In Re Marshall

219 B.R. 687, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 725, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2247, 1997 WL 875707
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. North Carolina
DecidedDecember 16, 1997
Docket19-10112
StatusPublished

This text of 219 B.R. 687 (In Re Marshall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Marshall, 219 B.R. 687, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 725, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2247, 1997 WL 875707 (N.C. 1997).

Opinion

ORDER DENYING DEBTORS’ OBJECTION TO DEFICIENCY CLAIM

CATHERINE R. CARRUTHERS, Bankruptcy Judge.

THIS MATTER coming on for hearing, after due and proper notice, before the undersigned bankruptcy judge in Winston-Salem, North Carolina on October 8,1997, upon the Debtors’ objection to a deficiency claim filed by Green Tree Financial Corporation (hereafter “Green Tree”). Kathryn L. Brin-gle appeared as the Chapter 13 Standing ■Trustee, John Boddie appeared on behalf of the Debtors, and Susan C. Campbell appeared on behalf of Green Tree. The court, after a review of the record and the testimony presented and the arguments of counsel, makes the following findings of fact.

1. The Debtors filed for protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on August 16,1996. At that time, Green Tree held a duly perfected security interest in a 1989 mobile home and had filed a proof of claim *689 with the bankruptcy court evidencing a secured debt in the amount of $15,275.04.

2.. The Debtors’ Chapter 13 plan was confirmed on October 17, 1996, and provided for monthly payments to Green Tree. Subsequently, Green Tree filed a motion for relief from stay asserting that the Debtors’ had failed to make the adequate protection payments provided for in the Debtors’ Chapter 13 plan, and on March 10, 1997, this court entered a consent order granting Green Tree’s motion to lift the stay providing that the mobile home would be turned over to Green Tree effective April 1, 1997, and that Green Tree would have 120 days, or up to August 1, 1997, within which to file a deficiency claim.

3. On July 1, 1997, Green Tree timely filed a deficiency claim in the amount of $13,341.38. On August 22,1997, the Debtors filed an objection to this deficiency claim contending that the sales price of the mobile home was unconscionably inadequate and that the sale was not commercially reasonable. This hearing is the result of the filing of Green Tree’s deficiency claim and the Debtors’ objection thereto.

4. Green Tree disposed of the property by way of private sale on the 25th day of May, 1997, to a purchaser that is not affiliated with Green Tree.

5. Notice of the private sale and right to redeem was sent to the Debtors’ last known address by first class and certified mail. It is undisputed that Green Tree knew that the Debtors had vacated their home and were no longer residing at that address when the notice was sent. The certified mail was returned. There was no evidence as to the receipt or the denial of receipt of the notice which was sent via first class mail.

6. Green Tree presented testimony from an appraiser and co-manager of one of the Green Tree branches detailing the poor condition of the home. This representative also testified as to similar market values and comparable mobile home sales. Green Tree made a physical inspection of the unit and based upon the physical inspection of the unit decided to use a wholesale liquidation rather than liquidate through retail. The decision was made after obtaining an estimate of $4,445 to make repairs to the home. Green Tree’s expert testified that after inspection of the unit he believed the unit to have a value of $5,500.. Detailed information regarding the unit was sent to 30 dealers. Thereafter, three offers were obtained with the last and highest offer being $2,650.

7.The Debtors were not present at the hearing and did not present any evidence.

ISSUE

The issue before this court is whether the secured creditor, Green Tree, conducted a private sale of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code, specifically North Carolina General Statute § 25-9-504.

DISCUSSION

North Carolina General Statute § 25-9-504(3) states in relevant part, that

Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms, but every aspect of the disposition, including the method, manner, time, place, and terms must be commercially reasonable.

The Debtors contend that the sale was not commercially reasonable in that (1) the sales price was unconscionably disproportionate to the amount of the debt; and (2) Green Tree did not give the Debtors proper notice of the private sale.

North Carolina specifically authorizes disposition of collateral by private sale. Associates Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Welborn, 269 N.C. 563, 566, 153 S.E.2d 7, 9 (1967). A creditor, when seeking a deficiency, has the burden of proving that the sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. Church v. Mickler, 55 N.C.App. 724, 731, 287 S.E.2d 131, 135 (1982). The creditor must also show compliance with reasonable notification. Don Jenkins & Son Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. Catlette, 59 N.C.App. 482, 483, 297 S.E.2d 409, 410 (1982).

The first issue to be determined is if the private sale was commercially reasonable.

Pursuant to N.C, Gen.Stat. § 25-9-507(2) *690 The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale of a different time or in a different method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to 'establish that the sale was- not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured party either sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the current price in such market at the time of the sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity with the reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold, he has sold in a commercially reasonable manner.

Based on the testimony presented by Mr. John Pearson, who was qualified as an expert, the facts appear abundantly clear that this property was sold in a manner which is accepted in the mobile home industry. The property was inspected, a list of repairs was made, and a determination was made that a better price could be obtained by selling this unit at a wholesale rather than a retail price. Information about this particular unit was transmitted to 30 dealers, and three dealers made offers. The fact that the price obtained ($2,650) was less than what Green Tree’s expert had estimated to be the fair market value of the unit ($5,500) does not make the sale commercially unreasonable. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Davis, 37 N.C.App. 114, 245 S.E.2d 566 (1978).

As to the first issue, the court finds that Green Tree’s private sale of the Debtors’ mobile home in obtaining a sales price of $2,650 constitutes a commercially reasonable sale, and that the final sales price was representative of the condition of the mobile home and was relative to other prices obtained on comparable mobile homes. The testimony provided by Green Tree is sufficient to justify a finding that the sales price obtained was not commercially unreasonable.

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Related

First National Bank of Lewistown V.
850 P.2d 954 (Montana Supreme Court, 1993)
Associates Financial Services Corp. v. Welborn
153 S.E.2d 7 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1967)
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Davis
245 S.E.2d 566 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1978)
Church v. Mickler
287 S.E.2d 131 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1982)
Henson v. Foremost Insurance
280 S.E.2d 848 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1981)
Don Jenkins & Son Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. Catlette
297 S.E.2d 409 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1982)
NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. American Doubloon Corp.
481 S.E.2d 387 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1997)
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286 N.W.2d 750 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1980)

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Bluebook (online)
219 B.R. 687, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 725, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2247, 1997 WL 875707, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-marshall-ncmb-1997.