In re Maxwell's Estate

3 N.Y.S. 422, 1889 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 13
CourtNew York Surrogate's Court
DecidedJanuary 22, 1889
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 3 N.Y.S. 422 (In re Maxwell's Estate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Surrogate's Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Maxwell's Estate, 3 N.Y.S. 422, 1889 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 13 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1889).

Opinion

Teller, S.

This is a proceeding for the revocation of letters testamentary- and the judicial settlement of the account of James ICerr, as testamentary trustee. The will of John Maxwell was admitted to probate in September,. 1882. It contains the following provisions: “I give, devise, and bequeath unto my executor hereinafter named the use of all my real estate, and the use-of all of my personal property, (except household furniture,) for and during the term of the natural life of my wife, Mary Maxwell, in trust nevertheless-to rent from time to time so much of the real estate as may not be required by my said wife for her use, and to sell and convert the personal property which is not invested in securities, and to invest the proceeds of the same in some-good interest-bearing securities, and to pay the rent derived from said real estate and the interest derived from the investments of said personal property to my wife for the term of her natural life; and in case the income derived from the rents and from the investments of said personal property shall not-be sufficient to provide for my said wife in a suitable and proper manner, then my executor is authorized to apply so much of the principal of said investment of the personal property as may be necessary, in addition to said income from my real and personal estate, to provide for her in a suitable and proper manner.” At the decease of his wife the testator gives and devises all, his real and personal property to his two daughters, and to his grandchildren, Mary E. and Catherine A. Maxwell, share and share alike; the survivor of the grandchildren at the death of his wife, if one should previously die without issue, to take the other’s share. James Kerr was appointed executor and-trustee. The petitioner is the testator’s widow. On the 31st day of July, 1884, the accounts of the executor and trustee were judicially settled in this court. It was then found and adjudged that there was unexpended of the personal estate in the hands of the said trustee held by him for the purposes of" the trust, the sum of $2,362.60, after payment of all debts and the expenses-of the accounting. Of this amount $600 was invested in bond and mortgage;, the balance was, at the time of the accounting, on deposit in the First National. Bank of Auburn, to the credit of the executor, in an account by itself; $800,, the proceeds of certain mortgages held by the executor, having been deposites in the spring of 1883, and the balance having been transferred from other banks,, in October, 1882. The $600 mortgage was paid to the executor and trustee? in September, 1887, and the proceeds were thereupon deposited by him in the First National Bank of Auburn, and credited upon the same account, and in the same manner, as the other funds.' On the 21st day of January, 1888, the First National Bank suspended payment, and went into the hands of a receiver. The executor and trustee was at the time of making the deposits, and at the time of the failure of the bank, a director thereof, and a part of the [423]*423time was a member of the committee of the board appointed to examine its affairs. He was a borrower from the bank, both individually and as a member of a business Ann. The individual indebtedness to the amount of $1,300 is still unpaid. It is alleged and admitted that the executor is insolvent. The deposits of the firm were made in this bank to nearly the time of its failure; but at the time of the failure this account was overdrawn to a small amount, which has since been paid. The evidence shows that the executor believed the bank to be perfectly solvent. The last examination by the committee was made in October, 1887. The executor was then ill, and unable to take part. The examinations made by the committee consisted in looking over the books of the bank, to see whether the notes and the bills receivable corresponded with the statement of the cashier, and to ascertain whether the amount of cash on hand was correctly stated; and at the end of every year an examination was made of the securities. The reason given by the executor for changing the deposits of money from other banks to this one is that it paid 4 per cent, on deposits, while the others paid only 3 per cent. It appears that the change was made with the consent of the petitioner, who was entitled to the income of the property, and who has had the interest upon the deposits; and that other parties in interest were consulted in regard to the deposits. The executor testifies that he endeavored to find an investment of this fund upon bond and mortgage, and consulted an attorney and others in regard to it, and did not find any, and that the savings banks were making loans at 5 per cent. The attorney also testifies that he endeavored to procure a mortgage for the executor, but was unable to do so. It appears that some of the leading business men of the city deposited money in this bank up to the time of the failure, and that other directors, who had the same opportunity to know the condition of the bank, had large deposits there at the time of the failure, and believed the bank to be perfectly solvent. It is proven that the amount of the deposits in the bank, when it closed, was from six to eight hundred thousand dollars. A dividend of 25 per cent, has been paid to creditors by the receiver. It does not appear what the cause of the failure was. The accountant employed by the receiver, and who has since succeeded him as receiver of the bank, testified in thp proceeding that he had no knowledge from the books of the bank as to its solvency at any date prior to its closing, and that it would take from 10 to 20 days for anybody to arrive at any information. There is nothing to show whether the failure is due to the defalcation of any officer of the bank, or whether the books showed the real condition of the bank, or whether the assets were valueless to any considerable extent. It does appear that the cashier, in whom much confidence had been placed, absconded at the close of the last banking day before the bank discontinued business.

It is claimed on the part of the contestants -that the executor and trustee, not having invested the trust funds in real estate securities or government bonds, or deposited the same with trust companies approved by the court, and designated by them as proper depositories, is chargeable with the amount of the estate and interest. The principal authority cited to sustain this proposition is the case of King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76. This case involved the question of the liability of a trustee who had invested funds held by him in canal, railroad, and bank stocks, in violation of the obligation of his trust. It was held that to place the principal of a fund in a condition in which it is necessarily exposed to the hazard of loss or gain, according to the success or failure of the enterprise in which it is embarked, and in which by the very terms of the investment the principal is not to be returned at all, was a violation of the trust, and that the oestuis que trmtent were not obliged to accept the investments, and might call upon the executors to pay over the whole amount of their legacies, and interest thereupon. The court says: “The just and true rule is that the trustee is bound to employ such diligence and such prudence in the care and management as in general prudent men of discretion [424]*424and intelligence in such matters employ in their own like affairs. This necessarily excludes all speculation,—all investments for an uncertain and doubtful rise in the market. * * * The preservation of the fund, and the procurement of a just income therefrom, are primary objects of the creation of the trust itself, and are to be primarily regarded.” The same principle was asserted in the case of

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Bluebook (online)
3 N.Y.S. 422, 1889 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 13, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-maxwells-estate-nysurct-1889.