In re McMonagle

41 Misc. 407, 3 Liquor Tax Rep. 223, 84 N.Y.S. 1068
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 15, 1903
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 41 Misc. 407 (In re McMonagle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re McMonagle, 41 Misc. 407, 3 Liquor Tax Rep. 223, 84 N.Y.S. 1068 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1903).

Opinion

Kellogg, John M., J.

The petitioner seeks-a revocation of the liquor tax certificate at the Riverside Hotel at the village of Rensselaer Falls upon the ground of false statements made by respondent in the application for said certificate. Her husband, the manager of the business, owned the premises and they resided there and were familiar with the property and its surroundings, had. been hotel-keepers for years and he had previously been convicted under the Excise Law for two offenses, and they each had knowledge of the situation and were familiar with the Excise Law.

First. The dining-room contained only 144 feet of floor space instead of 150 as shown by the statement. Nevertheless all guests at the house received reasonable accommodations at the table, and when the dining-room was full guests were seated at the table in the sitting-room, a room not connected with the other dining-room or kitchen except through the main hall. Another dining-room is in process of erection and the court would hesitate to revoke a certificate upon this matter standing alone.

Second. The hotel does not comply with the law with reference to the bedrooms, and the-statements made by the respondent in that respect are false. When the application [409]*409was made and a certificate granted there were hut six rooms in the hotel furnished as bedrooms and one of these rooms did not have an independent access by a door opening into the hallway, but about a month after the certificate was granted the excise department called attention to this defect and a door was cut from the hall into this room and we need not consider that matter further. The family of the respondent consists of herself and husband, and they had one servant and at times more. When the application for the certificate was made, June eighteenth, the respondent and her husband occupied one of the six bedrooms. The certificate was received June twentieth; and the sale of liquor on the premises was not begun until June twenty-second. Upon June twenty-second the respondent and her husband slept in a bed which they had put up in the hallway of the hotel into which the five sleeping-rooms in the second story opened, and since that time they have occupied such hallway as their bedroom, there being no partition or screen of any kind between the bed and the remainder of the hall. Ordinary bedroom furniture and their clothing are kept in that part of the hall. The servant, when there was but one, slept in the attic. At the time this proceeding was commenced a second servant was employed, and a lop was fitted up in the lower hall from which the remaining bedroom opens, and she occupied that hall for a sleeping-room for about a week when the bedroom in the new addition to the hotel was arranged and a bed for both the servants moved into it. We do not think this is a compliance within the statutory requirement that there shall be at least six bedrooms exclusive of those occupied by the family and servants. The respondent has in fact made the hall, into which the other bedrooms open, her bedroom. A guest arriving late, or departing early, or desiring to leave his room in the night, must pass through the sleeping-room of the respondent and her husband to gain access to the hall below or the street. And the evidence shows that guests passed through the hallway while the respondent was in bed, only screened from observation by the bed clothes. This arrangement does not constitute a hotel as defined by the stat[410]*410ute. When the statement was made and certificate granted there were hut five bedrooms aside from the one occupied by the respondent, and her removal into the hall into which these bedrooms opened does not cure the defect but now presents a situation where under section 28, subdivision 2, of the Liquor Tax Law “ The holder of said certificate was not entitled to receive or hold the same.”

Third. There were buildings used exclusively as residences, the nearest entrance to which were within 200 féet of the nearest entrance to the premises where the liquor was to be sold, and the statements in that respect were false.

The Riverside Hotel,.up to the granting of this certificate, was a residence, a frame building all under one roof and nearly square. A hall ran through the building from the front to the rear on the ground floor. There was a door opening into this hall from the street in front, and another from the hall at the back of the house. Along near the center of the hall was a stairway, and from this stairway to the back of the building the hall was narrowed up. On the easterly side of the hall and building the room in front was the sitting-room, the next the dining-room and in the rear the kitchen. Upon the other side of the hall was the parlor (at first the barroom and now the office), immediately back of it the bedroom (at first a bedroom and now a barroom), and in the rear a storeroom (now a bedroom). Each of these rooms opened into the hall by a door. The distance from the front door to the front entrance to the residence of the petitioner was 190.95 feet; the distance from the back door to the front entrance to the residence of the petitioner was 180.4 feet; the distance from the back door to the front entrance of the residence of Mr. Redell, was 191.5 feet. This situation remained the same until Monday, the twenty-second of June, when the respondent caused the front door to be closed up, a window put in its place and a new entrance made into the barroom, which was in the northwesterly corner of the house where had been the parlor, the new entrance being 205.3 feet from the McMonagle entrance. When the respondent swore to the statement be[411]*411fore the attorney for the surety company which furnished her bond, he informed her that making the application before the front door was closed would not cause her any trouble if such door actually was closed up before any liquor was sold. She received the liquor tax certificate on Saturday evening, June twentieth, and Monday morning, June twenty-second, proceeded to close up the old entrance door, and no liquor was sold until after it was closed. After the old main entrance was closed the only entrance to the hotel was by the new entrance, through the barroom, or by the back door referred to. After being there a month the bar was put in a room back of the first barroom and a new door cut into it, the old barroom being used as an office, so that then the entrances to the hotel were the new entrance leading into the office, the new entrance leading into the barroom and the back entrance leading into the back hall. Between the barroom and the rear outside wall of the building was a small bedroom about 8 x 10 feet and by entering the back hall from the rear door a person is within eight or ten feet of the barroom and has only to open a door to- enter it. It does not appear that the new addition to the hotel remedies the defect as to this side entrance in any way or leaves this entrance outside of the prohibited distance from these dwellings. It must, therefore, be assumed that the situation as to it remains the same as when the application was made, and that it is not being changed.

Subdivision 8 of section 17 of the Liquor Tax Law requires the consent of owners of a dwelling, the “ nearest entrance ” of which is within two hundred feet measured in a straight line of the nearest entrance * * * to the premises

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Related

People ex rel. Higgins v. Hegeman
75 Misc. 163 (New York County Courts, 1912)

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Bluebook (online)
41 Misc. 407, 3 Liquor Tax Rep. 223, 84 N.Y.S. 1068, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-mcmonagle-nysupct-1903.