In Re McFadyen

216 B.R. 1006, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 149, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 39, 1998 WL 28155
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedJanuary 20, 1998
DocketBankruptcy 97-2870-BKC-3F3
StatusPublished

This text of 216 B.R. 1006 (In Re McFadyen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re McFadyen, 216 B.R. 1006, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 149, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 39, 1998 WL 28155 (Fla. 1998).

Opinion

*1007 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

JERRY A. FUNK, Bankruptcy Judge.

This Case is before the Court on an Objection to Claim 8 (Doe. 29) and a Motion to Value Federal Tax Lien (Claim 8) (Doc. 28), both filed by Patricia Lee McFadyen (“Debtor”). The Court held a hearing on November 26, 1997. Based on the evidence presented, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The parties entered a Stipulation of Facts concerning the background facts of this Case. (Doc. 46). The Debtor purchased her homestead residence (the “Property”) in October of 1992 in her sole name as a single woman. Her name at that time was Patricia Lee Sevier. In November 1993, the Debtor quit-claimed the deed from herself to herself and Daniel John McFadyen II (“McFadyen”). The Debtor and McFadyen married November 26, 1994. The Debtor has resided at the Property from October 1992 when she purchased it until the present date. The Internal Revenue Service (“I.R.S.”) filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien with Clay County Official Records on October 16, 1995 for the taxable years 1990, 1991, and 1992. The parties stipulate that if the Debtor’s Property were sold as of the petition filing date, the amount realized would be $85,500.00. The Property is encumbered by a first mortgage in favor of Francis Spede dated October 30, 1992. The amount of the first mortgage due and owing as of the petition filing date is $63,559.73. The Debtor had failed to pay the ad valorem property tax on the Property for a number of years. The Property was scheduled to be sold for taxes on May 21, 1997. The Debtor was required to pay $4,774.86 to redeem the tax certificates in full. Debtor recently filed income tax returns for the following years, which reflected the following tax liability:

Year Tax per Return
1993 $1,811 (per Amended Return)
1994 $2,207
1995 $ 784
1996 $ 797

The Court held a hearing on November 26, 1997 where the following relevant facts came to light. The Debtor filed her voluntary Chapter 13 Petition on April 17, 1997 (Doc. 1). On Schedule A, “Real Property,” Debtor listed as her “Homestead” property located at 1806 Farm Way, Middleburg, FL, (“Property”) with a current market value of her interest in the Property without deductions for any secured claim or exemption as $82,-000. (Schedule A). She listed the amount of a secured claim on the Property as $67,-103.12. (Schedule A). Debtor also listed the Property on Schedule C as exempt pursuant to Article X, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution as her homestead. (Schedule C). On Schedule D, Debtor listed Francis Spede as holding a secured claim, a “Purchase Money Mortgage” in the amount of $63,500. (Schedule D).

The I.R.S. filed Proof of Claim 8 in the amount of $18,927.73: $8,017.33 as secured, representing taxes for years 1990-1992 and $10,910.40 as unsecured, priority, representing estimated taxes for years 1993-1996.

On September 25, 1997, Debtor filed a Motion to Value Federal Tax Liens (Claim 8) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 502 and 506(a) (Doc. 28) and an Objection to Claim 8 (Doc. 29). Both the Motion and the Objection claim that the amount of the I.R.S.’s secured claim should be equal to the fair market value of the property owned by the Debtor as of the petition date, which equals $2,700, the value of her personal property listed in Schedule B. Debtor further asserts that her interest in the Property is valueless under any accepted valuation method.

The I.R.S. filed a Response to both the Motion to Value (Doc. 35) and to the Objection to Claim 8 (Doc. 34), in which the I.R.S. claims that it has valid secured claims for 1990, 1991, and 1992, which are secured by the Debtor’s equity in her Property. 1 Be *1008 cause the Debtor concedes secured status by the I.R.S. of $2,700, the I.R.S. contends that the balance of its secured claim, $5,317.33, is secured by virtue of Debtor’s ownership in the Property. The I.R.S. further contends that because the assessment for the 1991 taxes was made on June 10, 1991, prior to any conveyance by the Debtor, this assessment in the amount of $964.70 is secured by 100% of the value of the Property. Furthermore, the I.R.S. asserts that the balance of its secured claim, $4,352.63 ($5,317.33 minus $964.70) is secured by virtue of the Debtor’s current ownership in the Property. The equity in the Property is $17,165.41. 2 The I.R.S. claims that the fair market value of the Debtor’s interest in the Property is either (a) 100% of the equity in the Property or $17,-165.41; (b) 50% of the equity in the Property or $8,582.70; or (c) 95% of the equity as she listed her interest on Schedule B as $82,000 and stipulated that the fair market value is $85,500, therefore, making her interest 95% of the total equity or $16,307.13.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The issue the Court is called upon to decide is how much additional value is to be given to the secured claim of. the I.R.S. by virtue of the fact of the Debtor’s ownership interest in the Property, which is her homestead. It having been established that the 1.R.S. has filed a secured claim for $8,017.33 for tax years 1990, 1991, and 1992, and the Debtor has conceded that the I.R.S. is secured to the extent the $2,700 in Debtor’s nonexempt personal property, the Court must specifically determine what of that balance, $5,317.33, is secured by Debtor’s current ownership in the Property.

First addressing the issue of whether the I.R.S. can have a secured lien on the Debtor’s Property as it is her homestead, the Court finds that Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for a Federal Tax Lien to attach to any property owned by the taxed party, stating in pertinent part:

If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.
26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1997).

Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code allows for a debtor to exempt certain property from the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1997). Pursuant to Section 522(b), Florida has opted out of the federal exemptions found in Section 522(d); therefore, the exemptions available to a debtor filing in the state of Florida are those proscribed by Florida law. The exemption at issue in this Cáse is the homestead exemption, as set forth in Article X, Sec. 4 of the Florida Constitution. 3

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450 F.2d 62 (Fifth Circuit, 1971)
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In Re Carr
185 B.R. 892 (M.D. Florida, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
216 B.R. 1006, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 149, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 39, 1998 WL 28155, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-mcfadyen-flmb-1998.