In re M.D.T.

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 14, 2026
• Docket: 115543
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re M.D.T., 2026-Ohio-1774.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE M.D.T. : : No. 115543 A Minor Child : : [Appeal by the Cuyahoga County : Office of Child Support Services] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: VACATED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 14, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. FA24113013

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew D. Greenwell and Jake A. Elliott, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

Appellant Cuyahoga County Office of Child Support Services (“OCSS”

or “the agency”) appeals an order of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas,

Juvenile Division, finding it in contempt for failing to comply with a magistrate’s

order dated April 17, 2025. OCSS claims the following errors:

1. The Trial Court abused its discretion when it found beyond a reasonable doubt OCSS was in criminal contempt because the unrefuted evidence established that OCSS was unaware of the Court’s April 16, 2025 Order to produce documents reviewed in generating its administrative child support orders in the case and therefore did not possess the requisite intent to defy the Court’s Order.

2. The Trial Court abused its discretion when i[t] improperly shifted the burden in a criminal contempt proceeding to OCSS, the alleged contemptor [sic], to prove its innocence of the alleged failure to comply with the order, despite the well-established law requiring the movant, in this case the Court, to prove OCSS’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

We find insufficient evidence of criminal contempt and vacate the trial

court’s judgment.

I. Facts and Procedural History

This appeal concerns orders issued to OCSS during the pendency of a

child-support case. The father (“Father”) of the child filed an objection to an

administrative order issued by OCSS on February 18, 2025, requiring him to pay

$927.57 per month in child support and $23.80 per month for cash medical support,

plus related processing fees beginning on March 3, 2025. A magistrate held a

hearing on Father’s objection on April 8, 2025. During the hearing, Father

questioned the overtime earnings OCSS used to calculate his support obligations,

and the juvenile court orally requested that OCSS provide the documents used to

generate Father’s support obligations either in a notice of submission prior to trial

or with a witness at trial.

On April 10, 2025, OCSS, through its counsel, the Cuyahoga County

Prosecutor’s Office, filed a “Notice of Submission of Documents.” In the submission,

OCSS provided a “corrected” administrative order for child support and medical support, which included the “Parenting Child Support Computation Worksheet”

that OCSS used to calculate the administrative order. It did not provide any

additional documents.

On April 14, 2025, the magistrate issued a pretrial order requiring OCSS

“to file a Notice of Submission prior to the next hearing or provide documents at the

next hearing used to generate the administrative order.” On April 17, 2025, the

magistrate issued another judgment entry requiring OCSS to file the documents it relied

on in issuing the administrative child-support order dated February 18, 2025, and the

corrected child-support order dated February 21, 2025.

The magistrate’s April 17, 2025 order stated, in part, that “filing the

administrative order itself as the document used to create the child support order is an

absurd interpretation of this courts [sic] order.” The order further stated that OCSS was

required to provide the requested documents to the court at least 14 days before the trial

scheduled to take place on June 3, 2025. Regarding the requested documents, the

magistrate’s order stated, in relevant part:

OCSS is further ordered to file a print out of all notes in the running record comments in SETS (found on the “SFRC” screen) which detail how the support officer calculated the support obligation in this case both in the original and corrected orders.

Finally, OCSS is ordered to file a print out of all notes in the running record comments in sets (found on the “SFRC” screen) which explain why a corrected order was needed in this case and what was changed between the February 18, 2025 order and the February 24, 2025 corrected order under which OCSS is believed to be currently operating for this child.

In lieu of filing a Notice of Submission as outlined above, OCSS may present Administrative Hearing Office[r] . . . who issued the administrative orders in this case, or another competent witness, to testify at the trial. The witness produced by OCSS must be knowledgeable regarding how the order in this case was calculated and should bring all documents outlined above.

Failure to file a Notice of Submission, or produce a suitable witness to provide the needed information, may result in a finding of civil contempt or other appropriate sanctions.

(Emphasis in original.) The April 17, 2025 magistrate’s decision was emailed to the

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office. It was not sent directly to OCSS or to any

employee of the agency.

On June 2, 2025, the day before the June 3, 2025 trial, OCSS, through

counsel, filed a “Notice of Inability to Comply and Brief in Support of the Agency’s

Inability to Comply” with the court’s April 17, 2025 order. OCSS asserted that it

could not comply with the court’s order because (1) the order was sent to the

prosecutor’s office and assistant prosecuting attorneys do not assist pro se litigants

who challenge administrative support orders, (2) complying with the magistrate’s

order could require an assistant prosecuting attorney to testify as a witness in the

case, (3) the court’s order does not exclude information the disclosure of which is

prohibited under Ohio Adm.Code 3125.50, and (4) the obligor (Father) did not

request the relief ordered by the magistrate.

The magistrate proceeded with the trial on Father’s objection to the

administrative child-support order without the requested documents from OCSS.

There appears to have been no attempt to reschedule the hearing on Father’s objection to allow the court to either consider OCSS’s reasons for noncompliance or

to obtain the requested records.

Father argued at the hearing that OCSS incorrectly calculated his

overtime on Line 2 of the child-support computation worksheet. Despite being

ordered to do so, Father, himself, failed to bring documents to substantiate his claim

that OCSS used incorrect data to calculate his income. The magistrate nevertheless

rendered judgment based on Father’s testimony that OCSS had used incorrect

information to conclude that his average overtime earnings were $12,685.65 and

reduced the amount of overtime in Line 2 to $7,7334.29. As a result, Father’s annual

income was reduced by $5,351.65, which resulted in Father’s support obligation

being reduced to $870.17 per month, and his cash medical support obligation was

reduced to $22.78 per month. The magistrate issued his decision on June 17, 2025.

Neither Mother nor Father were represented by counsel and neither party objected

to the magistrate’s decision. In the absence of an objection, the juvenile court

adopted the magistrate’s decision on July 3, 2025.

On June 10, 2025, the magistrate issued a judgment entry ordering

OCSS Administrator “Tiffany Dobbins” to appear before the magistrate on June 27,

2025, to “show cause why OCSS should not be held in criminal contempt for failing

to comply with the Magistrate’s Order issued April 17, 2025.” Because the trial on

Father’s objection had proceeded without the requested documents and Father’s

child-support obligation had already been reduced, the court informed OCSS that

the show-cause hearing would be a criminal-contempt proceeding rather than the previously contemplated civil-contempt proceeding that would have allowed OCSS

to purge the alleged contempt. The June 10, 2025 magistrate’s decision again did

not mention the reasons for noncompliance outlined in the agency’s “Notice of

Inability to Comply.” OCSS, through counsel, filed an objection to the magistrate’s

decision on June 23, 2025. On June 25, 2025, the trial court overruled the objection

and ordered the director of OCSS or “any other competent witness” to appear at the

show-cause hearing.

OCSS appeared at the hearing through counsel and called two

witnesses: Tiffany Dobbins-Brazelton, the OCSS director, and Katherine Slosarik,

an OCSS records custodian. Neither witness had any knowledge of the April 17,

2025 order. The assistant county prosecutor who represented OCSS argued the

magistrate could not find OCSS in criminal contempt because there was no evidence

that the agency recklessly or intentionally violated the court’s April 17, 2025 order

to produce documents. He asserted that although the court’s order was served on

the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office, there was no evidence that anyone at

OCSS knew about the order. He, therefore, argued that the evidence presented at

the hearing demonstrated negligent miscommunication rather than intentional

misconduct. OCSS also produced the documents in response to the court’s order.

Following the hearing, the magistrate issued a decision finding OCSS

guilty of criminal contempt and sentencing the agency to a fine of $250. The

magistrate’s decision did not address any of the reasons OCSS had articulated in the

“Notice of Inability to Comply and Brief in Support of the Agency’s Inability to Comply” with the court’s April 17, 2025 order. The magistrate nevertheless pointed

out that the mother and child in this case were potentially harmed by OCSS’s failure

to produce the requested documents because the amount of child support was

reduced based on Father’s testimony alone. OCSS, through counsel, filed objections

to the magistrate’s decision, arguing there was no evidence that the agency

intentionally failed to comply with the court’s April 17, 2025 order. The juvenile

court overruled the objections, found OCSS guilty of criminal contempt, and

imposed a fine of $250. OCSS now appeals the trial court’s judgment.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Contempt can be either direct or indirect. In re J.M., 2008-Ohio-

6763, ¶ 46 (12th Dist.). Direct contempt involves “misbehavior in the presence of or

so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice.” R.C. 2705.01.

Indirect contempt involves acts occurring outside the presence of the court that

demonstrate a lack of respect for the court or its lawful orders. R.C. 2705.02; In re

Lance, 2016-Ohio-2717, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).

Contempt is further classified as either civil or criminal. Oak Hill

Banks v. Ison, 2003-Ohio-5547, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.). “This distinction depends largely

upon the character and purpose of the punishment imposed.” Id. Civil contempt is

characterized by a conditional sanction that gives the contemnor an opportunity to

purge the contempt by complying with the court’s order. Cleveland Hts. v. Preston,

2026-Ohio-344, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), citing Liming v. Damos, 2012-Ohio-4783, ¶ 12. In a civil contempt proceeding, the contemnor is only punished if he or she fails to

purge the contempt through compliance with the court’s order.

By contrast, a criminal contempt proceeding does not afford the

contemnor an opportunity to purge the contempt. Criminal contempt is

“characterized by unconditional sanctions intended to punish the contemnor and

vindicate the authority of the court.” Doe v. Univ. Hosps. Health Sys., 2023-Ohio-

2120, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), citing Liming at ¶ 12. Criminal contempt is solely punitive.

The juvenile court found OCSS guilty of indirect criminal contempt of

court. Ordinarily, we review contempt findings for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,

Miller v. Miller, 2020-Ohio-5262, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing Hissa v. Hissa, 2014-Ohio-

1508, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). However, a court does not have discretion to impose sanctions

for criminal contempt unless it finds all the elements for criminal contempt proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Mallory-Nichols, 2023-Ohio-3982, ¶ 28

(8th Dist.). Thus, when reviewing a trial court’s finding of indirect, criminal

contempt, an appellate court “‘“must determine whether sufficient evidence existed

for the trial court to reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the

contemnor purposely, willfully, or intentionally violated a prior court order.”’” In re

D.S.S., 2020-Ohio-5386, ¶ 19 (11th Dist.), quoting Weisgarber v. Weisgarber, 2016-

Ohio-676, ¶ 10 (5th Dist.), quoting In re West, 2015-Ohio-1501, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.). See

also In re Mallory-Nichols at ¶ 28.

In short, to be found guilty of criminal contempt for failure to comply

with a court order, the court must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the contemnor intentionally failed to comply with a valid court order. Univ. Hosps.

Health Sys. at ¶ 18; In re Mallory-Nichols at ¶ 28, quoting Midland Steel Prods. Co.

v. Internatl. Union, United Auto., Aero. & Agricultural Implement Workers, Local

486, 61 Ohio St.3d 121, 127 (1991) (“[I]n cases of indirect criminal contempt, ‘it must

be shown that the alleged contemnor intended to defy the court.’”).

B. Criminal Contempt Finding

In the first assignment of error, OCSS argues there was insufficient

evidence to support the court’s criminal-contempt finding because there was no

evidence that OCSS intentionally violated the court’s April 17, 2025 order. We agree.

Neither the director of OCSS nor its records custodian had any

knowledge of the court’s request for the documents used to generate Father’s

support obligations. The notice was sent to the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s

Office, and it appears from the testimony that the notice was not communicated to

OCSS. The failure to convey the notice to OCSS was likely the result of an oversight

or misunderstanding. The prosecutor filed the “Notice of Inability to Comply,”

which may or may not have had any merit, but the magistrate failed to consider the

arguments presented therein. Regardless of whether there was merit to any of the

reasons outlined in the “Notice of Inability to Comply,” there is no evidence that

OCSS intentionally defied the court’s order. Therefore, the trial court erred in

finding OCSS guilty of criminal contempt.

Moreover, criminal contempt is a very serious allegation. It is

reserved for “‘exceptional circumstances’ . . . such as acts threatening the judge or disrupting a hearing or obstructing court proceedings.” Harris v. United States, 382

U.S. 162, 164 (1965), quoting Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 54 (1959).

Criminal contempt “always, and rightly, is regarded with disfavor and,

if imposed in passion or pettiness, brings discredit to a court as certainly as the

conduct it penalizes.” Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8 (1952); see also United

States v. Concord Mgt. & Consulting L.L.C., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225949

(D.C. Dist. July 1, 2019), quoting United States v. Koubriti, 305 F.Supp.2d 723, 748

(E.D. Mich. 2003) (“Criminal contempt is generally reserved for ‘repeated and

flagrant abuses’ that demonstrate a willful disregard for the court’s authority.”). In

other words, criminal contempt should not be imposed for inappropriate reasons.

A court’s criminal-contempt power should be used only in the rarest of

circumstances where the contemnor has engaged in an egregious disregard for the

court’s authority.

The magistrate could have continued the hearing on Father’s

objection to the child-support calculation in order to allow OCSS to purge a case of

civil contempt. In that way, the magistrate could have received the requested

documents prior to the hearing and factored them into the court’s evaluation of

Father’s objection. Instead, the court proceeded with the hearing on Father’s

objection without the benefit of the documents, and the magistrate was forced to

reduce Father’s child-support obligation based on Father’s uncontroverted, and

possibly self-serving, testimony. The reduction in child support may have been unwarranted and, by the magistrate’s own admission, the reduction in child support

may have resulted in harm to the child unnecessarily.

While the magistrate was understandably frustrated that the

requested documents were not produced, litigation does not always proceed

smoothly, and courts need to be flexible in order to achieve the most just outcomes.

As previously stated, courts must refrain from acting for inappropriate reasons such

as frustration or passion because such conduct “brings discredit to the court as

certainly as the conduct it penalizes.” Sacher at 8. If the court felt the requested

information was necessary for its decision, it could have handled this case in a way

that allowed it to receive the requested information. The court could have continued

the hearing. Instead, it went forward and decreased the payment at the expense of

the mother and child, who may have lost a portion of their child support

unnecessarily. Indeed, Father also failed to provide documentation, as ordered, to

support his testimony regarding the alleged miscalculation of his overtime, and he

was not sanctioned for it. The magistrate’s decision to then proceed with a criminal-

contempt proceeding against OCSS under these circumstances was an abuse of

discretion. The juvenile court compounded the error by ratifying the magistrate’s

decision. We, therefore, sustain the first assignment of error.

Our resolution of the first assignment of error is dispositive of the

appeal. Therefore, the second assignment of error is moot.

The juvenile court’s order finding OCSS guilty of criminal contempt is

hereby vacated. It is ordered that costs are waived.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR