IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1893 Filed February 7, 2018
IN THE INTEREST OF M.D., M.D., and D.D., Minor Children,
E.D., Mother, Appellant,
D.D., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Christine Dalton Ploof,
District Associate Judge.
The mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to their children. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Jennifer M. Olsen of Olsen Law Office, Davenport, for appellant mother.
Randall L. McNaughton of Randall McNaughton Attorney at Law,
Davenport, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Matthew D. Hatch of Hatch Law Firm, P.C., Bettendorf, guardian ad litem
for minor children.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ. 2
POTTERFIELD, Judge.
The mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to their three children, M.D. born in 2005; M.D., born in 2009; and D.D., born
in 2011. The juvenile court terminated each parent’s rights as to all three children
pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d) and (f) (2017). On appeal, both
parents maintain their parental rights should not have been terminated because
(1) there is not clear and convincing evidence to support the statutory grounds for
termination, (2) it is not in the best interests of the children, and (3) a permissive
factor weighs against termination. Additionally, the father claims the oldest child
should have been appointed an attorney separate from the guardian ad litem
(GAL). See Iowa Code § 232.89(4).
We begin our review1 by considering the statutory grounds for termination.
Where, as here, the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one
ground, we may affirm on any ground we find supported. See In re S.R., 600
N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). Under subsection (f), each parent challenges
only the final element—whether the children could be returned home at the time of
the termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(f)(4); In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d
703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting “present time” language of section 232.116 to
mean “at the time of the termination hearing”).
It is undisputed that both of the parents made some improvements between
the time the children were removed and the hearing. The home was unsanitary at
1 We review termination proceedings de novo. In re M.W., 876 N.W2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). We will affirm the juvenile court’s order if the grounds for termination are proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006). Our primary concern is the best interests of the children. Id. 3
the time the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) got involved—February
2016. There were dirty clothes strewn throughout the home and strong odor of cat
and dog urine, along with the smell of having six pets in a small space. The middle
child’s teacher reported she often arrived at school with “filthy” arms and face,
wearing soiled, too-small clothing—sometimes pajamas. While the parents had
regressed in some ways in the months preceding the hearing—which took place
in September 2017—for most of the pendency of the case, the home was
considered sanitary by the department.
Additionally, DHS initially got involved due to an allegation of physical abuse
by the father against the oldest child. The father kicked the child while wearing
boots, leaving a bruise larger than a silver dollar on the child’s inner knee. The
father had since completed an anger-management course and a batterer’s
education program, and the service provider testified she no longer had any
concerns about the father expressing his anger through physical abuse. The
parents continued to attend couple’s counseling, and everyone acknowledged
their relationship had improved.
However, there were still a number of serious, legitimate concerns
surrounding both parents. After the children were removed, the oldest two children
reported they had been sexually abused in the home. Based on the oldest child’s
report, DHS learned the parents had allowed a registered sex offender to live in
the home. When asked, the parents admitted they had “heard rumors” about the
man before they allowed him to live in the home and spend time with the children.
Later, the middle child named a second man who had been allowed to live in the 4
home and who had also sexually abused her and her older sister.2 Yet the parents
failed to take responsibility for allowing the men into their home and their failure to
protect their daughters. Until shortly before the termination hearing, they denied
the incidents could have occurred, instead referring to the oldest child as a “chronic
liar” and blaming her for raising the issue. The parents failed to grasp that these
incidents—and their response to them—had created trust issues between them
and the children. All of the children, but the middle child especially, continued to
have extreme behavioral issues at the time of the termination hearing. Although
the parents had “checked all the boxes” as to what they were asked to complete
during the pendency of the case, they were still unable or unwilling to grasp their
role in working toward resolving their children’s behavioral issues; it was noted the
parents expected professionals to “fix” the children for them. Additionally, while
the parents were able to verbalize what they needed to do to keep their children
safe, in the months preceding the termination hearing, it was discovered the
parents had again allowed someone else to move in to the family home. The
parents continued to deny it was true, but a service provider had stopped by for
two unannounced visits in two months and had witnessed the same woman
sleeping in the same bedroom both times. When questioned as to how they knew
the woman or what they had done to check her out, the mother testified they had
met the woman at the dog park a few months ago.
We acknowledge that the parents had made strides in some areas during
the pendency of this case, but the children would still have been at risk of suffering
2 The middle child had also recently indicated that the father had sexually abused her and the oldest sister. The father denied the allegations. 5
an adjudicatory harm if returned to their parents’ care at the time of the termination
hearing. Thus, there is clear and convincing evidence to support termination under
section 232.116(1)(f).
Next, we consider whether termination of the mother’s and father’s rights
was in the children’s best interests. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2). In considering
the children’s best interests, we focus on “the child[ren]’s safety, to the best
placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1893 Filed February 7, 2018
IN THE INTEREST OF M.D., M.D., and D.D., Minor Children,
E.D., Mother, Appellant,
D.D., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Christine Dalton Ploof,
District Associate Judge.
The mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to their children. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Jennifer M. Olsen of Olsen Law Office, Davenport, for appellant mother.
Randall L. McNaughton of Randall McNaughton Attorney at Law,
Davenport, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Matthew D. Hatch of Hatch Law Firm, P.C., Bettendorf, guardian ad litem
for minor children.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ. 2
POTTERFIELD, Judge.
The mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to their three children, M.D. born in 2005; M.D., born in 2009; and D.D., born
in 2011. The juvenile court terminated each parent’s rights as to all three children
pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d) and (f) (2017). On appeal, both
parents maintain their parental rights should not have been terminated because
(1) there is not clear and convincing evidence to support the statutory grounds for
termination, (2) it is not in the best interests of the children, and (3) a permissive
factor weighs against termination. Additionally, the father claims the oldest child
should have been appointed an attorney separate from the guardian ad litem
(GAL). See Iowa Code § 232.89(4).
We begin our review1 by considering the statutory grounds for termination.
Where, as here, the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one
ground, we may affirm on any ground we find supported. See In re S.R., 600
N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). Under subsection (f), each parent challenges
only the final element—whether the children could be returned home at the time of
the termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(f)(4); In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d
703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting “present time” language of section 232.116 to
mean “at the time of the termination hearing”).
It is undisputed that both of the parents made some improvements between
the time the children were removed and the hearing. The home was unsanitary at
1 We review termination proceedings de novo. In re M.W., 876 N.W2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). We will affirm the juvenile court’s order if the grounds for termination are proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006). Our primary concern is the best interests of the children. Id. 3
the time the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) got involved—February
2016. There were dirty clothes strewn throughout the home and strong odor of cat
and dog urine, along with the smell of having six pets in a small space. The middle
child’s teacher reported she often arrived at school with “filthy” arms and face,
wearing soiled, too-small clothing—sometimes pajamas. While the parents had
regressed in some ways in the months preceding the hearing—which took place
in September 2017—for most of the pendency of the case, the home was
considered sanitary by the department.
Additionally, DHS initially got involved due to an allegation of physical abuse
by the father against the oldest child. The father kicked the child while wearing
boots, leaving a bruise larger than a silver dollar on the child’s inner knee. The
father had since completed an anger-management course and a batterer’s
education program, and the service provider testified she no longer had any
concerns about the father expressing his anger through physical abuse. The
parents continued to attend couple’s counseling, and everyone acknowledged
their relationship had improved.
However, there were still a number of serious, legitimate concerns
surrounding both parents. After the children were removed, the oldest two children
reported they had been sexually abused in the home. Based on the oldest child’s
report, DHS learned the parents had allowed a registered sex offender to live in
the home. When asked, the parents admitted they had “heard rumors” about the
man before they allowed him to live in the home and spend time with the children.
Later, the middle child named a second man who had been allowed to live in the 4
home and who had also sexually abused her and her older sister.2 Yet the parents
failed to take responsibility for allowing the men into their home and their failure to
protect their daughters. Until shortly before the termination hearing, they denied
the incidents could have occurred, instead referring to the oldest child as a “chronic
liar” and blaming her for raising the issue. The parents failed to grasp that these
incidents—and their response to them—had created trust issues between them
and the children. All of the children, but the middle child especially, continued to
have extreme behavioral issues at the time of the termination hearing. Although
the parents had “checked all the boxes” as to what they were asked to complete
during the pendency of the case, they were still unable or unwilling to grasp their
role in working toward resolving their children’s behavioral issues; it was noted the
parents expected professionals to “fix” the children for them. Additionally, while
the parents were able to verbalize what they needed to do to keep their children
safe, in the months preceding the termination hearing, it was discovered the
parents had again allowed someone else to move in to the family home. The
parents continued to deny it was true, but a service provider had stopped by for
two unannounced visits in two months and had witnessed the same woman
sleeping in the same bedroom both times. When questioned as to how they knew
the woman or what they had done to check her out, the mother testified they had
met the woman at the dog park a few months ago.
We acknowledge that the parents had made strides in some areas during
the pendency of this case, but the children would still have been at risk of suffering
2 The middle child had also recently indicated that the father had sexually abused her and the oldest sister. The father denied the allegations. 5
an adjudicatory harm if returned to their parents’ care at the time of the termination
hearing. Thus, there is clear and convincing evidence to support termination under
section 232.116(1)(f).
Next, we consider whether termination of the mother’s and father’s rights
was in the children’s best interests. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2). In considering
the children’s best interests, we focus on “the child[ren]’s safety, to the best
placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and
to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” Id.
The parents maintain termination was not in the children’s best interests because,
at the time of the termination hearing, the children were each in a separate
placement. We acknowledge the importance of sibling relationships has been
statutorily recognized in section 232.108. See also In re A.J., No. 13-0216, 2013
WL 1227360, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2013). But we disagree with the
parents’ assertion that their rights must remain intact in order to support the sibling
relationship. Iowa Code section 232.108(6) contemplates the role of the
department and child-placement agency in facilitating visits between siblings even
after the children are adopted. And here, the social worker testified the goal of the
department was to place all three children together, once the middle child was
ready to leave the psychiatric medical institution for children where she currently
resided. Even if the siblings are not ultimately able to be adopted by a single
family, returning these three children with special needs to their parents is not in
their best interests, as the parents are not currently able to provide them with a
safe, supportive, and structured home, and we must consider each child’s need
with a sense of urgency. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000). 6
The father notes there is a permissive factor in section 232.116(3) that
allows the court to avoid termination of the parents’ rights if a child over the age of
ten objects to the termination. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(b). He claims the
oldest child—who was over ten years old at the time of the termination hearing—
should have been appointed an attorney separate from the GAL in order to ensure
she was informed of the proceedings and her wishes were known. See id. §
232.89(4). It does not appear the father raised the issue of bifurcating the role of
the GAL with appointment of an attorney with the juvenile court, and we will not
consider the issue for the first time on appeal. See In re C.M., 652 N.W.2d 204,
207 (Iowa 2002) (noting even in termination cases, “[c]onstitutional questions must
be preserved by raising them ‘at the earliest opportunity after the grounds for
objection become apparent.’” (citation omitted)). Both parents maintain their
strong bond with their children outweighs the termination of their parental rights.
See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). After reviewing the record, we cannot say the
children’s bond with their parents is so strong as to countervail the benefits
termination of the parents’ parental rights will ultimately bring to the children.
We affirm the termination of both parents’ rights as to each child.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.