NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2021 IL App (3d) 200534-U
Order filed May 17, 2021 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
In re M.D, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit, a Minor ) Rock Island County, Illinois. ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) Appeal No. 3-20-0534 ) Circuit No. 2017-JA-30 v. ) ) Lindsey C., ) ) The Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Theodore G. Kutsunis, ) Judge, presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lytton and Wright concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: Orders finding respondent unfit to care for the child and subsequently terminating her parental rights were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to disqualify the prosecuting assistant State’s Attorney.
¶2 The trial court found respondent, Lindsey C., to be an unfit parent to M.D. and
subsequently terminated her parental rights. On appeal, respondent argues that the court’s finding of unfitness and termination order were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent
also argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to disqualify the assistant State’s
Attorney who proceeded on the termination petition. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
trial court’s termination of parental rights and its order denying respondent’s motion to
disqualify.
¶3 FACTS
¶4 On August 22, 2017, the State filed a petition for Adjudication of Wardship and a
Petition for Temporary Custody of the Minor, M.D., born on October 24, 2013. The State alleged
the child was neglected because respondent’s substance abuse created an environment injurious
to M.D.’s health and presented a substantial risk of harm. In support, the State alleged that when
M.D.’s brother was born on August 10, 2017, he required treatment for withdrawal. The State
also alleged that respondent had pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine in September
2016 and been sentenced to 30 months’ probation. Finally, the State alleged that respondent had
tested positive for cocaine and methamphetamine between March and August of 2017.
¶5 Respondent failed to appear at the first appearance hearing because she was in drug
treatment. However, a relative caregiver, respondent’s uncle Merle C., was present. Also present
was the natural father of M.D., Joshua D. The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem for M.D.,
and the Public Defender to represent respondent. The court granted temporary custody of M.D.
to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”). DCFS then filed an initial
family service plan, requiring respondent to comply with psychiatric, domestic violence,
substance abuse, and counseling services, engage in parenting education, and meet her probation
requirements. The permanency goal was set as “return home within 12 months.”
2 ¶6 At a pre-trial conference held on February 16, 2018, respondent stipulated to the facts
presented in the Petition for Adjudication of Wardship. Bethany for Children and Families
(hereinafter “Bethany”) filed a report on March 2; it recommended that the permanency goal
remain return home within 12 months. An Integrated Assessment was also filed with the court on
March 2, for which respondent, Joshua D., and the relative caregivers, Merle C. and Florence C.,
had been interviewed and M.D. and M.C. were also screened.
¶7 In her interview, respondent explained that her relationship with Joshua D. had lasted
from 2007 to 2015, during which time they cohabited and engaged in substance abuse. Law
enforcement had been contacted twice in 2011 when respondent and Joshua D. were under the
influence of bath salts. Respondent described Joshua D. as sociopathic and narcissistic, but also
stated that she loved him, visiting him twice a week when he was incarcerated. Respondent also
reported that she had used methamphetamine, for which she had been arrested on possession
charges. She also used Adderall, Xanax, and other unprescribed pills. She has been arrested
twice for DUI, including once in 2014 when M.D. was four months old. At the time of her
interview, respondent was engaged in intensive outpatient treatment through the Riverside
Treatment Center. She related numerous traumatic events in her life, including sexual abuse by a
sexual predator during her childhood, physical abuse by Joshua D., and the suicide of her
brother. She also reported symptoms of depression, mania, anxiety, and anger control issues in
her relationships.
¶8 After screening M.D., the Assessment Team reported that she was in excellent physical
health, meeting all age-appropriate developmental milestones, and she appeared to be a happy
and relaxed child. She was also reported to be strongly attached to respondent. As evidence of
that attachment, the relative caregivers stated that she waits in a chair every Saturday and Sunday
3 in anticipation of her visitation time with respondent, and “squeals with delight” when she sees
respondent approaching. Furthermore, the Team reported that respondent and Joshua D.’s
genuine concern for M.D. and their desire to achieve reunification were seen as strengths within
her family support system.
¶9 The Team believed that respondent did not fully appreciate the impact of her substance
abuse on herself and on those around her, including M.D. It noted that she may have been less
than forthcoming with her responses about her substance abuse history, noting vague answers,
especially when questioned about drug use during pregnancy. The Team also expressed concern
over her level of attachment to Joshua. The Team listed the prognosis for reunification of
respondent and M.D. as “Guarded,” pointing to its concerns regarding respondent’s substance
abuse, her relationship with Joshua D., and her lack engagement with treatment services. Success
in these areas was deemed critical to achieving the goal of reunification. Supervised visitation was
recommended for four hours each Saturday and Sunday.
¶ 10 The court entered a dispositional order on March 16. It adjudicated M.D. as neglected,
and she was placed in the custody of Merle C. and Florence C., the relative caregivers.
Guardianship remained with DCFS, and visitation was to be at the discretion of DCFS and
Bethany. The court ordered respondent to (1) attend and successfully complete parenting classes,
(2) obtain a substance abuse evaluation and follow any recommendations for treatment, (3)
obtain a psychiatric evaluation and follow any recommendations for treatment, (4) obtain a
domestic violence assessment and follow any recommendations for treatment, (5) cooperate with
counseling, and (6) obtain and maintain appropriate housing and income.
¶ 11 DCFS filed permanency reports in June and September of 2018, both of which
recommended the permanency goal remain as return home within 12 months. In a third
4 permanency report on November 30, respondent was found to have made unsatisfactory progress
in all areas and she had pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine and was incarcerated in
Iowa. Moreover, Bethany’s caseworker Matykiewicz decreased respondent’s visitation time with
M.D. to one day a week for two hours due to respondent’s repeated tardiness or failure to appear.
This action resulted in text messages to the caseworker with profanity and name-calling.
Nonetheless, the recommended permanency goal remained a return home with twelve months.
On December 14, Bethany filed a status alert detailing the text messages between respondent and
Matykiewicz, and a Facebook exchange between respondent and James Quist, concerning
respondent’s plans to move out of state with M.D. The court entered a new permanency order
finding respondent had not made either reasonable and substantial progress or any reasonable
efforts toward reunification.
¶ 12 DCFS filed two more permanency reports on March 1 and June 20, 2019, in which the
permanency goal remained return home within 12 months. In the June report, respondent was
found to have made satisfactory progress with substance abuse treatment because she was active
in the Clean & Sober program at the Scott County jail in Iowa. However, the day before the June
report was filed, Bethany filed a status alert, which recommended changing the goal to substitute
care pending court decision on termination of parental rights. The court ordered that the goal be
changed, and the State subsequently filed a supplemental petition to terminate respondent’s
parental rights. It alleged that respondent failed to make reasonable efforts or progress during
two specific nine-month periods after the neglect adjudication: March 16 through December 16,
2018, and then December 17, 2018 through September 17, 2019.
¶ 13 A fitness hearing was conducted on March 12, 2020. Matykiewicz, her supervisor Lynn
Lohman, and respondent testified at the hearing.
5 ¶ 14 Matykiewicz testified that respondent had made neither reasonable efforts nor reasonable
progress during the relevant periods. She noted that respondent failed to successfully complete
substance abuse treatment, parenting and domestic violence service, and mental health treatment
and had failed to provide verification of employment.
¶ 15 Matykiewicz testified that respondent did not comply with domestic violence services.
Respondent did do some of the work in May 2019 when she was in the Scott County jail, but she
did not complete the treatment. It was recommended that respondent participate in individual
counseling and medication monitoring, but she never followed through with those services.
Respondent did have an initial evaluation for substance abuse treatment. It was recommended
she receive Level II outpatient treatment and she was referred to Riverside Access Center from
which she was unsuccessfully discharged due to lack of attendance. Respondent’s substance
abuse treatment was sporadic throughout the life of the case and she never successfully
completed that treatment. Matykiewicz testified that respondent completed drug drops only
sporadically. She did not appear for some tests, and she tested positive for methamphetamine in
July 2019. Matykiewicz stated that she had received from the Scott County Jail a certificate
stating respondent had shown an interest in stopping the use of alcohol and drugs.
¶ 16 Matykiewicz indicated respondent had reported she was employed during the case, but
never provided verification of employment. Respondent also did not provide any verification of
income besides her oral statement. As for appropriate housing, respondent was residing with her
mother throughout the life of the case. However, a home-safety check was never completed due
to reports that respondent was bringing several unknown males to the house. Matykiewicz
indicated that respondent’s mother’s home was not a return home option. Visits were supervised
6 and went “fine.” Visits were initially once per week for two hours, but a decision was made to
decrease to one hour due to respondent not calling, confirming on time, or arriving late.
¶ 17 On cross-examination, Matykiewicz testified she had taken the case over from Cindy
Felske and had reviewed the documents Felske had prepared. Respondent was informed about
services at child and family team meetings which were held every couple of months.
Matykiewicz agreed respondent engaged in “a lot” of services, but she did not complete them.
Matykiewicz indicated that pursuant to the 2018 service plan, respondent had received an
evaluation at Robert Young in June 2018 and was prescribed medication. Respondent told
Matykiewicz on June 20, 2018, that she had been engaged in substance abuse treatment for about
six weeks. Matykiewicz verified with the treatment provider that respondent had been admitted
to Level II treatment but was unable to confirm her actual therapist. Matykiewicz visited
respondent at Scott County Jail once per month and testified that respondent participated in
programming at the jail and during the rest of the case. Respondent resumed visitation after her
release from Scott County Jail.
¶ 18 On redirect examination, Matykiewicz testified that respondent was expected to have
medication monitoring after an updated assessment in June 2018 but had run out of medication at
that time and she missed her appointment in July. Respondent did not complete her treatment at
Riverside because she was discharged for lack of attendance. There was a positive drug test for
methamphetamine in August 2018. Respondent reported at the February 2019 child and family
meeting that she was not taking medication. Respondent did not re-engage in a substance abuse
program after the initial discharge until she was in Scott County Jail. Respondent exhibited
satisfactory parenting abilities at visits. After she was released from jail, Matykiewicz informed
7 respondent how she could complete services she had begun in jail, but respondent did not follow
up on any of them.
¶ 19 Lynn Lohman testified that she was employed at Bethany as the division director for
child welfare and placement and was the supervisor in this case throughout its history. She
testified respondent’s housing was never evaluated because her lack of progress in services
precluded both home visits and a return home option. Matykiewicz left Bethany and respondent
had two other caseworkers prior to her January 2019 incarceration in the Logan Correctional
Facility.
¶ 20 Respondent was incarcerated at the time of the hearing and attended in the custody of the
Department of Corrections. She was 32 years old and was currently in a romantic relationship
with Robert V., whom she had known for 18 years. She had provided the caseworker with
identifying information for Robert. She testified that her probation following a felony drug
possession conviction in August 2018 had been revoked and she was sentenced in January 2019
for a two-year term. Her scheduled release date was January 12, 2021.
¶ 21 Prior to her incarceration, she had been employed part-time at a boarding and grooming
company in Bettendorf, Iowa for about four and a half months and stated she had worked at
Petco for almost three months. She did not get pay stubs from Petco, but she had shown
Matykiewicz her work schedule. She claimed she was “technically” never unemployed during
this case because she could do pet sitting and grooming from her house, which would make her
self-employed. Respondent denied ever talking with Matykiewicz on the phone but claimed she
left unanswered messages for Lohman multiple times. Throughout the case she lived in her
mother’s house in Moline. Her mother is elderly, has COPD, had had her hip replaced and
required a walker and wheelchair to get around. From August 2017 until the end of February
8 2019, respondent’s mother was living with the relative caregivers. During the case, respondent’s
boyfriend, her brother, and her cousin, had lived at the house. Respondent claimed that
caseworker Cindy Felske completed a home-safety check. While incarcerated, a doctor known to
her only as “Dr. Scott” prescribed medication that she had to have filled when she was released.
¶ 22 Respondent testified she went to the Robert Young Mental Health Center “at least eight
times throughout a two-year course” and before that went to Country Oaks. Respondent stated
she completed three out of five domestic violence courses at Scott County Jail with “Mara” from
Family Resources. Respondent was unable to complete the program because Mara received a
promotion, and the courses were no longer offered at Scott County Jail. She claimed she
contacted Family Resources after she was released and was told she had to wait until classes
began again and would have to start over. She attempted substance abuse treatment four times,
twice with Riverside and twice with “CADS.” She testified that she had completed 64 of 75
hours before she was taken into custody in Mercer County.
¶ 23 Respondent was also involved with Alcoholics Anonymous. She was on a waiting list for
substance abuse treatment at DOC. The next group would start in a “couple weeks” and last
approximately 11 weeks. She also signed up for values and relationship skills, “Mommy and Me
Program,” and domestic violence courses. She felt she had made valid efforts and attempts to
complete her services. She learned how to appropriately behave around family members and
friends, whom she should be around if she wanted to be a role model for her children and be a
productive member of society. Respondent stated that she did not need additional services to
parent her children. She did not provide pay stubs to verify employment because she “had one
pay stub” and then shortly after the caseworker never asked for a pay stub and did not say she
needed any other form of verification for employment at Petco.
9 ¶ 24 After hearing arguments from the State, respondent, and the Guardian ad litem, the court
orally issued its findings of fact and ruling. The court noted that after adjudication respondent
was placed on probation, committed two new crimes, and was sent to prison. It also noted
respondent did not successfully complete any substance abuse treatment program, the mental
health counseling program, or a domestic violence program. Finally, the court noted respondent
never provided verification of employment. The court stated that, listening to respondent testify,
it appeared respondent had anger in her voice and was blaming Bethany and the caseworkers for
her problems. It perceived respondent as someone who did not want to cooperate.
¶ 25 The court found that during the relevant period respondent did not put forth sufficient
effort. It found the evidence both clear and convincing that respondent did not make reasonable
progress during either period. It further found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent
failed to maintain a reasonable degree of responsibility for the child’s welfare throughout the
case. The court held respondent was unfit by clear and convincing evidence. A written finding of
unfitness and order as to respondent was filed March 16, 2020.
¶ 26 Bethany subsequently filed a best interest report. The report indicated M.D. was six years
of age and had been in relative foster care since August 21, 2017. The minor’s basic health,
safety, educational, and well-being needs were consistently met by the relative caregivers. M.D.
took dance lessons and was in her second year of lessons. She was a member of the YMCA
where she took swimming lessons and participated in Kids Night Out monthly activities. It was
reported M.D. was doing well in school. The relative caregivers had been married for 43 years.
They resided in a two-bedroom home in Moline. They had worked for their employer for 30
years. M.D. was bonded to the foster parents and wanted to continue living with them. They
wished to adopt M.D. Florence C., the foster mother, and M.D. spent a lot of time together doing
10 homework, activities, projects, and more. M.D. had two paternal siblings and one maternal
sibling. She had regular contact with her maternal sibling and with other extended family
members. The caseworker recommended that it was in the best interest of M.D. to terminate
respondent’s parental rights.
¶ 27 A best interest hearing was conducted on July 27, 2020. Vickie Wickersham, the
caseworker on the file since December 2019, and respondent testified.
¶ 28 Wickersham testified M.D. had sibling visitation with her youngest sibling, her brother.
Wickersham indicated that M.D. had contact with her two other siblings when she visited with
her paternal grandmother prior to COVID-19. M.D. was placed in relative placement with her
legal uncle. The relative caregivers were in their mid-60s. Merle C., the foster father, was
diagnosed with cancer in April 2020 and was receiving treatment. He reported the cancer had not
spread. Wickersham testified that, even if Merle C. passed away, Florence C. would still be able
to adopt M.D. Visitation with respondent was to be continued while she was in DOC. However,
visits were being arranged when COVID occurred, and no visits occurred. There were no
restrictions on phone calls for M.D. Wickersham testified that, when respondent was released
from prison, she requested visitation, which was scheduled. However, respondent subsequently
went to jail in Iowa. She was then released from jail and was requesting visitation with M.D.
Wickersham indicated that no one specifically asked M.D. about her desire for visitation.
¶ 29 With regard to her periods of incarceration, Respondent testified that she was sentenced
on January 14, 2019, left Mercer County in January 2019, was in Logan Correctional for 38
days, then transferred to Decatur Correctional Center. Respondent was released from DOC on
July 10, 2020. Respondent was taken into custody on a warrant for probation violation out of
Scott County, Iowa, and held from July 13 to July 23, 2020. Respondent was currently on parole
11 from Illinois. Prior to going to prison, respondent had weekly visits with M.D. for one hour at the
Bethany office. She was also allowed to call the foster home and talk to M.D. Respondent stated
she called every day but talked to M.D. two to three times a week. She did not have visitation
while she was in custody in Mercer, nor did she have any phone calls with the minor. She did not
have visits while she was at Logan. She stated she tried calling while she was at Logan, but no
one picked up.
¶ 30 Respondent did not have visits while she was at Decatur. Video visitation was allowed,
but respondent asserted the foster mother would not allow it. She claimed she called every day
while at Decatur, but she was only able to talk with M.D. twice. Respondent indicated that,
during the phone calls, M.D. was very excited about talking to her. Respondent stated she wrote
M.D. while she was incarcerated and received a card from M.D. When she was released from
DOC, respondent immediately requested a visit. The visit was arranged for July 14, but she was
picked up by Scott County on July 13. She was still on probation from Scott County. Respondent
testified that now she has been released, she was going to be evaluated for treatment. She stated
that this time would be different because “in six months I will be done with treatment” and she
had a parole officer. She testified that the parole officer did not see any issues “as long as
everything goes smoothly” and respondent did what she was supposed to do.
¶ 31 At the close of the arguments, the court presented its findings of fact and ruling. The
court noted that M.D. had been with the relative caregivers for a significant period. M.D.
understands her background, family ties, and her personal identity because the caregivers are
related to respondent. The relative caregivers were both working and providing a home, dance
lessons, and swimming lessons. They were acting as the parents, providing for M.D.’s health and
safety with no indication that they could not continue to do so. The court stated it heard no
12 evidence that M.D. was not attached in any way to the relative caregivers. It also stated they
could not wait forever for the parents to “get their act together.” Finally, the court stated it had
not heard any affirmative evidence that respondent was ready to “step into the shoes to be a
mother.” It indicated respondent had been given an opportunity all these years, but she had not
taken advantage of it. The court found it was in M.D.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s
parental rights. It subsequently issued a written order of termination on December 18, 2020.
¶ 32 On September 29, 2020, respondent filed a joint motion with Joshua D. to disqualify
Assistant State’s Attorney Jeffrey S. McKinley because of an alleged conflict of interest.
McKinley represented the State at all hearings regarding the case, except during a medical leave
of absence from June to September 2020. The motion alleged that McKinley had a preexisting,
undisclosed social relationship with M.D.’s foster mother, Florence C., through activities in local
politics. Florence C. was Precinct Committeeman for the same political party for which
McKinley was the local treasurer. Facebook postings were attached as exhibits demonstrating the
relationship. (C706) The first exhibit is a post from August 1, 2020, with a correspondence
between McKinley and Florence C. The second exhibit is a post from September 5, 2016 in
which Florence C. voices her support for McKinley’s campaign for Circuit Clerk and is shown
marching in a parade on behalf of McKinley. Among other things, the motion requested that the
court reinstate the permanency goal to return home within 12 months.
¶ 33 The court issued an order denying the joint motion. The court noted that the State’s
Attorney’s discretion “under the Juvenile Court Act is not absolute,” because any agency “may
file a petition initiating a child protection proceeding.” It further noted that if “a particular case
passed a legal screen, DCFS is required to ask the State’s Attorney to file a petition to terminate
parental right” and the assigned attorney must file the requested petition if he “determine[d] that
13 statutory circumstances” warrant it. Finally, the court noted that, as a prosecutor, McKinley had a
duty to act “in good faith free of any bias or prejudice.” It found no evidence to conclude that
McKinley “acted in bad faith in his handling of his case.” It concluded that “the marching in
parade or the holding the elected office of precinct committeeman while McKinley was a
treasurer of the same political party did not rise to the level of conflict of interest” prohibited by
the rules of professional conduct.
¶ 34 Respondent now appeals.
¶ 35 ANALYSIS
¶ 36 On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred in (1) finding her unfit, (2)
terminating her parental rights, and (3) denying the joint motion to disqualify McKinley. We
reject respondent’s arguments and affirm the court’s orders.
¶ 37 I. The Termination of Respondent’s Parental Rights
¶ 38 Parental rights may be involuntarily terminated where (1) the State proves, by clear and
convincing evidence, that a parent is unfit pursuant to grounds set forth in Section 1(D) of the
Adoption Act, and (2) the trial court finds that termination is in the child’s best interests. 750
ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2019); In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill.2d 234, 244 (2006). The State is not
required to prove every ground it has alleged for finding a parent unfit. In re K.I., 2016 IL App
(3d) 160010, ¶ 37 (citing In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d 340, 349 (2005)). “A parent’s rights may
be terminated if even a single alleged ground for unfitness is supported by clear and convincing
evidence.” Id.
¶ 39 Pursuant to the Adoption Act, a parent is unfit if she failed “to make reasonable progress
toward the return of the child to the parent during any [nine]-month period following the
adjudication of neglected or abused minor.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2019). Reasonable
14 progress under section 1(D)(m)(ii) requires “demonstrable movement toward the goal of
reunification.” In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d 181, 211 (2001). On review, the trial court’s fitness
determination will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re
K.I., 2016 IL App (3d) 160010, ¶ 38 (citing In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d at 354). A court’s
decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly
apparent. Id.
¶ 40 It was respondent’s substance abuse problems that caused the removal of M.D. from her
custody. We conclude that the evidence at the fitness showed that respondent failed to
successfully complete any of the drug treatment services ordered by the trial court during the
designated nine-month periods. In August 2018, respondent tested positive for
methamphetamine. Bethany caseworker Matykiewicz testified that, during the relevant periods,
respondent’s participation in the drug treatment services was “sporadic” leading to her discharge
for lack of attendance. Respondent did not re-engage in a substance abuse program after the
initial discharge until she was held in Scott County jail. After her release in July 2019,
respondent told Matykiewicz that she could complete the services she began in jail, but she did
not follow up on any of them.
¶ 41 On a petition for termination of parental rights, once a finding of unfitness has been
made, all considerations must yield to the best interest of the child. In re O.S., 364 Ill. App. 3d
628, 633 (3rd Dist. 2006). At this stage of the proceedings, the State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. In
re D.T., 212 Ill.2d 347 (2004). The trial court’s decision requires consideration of statutory
factors, including, inter alia: (1) the physical safety and welfare of the child, including food,
shelter, clothing, and health; (2) the development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s
15 background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious; (4) the child’s sense of
attachments; (5) the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties, including
church, school, and friends; (7) the child’s need for permanence; (8) the uniqueness of every
family and child; (9) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and (10) the
preference of the persons available to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1–3(4.05) (West 2019).
The trial court’s task requires the court to balance these factors, weighing them at the first
instance, and places the court “in a better position to see the witnesses and judge their
credibility.” In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71 (internal citations and quotations marks
omitted). Thus, on review, we accord the trial court’s determination in a termination proceeding
great deference and will not reverse it unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re O.S., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 633.
¶ 42 The relevant factors in this case show that the trial court’s termination order was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. First, the evidence on M.D.’s physical safety and
welfare favors terminating respondent’s rights. The best interest report indicated basic health,
safety, educational, and well-being needs were consistently met by the relative caregivers. M.D.
was in her second year of dance lessons and was taking swimming lessons. It was also reported
M.D. was doing well in school.
¶ 43 Second, through her relative caregivers, M.D. had been able to maintain her family ties,
and create a sense of attachments with her foster parents. The foster father Merle C. was
respondent’s uncle and M.D.’s legal uncle. Through him M.D. has been able to maintain her ties
and develop her identity. M.D. had sibling visitation with her brother and maintained contact
with her two other siblings prior to COVID-19 when she visited her paternal grandmother.
Respondent also had visitation rights and unlimited access to M.D. via telephone until she was
16 arrested and incarcerated for drug possession. Although Merle C. has been diagnosed with
cancer, he has since reported positive response to treatment. In addition, the report included
evidence that M.D. had bonded with her foster mother Florence C., spending a lot of time doing
homework, activities, projects and more. Caseworker Wickersham testified that even if Merle C.
passed away, Florence C. would still be able to adopt M.D.
¶ 44 Finally, the relative caregivers are in a better position to meet M.D.’s need for
permanence and structure. At the fitness hearing, director Lohman testified that respondent lived
in her mother’s house and lacked independent housing. Moreover, her mother’s home was never
evaluated because respondent never progressed far enough in services to consider moving even
the weekly visits to the home. There is no evidence that respondent has a suitable residence for
M.D. and her brother or that she can earn sufficient income to secure appropriate housing. By
contrasts, the evidence showed that the caregivers had been married for 43 years. They resided in
a two-bedroom home in Moline and had worked with the same employer for 30 years. M.D. was
six years old at the time of the hearing and had been living with the relative caregivers for at
least two years. Thus, the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights is amply
supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 45 II. The Motion to Disqualify the Assistant State’s Attorney McKinley
¶ 46 A trial court’s decision on whether to disqualify counsel will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion. In re Estate of M.L., 2018 IL App (3d) 170712, ¶ 23. “An abuse of discretion
occurs where no reasonable person would agree with the position adopted by the trial court.”
Schwartz v. Cortelloni, 177 Ill. 2d 166, 176 (1997). A party seeking to disqualify opposing
counsel bears a heavy burden of proving a conflict of interest. In re Estate of M.L., 2018 IL App
(3d) 170712, ¶ 22.
17 ¶ 47 Respondent argues that the trial court erred in denying the joint motion to disqualify
Assistant State’s Attorney McKinley. In the motion, respondent and Joshua D. allege that
McKinley had a pre-existing political relationship with Florence C. They make two specific
claims: first, that McKinley was the treasurer of the same political party for which Florence C.
served as a precinct committeeman; and second, that Florence C. participated in a parade in
support of McKinley’s political campaign for county clerk. On appeal, respondent contends that
this political activity created a personal relationship that should be considered a conflict of
interest, running afoul of Rules 1.7(a)(2) and 1.11 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.
We disagree and affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to disqualify.
¶ 48 Illinois Supreme Court rules are interpreted under the same principles that govern the
interpretation of statutes. People v. Santiago, 236 Ill.2d 417, 428 (2010). If the language of the
rule is clear and unambiguous, the rule will be given its plain and ordinary meaning without
resorting to further aids of statutory construction. Id. “One of the fundamental principles of
statutory construction is viewing all the provisions of an enactment as a whole.” Id. Words and
phrases in a rule should be “interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute.” Id.
¶ 49 Rule 1.11 governs special conflicts of interest for current government officers and states
that a lawyer currently serving as a public officer “shall not (i) participate in a matter in which
the lawyer participated personally and substantially while he was in private practice or non-
government employment; or (ii) negotiate for private employment with parties to a matter
involving the government matter.” Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct R. 1.11(d)(2). It incorporates by
reference Rule 1.7. Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct R. 1.11(d)(1). Rule 1.7 prohibits a lawyer from
representing a client in a matter that “involves a concurrent conflict of interest. Ill. R. Prof’l
Conduct R. 1.7(a). Subparagraph (a)(2) states that such conflict exists where “there is a
18 significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited *** by a
personal interest of the lawyer.” Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7(a)(2).
¶ 50 The conflict alleged by respondent and Joshua D. does not fit squarely within the type of
conflicts recognized in the code, but we can derive some concepts against which to evaluate
whether the alleged relationship requires disqualification. We conclude that there is no
“significant risk” that McKinley’s prosecution of the case was either “materially limited” or
affected by the alleged personal relationship with Florence C. First, the political “connection”
described in the motion is, standing alone, too attenuated to create the type of personal interest
prohibited under Rule 1.7(a)(2). Although both Florence C. and McKinley were members of and
held offices in the same political party, Florence C. had neither the ability nor the authority to
determine the success of McKinley’s campaign for electoral office. Nor did the motion allege or
present any evidence that Florence C. offered McKinley any assistance greater than that of any
other member of the Rock Island County electorate.
¶ 51 Second, a significant risk of material limitation was unlikely in such a case involving
termination of parental rights. Although McKinley had discretion to proceed with the termination
proceeding against respondent, his discretion was not absolute. “Any adult person, any agency or
association by its representative may file, or the court on its own motion, consistent with the
health, safety and best interests of the minor may direct the filing through the State’s Attorney of
a petition in respect of a minor under this Act.” 705 ILCS 405/2-13(1) (2019). Under the statute,
“the State’s Attorney and the circuit court share the concurrent duty to ensure the best interests of
the child, the child’s family, and the community.” In re D.S., 198 Ill. 2d 309, 332 (2001).
¶ 52 In this case, Bethany filed a status alert, which recommended changing the goal to
substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights. The court ordered
19 that the goal be changed consistent with that recommendation, and the State subsequently filed a
supplemental petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Thus, because the court
exercised its discretion and its duty and ordered the change in status, we conclude that
proceeding with the termination petition was not motivated by or initiated on account of any
alleged political connection between McKinley and Florence C. We find no evidence of a
conflict requiring McKinley’s disqualification.
¶ 53 CONCLUSION
¶ 54 The judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed.
¶ 55 Affirmed