In re Meredith

144 F. 230, 1906 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 247
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedFebruary 28, 1906
DocketNo. 69
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 144 F. 230 (In re Meredith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Meredith, 144 F. 230, 1906 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 247 (N.D. Ga. 1906).

Opinion

NEWMAN, District Judge.

The report of the referee on the matter now presented in the above bankruptcy case is as follows:

"1, Frank D. Fpson, one of tlio referees of said court in bankruptcy, do hereby certify that, in the course of the proceedings in said cause before me. the following questions arose pertinent to the said proceedings:
“First. "Whether or not an order should be made allowing petitioners 1<) withdraw their claims, from the bankruptcy court, in order that they might properly participate in tlio distribution of property in the hands of a receiver under state court proceedings, which was subject to the waiver of homestead and exemption notes held by these petitioning creditors, so that they might realize from said homestead estate such percentage as might he awarded them out of same.
“Second. Whether or not an order should be made that the trustee be directed, in the payment of dividends, to retain in his hands a sufficient sum to protect any dividends which might he properly payable thereafter to these petitioning creditors who hold those waiver notes, so that after such claims are proved tile dividends on such claims would he of such amount as would equal tlio dividends heretofore paid to other creditors, for the amount proved as balance due on the waiver notes.
“Third. Whether or not an order should be made allowing said petitioning creditors, holding said waiver notes, to prove the balance due on their claims after the distribution of said homestead estate, provided said claims aro tiled for proof with referee in bankruptcy, within CO days after final termination of said state court proceedings.
“Fourth. The question as to a stay of discharge having been stricken from petition when presented to me as referee, said question was not considered nor passed upon by me.
“Summary of Fact.
“This petition was filed in this office on the 11th day of December, A. D. 1905, and on the 13th day of January, A. D. 1906, an order was made fixing the 31st day of January, A. D. 1900, as the day for hearing same, which was to be had at referee’s office in Athens, said district of Georgia, at 11:30 o’clock in tlie forenoon. Notice mailed to parties at interest. On the day set for the hearing, A. G. McCurry, Esq., appeared for petitioning creditors, and Y. D. Smith, Esq., for the trustee.
“An amendment was offered and allowed adding to petition Uie allegation that the Mayfield Woolen Mills Clothing Company held two promissory notes in amount of $147 each. The claim of Penn & Watson'has not been filed in this court.
“it was agreed between counsel that the facts set forth in the petition relating to proceedings in state court, and the former proof of claims in this bankruptcy court, the payment of the dividends and returns thereof to trustee, were true as set out.
“Finding of Daw.
“As to the question of the right to withdraw these proved claims, I find that it is a matter within the discretion of the court, and, where it appears not to work to the disadvantage or interest of other creditors and is not opposed by the bankrupt whose interests are affected, that the court would allow the withdrawal of the claims, in re Swords, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 436, 112 Fed. 661.
"I find that the provisions of the law relating to the administration of' the estate direct and require that the trustee shall close same by distribution of the resulting funds as expeditiously as possible, compatible with the best interests of parties in the cause.
[232]*232“I find that under Act July 1, 3808, c. 541, § 57n, 30 Stat. 560, 561. [U. S. Comp. St. 3901, p. 3444], there is fixed a limitation as to the proof of claims, at one year from the date of adjudication, and I find that the proposed litigation of these xsetitioning creditors, in the state court, does not place them within the excepting clause of section 57n, allowing subsequent proof of a litigated claim within 00 days after the rendition óf a final judgment had on the litigation within 30 days after the expiration of the year. In re Thompson’s Sons, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 581, 123 Fed. 174; In re Prindle Pump Co., 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 405; In re Rhodes, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 197, 105 Fed. 231.
“As I apprehend the meaning and spirit of the decision of the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 307, 23 Sup. Ct. 751, 47 L. Ed. 1061, the court ruled and directed that, as between the inconvenience to the creditors and parties at interest, of being denied the right to subject the exempted property to their claims in the court of bankruptcy, and the bringing of a separate cause in a state court to enforce the same, the spirit and letter of the law required the ruling that the property would not be administered in the court of bankruptcy, and, because of the equities held by waiver note creditors against this particular fund, the discharge of the bankrupt on application would be stayed for a limited time, this would not interfere with the expeditious administration of the estate by the trustee, but would simply prevent the bankrupt from gaining an advantage over certain of his creditors which would work to their injury. On the other hand, the ruling of the court goes on to deal with the rights existing between the general creditors and those holding waiver notes, and, while deciding it unnecessary to pass upon the question as to whether the general creditors have any remedy to prevent these special waiver note creditors from, sharing with them in the general fund, and afterwards getting an additional payment from the exempted property, it is clear that in no part of the decision does the court' intimate that it would be equitable for this special class of creditors to delay the administration of the estate in order to obtain an extra dividend out of a special fund, and then come back and share with the general creditors on the remainder of their debt after crediting thereon this special credit, and for this purpose ask a special exemption from the limitation of section 57n, as to proof of their claim, as well.
“It might in fact, and probably often does, occur that the waiver notes are paid in full by the exempted property, yet until such was done, if this procedure as sought was allowed, the general estate would remain tied up by the setting apart of these dividends, to the manifest hindrance and delay of the administration of the same by the trustee.

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Bluebook (online)
144 F. 230, 1906 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 247, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-meredith-gand-1906.