial court’s findings and conclusion to adjudicate
the children as neglected. The trial court’s adjudication order is affirmed. It is so
ordered.
AFFIRMED.
Judge FLOOD concurs.
Judge WOOD concurs in the result by separate opinion.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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WOOD, Judge, concurring in the result.
Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I write separately to
address the inadequacy of the trial court’s procedures in this case. The adjudication
of a child as abused, neglected or dependent involves a balancing of some of society’s
most fundamental rights and requires the trial court to balance the protection of
juvenile’s rights of safety with a parent’s “constitutional right to care for their
children.” In re K.C., 386 N.C. 690, 691, 909 S.E.2d 170, 172 (2024). “‘In the
adjudicatory hearing, the court shall protect the rights of the juvenile and the
juvenile’s parent to assure due process of law.’” In re K.P., 249 N.C. App. 620, 623,
790 S.E.2d 744, 747 (2016) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-802 (2015)).
To ensure this balance is achieved, typically the trial court determines whether
the allegations submitted in a juvenile petition are “proved by clear and convincing
evidence” through the presentation of testimony and corroborative evidence. N.C.
Gen. Stat § 7B-805 (2015); see also In re K.C., 295 N.C. App. 363, 368-69, 905 S.E.2d
776, 781 (2024). If this process is to be forsaken in favor of judicial economy, it must
be done in conformity with the legal requirements.
There are two paths the trial court may take when streamlining the
adjudicatory process in abuse, neglect, and dependency cases: utilizing stipulations
within a traditional adjudicatory process or completing a consent adjudication. The IN RE M.H., D.C.
WOOD, J., concurring in the result.
two options have separate and distinct requirements to which trial courts must
adhere.
“[S]tipulations are judicial admissions and are therefore binding in every
sense, preventing the party who agreed to the stipulation from introducing evidence
to dispute it and relieving the other party of the necessity of producing evidence to
establish an admitted fact.” In re A.K.D., 227 N.C. App. 58, 60, 745 S.E.2d 7, 9 (2013)
(quoting Thomas v. Poole, 54 N.C. App. 239, 241, 282 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1981)).
“Courts look with favor on stipulations designed to simplify, shorten, or settle
litigation and save cost to the parties, and such practice will be encouraged.” Eidson
v. Kakouras, 286 N.C. App. 388, 401, 880 S.E.2d 760, 770 (2022) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). However, when our General Assembly created the specific
statutory stipulation process for abuse, neglect, and dependency adjudications, it
included rules that are stricter than stipulations by litigants in many other legal
contexts.
If the court finds from the evidence, including stipulations by a party, that the allegations in the petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall so state. A record of specific stipulated adjudicatory facts shall be made by either reducing the facts to a writing, signed by each party stipulating to them and submitted to the court; or by reading the facts into the record, followed by an oral statement of agreement from each party stipulating to them.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-807(a). The statute allows two options for factual stipulations:
(1) specific adjudicatory facts, reduced to writing and signed by each party stipulating
2 IN RE M.H., D.C.
to them be submitted to the court; or (2) the facts are orally spoken into the record
followed by an oral statement of agreement from each party stipulating to them. Id.
“It is well established that stipulations as to questions of law are generally held
invalid and ineffective, and not binding upon the courts, either trial or appellate.” In
re R.P., 276 N.C. App. 195, 201, 856 S.E.2d 868, 872 (2021) (quoting In re R.L.G., 260
N.C. App. 70, 76, 816 S.E.2d 914, 919 (2018)). When adequate stipulations are made
by the parties, the trial court is then “required to make findings of fact, adjudicate,
and state conclusions of law arising on those facts, and enter judgment accordingly.”
In re R.P., 276 N.C. App. at 203, 856 S.E.2d at 873.
In contrast, “[a]n adjudication of abuse, neglect or dependency in the absence
of an adjudicatory hearing is permitted only in very limited circumstances.” In re
Shaw, 152 N.C. App. 126, 129, 566 S.E.2d 744, 746 (2002). Such a limited
circumstance is a consent adjudication. “A consent adjudication ‘is the agreement of
the parties, their decree, entered upon the record with the sanction of the court.’” In
re R.L.G., 260 N.C. App. at 73, 816 S.E.2d at 917 ( quoting In re Thrift, 137 N.C. App.
559, 562, 528 S.E.2d 394, 396 (2000)).
“N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7–801(b1) authorizes the court to enter ‘a consent
adjudication order’ only if: (1) all parties are present or represented by counsel, who
is present and authorized to consent; (2) the juvenile is represented by counsel; and
(3) the court makes sufficient findings of fact.” In re K.P., 249 N.C. App. at 623-24,
790 S.E.2d at 747. When a consent adjudication meets the statutory requirement
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there is “no adjudicatory hearing, the court [does] not receive or weigh evidence,
assess the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise engage in the process of fact-finding.”
In re J.S.C., 253 N.C. App. 291, 295, 800 S.E.2d 126, 129 (2017).
In the case sub judice, the trial court conflated these two distinct procedures.
On the morning of 8 May 2025, some of the parties involved in the case met and
signed a document entitled “Consent Agreement.” The document states that “by their
signatures affixed hereto, that there is clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that
would support the following facts as alleged and/or amended in the verified Juvenile
Petition(s): Allegations #1-19.” The document was signed by Mother, Mother’s
attorney, Respondent-Father, Respondent-Father’s attorney, a social
worker/supervisor, DSS’ staff attorney, the GAL supervisor, GAL attorney, Suggs-
Father, Suggs’ provisional attorney, and Parks-Father’s provisional attorney.
Later that afternoon, the trial court held an adjudication hearing. The order
notes DSS’ attorney, GAL attorney, Respondent-Father’s attorney, and Mother’s
attorney as present for the hearing. However, in the transcript, it is clear that
Respondent-Father’s attorney was not present for the hearing as he had requested
leave for a doctor’s appointment. Furthermore, there is no evidence Respondent-
Father himself was present for the hearing. It is clear neither Suggs-Father nor
Parks-Father were present based on their respective attorney’s discussions with the
trial court. However, as Respondent-Father’s attorney was not present, the trial
4 IN RE M.H., D.C.
court did not engage in a conversation with his attorney, nor did it address
Respondent-Father.
During the hearing, the DSS attorney stated, “I’m holding the consent
agreement that stipulates a finding of neglect within the meaning of the statute.”
After confirming who signed the Consent Agreement, the trial court states, “All right
based on all the signatures and the consent on the record, the Court’s going to accept
this consent agreement for these juveniles as neglected.” The DSS attorney then
requested to enter documentary evidence including the verified juvenile petition,
Tedi-Bear Clinic records, Snow Hill Police Department records, and Green County
School Board of Education records. The trial court replied, “These will be received
into the record. All right. So adjudication is done. I’ll sign the order.” No additional
testimony was given at the hearing.
On 17 June 2025, the trial court entered the written Adjudication Order. The
order erroneously states both Respondent-Father and Respondent-Father’s attorney
were present for the hearing. Then prior to the findings, the order records the
evidence:
EVIDENCE: As evidence for the Adjudication, the Court received the Verified Petition filed in this matter as amended by the Consent Agreement, Tedi Bear records, Snow Hill records and Greene County School records. The Department, Guardian ad Litem and Respondent Mother stipulated to the Findings of Fact and entered consent as to the Adjudication and Disposition of this matter. Respondents Fathers, via their attorneys, took no position.
5 IN RE M.H., D.C.
The trial court’s order then states twenty-one findings of fact before concluding as a
matter of law that the children meet the definition of neglected juveniles within N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15).
It is clear, based on both the trial court’s procedures and its Adjudication
Order, that although the document was titled a “Consent Agreement” and the trial
court purportedly accepted the “consent agreement for these juveniles as neglected,”
the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7-801(b1) were not met to authorize the court
to enter a “consent adjudication order.”
The first prong of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7-801(b1) requires all parties be present or
represented by counsel, who is present and authorized to consent. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7-801(b1). This clearly did not occur. During the hearing when the trial court was
entering the order, it appears neither Respondent-Father nor his attorney was
present. Additionally, neither of the other two fathers were present. Suggs-Father
had a provisional attorney at the time the document was signed, and the trial court
appointed him at the hearing. Parks-Father had a provisional attorney who stated
he had not been able to speak with his prospective client and could take no position
on the consent. Finally, the Adjudication Order itself states “Respondents Fathers,
via their attorneys, took no position.” Therefore, it is clear not all parties were
present or represented by counsel, who was present and authorized to consent
therefore the trial court could not enter a valid “consent adjudication order.”
On appeal, the appellees argue that the “Consent Agreement” at least meets
6 IN RE M.H., D.C.
the requirements under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-807(a) to be considered stipulations. I
agree that, at best, some of the allegations in the “Consent Agreement” can be seen
as poorly conducted stipulations. Both Respondent-Father and his attorney signed
the “Consent Agreement” which specifically stated, “[t]he parties agree/stipulate, by
the signatures affixed hereto, that there is clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that
would support the following facts, as alleged and/or amended in the verified Juvenile
Petition(s): ALLEGATIONS: #1-19” and this agreement was submitted to the trial
court. Although the specific adjudicatory facts are not written out as they should be,
the allegations in the petition to which Father agreed are identified. This meets the
requirement in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-807(a) that allows for stipulations in that specific
adjudicatory facts were reduced to writing and signed by each party stipulating to
them prior to being submitted to the court.
However, “[i]t is well established that stipulations as to questions of law are
generally held invalid and ineffective, and not binding upon the courts, either trial or
appellate.” In re R.P., 276 N.C. App. at 201, 856 S.E.2d at 872 (quoting In re R.L.G.,
260 N.C. App. at 76, 816 S.E.2d at 919). “The determination of whether a juvenile is
neglected within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) is a conclusion of law.”
In re R.L.G., 260 N.C. App. at 76, 816 S.E.2d at 918-19.
The formulation of this conclusion requires the hearing judge to consider the properly admitted evidence, determine the weight and burden on DSS, and reconcile the nexus, if any, between the stipulated facts, and to adjudicate whether the child is neglected or abused. “The
7 IN RE M.H., D.C.
trial court’s findings must consist of more than a recitation of the allegations contained in the juvenile petition. The trial court must, through processes of logical reasoning, based on the evidentiary facts before it, find the ultimate facts essential to support the conclusions of law.”
In re R.P., 276 N.C. App. at 202, 856 S.E.2d at 873 (quoting In re K.P., 249 N.C. App.
at 624, 790 S.E.2d at 747).
Here, allegations 18 and 19 in the juvenile petition, which were incorporated
into the “Consent Agreement,” are clearly conclusions of the law. They state that the
juveniles are neglected and dependent as defined within North Carolina statutes. As
conclusions of law, these two allegations cannot be stipulated to and are therefore
invalid stipulations. Allegations 1-17 in the juvenile petition, which were
incorporated into the “Consent Agreement,” are facts, and despite the misleading title
of “Consent Agreement,” it appears Defendant-Father has effectively signed factual
stipulations regarding those allegations.
The remaining stipulated facts, as well as the additional documentary evidence
submitted during the adjudicatory hearing, are adequate support for the trial court’s
twenty-one findings of fact in the adjudication order and those findings support the
trial court’s conclusion that the juveniles meet the statutory requirements for
neglected juveniles under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15). Therefore, I concur in the
result affirming the trial court’s order. However, I write to stress to the trial courts
that “[a]s the link between a parent and child is a fundamental right worthy of the
highest degree of scrutiny, the trial court must fulfill all procedural requirements in
8 IN RE M.H., D.C.
the course of its duty . . . .” In re K.P., 249 N.C. App. at 627, 790 S.E.2d at 749. I
support procedures which aid judicial economy, but the process must be done in
conformity with the legal requirements. Otherwise, they may be subject to challenge
or viewed as subterfuge designed to circumvent legal safeguards and undermine the
integrity of the judicial process.