NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 250244-U NOTICE Decision filed 09/23/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NOS. 5-25-0244, 5-25-0245 cons. Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re MASON B. and NADIA K., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Madison County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) Nos. 21-JA-276, 21-JA-277 ) Jennifer A., ) Honorable, ) Janet Rae Heflin, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Barberis and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights, denying her successive motion for substitution of judge, and granting an order of protection against her. As any arguments to the contrary lack merit, we grant the respondent’s appointed counsel on appeal leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶2 Respondent Jennifer A. appeals from three orders of the trial court, which terminated her
parental rights over two minor children, denied her motion for substitution of judge, and granted
an order of protection against her. 1 Respondent’s appointed attorney on appeal concluded this
1 This case is accelerated pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), with a disposition date of August 22, 2025. The pro se respondent was granted leave to file an amended brief after the dispositional due date. Accordingly, we find that good cause exists for filing the decision after August 22, 2025. 1 appeal lacks substantial merit and filed a motion to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), along with a memorandum of law in support of that motion.
¶3 Respondent filed an initial response to the Anders motion on August 21, 2025. Respondent
filed an amended response on September 15, 2025. 2 This court has examined the August 21, 2025,
response, the September 15, 2025, response, counsel’s Anders motion and the accompanying
memorandum of law, and the record on appeal, and concludes this appeal lacks merit. Accordingly,
respondent’s appointed attorney is granted leave to withdraw as counsel, and the judgment of the
circuit court is affirmed.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 This matter arises from two cases initiated by the State against respondent regarding two
minor children. The State filed juvenile petitions for both children, alleging that they were
neglected as defined in the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1
et seq. (West 2022)). 3 The trial court entered a temporary custody order in both cases on October
5, 2021, finding that probable cause existed for removing the minors from their parents based on
the State’s allegations. Both children were placed with the foster families mentioned in this appeal
in October 2022. The foster father of respondent’s son filed a petition for order of protection
against respondent, and the trial court entered an emergency order of protection on August 9, 2023,
which was later extended twice. 4
2 Respondent filed a motion for leave to file an amended brief instanter; said motion is granted. Respondent also filed a motion for leave to supplement the record and exhibits on September 17, 2025; this motion is denied as the proposed supplement is comprised of documents and exhibits that were not part of the record below. 3 The petitions named respondent and the children’s respective biological fathers; however, we will only discuss respondent, as the fathers are not parties to this appeal. 4 The foster mother of respondent’s daughter also filed a petition for order of protection; however, it is not at issue in this appeal. 2 ¶6 The State filed petitions to terminate parental rights in both minors’ cases in September
2023, alleging that respondent was an unfit parent pursuant to the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01
et seq. (West 2022)). Respondent, through counsel, filed a motion for substitution of judge on
November 2, 2023. Respondent’s counsel also moved to withdraw on the same date. The trial court
granted both motions, a new judge was assigned to the case, and respondent proceeded pro se.
Respondent had also filed motions for change of venue and to change the Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) office assigned to her case; however, she failed to appear at the
hearing date on those motions, and they were denied.
¶7 The trial court held hearings on the State’s petitions to terminate parental rights. The court
entered an order finding respondent unfit to parent on March 4, 2024, finding that she had made
reasonable efforts, but not reasonable progress, towards correcting the conditions that led to the
minors’ removal. The court held the best-interest portion of the termination hearing on July 18,
2024, and took the matter under advisement. On November 7, 2024, respondent filed another
motion for substitution of judge. Following a hearing, the trial court denied her motion, finding
that she had failed to meet her burden of showing prejudice or bias. 5 On May 17, 2025, the trial
court entered an order terminating respondent’s parental rights over both minors. Respondent filed
a timely notice of appeal.
¶8 II. ANALYSIS
¶9 Appointed counsel argues that the termination of respondent’s parental rights, denial of her
motion for substitution of judge, and entry of an order of protection against her were proper, and
5 Respondent had also filed a motion for substitution of judge against the current judge assigned to the case on May 13, 2024. This motion was similarly denied. However, it is not at issue on appeal. 3 there are no meritorious arguments to the contrary. In the memorandum supporting her Anders
motion, counsel states that she considered raising the following issues on appeal:
(1) Whether the trial court’s finding that respondent was unfit to parent was against the manifest weight of the evidence;
(2) Whether the trial court erred in finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best interest of the minor;
(3) Whether the trial court erred in denying respondent’s motion for substitution of judge; and
(4) Whether the trial court erred in granting an order of protection against respondent.
Counsel has determined that these issues would be without arguable merit, and the trial court’s
judgment was therefore proper.
¶ 10 A. “Unfit Person” Finding
¶ 11 A parent’s right to raise his or her child is a fundamental right, which a court may not
terminate without the parent’s consent except as authorized by statute. In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.
2d 340, 354 (2005). A court’s statutory authority to involuntarily terminate parental rights is
governed by the Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption Act. Id. Pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act,
the involuntary termination of parental rights requires a two-step process. In re Donald A.G., 221
Ill. 2d 234, 244 (2006). First, the court must determine, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
parent is an “unfit person” as defined by section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. Id.; 705 ILCS 405/2-
29(2) (West 2022); 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022). If the court makes a finding of unfitness, it
next considers whether termination of the parent’s rights is in the best interests of the child. In re
Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d at 244; 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022).
¶ 12 As applicable to the underlying case, the Adoption Act defines an “unfit person,” in
relevant part, as:
4 “D. ‘Unfit person’ means any person whom the court shall find to be unfit to have a child, without regard to the likelihood that the child will be placed for adoption. The grounds of unfitness are any one or more of the following ***: *** (m) Failure by a parent (i) to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from the parent during any 9-month period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor under Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or dependent minor under Section 2-4 of that Act, or (ii) to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor ***.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i), (ii) (West 2022).
¶ 13 Under the Adoption Act, a “reasonable effort” is “a subjective standard and refers to the
amount of effort reasonable for the particular parent.” In re P.S., 2021 IL App (5th) 210027, ¶ 34.
The court must determine “whether the parent has made earnest and conscientious strides toward
correcting the conditions that led to the removal of the minor from the home.” Id.
¶ 14 “Reasonable progress,” by contrast, is determined by an objective standard, which is based
upon the amount of progress measured from the conditions existing at the time custody was
revoked. In re Za. G., 2023 IL App (5th) 220793, ¶ 47. Measuring reasonable progress under
section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act involves a consideration of “the parent’s compliance with the
service plans and court’s directives in light of the condition that gave rise to the removal of the
child and other conditions which later become known that would prevent the court from returning
custody of the child to the parent.” In re D.T., 2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 17 (citing In re C.N.,
196 III. 2d 181, 208 (2001)).
¶ 15 In reviewing a trial court’s findings that a parent is unfit and that terminating parental rights
is in the best interest of the child, we do not retry the case; rather, we must determine if the findings
are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Za. G., 2023 IL App (5th) 220793, ¶ 31. The
trial court’s finding of unfitness is afforded great deference because the court was best positioned
to view and evaluate the parties and their testimony. Id. Accordingly, on appeal, we will not
5 reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses. A decision is contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence “if the opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to
be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” Id.
¶ 16 Here, the trial court found that respondent had made reasonable efforts, but had failed to
make reasonable progress. We therefore begin with the potential argument that respondent showed
by clear and convincing evidence that she had made reasonable progress. As per the testimony of
Ciera Smith, a DCFS caseworker who was assigned to respondent’s case for approximately three
years, respondent’s service plan consisted of the following tasks: mental health treatment,
substance abuse treatment, parenting education classes, and maintaining a safe and stable home
environment.
¶ 17 Smith told the court that respondent was “somewhat” cooperative with DCFS, but not
consistently. Initially, she was not cooperative with substance abuse treatment, although she
eventually sought treatment services. However, she was told by the treatment provider that she did
not need services and was not recommended any treatment. Smith explained that she did not
believe that the facility was aware of respondent’s previous positive drug tests, as it relied “heavily
on self-reporting from parents.”
¶ 18 She further testified that respondent’s failure to acknowledge her substance abuse issue
was a barrier to treatment, and that respondent had been referred for drug testing 10 times and
tested positive for methamphetamine on 7 of those tests. The minor children also tested positive
for drugs on two occasions, approximately seven months apart, following unsupervised visits with
respondent. The first of these instances occurred alongside an incident in which a friend of the
respondent accidentally cut off one of the children’s fingers.
6 ¶ 19 Respondent was similarly inconsistent in her compliance with mental health treatment.
Although she had completed a mental health evaluation in December 2023, she had not followed
through with obtaining treatment. Smith testified that DCFS referred respondent to several mental
health and substance abuse treatment providers, but she always chose to find her own providers,
and would repeatedly change providers when “when one [didn’t] suit [her] needs.” Additionally,
the aforementioned drug testing revealed that she did not consistently take the psychotropic
medication prescribed to her.
¶ 20 Regarding parenting classes, respondent did successfully complete the recommended
classes in the summer of 2022, but she was recommended for additional classes following the
children’s second positive drug test in February 2023. She engaged in a course that did not meet
DCFS’s standards for parenting courses and was therefore referred again in November 2023. The
caseworker testified that she did not receive any notice that respondent had completed these
classes. Respondent testified that she was currently enrolled. However, the caseworker stated that
respondent was not rated as satisfactory on the parenting portion of her service plan.
¶ 21 Respondent testified that she was a recovering drug addict and alcoholic, but was trying
her best to get help and get her children back. She averred that she was “very adamant about going
to AA” and completed both a mental health assessment and substance abuse classes. She
acknowledged that she had not completed the third recommended parenting course, but said she
was attending classes and only had two left. She further testified that she repeatedly tried to contact
DCFS for information on what she was supposed to do but never received a response. She denied
being noncompliant with her service plan.
¶ 22 The State acknowledged that in the time prior to the filing of the petition in September
2023, respondent had a history of “doing things well and doing things not well.” However, it
7 argued that she had never made progress to the point that the minors were returned to her home.
The two occasions upon which her parenting time was increased were the times that the children
tested positive for methamphetamine. The State concluded that respondent had not made
substantial efforts over a nine-month period, and asked the trial court to find her unfit to parent.
¶ 23 A consideration of respondent’s progress towards reunification, as measured objectively
by her compliance with her service plan, shows that the trial court’s findings were not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. It is clear from the record that respondent failed to substantially
comply with any of the tasks required to correct the conditions that led to the minors’ removal.
The unrefuted evidence provided by DCFS clearly and convincingly demonstrated respondent’s
unfitness.
¶ 24 Furthermore, the trial court stated that it had taken notice of the orders entered on January
17, 2023, and February 20, 2023, which indicated that respondent was making reasonable efforts
and was granted unsupervised visitation. However, the court noted that there had never been an
order stating that she was making reasonable progress. The court then rendered its finding of
unfitness. Giving deference to the trial court’s determination, and without reweighing the evidence,
we conclude that there is no meritorious argument that could be made that this finding was
unreasonable or arbitrary.
¶ 25 B. “Best Interest of the Child” Finding
¶ 26 After determining that respondent was unfit to parent, the trial court found that terminating
her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Once the court makes a finding of unfitness,
“[t]he issue is no longer whether parental rights can be terminated; the issue is whether, in light of
the child’s needs, parental rights should be terminated.” (Emphases in original.) In re D.T., 212
Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). The parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship “must
8 yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” Id. At this stage of the termination
hearing, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that termination
of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 31.
¶ 27 In making a best-interest determination, the trial court must consider, within the context of
the child’s age and developmental needs, the following factors:
“ ‘(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, continuity of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to care for the child.’ ” Id. ¶ 32 (quoting In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1072 (2006)).
See also 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022).
¶ 28 As with the trial court’s findings at the unfitness stage, we afford the court great deference,
as it is in a superior position to view the witnesses, assess their credibility, and weigh conflicting
evidence. In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 33. We will not reverse the trial court’s best-
interest determination unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.
¶ 29 At the best-interest portion of the termination hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of
DCFS caseworker Smith’s prior testimony and heard additional statements from her. Smith
prepared the best-interest report, which the court admitted into evidence. She testified about the
current foster placements for the two children. In both placements, the foster parents had passed
background checks, signed permanency commitments, and wanted to adopt the children.
¶ 30 Smith described the respective home environments as safe and stable, and described the
positive bonds each child had with their new foster siblings and the comfort and care they received
from their foster parents. Based on her review of the children’s cases, Smith opined that it would
9 be in both children’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Smith also testified
that she was aware of the fact that the foster parents filed orders of protection against respondent
and further testified that they were filed because of several incidents in which respondent used the
foster mother’s name to get hospital and school records, sent harassing text messages, and made
threats over Facebook.
¶ 31 After the State rested, respondent called her mother to testify. Her mother stated that she
did not see why the children were removed from placement with her, and that they should be
returned to her home. She also testified that she saw bruises on both children on two occasions in
2023 when visiting the DCFS office, and that one of the children had a bladder infection in
February 2024.
¶ 32 Respondent also called Leah Sika, the DCFS supervisor assigned to respondent’s case.
Respondent asked Sika whether her being on the board of directors for a fostering nonprofit along
with a foster parent of one of the children was a conflict of interest. Sika testified that she was
contacted by and responded to DCFS’s ethical officer and conflict-of-interest committee regarding
respondent’s case, and had not received a formal disposition from their findings. She also stated
that she was no longer on the board as of December 2023, and that she knew the parent because
he was a longtime licensed foster parent with DCFS. Sika also testified that she was informed of
bruises on one of the children, and that she was told they came from roughhousing at his foster
home and were not deemed abuse. Sika believed that the children were both happy in their
placements.
¶ 33 On cross-examination, she explained that she had the opportunity to observe the minors in
their placements. She believed both foster families were able to maintain the minors’ background
ties to their religion, foster community ties with the minors, and develop their sense of identity.
10 She further stated that the minors had not expressed any fears in their respective homes, and that
moving the minors from these homes would be detrimental to them because they had been with
these families for two years and had developed a sense of safety, stability, and security with them.
Sika opined that, given the history of the case and the harm the minors had endured, the foster
parents were better positioned to parent the minors than respondent.
¶ 34 Respondent also made a statement, alleging that her civil rights had been violated and she
was denied her right to religion because she was an atheist and objected to the foster parents taking
her children to church. She stated that while she knew she had made mistakes, she loved her
children and should not have had them taken away, and that her children wanted to come home to
her. She argued that she no longer did drugs and had made “huge improvements and changes” in
her life. She also challenged the validity of the medical records showing that her son had tested
positive for drugs and alleged that a previous foster parent had neglected her daughter for a month
and a half when she had an infection caused by poor hygiene.
¶ 35 In its March 17, 2025, termination orders, the trial court found that both children had been
in their current foster placements since October 2022, both sets of foster parents had signed
permanency commitments and wished to adopt the minors, the minors were strongly bonded to
their foster families, and their emotional, psychological, and financial needs were met in the
respective foster homes. Based on these conclusions, as well as the contents of DCFS’s best-
interest reports, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the minors.
¶ 36 On appeal, appointed counsel acknowledges that the evidence showed that respondent
loves her children and was trying to have them returned to her care. However, this is not the
primary concern at this stage of termination proceedings. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. The record
11 shows that the State demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in the children’s
best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The testimony and evidence sufficiently
supported findings that the statutory factors weighed in favor of termination based on the
children’s best interests, and the trial court’s orders show that the court considered these factors in
rendering its decision. We therefore agree with counsel that there is no meritorious argument to be
made that the trial court’s best-interest determination was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶ 37 C. Motion for Substitution of Judge
¶ 38 Next, appointed counsel considered whether the trial court erred in denying respondent’s
motion for substitution of judge. Respondent filed her first motion to disqualify or substitute judge
on November 2, 2023, alleging bias against her. The court granted this motion on December 12,
2023, and a new judge was assigned to the case.
¶ 39 Section 2-1001(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a) (West 2022))
provides that each party to a civil action is entitled to a substitution of judge for cause. This section
states, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(ii) Every application for substitution of judge for cause shall be made by petition, setting forth the specific cause for substitution and praying a substitution of judge. The petition shall be verified by the affidavit of the applicant.
(iii) Upon the filing of a petition for substitution of judge for cause, a hearing to determine whether the cause exists shall be conducted as soon as possible by a judge other than the judge named in the petition. The judge named in the petition need not testify but may submit an affidavit if the judge wishes. If the petition is allowed, the case shall be assigned to a judge not named in the petition. If the petition is denied, the case shall be assigned back to the judge named in the petition.” Id. § 2-1001(a)(3)(ii), (iii).
¶ 40 Although the statute does not define “cause,” our courts have held that the forced removal
of a judge requires actual prejudice, which means a showing of “either prejudicial trial conduct or
12 personal bias.” In re Marriage of O’Brien, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 30. Judges are presumed to be
impartial, and the burden of overcoming that presumption rests on the party seeking substitution.
Id. ¶ 31. Furthermore, “most bias charges stemming from conduct during trial do not support a
finding of actual prejudice.” Id. Where a party seeks to substitute a judge for bias or prejudice, “it
must normally stem from an extrajudicial source, i.e., from a source other than from what the judge
learned from her participation in the case before her.” In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d 519, 554
(2010).
¶ 41 Here, respondent filed her first motion for substitution of judge against the second judge
assigned to her case on May 13, 2024. The trial court, under a different judge, heard the motion on
May 20, 2024. Respondent argued that the new judge was biased against her because she refused
to hear respondent’s side regarding the order of protection, and failed to notify respondent of a
hearing date for her pending motions, causing them to be denied.
¶ 42 Regarding the first issue, the State explained in response that the court did not actually hear
argument on the order of protection, as it was not set for hearing on the date in question.
Furthermore, this was under the original judge assigned to the case; the second judge only
continued the matter because the order of protection would be affected by the then-pending
termination issue. At the time of the hearing on respondent’s motion, there had not been a hearing
on the order of protection. Secondly, the State argued that even if respondent was correct that she
did not receive email notice from the court regarding the hearing date that she missed, she was
notified of the date from DCFS, which had provided her with the date on several occasions.
Therefore, the court’s denial of her motions was through her own choice to not appear.
13 ¶ 43 The court then found that respondent had failed to meet her burden of demonstrating bias
and merely asserting that the court’s email notice was not sent to her was insufficient to meet that
“very high bar.” The court therefore denied her motion.
¶ 44 Respondent filed a successive motion for substitution of judge, which the trial court heard
on December 12, 2024. Prior to the hearing, respondent had the opportunity to have an attorney
appointed to represent her; however, she chose to proceed with the hearing pro se. Respondent
alleged that the current judge had a conflict of interest because she was “best friends” with the
secretary of respondent’s former attorney—although she admitted that the judge was not involved
in her case during the time that this attorney represented her. Respondent also alleged that the
judge was Facebook friends with counsel for DCFS, with the DCFS investigator assigned to her
case, and with the DCFS caseworker who testified at the termination hearing. She further claimed
that the judge would not allow “the facts to come out” due to her bias against respondent.
¶ 45 The trial court explained that social media activity did not reflect the nature of a real-life
relationship, and that it was not uncommon for people who work in the same field to have
connections on social media that may or may not extend to everyday life. The court therefore
denied this motion as well, finding that respondent had failed to provide sufficient evidence to
require the judge’s removal for cause.
¶ 46 It is clear from the record that respondent presented no evidence of actual prejudice in
either of her challenges to the second judge assigned to her case, and failed to meet her burden of
overcoming the presumption that the judge was impartial. In her first attempt, her allegation that
the judge did not allow her to be heard was based on her own mistake or misunderstanding. Her
remaining argument was that she did not receive the email notifying her of a hearing date. Even if
this were true, it is clear that this would not support a meritorious claim of prejudice or bias. At
14 the second hearing, respondent made vague, unsupported claims of the judge not allowing “the
facts to come out,” and alleged that she was Facebook friends with certain individuals at DCFS
who were involved in respondent’s case. As the trial court found, respondent did not show that the
judge had any actual relationship with these individuals beyond a connection on social media.
Furthermore, respondent did not demonstrate any prejudicial conduct in the proceedings or any
personal bias that arose from these alleged relationships. Therefore, we find that there is no valid
basis upon which to challenge the trial court’s denial of respondent’s motion to substitute judge.
¶ 47 D. Order of Protection
¶ 48 Lastly, appointed counsel considered whether respondent could argue that the trial court
erred in granting the petition for an order of protection filed by the foster father of respondent’s
son against respondent. The trial court entered an emergency order of protection on August 9,
2023, which was extended twice and covered both foster parents and their minor children. The
court entered a plenary order of protection, adding respondent’s son to the list of protected
individuals, on November 8, 2024.
¶ 49 Section 2-25 of the Juvenile Court Act allows the court to issue an order of protection “in
assistance of or as a condition of any other order authorized by this Act,” based on the health,
safety, and best interests of the minor. 705 ILCS 405/2-25(1) (West 2022); see also In re D.P.,
2011 IL App (1st) 111631, ¶ 4. Pursuant to this section, the order may require a person to, in
pertinent part, do any of the following:
“(a) to stay away from the home or the minor; *** (c) to abstain from offensive conduct against the minor, his parent or any person to whom custody of the minor is awarded; *** (g) to refrain from acts of commission or omission that tend to make the home not a proper place for the minor;
15 (h) to refrain from contacting the minor and the foster parents in any manner that is not specified in writing in the case plan.” 705 ILCS 405/2-25(1)(a), (c), (g), (h) (West 2022).
¶ 50 In his petition for an order of protection, the foster father alleged the following: that
respondent had been posting defamatory statements and threats towards him and his wife on social
media for the past year; that respondent filed a false claim accusing him and his wife of causing
bruises to the child and falsifying his medical records to make respondent look like a bad parent;
that respondent impersonated his wife in order to obtain confidential information from the child’s
school, and then reported to the child’s truancy officer that the foster parents were abusing him;
that respondent surveilled his residence; that respondent had a history of violence, including an
arrest for aggravated battery that occurred in the minor’s presence; and that he and his wife feared
that respondent’s harassment and threats would result in both physical harm and harm to their
careers and reputations.
¶ 51 At the order of protection hearing, both foster parents testified to the various incidents
alleged in the petition. Respondent admitted that she had contacted her son’s school, claiming to
be his foster mother. The foster father identified an email that respondent had sent to the school,
in which she made various accusations against the foster parents and DCFS workers regarding
treatment of the child. He noted that the email included his address, which the family had never
provided to respondent. He testified that when he learned of the email, he felt unsafe and feared
for his family, causing him to install a surveillance system at home before ultimately moving to a
new residence.
¶ 52 The trial court took judicial notice of the foster father’s December 6, 2023, petition for
indirect civil contempt based on communications from respondent on social media. He testified
that respondent’s posts about him and his wife violated the emergency order of protection in effect
16 at that time, and further alleged that respondent continued to violate its terms by making more
threatening and defamatory posts directed at the foster parents. He acknowledged that the social
media posts in question did not use his or his wife’s names but explained that he believed them to
be about his family based on various references and context clues, as well as the other actions
respondent had taken against his family, as previously discussed.
¶ 53 The minor’s foster mother testified that she was a licensed nurse practitioner, and that she
had learned of respondent’s attempt to obtain medical records about the child using her name
and/or professional credentials. She also testified about feeling attacked and violated by
respondent’s social media posts; she feared that the anger exhibited in the posts could transition to
real life, and respondent could cause physical harm. She stated that respondent’s actions continued
despite the emergency order of protection in place. On cross-examination, she admitted that she
did not know for sure if the posts were made by respondent, but she believed that it was her based
on the wording.
¶ 54 Respondent testified about discrepancies in her son’s medical records, that she had never
gone to the foster parents’ residence, and, regarding her social media posts, that “half the things
that they’ve said that they’re scared about has nothing to do with them.” After hearing the
testimony, the trial court found that that the foster parents were credible, and respondent was not.
It further found that respondent had engaged in a “course of conduct that was intended to harass
*** the foster parents and did cause them distress.” The court explained that the Juvenile Court
Act allowed for the entry of an order of protection when it is in the best interest or welfare of the
child, and the court found this to be the case here. It therefore extended the order of protection for
two years, based on a finding that this was in the child’s best interest.
17 ¶ 55 As we previously discussed regarding the trial court’s superior positioning to assess the
credibility of witnesses and assign the appropriate weight to their testimony, we do not substitute
the trial court’s findings with our own. Furthermore, it is clear from the record that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in making these findings. Respondent did not present credible evidence
contradicting the testimony and evidence offered by the petitioner. She even admitted to
impersonating her son’s foster mother as per the allegations in the petition. She failed to counter
the allegations that her social media posts were directed at the foster parents. We agree with
appointed counsel on appeal that there is no meritorious argument to be made that the trial court
erred in granting the plenary order of protection.
¶ 56 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 57 As this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit, we grant appointed counsel leave to
withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 58 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.