In Re Mausolf

403 B.R. 761, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1010
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida.
DecidedApril 15, 2009
Docket19-12781
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 403 B.R. 761 (In Re Mausolf) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Mausolf, 403 B.R. 761, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1010 (Fla. 2009).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING DEBTOR’S MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENT

JOHN K. OLSON, Bankruptcy Judge.

THIS MATTER came before the Court for hearing (the “Hearing”) on February *763 26, 2009 upon Jefferey Allen Mausolf s (the “Debtor”) Motion (the “Motion”) for Approval of Reaffirmation Agreement (the “Reaffirmation Agreement”) [D.E. 34]. The Debtor moved the Court for approval of an agreement that would enable the Debtor to continue servicing the debt on his automobile because he wished to retain possession of the automobile, which is encumbered by a lien. The substantive issue raised by the Motion is whether a reaffirmation agreement that is negotiated prior to, but executed and filed with the court after, the granting of a chapter 7 discharge meets the requirements of, and is enforceable under, section 524(c) of title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. sections 101, et seq. (the “Bankruptcy Code”) and Rule 4008(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court (i) finds that the Reaffirmation Agreement is enforceable under section 524(c) of the Bankruptcy Code because it was “made” prior to the granting of the Debtor’s discharge, and (ii) will exercise its power under Bankruptcy Rule 4008(a) to enlarge the time for filing the Reaffirmation Agreement. Accordingly, the Motion is granted and the Reaffirmation Agreement is approved.

FACTS

The Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on July 15, 2009 [D.E. 1]. On that date, the Debtor indicated his intent to reaffirm a debt (the “Debt”) owed to Wells Fargo Auto Finance (“Wells Fargo”) in his Statements of Intention [D.E. 5]. The Debt is secured by a lien on the Debtor’s sole automobile, a 2003 Chevrolet Monte Carlo (the “Monte Carlo”).

In August of 2008, Wells Fargo sent the Debtor’s first attorney a letter indicating their intent to enter into a reaffirmation agreement with the Debtor. No written agreement was executed between the parties, nor was any agreement filed with the Court prior to the Debtor being granted a discharge (the “Discharge”) on October 16, 2008 [D.E. 18].

Subsequent to the Discharge, the Debt- or filed a pro se motion to reopen his chapter 7 case for the sole purpose of reaffirming the Debt, which the Court granted on February 10, 2009 [D.E. 30]. 1 On February 23, 2009, the Debtor filed his Motion for Approval of Reaffirmation Agreement. Wells Fargo filed the Reaffirmation Agreement with the Court on March 3, 2009 [D.E. 38].

At the Hearing, the Debtor offered evidence by proffer of his ability to satisfy the Debt as modified by the Reaffirmation Agreement and the Reaffirmation Agreement’s significance and purpose. Specifically, the Debtor established that the difference between his monthly income and actual monthly expenses is greater than the payments required by the Reaffirmation Agreement. The Debtor also showed that he cannot commute to and from work without the Monte Carlo, which Wells Fargo may repossess if the Reaffirmation Agreement is not approved.

DISCUSSION

To be enforceable, a reaffirmation agreement must satisfy the requirements set forth in section 524(c) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 4008. In this case, the Debtor has substantially complied with the Bankruptcy Code and *764 the Bankruptcy Rules’ requirements, leaving this Court to decide only (i) whether the Reaffirmation Agreement was “made” prior to the granting of the Discharge as required by 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1), and (ii) whether the Court should exercise its discretion to enlarge the time for filing the Reaffirmation Agreement as provided by Bankruptcy Rule 4008(a).

1. Making of the Reaffirmation Agreement

Pursuant to section 524(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, a reaffirmation agreement must be “made before the granting of the discharge under section 727” of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1). Although most courts interpreting this language look to the date of execution as a primary indication of when a reaffirmation agreement has been “made,” In re LeBeau, 247 B.R. 537, 539-40 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2000) (collecting cases), In re Picciano, No. 07-11084-RGM, 2008 WL 1984255 (Bankr.E.D.Va. May 5, 2008) (collecting cases), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida has held, and this Court agrees, that, “under the appropriate circumstances, determination of when a reaffirmation agreement is ‘made’ may turn on extrinsic evidence and general contract principles.” LeBeau, 247 B.R. at 540 (citations omitted). There is no question that a reaffirmation agreement entered into after the granting of a discharge is unenforceable. 2 However, it is this Court’s opinion that, in determining when a reaffirmation agreement is “made” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1), the date of the agreement’s execution is not alone dispositive.

In In re LeBeau, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida found “indirect support” for the idea that contract principles govern the making of a reaffirmation agreement in a footnote to an Eleventh Circuit opinion. LeBeau, 247 B.R. at 540 (citing Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir.1993)). In that footnote, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “[r]eaffirmation contemplates a voluntary agreement between a creditor and the debtor whereby a debt which is otherwise dischargeable with respect to the personal liability of the debtor, is renegotiated or reaffirmed by both parties.” Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1514, n. 2. According to the LeBeau Court, “[i]t follows then that the renegotiation by the parties necessarily involves the contemplation of a new contract.” LeBeau, 247 B.R. at 540.

The basic tenets of contract law provide that a binding contract requires a “meeting of the minds ‘by acceptance and performance within the terms of the offer.’ ” Otworth v. Florida Bar, 71 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1215 (M.D.Fla.1999) (citing Sumerel v. Pinder, 83 So.2d 692, 693 (Fla.1955)). Under Florida law, all parties to a contract must possess a “common or mutual intent to form a binding contract.” 11 Fla. Jur.2d Contracts § 20 (2009). Therefore, it is necessary “that there be a meeting of the minds as to all the essential terms of the contract.” Id.

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Bluebook (online)
403 B.R. 761, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1010, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-mausolf-flsb-2009.