In re McCormick

2 Gibb. Surr. 350, 22 Misc. 309, 49 N.Y.S. 1119
CourtNew York Surrogate's Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1898
StatusPublished

This text of 2 Gibb. Surr. 350 (In re McCormick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Surrogate's Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re McCormick, 2 Gibb. Surr. 350, 22 Misc. 309, 49 N.Y.S. 1119 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1898).

Opinion

Abbott, S.

Eliot McCormick died on October 10, 1891, leaving a last will which was admitted to probate by the Surrogate’s Court of the county of Kings.

The testator left him surviving his widow, the petitioner in this proceeding, and a daughter, Theodora, who was of the age of six months at the time of his decease.

By his will he devised to his widow his residence, then in course of construction, upon Dean street, which was of the value of about $16,500.

This property passed to the petitioner subject to a mortgage of $7',000 thereon. That mortgage has since been paid off by the petitioner and a new mortgage obtained to secure the sum of.$8,000. These premises are not now occupied by-the peli-[351]*351tioner, but are rented by ber and yield a net annual rental of-about the sum of $150.

The said will gave and devised the testator’s residuary estate to Edgar W. Abbott and Charles C. Cumings, the respondents herein, in trust as to one-half thereof to pay the income to his wife for life, with remainder, upon her decease, to his children, and as to the other one-half in trust " to divido the same into as many equal shares as I have children surviving me, and to set apart one share for each child and to apply the net income of each child’s share to the support, maintenance and education of said child until such child arrives a.t the age of twenty-one years, when the principal of such share shall be paid to such child. Should any child die before attaining that age, the share of such child shall be distributed and conveyed in equal shares to his issue, if any; and in default of such issue, to my other then surviving children, and to the issue of any deceased child, in equal shares per stirpes, such issue to take the share which such child would take if living.”

The petitioner and respondents in this proceeding were appointed guardians of testator’s children, and the respondents were appointed trustees to carry out the provisions of the will.

The net income derived from the trust estate amounts to be*tween-$2,500 and $2,800 per year. Since the testator’s decease, one-half of this net income has been regularly paid to the potilioner, and such portion of the remaining one-half of said income has been paid to the petitioner for the support, maintenance and education of the said infant as the petitioner and respondents have mutually and from time to time agreed upon.

No differences of opinion as to the amount necessary to be applied to such purpose seem to have arisen between the petitioner and respondents until the month of February, 1897. Their relations until that time were entirely harmonious, and no differences of opinion existed as to the sufficiency of the amount paid over for the support and maintenance of the infant Theodora.

[352]*352The income of both mother and daughter will be about doubled within a few years from an additional fund of upward of $50,000 which will accrue to the estate of Eliot McCormick.

In February, 1897, the petitioner married Mr. Charles IT. McDonald of the city of New York, and immediately thereafter claimed and insisted that it -was the duty of the trustees, under the provisions of said last will and testament, to pay to her for the support and maintenance of said infant the entire net income realized from the one-half share of the trust estate invested for the infant’s benefit, as well as all accumulations of income then in the hands of the trustees.

The matters which are really material to this application, contained in the moving and answering papers submitted to me, are very brief. The voluminous petitions and affidavits presented are made up, to a large degree, of utterly and entirely irrelevant and immaterial matter which has ho bearing whatever upon the true issue presented for my determination.

It is but fair to the trustees appointed under the said last will and testament, in view of the numerous suggestions and intimations contained in the moving papers of the petitioner, reflecting upon the performance of their trust duties by the respondents, that I should here state that the conduct and management of the said trust estate by the respondents has been peculiarly able, careful, wise and judicious, and so far from being subject to any adverse criticism by reason of such management, they are entitled to the thanks of both the petitioner and the infant for their wise and careful administration of this trust.

■The income of Mr. McDonald at the time of his marriage to the petitioner was about the sum of $3,600 per year. The income of the petitioner derived from the estate of Eliot McCormick amounts to about the sum of $1,500 per year.

At the time of petitioner’s marriage to Mr. McDonald h© was occupying a small apartment in the city of New York, for which- he paid an annual rental of $800. After his mar-[353]*353xiage, the apartment proved insufficient for the adequate accommodation of his larger family, consisting of himself his wife, his own son, by a former marriage, of the age of eleven years, and the infant Theodora McCormick, who is now’ of the age of seven years, and he rented a three-story house in the upper part of New York, on St. Nicholas avenue, at an annual rental of $1,200, for the better accommodation of his family.

The sole question to be determined by me in this proceeding is whether the direction contained in the will of Eliot McCormick, “ to apply the net income of each child’s share to the support, maintenance and education of said child, until such child arrives at the age of twenty-one years,” renders it necessary for (he trustees to apply all of such net income every year to such support, maintenance and education, without reference to the wants and reasonable requirements of the infant, or whether such trustees are vested with a. reasonable discretion, in respect of the amount of such net income which shall be so applied in view of the age, surroundings-and general environment of the infant. ' ■

It is strennonsly contended, in behalf of the petitioner, that the trustees are empowered to exercise no discretion whatsoever in this regard, but must apply each and every year the total amount of the net income derived from the trust estate to tho support, maintenance and.education of the infant; while on the other hand, it is contended with equal force, that tho duty is cast upon the trustees to exercise a reasonable discretion and judgment in the disbursement of such net income.

A few of the principles discussed in briefs of both counsel aro well settled and may he eliminated from this discussion, and without the necessity of citation of aeathorities.

1. Whenever a parent, -whether father or mother, is possessed of an ample income, and is able to support, maintain and educate his minor child, the duty is cast upon him by law so to do, without calling upon such infant-for any contribution thereto.

2. If, however, the parent has a limited income, while the [354]*354infant is possessed of a.

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Bluebook (online)
2 Gibb. Surr. 350, 22 Misc. 309, 49 N.Y.S. 1119, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-mccormick-nysurct-1898.