In Re Maruska's Estate

64 N.W.2d 734, 158 Neb. 723, 1954 Neb. LEXIS 82
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedMay 28, 1954
Docket33502
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 64 N.W.2d 734 (In Re Maruska's Estate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Maruska's Estate, 64 N.W.2d 734, 158 Neb. 723, 1954 Neb. LEXIS 82 (Neb. 1954).

Opinion

Wenke, J.

This action arose as a result of Bessie Sperry and Jerry Maruska objecting to the allowance for probate of the last will of Marie Maruska, deceased, when offered for that purpose by Mildred and Melvin Horton, the latter being named executor therein.

The district court for Buffalo County submitted to a jury the issue of whether or not the will was the result of undue influence exercised over deceased by Mildred and Melvin Horton. The jury found that it had been so obtained and was not the true and valid will of the deceased. The proponents then filed a motion asking the court to set aside the verdict and grant them either a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. This motion the court overruled and from its ruling this appeal was taken.

Appellants state the sole issue involved on appeal is, is the evidence sufficient to support a verdict of undue influence?

“Undue influence, in order to invalidate a will, must be of such character as to destroy the free agency of the testator and substitute another person’s will for his own.

“The elements necessary to be established to warrant the rejection of a will on the ground of undue in-' fluence are: (1) That the testator was subject to such influence; (2) that the opportunity to exercise it existed; (3) that there was a disposition to exercise it; (4) that the result appears to be the effect of such influence.” In re Estate of Johnston, 147 Neb. 886, 25 N. W. 2d 526.

“The burden of proof to establish undue influence is on the party so alleging. In re Estate of Hagan, 143 *725 Neb. 459, 9 N. W. 2d 794; In re Estate of George, 144 Neb. 887, 15 N. W. 2d 80.” In re Estate of Johnston, supra.

In considering the evidence adduced at the trial as to a certain issue, when proper motion is made for that purpose, the trial court should, in determining whether or not that issue should be withdrawn from the jury, apply thereto the following principle: If a motion for a directed verdict is made at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence and again at the close of all the evidence, or in the alternative to dismiss plaintiff’s case, to test the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict, it must be considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, that is, every controverted fact must be resolved in his favor and he should be given the benefit of every inference that can reasonably be deduced therefrom. See Dorn v. Sturges, 157 Neb. 491, 59 N. W. 2d 751.

In In re Estate of Thompson, 153 Neb. 375, 44 N. W. 2d 814, where the same issue was involved as here, we said: “A motion of proponents on the trial of a will contest made at the close of the evidence of the contestants to withdraw from consideration of the jury the issue of undue influence admits the truth of all material and relevant evidence submitted by the contestants, and they are entitled to have it and all inferences fairly deducible therefrom viewed in the most favorable light in testing the correctness of the ruling of the court granting the motion.”

After so considering the evidence it is the duty of the trial court to determine the issue or issues upon which there is competent evidence and submit them, and only them, to the jury.

In a will contest on the ground of undue influence, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict upon such issue in favor of the contestants, then the trial court should withdraw that issue from the jury and, if that is the only issue, either direct a verdict or discharge the jury and render judgment for proponents. *726 See Nebraska Methodist Hospital v. McCloud, 155 Neb. 500, 52 N. W. 2d 325.

On the other hand, that question should be submitted, to the jury when the facts and circumstances proved, together with inferences fairly deducible therefrom, are' such that reasonable minds might conclude the will was. not the free and voluntary act of testatrix, but the result of undue influence exercised upon her. See In re Estate of Strelow, 120 Neb. 242, 233 N. W. 889.

The same principles apply on appeal and, in applying' them, we consider the evidence adduced in light of the-following:

“In testing the sufficiency of evidence to support a verdict it must be considered in the light most favorable to the successful party, that is, every controverted fact must be resolved in his favor and he should have the benefit of every inference that can reasonably be deduced therefrom.” Borcherding v. Eklund, 156 Neb. 196, 55 N. W. 2d 643.

In considering this issue we have, in regard thereto, stated:

“Undue influence cannot be inferred alone from motive or opportunity. There must be some evidence, direct or circumstantial, to show that undue influence not only existed, but that it was exercised at the very time the will was executed.” In re Estate of Thompson, supra.
“There may be influences directing the will-maker’s-attention to proper obligations which it might be thought, ought to be satisfied by testamentary provisions. Such influences may be persuasive and.effective, but, so long as not coercive, they are not undue. Circumstances often arise where such conduct is wholly justifiable.”' In re Estate of Thompson, supra.
“Mere suspicion, surmise, or conjecture is not enough, to warrant a finding of undue influence. • There must be a solid foundation of established facts upon which to rest an inference of its existence.” In re Estate of *727 Fehrenkamp, 154 Neb. 488, 48 N. W. 2d 421.
“Undue influence is usually surrounded by all possible secrecy. It is almost always difficult to prove by direct and positive proof. It is largely a matter of inferences from facts and circumstances surrounding the testator, his life, character, mental condition, as shown by the evidence, and opportunity afforded designing persons for the exercise of improper control.” In re Estate of George, 144 Neb. 887, 15 N. W. 2d 80.
“In making proof of undue influence a contestant is-not limited to the bare facts that he may be able to adduce, but he is entitled to all inferences that may be legitimately derived from established facts.” In re Estate of George, supra.
“In evaluating the testimony and proper inferences therefrom, it is not always possible to apply the evidence tending to establish improper influence which is referable to the will solely to one-of the essential elements. It is permissible therefore not to strive to separate each fact supported by evidence offered as proof of undue influence and allocate it under one or more of the four essential elements requisite to establish the exercise of undue influence, but to view the entire evidence offered by the contestants as proof of this issue and rest the decision upon whether or not the evidence as a whole is of such a substantial nature as to contain some proof of each of the essential elements, and to require that the issue of undue influence be submitted to and determined by a jury.” In re Estate of Fehrenkamp, supra.

Marie Maruska died on June 24, 1951.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re Knott's Estate
82 N.W.2d 568 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1957)
Benedict v. Andersen
77 N.W.2d 320 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1956)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
64 N.W.2d 734, 158 Neb. 723, 1954 Neb. LEXIS 82, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-maruskas-estate-neb-1954.