[Cite as In re M.G., 2025-Ohio-4566.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ADAMS COUNTY
IN RE: M.G. : : : Case Nos. 25CA1216 : : : : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY :
APPEARANCES:
Brian T. Goldberg, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.
Ariana Bowles-Norris, Adams County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, West Union, Ohio, for appellee.
Smith, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, T.G., appeals the trial court’s judgment that placed her 22-
month-old child in the permanent custody of Adams County Children Services
Board (“the agency”). In her sole assignment of error, appellant essentially argues
that the trial court’s judgment placing the child in the agency’s permanent custody
is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Upon review, we do not find any
merit to appellant’s assignment of error. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s
assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. Adams App. No. 25CA1216 2
FACTS
{¶2} On June 30, 2023, the agency filed a complaint that alleged that the
child was an abused and dependent child. The complaint averred that the
approximately four-week-old child had multiple, unexplained injuries, including
bruises and broken ribs. The complaint further asserted that the agency had active
dependency and abuse cases involving two of the child’s siblings. The agency
requested temporary custody of the child, which the trial court granted.
{¶3} The trial court later adjudicated the child an abused and dependent
child and continued her in the agency’s temporary custody.
{¶4} On June 12, 2024, the agency filed a motion that requested permanent
custody of the child. The agency argued that the child cannot be placed with
appellant within a reasonable time and that placing the child in its permanent
custody is in the child’s best interest.
{¶5} On September 18, 2024, the trial court held a hearing to consider the
agency’s permanent custody motion. Caseworker Theresa Smith testified that,
although appellant completed a mental health and substance abuse assessment, as
well as a parenting course, she did not consistently comply with her treatment
program. Smith further stated that appellant has maintained stable housing, but she
did not inform the agency when she had visitors, which she was required to do
given the agency’s concern regarding the physical abuse that the child and Adams App. No. 25CA1216 3
appellant’s other children had suffered. Smith indicated that the child is doing well
in the foster home and is bonded with the foster parents.
{¶6} Appellant testified that she completed a parenting course and obtained
a mental health assessment. She believed that she would be able to comply with
the case plan if given more time and asked the court to give her another six months
to demonstrate her ability to consistently comply with the case plan. The court
asked appellant whether she could explain the source of the child’s injuries, but
appellant stated that her counsel had advised her to refrain from answering the
question.
{¶7} The child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) testified that she has a consistent
concern about appellant’s lack of cooperation and ability to protect the child. The
GAL explained that she had not heard from appellant in close to one year. The
GAL reported that the child is thriving in the foster home and that the foster
parents are interested in adopting the child. She recommended that the court place
the child in the agency’s permanent custody.
{¶8} On October 24, 2024, the magistrate entered a decision that placed the
child in the agency’s permanent custody. Appellant subsequently filed objections.
{¶9} On April 7, 2025, the trial court overruled appellant’s objections and
granted the agency permanent custody of the child. The trial court concluded that
the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not Adams App. No. 25CA1216 4
be placed with either parent and that placing the child in the agency’s permanent
custody is in her best interest. The court found that appellant completed some of
her case plan requirements “but failed to demonstrate sustained progress.” The
court stated that appellant did not consistently attend mental health counseling or
adhere to her prescribed medication, did not maintain stable employment, and
“allowed unrelated adult males to stay overnight in her home without notifying the
agency.”
{¶10} The court further noted that appellant has not visited the child since
July 25, 2023, because her contact with the child “was suspended following the
documented injuries.” The court explained that appellant “has a documented
history of neglect and substantiated physical abuse with her children” and “was
unable to provide an explanation for [the child]’s injuries at the onset of the case.”
The court reasoned that, even if appellant had improved her stability, the “concerns
about her ability to protect [the child] remain unresolved.”
{¶11} The court observed that the child has been in the same foster home
since July 7, 2023, and that she is a “happy, healthy, and thriving toddler who has
bonded deeply with the foster family.” The court also pointed out that the foster
parents would like to adopt the child if the agency is granted permanent custody
and that the child’s GAL “strongly supports the motion for permanent custody.” Adams App. No. 25CA1216 5
The court emphasized that the GAL “stressed that permanent custody is the only
path to achieving the child’s long-term stability.”
{¶12} The court considered the child’s interactions and interrelationship and
concluded that “[t]he strong and positive bond [the child] has developed with her
foster family outweighs her limited and concerning relationship with her biological
mother and father.” The court noted that the child’s father did not have any
involvement in the case and again observed that the child suffered physical abuse
while in appellant’s custody.
{¶13} The court found that the child “has a critical need for a legally secure
permanent placement to ensure her safety, stability, and well-being.” The court
stated that appellant (1) “has not demonstrated the ability to ensure [the child]’s
safety or meet her basic needs,” (2) was unable to account for the child’s injuries,
(3) did not consistently comply with the case plan, and (4) failed “to address
significant safety concerns.” The court thus concluded that the child could not
achieve a legally secure permanent placement without granting the agency
permanent custody.
{¶14} The court also found that R.C. 2151.414(E)(7), (9), and (10) applied.
The court stated that (1) although appellant did not have a criminal conviction
involving injury to the child, the child’s injuries had been ruled as physical abuse, Adams App. No. 25CA1216 6
(2) appellant placed the child at substantial risk of harm due to physical abuse, and
(3) the father abandoned the child.
{¶15} Based upon all of the foregoing, the court concluded that the child
cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be
placed with either parent and that placing the child in the agency’s permanent
custody is in her best interest. Accordingly, the court granted the agency
permanent custody of the child. This appeal followed.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING [APPELLANT]’S LEGAL CUSTODY OF M.G. AND PLACING THE CHILD IN THE PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE AGENCY.
{¶16} In her sole assignment of error, appellant essentially asserts that the
trial court’s permanent custody judgment is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. She recognizes that “the trial court made findings to support the
conclusion that placement of the child in the permanent custody of the [a]gency
was in the child’s best interest.” Appellant contends, however, that placing the
child in the agency’s permanent custody was not in the child’s best interest.
Appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider “the positive steps [she] has
taken.” She further complains that the agency “never offered her an opportunity to
reunite with” the child. Appellant complains that the agency decided from the start Adams App. No. 25CA1216 7
that appellant would never have the opportunity to parent the child and did not
make any effort to offer her supervised parenting time.
Standard of Review
{¶17} A reviewing court generally will not disturb a trial court’s permanent
custody decision unless the decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
E.g., In re R.M., 2013-Ohio-3588, ¶ 53 (4th Dist.); see In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703,
¶ 1. When an appellate court reviews whether a trial court’s permanent custody
decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court “ ‘ “ ‘weighs the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and
determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact]
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
[judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” ’ ” Eastley v. Volkman,
2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20, quoting Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115 (9th
Dist. 2001), quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting
State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
{¶18} In a permanent custody case, the ultimate question for a reviewing
court is “whether the juvenile court’s findings . . . were supported by clear and
convincing evidence.” In re K.H., 2008-Ohio-4825, ¶ 43. In determining whether
a trial court based its decision upon clear and convincing evidence, “a reviewing
court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient Adams App. No. 25CA1216 8
evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” State v. Schiebel, 55
Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990). “Thus, if the children services agency presented
competent and credible evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably could
have formed a firm belief that permanent custody is warranted, then the court’s
decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.” R.M., 2013-Ohio-
3588, at ¶ 55 (4th Dist.).
{¶19} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, the court may
reverse the judgment only if it appears that the factfinder, when resolving the
conflicts in evidence, “ ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.’ ” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at
175. A reviewing court should find a trial court’s permanent custody decision
against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the “ ‘exceptional case in
which the evidence weighs heavily against the [decision].’ ” Id., quoting Martin at
175; see Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (the phrase “manifest weight of
the evidence” “denotes a deferential standard of review under which a verdict will
be reversed or disregarded only if another outcome is obviously correct and the
verdict is clearly unsupported by the evidence”).
{¶20} Moreover, deferring to the trial court on matters of credibility is
“crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much evident in the parties’ Adams App. No. 25CA1216 9
demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the record well.” Davis v.
Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419 (1997); accord In re Christian, 2004-Ohio-
3146, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.). As the Ohio Supreme Court long ago explained:
In proceedings involving the custody and welfare of children the power of the trial court to exercise discretion is peculiarly important. The knowledge obtained through contact with and observation of the parties and through independent investigation can not be conveyed to a reviewing court by printed record.
Trickey v. Trickey, 158 Ohio St. 9, 13 (1952).
Permanent Custody Framework
{¶21} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) specifies that a trial court may grant a children
services agency permanent custody of a child if the court finds, by clear and
convincing evidence, that (1) the child’s best interest would be served by the award
of permanent custody, and (2) as relevant here,
(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, . . . and the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)
{¶22} In the case at bar, the trial court found, pursuant to
2151.414(B)(1)(a), that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a Adams App. No. 25CA1216 10
reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.1 Appellant does not
dispute this finding. Because appellant does not dispute the trial court’s R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a) finding, we do not address this factor.
Best Interest
{¶23} If a trial court finds the existence of one of the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)
conditions, before the court may grant the agency permanent custody of a child, the
court also must conclude that placing the child in the agency’s permanent custody
is in the child’s best interest. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).
{¶24} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires a trial court to consider all relevant, as
well as specific, factors to determine whether a child’s best interest will be served
by granting a children services agency permanent custody. The specific factors
include: (1) the child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents,
siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person
who may significantly affect the child; (2) the child’s wishes, as expressed directly
by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the
child’s maturity; (3) the child’s custodial history; (4) the child’s need for a legally
secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved
1 Although the magistrate found, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), that the child had been in the agency’s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, the trial court did not. Adams App. No. 25CA1216 11
without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; and (5) whether any factors
listed under R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply.
{¶25} Determining whether granting permanent custody to a children
services agency will promote a child’s best interest involves a balancing of “all
relevant [best interest] factors,” as well as the “five enumerated statutory factors.”
In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 57, citing In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56;
accord In re C.G., 2008-Ohio-3773, ¶ 28 (9th Dist.); In re N.W., 2008-Ohio-297, ¶
19 (10th Dist.). However, none of the best interest factors requires a court to give
it “greater weight or heightened significance.” C.F. at ¶ 57. Instead, the trial court
considers the totality of the circumstances when making its best interest
determination. In re K.M.S., 2017-Ohio-142, ¶ 24 (3d Dist.); In re A.C., 2014-
Ohio-4918, ¶ 46 (9th Dist.). In general, “[a] child’s best interest is served by
placing the child in a permanent situation that fosters growth, stability, and
security.” In re C.B.C., 2016-Ohio-916, ¶ 66 (4th Dist.), citing In re Adoption of
Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 324 (1991).
{¶26} In the case before us, appellant has not raised any specific arguments
regarding the trial court’s best interest determination. In fact, she explicitly agrees
that “the trial court made findings to support the conclusion that placement of the
child in the permanent custody of the [a]gency was in the child’s best interest.”
She thus does not challenge any of the trial court’s best interest findings. As we Adams App. No. 25CA1216 12
have recognized in previous cases, when a parent does not present any analysis of
the best interest factors, we ordinarily will not create that analysis for the parent.
See In re J.C., 2023-Ohio-3299, ¶ 33 (4th Dist.); In re B.P., 2021-Ohio-3148, ¶ 56
(4th Dist.); In re B.M., 2020-Ohio-1376, ¶ 37 (4th Dist.). Indeed, an appellant, not
an appellate court, has the duty “ ‘to construct the legal arguments necessary to
support the appellant's assignments of error.’ ” Cook v. Ohio Dept. of Job &
Family Servs., 2015-Ohio-4966, ¶ 40 (10th Dist.), quoting Bond v. Canal
Winchester, 2008-Ohio-945, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.); accord State v. Quarterman, 2014-
Ohio-4034, ¶ 19 (stating that appellate court is “not obligated to search the record
or formulate legal arguments on behalf of the parties”). For this reason, we briefly
note that the record contains ample clear and convincing evidence to support the
trial court’s best interest determination. The child has lived with the foster family
since early July 2023, when she was about one month old. Moreover, the GAL
indicated that the child is thriving in the foster home and has established bonds
with the foster family. The GAL further recommended that the court place the
child in the agency’s permanent custody. In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, at ¶ 56
(observing that “[t]he trial court has discretion to accept the testimony of the
guardian ad litem on the child’s wishes”).
{¶27} Rather than focusing on the child’s best interests, appellant’s
argument instead focuses upon her alleged case plan compliance. However, a Adams App. No. 25CA1216 13
parent’s efforts to improve the parent’s situation, or to comply with a case plan,
may be relevant, but not necessarily conclusive, factors when a court evaluates a
child’s best interest. See In re Ca.S., 2021-Ohio-3874, ¶ 39-40 (4th Dist.); In re
B.P., 2021-Ohio-3148, ¶ 57 (4th Dist.); In re T.J., 2016-Ohio-163, ¶ 36 (4th Dist.),
citing In re R.L., 2014-Ohio-3117, ¶ 34 (9th Dist.) (“although case plan compliance
may be relevant to a trial court’s best interest determination, it is not dispositive of
it”); In re K.M., 2019-Ohio-4252, ¶ 70 (4th Dist.), citing In re W.C.J., 2014-Ohio-
5841, ¶ 46 (4th Dist.) (“[s]ubstantial compliance with a case plan is not necessarily
dispositive on the issue of reunification”); accord In re S.C., 2015-Ohio-2280, ¶ 40
(8th Dist.) (“[c]ompliance with a case plan is not, in and of itself, dispositive of the
issue of reunification”); In re C.W., 2020-Ohio-6849, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.) (“[c]ase-plan
compliance is not the only consideration in a legal-custody determination”).
“Indeed, because the trial court’s primary focus in a permanent custody proceeding
is the child’s best interest, ‘it is entirely possible that a parent could complete all of
his/her case plan goals and the trial court still appropriately terminate his/her
parental rights.’ ” W.C.J., 2014-Ohio-5841, at ¶ 46 (4th Dis.), quoting In re
Gomer, 2004-Ohio-1723, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.); accord In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1704, at ¶
90 (8th Dist.) (substantial compliance with case plan services is not, in and of
itself, “dispositive” and “does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a social
services agency”). Thus, a parent’s case plan compliance will not preclude a trial Adams App. No. 25CA1216 14
court from awarding permanent custody to an agency when doing so is in the
child’s best interest. See In re S.M., 2023-Ohio-2686, ¶ 44 (4th Dist.).
Accordingly, even if appellant complied with some parts of the case plan, her
compliance does not override the child’s best interest.
{¶28} Appellant also argues that the agency did not make reasonable efforts
to offer her visits with the child. However, as the trial court found, the agency
stopped appellant’s visits with the child once physical abuse had been
substantiated. The evidence indicates that appellant’s failure to comply with her
case plan prevented the agency from establishing a visitation schedule.
{¶29} Given all of the foregoing, the trial court could have quite reasonably
decided not to experiment with the child’s welfare by continuing her in custodial
limbo to give appellant more time to demonstrate that she would consistently
comply with her case plan or otherwise be able to assure the agency of the child’s
safety if placed in her care. We repeatedly have recognized that trial courts need
not experiment with a child’s welfare:
“ ‘[A] child should not have to endure the inevitable to its great detriment and harm in order to give the . . . [parent] an opportunity to prove her suitability. To anticipate the future, however, is at most, a difficult basis for a judicial determination. The child’s present condition and environment is the subject for decision not the expected or anticipated behavior of unsuitability or unfitness of the . . . [parent] . . . . The law does not require the court to experiment with the child's welfare to see if he will suffer great detriment or harm.’ ” Adams App. No. 25CA1216 15
W.C.J., 2014-Ohio-5841, at ¶ 48 (4th Dist.), quoting In re Bishop, 36 Ohio App.3d
123, 126 (5th Dist.1987), quoting In re East, 32 Ohio Misc. 65, 69 (C.P. 1972).
Conclusion
{¶30} Based upon all of the foregoing reasons, we cannot say that the
evidence weighs heavily against the trial court’s judgment granting the agency
permanent custody of the child. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons,
we overrule appellant’s sole assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Adams App. No. 25CA1216 16
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to Appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Adams County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hess, J. and Wilkin, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
_____________________________ Jason P. Smith Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.