In re McHugh

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re McHugh

36 A.D.2d 207, 319 N.Y.S.2d 779, 1971 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4370

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 1, 1971

StatusPublished

This text of 36 A.D.2d 207 (In re McHugh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re McHugh, 36 A.D.2d 207, 319 N.Y.S.2d 779, 1971 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4370 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1971).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The respondent was admitted to practice in the First Judicial Department on June 10, 1942. The crux of the charge is that he delayed for a period of close to two years to file a petition for letters of administration and failed fully to co-operate with counsel of petitioner’s Committee on Grievances. The report of the Referee finding the charges to have been sustained is supported by the evidence and is confirmed.

We take into consideration the respondent’s forthright testimony at the hearing, the fact that the charge arose as a result of one isolated incident, and it does not seem to appear that respondent has ever been the subject of any other charge. Nevertheless, the respondent did delay the processing of the petition for letters of administration. This breach of professional conduct cannot be countenanced. Accordingly, the respondent should be censured.

Capozzoli, J. P., McGivebn, Mabkewich, Nunez and Kupbebman, JJ., concur.

Respondent censured.

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Per Curiam.

The respondent was admitted to practice in the First Judicial Department on June 10, 1942. The crux of the charge is that he delayed for a period of close to two years to file a petition for letters of administration and failed fully to co-operate with counsel of petitioner’s Committee on Grievances. The report of the Referee finding the charges to have been sustained is supported by the evidence and is confirmed.

We take into consideration the respondent’s forthright testimony at the hearing, the fact that the charge arose as a result of one isolated incident, and it does not seem to appear that respondent has ever been the subject of any other charge. Nevertheless, the respondent did delay the processing of the petition for letters of administration. This breach of professional conduct cannot be countenanced. Accordingly, the respondent should be censured.

Capozzoli, J. P., McGivebn, Mabkewich, Nunez and Kupbebman, JJ., concur.

Respondent censured.

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Bluebook (online)

36 A.D.2d 207, 319 N.Y.S.2d 779, 1971 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4370, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-mchugh-nyappdiv-1971.