In re M.B.

2021 IL App (4th) 210183-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: July 21, 2021
• Docket: 4-21-0183
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under 2021 IL App (4th) 210183-U July 21, 2021 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender th not precedent except in the NO. 4-21-0183 4 District Appellate limited circumstances allowed Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re M.B., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Vermilion County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 19JA106 v. ) Jerry B., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Thomas M. O’Shaughnessy, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Harris and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court’s neglect finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2 In September 2019, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship as to

M.B. (born in July 2017), the minor child of respondent, Jerry B., asserting the minor child was

neglected. After a November 2020 adjudicatory hearing, the Vermilion County circuit court

found the minor child was neglected as alleged in two counts of the State’s petition. After a

March 2021 dispositional hearing, the court (1) found respondent unfit, unwilling, and unable to

care for the minor child; (2) made the minor child a ward of the court, and (3) placed the minor

child’s custody and guardianship with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).

¶3 Respondent appeals, contending the circuit court erred by finding the minor child

was neglected. We affirm. ¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 The minor child’s mother is Angela N., who is not a party to this appeal. The

State’s September 2019 petition alleged M.B. was neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(a) of the

Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a) (West Supp. 2019)), in

that M.B. was not receiving the proper or necessary support or education as required by the law,

or medical or other remedial care recognized under State law as necessary for her well-being

(count IV). It also contended M.B. was neglected under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court

Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West Supp. 2019)), in that her environment was injurious to her

welfare due to (1) Angela’s substance abuse (count I), (2) respondent’s substance abuse (count

II), (3) Angela’s and/or respondent’s criminal activity (count III), and (4) Angela’s and/or

respondent’s failure to engage in and complete substance abuse services and other services in

order to remedy the conditions that required their other minor children to go into care in

Vermilion County case No. 14-JA-133 (count V).

¶6 On August 15, 2019, the circuit court held the adjudicatory hearing. The State

presented the testimony of (1) Stefanie Verando, a Vermilion County probation officer;

(2) Nathan Huckstadt, a Vermilion County probation officer; (3) Jill Miller, the caseworker in

case No. 14-JA-133; (4) Kristine Givens, a DCFS investigator; and (5) Jerald Feingold, a DCFS

investigator. At the State’s request, the circuit court took judicial notice of the orders and

findings in case No. 14-JA-133. Respondent and Angela did not present any evidence. The

guardian ad litem presented respondent’s testimony. The evidence relevant to the issues on

appeal follows.

¶7 Huckstadt testified part of his duties as a probation officer was administering drug

tests. On July 2, 2020, he administered a drug test to respondent, and respondent tested positive

-2- for cocaine and methamphetamine. Huckstadt had never been respondent’s probation officer.

¶8 Miller testified she was the caseworker in a prior juvenile case involving two

other minor children, respondent, and Angela. In that case, respondent’s recommended services

included substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, individual counseling, and a

psychological evaluation. Respondent never completed a psychological evaluation, was

unsuccessfully discharged from individual counseling, was unsuccessfully discharged from

parenting classes, and failed to do intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment. After

residential substance abuse treatment, respondent tested positive for cocaine in March 2016. To

Miller’s knowledge, respondent did not resume substance abuse treatment and was never drug

free. Additionally, Miller testified respondent threw a table at her during a child and family team

meeting. Respondent believed DCFS took the children to sell them and Miller was involved in

the sale. Miller testified the two minor children in the prior case could not be safely returned to

respondent in 2016. In her opinion, respondent needed significant services before he could

safely parent, and he never completed any services. Miller admitted she did not have any contact

with respondent after the termination of his parental rights in June 2016.

¶9 Givens testified she spoke to respondent on the telephone on September 20, 2019,

after the hotline call that gave rise to this case. She asked respondent to complete a drug screen

the following day. Respondent did not complete the drug screen. During a subsequent telephone

call on September 23, 2019, respondent informed Givens he had completed the drug screen

somewhere else and would get her the documentation. He also indicated he would provide

Givens with documentation showing he was not homeless. Respondent did not provide the

documentation. Givens described respondent’s demeanor during the second telephone call as

combative and erratic and noted he had trouble concentrating and staying on task. Givens

-3- testified respondent seemed impaired. During previous conversations with respondent, he was

cooperative. Before this case, respondent had not been indicated on any reports involving M.B.

¶ 10 In early 2019, Givens had indicated Angela on substance abuse issues after she

was incarcerated in the Ford County jail. At that time, respondent was living with his mother.

Givens had never administered a drug test to respondent. Givens also testified a person living in

a hotel is not considered homeless. Additionally, Givens testified M.B. appeared healthy when

she was taken into care.

¶ 11 Feingold testified he was the parallel investigator for this matter. He spoke to

respondent on September 11, 2019, at the Champaign Police Department. Angela had been

arrested that night, and respondent stated he had done nothing wrong. Respondent noted he and

M.B. were living with his mother, and Angela was living with her family. M.B. appeared to be

healthy. Feingold testified respondent did not appear to be intoxicated when respondent spoke

with him. Feingold took protective custody of M.B. that night. Feingold noted both Angela and

M.B. were listed as missing and endangered persons in the Illinois State Police system. The

taking of protective custody had already been authorized before Feingold went to the police

station.

¶ 12 After the State rested, both respondent and Angela made motions for a directed

finding. In response, the State withdrew count III. The court dismissed count IV and denied the

motion as to the other counts.

¶ 13 Respondent testified and admitted he used illegal substances when M.B. was not

in his presence. Respondent acknowledged, if he were to be drug tested after the adjudicatory

hearing, it would be “dirty.” Respondent had used methamphetamine two days before the

hearing. He also admitted he stated at the July 2, 2020, hearing, a drug test on that day would be

-4- “dirty.” Respondent further testified he had not seen M.B. for a year and a half. As to the prior

case, respondent testified he had done a psychological evaluation the “first time around.” He

also had completed both inpatient and outpatient substance abuse treatment. Last, respondent

admitted he had a substance abuse issue and was “trying to get it back in remission.”

¶ 14 After hearing the parties’ arguments, the circuit court found the State had proved

the allegations in counts II and V but not count I. The court noted the bases for its finding was

the evidence of both parents’ (1) failure to complete services in case No. 14-JA-133,

(2) continued need for treatment, and (3) longstanding addiction issues.

¶ 15 On March 25, 2021, the circuit court held the dispositional hearing. The State

presented the testimony of Amy Fellers, the caseworker for this case. The State recommended

M.B. be made a ward of the court, DCFS be granted guardianship, and the permanency goal be

substitute care. The guardian ad litem concurred with the State’s recommendation. Respondent

asserted M.B. should be returned home immediately. On March 26, 2021, the court entered a

written dispositional order (1) finding respondent unfit, unwilling, and unable to care for the

minor child, (2) making the minor child a ward of the court, and (3) placing the minor child’s

custody and guardianship with DCFS. The court entered a permanency goal of return home in

12 months.

¶ 16 On April 1, 2021, respondent filed a timely notice of appeal in sufficient

compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 660(b)

(eff. Oct. 1, 2001) (providing the rules governing civil cases govern appeals from final

judgments in all proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act, except for delinquency cases). Thus,

this court has jurisdiction of respondent’s appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1)

(eff. Mar. 8, 2016). See In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d 31, 43-44, 823 N.E.2d 572, 580 (2005),

-5- (noting “dispositional orders are generally considered ‘final’ for the purposes of appeal”),

abrogated on other grounds by In re M.M., 2016 IL 119932, ¶ 31, 72 N.E.3d 260.

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 The Juvenile Court Act provides a two-step process the circuit court must utilize

to decide whether the minor child should become a ward of the court. In re A.P., 2012 IL

113875, ¶ 18, 981 N.E.2d 336. Step one of the process is the adjudicatory hearing, at which the

court considers only whether the minor child is abused, neglected, or dependent. See 705 ILCS

405/2-18(1) (West 2018); A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 19. If the circuit court determines the minor

child is abused, neglected, or dependent at the adjudicatory hearing, then the court holds a

dispositional hearing, where the court determines whether it is consistent with the health, safety,

and best interests of the minor child and the public for the minor child to be made a ward of the

court. A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 21.

¶ 19 Here, respondent challenges only the first step. The State bears the burden of

proving a neglect allegation by a preponderance of the evidence, which means it must show the

allegations are more probably true than not. See A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 17. The State only has

to prove a single ground of abuse, neglect, or dependency to move the wardship proceedings to

the second step. See In re Faith B., 216 Ill. 2d 1, 14, 832 N.E.2d 152, 159 (2005) (noting the

State need only prove one ground for neglect and thus this court may affirm if any of the circuit

court’s bases for a neglect finding are upheld). On review, this court will not reverse a circuit

court’s neglect or abuse finding unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. See

A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 17. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the

opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 17.

¶ 20 In this case, the circuit court found the minor child was neglected under section

-6- 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West Supp. 2019)), which provides

a neglected minor is “any minor under 18 years of age *** whose environment is injurious to his

or her welfare.” Our supreme court has explained the terms “neglect” and “injurious” as follows:

“Generally, neglect is defined as the failure to exercise the care that circumstances

justly demand. [Citation.] This does not mean, however, that the term neglect is

limited to a narrow definition. [Citation.] As this court has long held, neglect

encompasses wilful as well as unintentional disregard of duty. It is not a term of

fixed and measured meaning. It takes its content always from specific

circumstances, and its meaning varies as the context of surrounding circumstances

changes. [Citation.] Similarly, the term injurious environment has been

recognized by our courts as an amorphous concept that cannot be defined with

particularity. [Citation.] Generally, however, the term injurious environment has

been interpreted to include the breach of a parent’s duty to ensure a safe and

nurturing shelter for his or her children. [Citation.]” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 22.

¶ 21 Respondent asserts the State did not show the minor child’s environment was

injurious to her welfare. He first contends the State failed to prove DCFS had probable cause to

remove M.B. from respondent’s custody from the start. Respondent further argues the State

failed to prove he (1) did not complete services in a previous case, (2) refused to participate in

services in this case, and (3) continued to have a substance abuse problem. The State contends

(1) any error during the initial shelter care proceedings is moot and (2) the circuit court did not

err in finding M.B. neglected.

¶ 22 When a subsequent adjudication of wardship is supported by adequate evidence,

-7- an appeal of the findings made during the temporary custody hearing is generally moot. In re

Edward T., 343 Ill. App. 3d 778, 792, 799 N.E.2d 304, 315 (2003). As explained below, the

State presented adequate evidence to support the adjudication and disposition in this case. Thus,

any contention of error regarding the temporary custody hearing and written order is moot.

Edward T., 343 Ill. App. 3d at 792, 799 N.E.2d at 316.

¶ 23 The circuit court’s finding of an injurious environment due to respondent’s

substance abuse was supported by the evidence. While isolated incidents of a parent’s drug

usage do not necessarily pose a danger to the minor child, “obviously an ongoing pattern of

substance abuse can create an injurious environment.” In re Z.Z., 312 Ill. App. 3d 800, 805, 727

N.E.2d 667, 671 (2000). In the previous juvenile case, respondent had failed to successfully

complete intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment and tested positive for cocaine in 2016

after he had done inpatient substance abuse treatment. In July 2020, respondent tested positive

for both cocaine and methamphetamine. Respondent himself admitted he used

methamphetamine two days before the adjudicatory hearing and used it before the previous

hearing as well. Respondent further acknowledged he had a substance abuse issue and was

“trying to get it back in remission.” Thus, we find the State’s evidence was sufficient to show

respondent had a continuing substance abuse problem.

¶ 24 Respondent contends, even if the evidence was sufficient to show he had a

substance abuse problem, no evidence was presented to show M.B.’s environment was

dangerous to her welfare due to his substance abuse. He notes both DCFS investigators testified

M.B. appeared healthy when she was taken into custody. However, Givens testified respondent

seemed impaired during her second telephone conversation with him. She described

respondent’s demeanor as combative and erratic and noted he had trouble concentrating and

-8- staying on task. Moreover, the circuit court was not required to believe respondent’s self-serving

testimony he only used illegal substances when M.B. was not around.

¶ 25 Accordingly, we find the circuit court’s conclusion M.B. was neglected based on

an injurious environment resulting from respondent’s substance abuse was not against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Since the State need only prove a single ground of abuse,

neglect, or dependency to move the wardship proceedings to the second step, we do not address

respondent’s arguments about the other ground for the neglect finding. See Faith B., 216 Ill. 2d

at 14, 832 N.E.2d at 159.

¶ 26 As to the dispositional order, respondent does not raise any claims of error. We

note the State’s evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court’s dispositional order. The

evidence showed respondent and Angela had not visited M.B. while she was in care and had not

completed an integrated assessment. The caseworker had been unable to refer both parents for

services due to difficulties with communication and their refusal to sign consent forms.

¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Vermilion County circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 29 Affirmed.

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