In re M.G.

2026 Ohio 337

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 3, 2026
• Docket: 2025CA00118
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re M.G., 2026-Ohio-337.]

COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

IN THE MATTER OF: M.G. Case No. 2025CA00118 (DOB: 05-16-21) Opinion & Judgment Entry (Sarah S., Appellant) Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Family Court Division, Case No. 2024JCV00453

Judgment: Affirmed

Date of Judgment: February 3, 2026

BEFORE: William B. Hoffman; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: Richard D. Hixson, Zanesville, Ohio, for Appellant Sarah S.; Brandon J. Waltenbaugh, Canton, Ohio, for Appellee Stark County Job & Family Services

Gormley, J.

{¶1} Appellant Sarah S. challenges the judgment of the Stark County Family

Court awarding permanent custody of her daughter, M.G., to Stark County Job & Family

Services (the “Agency”). Sarah argues that the trial court erred when it found that M.G.

could not and should not be returned to her within a reasonable time, and she challenges,

too, the trial court’s determination that awarding permanent custody to the Agency was in

M.G.’s best interest. Because we see no error in the trial court’s ruling, we now affirm.

The Key Facts

{¶2} In May 2024, the Agency filed its initial complaints — which were later twice

amended to correct clerical errors — alleging that M.G. and two of M.G.’s siblings were

dependent and neglected because of Sarah’s alleged substance abuse, the instability of her housing, and the children’s exposure to known drug users. The trial court on that

same day granted the Agency’s request to take immediate custody of the children

pending a shelter-care hearing to be held the following day. Sarah later agreed to a

finding of dependency at an adjudicatory hearing held in July 2024, and the trial court

awarded temporary custody of the children to the Agency. M.G. and her sister, L.G., were

placed together with the same foster family that had cared for the girls during the

pendency of an earlier case filed by the Agency in 2021 that had ended with the girls

being returned to Sarah.

{¶3} Next, the Agency created a case plan that was approved and adopted by

the trial court to aid in Sarah’s anticipated reunification with her children. That case plan

called for Sarah to undergo a substance-use assessment, submit to random drug tests to

verify that she was not using illegal drugs, obtain a job, and find stable housing. And the

substance-use assessment, once it was completed, resulted in a recommendation that

Sarah participate in individual counseling sessions.

{¶4} A review hearing held in November 2024 informed the court that Sarah had

tested positive for methamphetamine use on several of her test dates, still needed to

obtain stable housing and employment, and may have been residing with her boyfriend

despite the Agency’s concerns about that individual’s own substance-use issues. The

court maintained the conditions as they existed at the time of the review hearing, leaving

M.G. and L.G. in the care of their foster family and ordering Sarah to continue making

progress on her case plan.

{¶5} In March 2025, the Agency filed a motion asking the court to grant

permanent custody of M.G. and L.G. to the Agency, alleging — among other things — that M.G. and L.G. could not be placed with Sarah within a reasonable time and that

awarding permanent custody to the Agency was in M.G. and L.G.’s best interests. After

considering the evidence presented at a contested dispositional hearing, the trial court

awarded permanent custody of the girls to the Agency. Sarah now appeals that decision.

The Trial Court Did Not Err by Granting Permanent Custody of M.G. to the Agency

{¶6} In her first assignment of error, Sarah argues that the trial court erred by

finding that M.G. could not and should not be returned to Sarah within a reasonable

amount of time, and Sarah points to her case-plan progress in support of that view. Sarah

contends in her second assignment of error that the trial court improperly determined that

awarding permanent custody to the Agency was in M.G.’s best interest.

{¶7} A trial court “may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court

determines . . . by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child

to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency” and that any one of the five factors

enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). R.C.

2151.414(B), therefore, “establishes a two-pronged analysis.” Matter of K.H., 2025-Ohio-

21, ¶ 30 (5th Dist.). “In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the

. . . circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through [(e)] is present before

proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child.” Id.

{¶8} Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that “‘will produce in the mind of

the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id.

at ¶ 26, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the

syllabus. “‘Where the proof required must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will

examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.’” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 8, quoting State

v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990).

A. The Record Supports the Trial Court’s R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) Finding

{¶9} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) lists five scenarios, any one of which can serve as a

prerequisite for a trial court’s consideration of a permanent-custody request. “As long as

one of these factors is present, then the first prong of the test is satisfied.” Matter of A.S.,

2024-Ohio-2099, ¶ 36 (5th Dist.). The trial court here relied on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a),

which applies when the “child is not abandoned . . . and the child cannot be placed with

either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the

child’s parents.”

{¶10} To determine, under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), whether a child cannot be

placed with a parent, a court must look to R.C. 2151.414(E). That section in turn lists 16

possible scenarios, any one of which can support a trial court’s finding that a child cannot

be placed with either parent. “The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that

the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.” In re A.W., 2024-

Ohio-5791, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.).

{¶11} The trial court in this case found that R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) was the factor

supporting a finding that M.G. cannot be placed with her mother, and Sarah now

challenges that determination. That statutory provision tells us that a child cannot be

returned to a parent within a reasonable time when “[f]ollowing the placement of the child

outside the child’s home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent

efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused

the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s

home.”

{¶12} M.G. was initially removed from Sarah’s care due primarily to the Agency’s

concerns about Sarah’s substance abuse and her inability to secure stable housing for

her children. Sarah’s case plan was designed to address these issues by requiring her

to complete a substance-use assessment, to participate in random drug tests, and to

obtain housing and employment. And the assessment in turn called for Sarah to

participate in individual counseling sessions to address her substance-use issues. The

Agency’s case worker testified that to assist Sarah in completing the case plan, that

worker was willing to provide bus passes, administer the drug tests, offer case-

management services, and meet with Sarah every month to answer any questions from

her.

{¶13} The trial court heard testimony that Sarah was inconsistent with her

counseling sessions until May 2025, which was two months after the Agency had

requested permanent custody of M.G. The lab director and toxicologist from the

laboratory that analyzed Sarah’s drug-test results testified that Sarah had tested positive

for methamphetamine use multiple times between August 2024 and December 2024.

That witness testified, too, that in June 2025 — the same month when the permanent-

custody hearing took place — Sarah tested positive for either fentanyl, cocaine, or

methamphetamine use on three different dates. The case worker also testified that Sarah

told her that she — Sarah — had tested positive for methamphetamine and the

psychedelic drug MDMA when Sarah was tested at her substance-abuse treatment

facility on June 24, 2025. {¶14} On Sarah’s housing situation, the case worker voiced concerns at the June

2025 hearing about Sarah’s ability to make timely rent payments even though Sarah had

signed a lease for a two-bedroom apartment in February of that year. As for employment,

Sarah alleged that she had been selling hair pieces and wigs for income but provided to

the case worker as support some bank statements showing deposits with no indication

about the source of the funds. And though Sarah had provided to the case worker some

documentation showing that she had completed training for a new job at Lomeda

Services, that verification was dated just two days before the hearing, and Sarah was

unable to provide a pay stub because she had not yet been paid by that employer.

{¶15} We find that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s finding

that Sarah — despite reasonable case-planning services from the Agency — failed to

remedy the conditions that led to M.G.’s removal. Sarah continued to test positive for

illegal drugs throughout the 13 months when the case was ongoing, and she had three

positive tests in the very month when the permanent-custody hearing was held. She also

had not provided sufficient employment verification at the time of the hearing, and she

had not alleviated the Agency’s concerns about her ability to provide long-term and stable

housing for M.G. The trial court therefore did not err by concluding that Sarah had failed

to substantially remedy the conditions causing M.G. to be removed from her care and

finding that M.G. could not be returned to Sarah within a reasonable time. Sarah’s first

assignment of error is overruled.

B. Granting Permanent Custody of M.G. to the Agency is in M.G.’s Best Interest

{¶16} In determining whether granting permanent custody of a child to an agency

is in that child’s best interest, the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the ones listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). Those statutory factors include

the child’s interactions and relationships with the child’s family members and persons who

may significantly affect the child, the wishes of the child (with due regard to the maturity

of the child), the custodial history of the child, and the child’s need for a legally secure

placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of

permanent custody to the agency.

{¶17} “A child’s best interests are served” when the child is placed in a permanent

situation that “fosters growth, stability, and security.” In re M.K., 2023-Ohio-3786, ¶ 36

(5th Dist.). “‘The discretion’” that the juvenile court enjoys in determining whether an order

of permanent custody is in the best interest of a child “‘should be accorded the utmost

respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court’s determination will

have on the lives of the parties concerned.’” Id., quoting In re E.H., 2022-Ohio-1682, ¶

101 (5th Dist.).

{¶18} Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that

M.G.’s best interest would be served by granting permanent custody to the Agency.

According to the case worker’s testimony, though M.G. had bonded with Sarah and

though their mother-child visits had gone smoothly, M.G. was also bonded with her foster

parents and their two biological children, and M.G., L.G., and the foster family were

functioning well as a family unit. The case worker described the foster parents as patient,

loving, and attentive to M.G.’s needs. M.G. had been placed with the foster family for

over one year when the prior case filed by the Agency had been open, and that foster

family continued to provide care for M.G. on the weekends even after that first case had

been resolved. The trial court found that the foster family was meeting M.G.’s educational and medical needs, and the case worker testified that the foster family was interested in

adopting both M.G. and her sister.

{¶19} We find, too, clear and convincing evidence that, because of Sarah’s

continued use of illegal drugs while this case was ongoing in the trial court and because

of the Agency’s concerns about her ability to provide long-term and stable housing for

M.G., no safe and stable home would be available to M.G. absent a grant of permanent

custody to the Agency. M.G.’s guardian ad litem also testified that based on that person’s

experience with Sarah, a permanent-custody grant would be in M.G.’s best interest.

{¶20} The best-interest factors weigh in favor of the trial court’s decision to grant

permanent custody of M.G. to the Agency. Because both prongs of the permanent-

custody test have been shown in this case, we find that the trial court properly terminated

Sarah’s parental rights and appropriately placed M.G. in the permanent custody of the

Agency. Sarah’s second assignment of error is overruled. {¶21} For the reasons explained above, the judgment of the Family Court Division

of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County is affirmed. Costs are to be paid by

Appellant Sarah S.

By: Gormley, J.;

Hoffman, P.J. and

Popham, J. concur.