In Re Martin

199 B.R. 175, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 987, 1996 WL 452967
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedJuly 18, 1996
DocketBankruptcy 95-42745 S
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 199 B.R. 175 (In Re Martin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Martin, 199 B.R. 175, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 987, 1996 WL 452967 (Ark. 1996).

Opinion

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

MARY D. SCOTT, Bankruptcy Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the debtor’s Motion for Stay of Proceedings Pending Appeal, filed on July 11, 1996. Although represented by counsel, after failing in her attempt to dismiss this Chapter 7 case, 1 the debtor filed a pro se motion to convert the case to Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The trustee and a creditor objected to the motion to convert asserting that extreme circumstances exist in this case which preclude conversion, and that the debt- or is ineligible to be a debtor under Chapter 13 because the motion to convert was filed in bad faith. The Objectors further asserted that the debtor does not have regular income and is unable to submit a feasible plan.

Trial on the Motion to Convert was held on June 28, 1996, at the conclusion of which the Court made oral findings of fact and conclusions of law, denying the debtor’s motion. The debtor timely filed a Notice of Appeal and has asked this Court to stay all proceedings pending appeal of the Order denying the Motion to Convert, entered on July 3, 1996.

The bankruptcy court has discretion to grant a stay on such terms as are just, pursuant to Rule 8005, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. However, the moving party must demonstrate:

(1) she is likely to prevail on the merits of the appeal;
(2) she will suffer irreparable injury if the stay is denied;
(3) the other party will not be substantially harmed by the stay; and
(4) the public interest will be served by the granting of the stay.

Community Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Stratford Hotel Company (In re Stratford Hotel Company), 120 B.R. 515, 516-17 (E.D.Mo.1990) (affirming bankruptcy court’s determination that stay pending appeal of order lifting stay was not merited). The factual determinations of the bankruptcy court will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Apex Oil Company, 884 F.2d 343 (8th Cir.1989).

In the instant case, the debtor has failed to adequately assert grounds for a stay of the proceeding. Indeed, the only grounds raised are that the adversary proceedings against her will be moot and that the property of the estate would vest in her if this court *177 is reversed by the district court. While these may address the third prong of the test, the remainder of the elements are neither addressed nor met. The failure to even address these elements for the relief requested is sufficient reason to deny the motion for stay.

Even were the issues addressed, no grounds exist for a stay of the proceeding because the opposing party will be prejudiced by the stay, and the public interest mandates that this case proceed under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code without delay. The most compelling reason for denying the stay, however, is that there is no probability of success on the merits. At the trial on the merits, held on June 28, 1996, the Court made extensive findings of fact, many of which were based upon the credibility of the debtor as well as upon the many admissions of the debtor evidencing bad faith. In light of the intensely factual nature of the findings, the admitted fraudulent and/or criminal acts of the debtor, and the attendant burden to be met by the debtor on appeal, there is little probability of success on the merits of the appeal of the motion to covert.

While the debtor asserted that she has an absolute right to convert to Chapter 13 under section 706(a), this is true only if she is otherwise eligible for Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. § 706(d); Bobroff v. Continental Bank (In re Bobroff), 766 F.2d 797, 803 (3d Cir.1985). Accordingly, Martin must meet all eligibility requirements for filing a Chapter 13 case, including the requirement of good faith. The Eighth Circuit has set forth guidance on the issue of good faith in the Chapter 13 setting. In Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir.1990) (en banc), the Eighth Circuit sets forth several factors, modified from the factors initially stated in In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir.1982). 2 LeMaire advised that good faith depends upon,

[Wjhether the debtor has stated his debts and expenses accurately; whether he has made any fraudulent misrepresentation to mislead the bankruptcy court; or whether he has unfairly manipulated the Bankruptcy Code.

LeMaire at 1349. The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the “totality of the circumstances” test and set forth the “particularly relevant” factors to be applied in light of the purposes of Chapter 13:

The type of debt sought to be discharged and whether the debt is nondischargeable in Chapter 7, and the debtor’s motivation and sincerity in seeking Chapter 13 relief.

Id. at 1349. At the conclusion of trial, the Court found that the debtor has not only inaccurately stated her debts and expenses and attempted to mislead the court, but has unfairly manipulated the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, applying any of the three alternate standards, the first prong of the test set forth in LeMaire is met.

Additional factors indicate that the motion to convert to Chapter 13 is filed in bad faith such that the debtor is ineligible for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The schedules in this case are' not merely inaccurate, they are false. The debtor not only failed to list any income at all, including child support income she receives, but failed to coherently explain how she manages to subsist. There was evidence of checks and monies she received and endorsed, but merely claims it is “not mine.” Although she has or had bank accounts, they are not listed on the schedules. She also fails to list her debts with any measure of accuracy. She claims that all of the property currently and formerly titled in her name belongs to her parents, but discloses little of that information on the schedules. She not only fails to list property titled in her name, she fails to list transfers of property to her parents.

Another important mark of bad faith is the debtor’s manipulation of the schedules to conform to the relief sought. For purposes of Chapter 7 the debtor has no income. For purposes of Chapter 13, the debtor has commission income derived from a funeral home. These mutations not only indicate the falsity of the schedules, ground for denial of the *178 discharge, but are direct evidence of an attempt to unfairly manipulate the Bankruptcy Code.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re Solomon
277 B.R. 706 (E.D. Texas, 2002)
Martin v. Sanford (In re Martin)
271 B.R. 333 (Eighth Circuit, 2002)
In Re Martin
271 B.R. 332 (Eighth Circuit, 2002)
In Re Krishnaya
263 B.R. 63 (S.D. New York, 2001)
Blackwell v. Little (In Re Little)
253 B.R. 427 (Eighth Circuit, 2000)
In Re Wilcox
251 B.R. 59 (E.D. Arkansas, 2000)
Williams v. Marlar (In Re Marlar)
248 B.R. 577 (W.D. Arkansas, 2000)
In Re Martin
211 B.R. 23 (E.D. Arkansas, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
199 B.R. 175, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 987, 1996 WL 452967, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-martin-areb-1996.