In Re Mellard

117 B.R. 716, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1642, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1394, 1990 WL 110003
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedAugust 3, 1990
DocketBankruptcy 90-001860-BKC-6C3
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 117 B.R. 716 (In Re Mellard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Mellard, 117 B.R. 716, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1642, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1394, 1990 WL 110003 (Fla. 1990).

Opinion

*717 MEMORANDUM OPINION

C. TIMOTHY CORCORAN, III, Bankruptcy Judge.

THIS CASE came on for hearing on June 26, 1990, pursuant to an order to show cause directed to Neil J. Buchalter, Esquire, and Andrew Baron, Esquire (Document No. 10).

Each lawyer has received an excessive amount as an attorneys fee for representing “repeat” or “serial” filing Chapter 13 debtors. To remedy the abuse of the bankruptcy system and the prejudice to creditors that results from the payment of the excessive fees, the court will order the disgorgement of the excessive amounts and the payment of them to the Chapter 13 Standing Trustee for use in paying creditors under the plan.

The Problem

The issues presented here present an unusual twist on a substantial problem that the court faces on a weekly basis in the administration of the Chapter 13 docket. The fundamental problem is that of the “repeat” or “serial” Chapter 13 filer and the resulting abuse of the bankruptcy system. Under this all too common pattern, a debtor urges confirmation of a plan when the facts unfortunately reveal that the debtor has no realistic prospect of successfully completing the payments under the plan. Either before or after confirmation, the debtor fails to make the required plan payments, the case is dismissed, and the debtor then refiles one or more additional times before the debtor finally accepts reality and abandons the effort.

The evil perpetrated by this pattern of euphoria and failure, of course, is that creditors are not paid and are prevented by the automatic stay from pursuing the collection of their just due. Mortgage creditors have frequently been put off for two years or more, with no payments at all, by a debtor’s skillful use of an abusive pattern of filings, dismissals for non-payment, and refilings. This evil can be particularly abusive when mortgage creditors are involved who hold mortgages on properties that the debtor rents to tenants. Thus, the debtor’s pattern of abuse not only illegitimately delays creditors when there is no realistic possibility of successfully completing the plan, but it also allows the debtor to profit by the collection of rent while preventing the mortgagee from collecting the mortgage.

In some cases fitting within this pattern, the debtor may intentionally invoke the bankruptcy process to benefit from the automatic stay with no intention whatsoever of meeting his obligations or completing a plan. In most cases, however, the debtor probably has no abusive intent. Instead, the debtor verily intends to complete a plan, but the facts are all against him. In other words, the' debtor grasps at straws in an effort to save his home or automobile. If the debtor’s financial circumstances permit him to complete a Chapter 13 plan, the purposes of this chapter of the Bankruptcy Code are well met; if they do not, the debtor’s invocation of this chapter results in abuse in fact despite the debtor’s lack of an objective intent to cause that abuse.

The challenge presented to the court in these circumstances is to determine at an early point before any abuse occurs which cases are real and which are illusory. This is a most difficult task. Expecting clairvoyance on the part of the court, the Bankruptcy Code gives little guidance. It tells the court that a Chapter 13 plan must be proposed in “good faith.” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). It requires the court to find that “the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6). It tells the court to dismiss a case when there is an “unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors,” when the case cannot be confirmed, and when payments that are due are not made. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(1), (4), (5), and (6).

In applying these criteria, the court has little with which to work other than desperate debtors promising to do whatever is required and begging for another chance. Neither the debtors’ situations, nor the sympathy they invoke, nor the Bankruptcy Code provides much aid to the court in *718 finding the narrow line between fairness to the debtor in giving him a chance to make a plan work and fairness to creditors in denying a chance to those who have no prospects of success.

The Complication

The problems presented by the “repeat” or “serial” filer are further complicated by the manner in which attorneys charge fees. It is the practice of the bar to charge a flat fee for representing a debtor in a Chapter 13 case. Some lawyers charge this flat fee and require payment in full before filing. Other lawyers require that a substantial portion of the fee be paid before filing, with the remainder then paid through the plan itself.

In the former case, the lawyer receives the full fee “up front” whether the case is confirmed or not. If the case is dismissed before confirmation, the money has already been paid to the lawyer, and no refund is made of any unearned portion. In those circumstances, it has been the practice of the bar in this division to treat the filing of the second case as an entirely new matter and to charge a new, full fee for representing the debtor in the second case. If the second case is ultimately confirmed, the debtor has paid his lawyer twice the fee that would have been paid had the first case been completed. If the second case is dismissed before confirmation and a third case filed, the debtor will have paid three times the fee, and so on.

In those eases where intervening events make the factual situation different in the second case from that existing in the first case, it may be entirely appropriate for the attorney to treat the second ease as a “new” case and to charge a full, second fee. In those cases in which there is nothing or little different in the second case from that existing in the first case, however, the “case” is the same, and the dismissal and refiling represent nothing but an opportunity for the lawyer to charge twice.

The debtor’s payment to his lawyer of an aggregate fee that is excessive is of critical importance to the court. This stems, of course, from the fact that the excessive amount paid to the attorney would have been paid to creditors but for the payment to the attorney. Thus, not only does the “repeat” or “serial” filer delay his creditors by the pattern of dismissal and refiling, but he also reduces the amount available to pay creditors by the excessive amount he pays to his lawyer for the privilege of playing the dismissal and refile game.

To control — if not remedy — the additional dimension of abuse that results from the excessive attorneys fee payment, the court has established a practice of carefully scrutinizing the attorneys fee paid by the debtor in repeat filing situations. When the court finds the factual circumstances present in the second case to be different from those present in the first, the court has no difficulty in permitting the payment of a second, full fee.

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118 B.R. 817 (N.D. Florida, 1990)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
117 B.R. 716, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1642, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1394, 1990 WL 110003, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-mellard-flmb-1990.