NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2025 IL App (3d) 230529-U
Order filed April 1, 2025 _____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court MARJORIE ZILLIGEN, ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit, ) Du Page County, Illinois. Petitioner-Appellant, ) ) Appeal No. 3-23-0529 and ) Circuit No. 18-D-700 ) JON ZILLIGEN, ) The Honorable ) Richard D. Felice, Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE PETERSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Holdridge and Bertani concurred in the judgment. _____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: In an appeal in a postdissolution of marriage proceeding, the appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the ex-wife’s petition to modify maintenance. The appellate court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
¶2 Petitioner, Marjorie Zilligen, filed a postdissolution of marriage petition to modify
maintenance seeking to increase the amount of maintenance that was paid to her each month by
her ex-husband, respondent, Jon Zilligen. Jon filed a response and opposed the petition. After full briefing and an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the trial court denied Marjorie’s petition.
Marjorie appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The parties were married in October 1996 and had four children, all of whom are now
emancipated. During the marriage, Marjorie maintained the household and took care of the
children while Jon pursued his career, although Marjorie did work at times. In April 2018,
Marjorie filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. A bench trial was held on the petition, and,
in August 2019, the trial court entered a written judgment of dissolution. 1 At the time of the
dissolution, Marjorie was 57 years old and Jon was 55 years old. Jon’s average annual salary was
approximately $191,000 (approximately $221,700 if he received a bonus). The judgment of
dissolution provided, among other things, that the parties would split the retirement assets evenly
(approximately $472,650 each); that the non-retirement assets would be split with Marjorie
receiving a higher percentage with approximately 58% going to Marjorie (approximately
$420,200) and approximately 42% going to Jon (approximately $297,420); and that Jon would
pay Marjorie indefinite modifiable maintenance of $5500 per month, an amount that exceeded
the statutory guidelines amount. The trial court found that the guidelines amount was inadequate
for several reasons, including Marjorie’s lack of employability and marketable skills and her
medical and emotional issues.
¶5 In March 2020, Jon filed a petition to modify maintenance seeking to reduce the amount
of his monthly maintenance payment to Marjorie. Jon alleged in the petition that a substantial
1 The trial court also issued a letter opinion that was incorporated into, and made part of, the judgment of dissolution. We will refer to both documents collectively in this order as the judgment of dissolution.
2 change in circumstances had occurred in that his income had been significantly reduced because
of the COVID-19 pandemic. He later lost his job.
¶6 In May 2021, at a pretrial conference, the parties reached an oral agreement to settle
nearly all of the pending matters, including Jon’s petition to modify, and communicated that
agreement to the trial court. The case was continued so that the parties could put their settlement
agreement into writing. The parties were unable to do so, however, and Jon filed a motion to
enforce the oral settlement agreement that the parties had reached.
¶7 In July 2021, a hearing was held on Jon’s motion to enforce. After considering the
evidence presented, the trial court entered an order that essentially incorporated the terms of the
parties’ oral settlement agreement. Among other things, the order provided that: (1) Jon’s
maintenance payment was reduced to $2750 per month due to the substantial change in Jon’s
economic circumstances and based upon Jon’s reduced income (from unemployment benefits
and part-time, hourly employment); (2) Jon was required to maintain a diligent job search and to
notify Marjorie immediately if he obtained full-time, or further part-time, employment; (3)
Marjorie was to pay Jon $126,000 for Jon’s interest in the marital home; (4) Marjorie was also
required to pay Jon $15,500 to reimburse Jon for maintenance payments that he had already
made; and (5) all pending petitions and motions were withdrawn with prejudice (except a
petition relating to college costs).
¶8 Less than a week after the July 2021 order was entered, Jon obtained full-time
employment in the field in which he had previously worked, human resources (HR), at a pay rate
of approximately $114,000 per year, not including overtime compensation. Jon promptly notified
Marjorie of his new employment.
3 ¶9 Later that same month (July 2021), Marjorie filed a petition to modify maintenance and
sought to increase the amount of monthly maintenance that Jon was required to pay. Marjorie
alleged in the petition that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred from the time of
the July 2021 order in that: (1) Jon had obtained the full-time employment described above, and
(2) Marjorie had recently paid Jon $141,500 ($126,000 for Jon’s interest in the marital home and
$15,500 for the reimbursement of maintenance) and had less of an ability to support herself. Jon
filed a response and opposed the petition, and Marjorie filed a reply.
¶ 10 In March 2022, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition. The evidence
presented at the hearing, which consisted of the testimony of the parties and numerous exhibits,
can be summarized as follows. Jon, who was then 58 years old, testified that at the time of the
prior bench trial and when the judgment of dissolution was entered, he was working for Encore
Event Technologies (Encore) as the Senior Vice President of HR and Administration. Jon had
worked for Encore or a related company since approximately 2004. When the dissolution
occurred, Jon’s annual base pay at Encore was approximately $195,000. He also received a
discretionary bonus each year equal to or about 20% to 30% of his base pay.
¶ 11 At the end of 2019, Encore was bought out by another company (the new company). In
April 2020, after the COVID-19 pandemic had started and everything was shut down, the new
company instituted layoffs and pay reductions, and Jon’s base pay was reduced by 20%. As a
result, Jon filed a petition to modify maintenance and sought to reduce the amount of his
monthly maintenance payment. In August 2020, while Jon’s petition to modify was pending, his
employment at the new company was terminated. Jon was given a severance package whereby
he received his then salary (80% of his full base salary) for six months and was also given
outplacement services.
4 ¶ 12 Despite the changes in his employment, Jon continued to pay Marjorie $5500 per month
in maintenance and continued to contribute $1000 per month toward Marjorie’s monthly
mortgage payment (there was some dispute as to whether Jon had contributed to the mortgage
payment for the first three months after the judgment of dissolution was entered). To make those
payments, Jon pulled money from his savings each month, which caused his financial situation to
get worse. To try to improve his situation, Jon began working a part-time job as a tutor with C2
Educational Systems (C2). In that position, Jon was paid $21 per hour and worked 8 to 12 hours
per week. Jon also continued to look for new employment. He applied for multiple positions and
had some job interviews but was ultimately unsuccessful in his job search at that time.
¶ 13 According to Jon’s income records, he earned approximately $220,500 in gross income in
2020. A small portion of that income (approximately $12,600) came from C2. The remainder
(approximately $207,900) was from Encore.
¶ 14 In the beginning of February 2021, Jon’s severance payments from Encore ended. Jon
applied for and received unemployment compensation. The amount of his unemployment
compensation was slightly less than $700 per week.
¶ 15 In May 2021, the parties reached an oral settlement agreement on Jon’s petition to
modify and all other pending matters. Jon later filed a motion to enforce the oral settlement
agreement. A hearing was held on the motion in July 2021. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
trial court entered an order enforcing the oral settlement agreement and reducing Jon’s
maintenance payment to $2750 per month retroactive to when Jon’s petition to modify was filed.
Because the reduction in maintenance was retroactive, Marjorie had to reimburse Jon $15,500
for maintenance that he had already paid. The order provided further that Majorie would also pay
Jon $126,000 for his interest in the marital home where Marjorie was still residing.
5 ¶ 16 The day before the July 2021 court hearing, Jon was contacted by Human Capital
Management Partners (HCM), one of the networking groups that he had joined, about a possible
independent contractor position. Jon did not report or testify about the job lead at the court
hearing because he did not know if the lead was going to amount to anything. The following
week, Jon had a phone interview and was subsequently offered a position at Signode. A few days
later, Jon signed an independent contractor agreement with HCM. The position was located at
Signode. Jon was to be paid $55 per hour through HCM but would be responsible for paying his
own taxes. Jon promptly notified Marjorie that he had obtained new employment, and Marjorie
filed a petition to modify seeking to increase the amount of Jon’s monthly maintenance payment.
From the end of July until the middle of December 2021, Jon worked for HCM as an
independent contractor. In December 2021, a position opened up directly with Signode. Jon
applied for and received that position.
¶ 17 According to his income records, Jon earned approximately $95,100 in gross income in
2021. About $42,900 of that income came from Jon’s work for HCM. The remainder of Jon’s
income for that year came from Encore (approximately $20,600), unemployment compensation
(approximately $19,700), C2 (approximately $7300), and Signode (approximately $4600).
¶ 18 At the time of Jon’s testimony in the instant proceeding, Jon was still employed at
Signode as the HR Manager. His base pay was $120,000 per year, and he was eligible to earn a
bonus. According to Jon, however, despite obtaining a higher salary, he still did not make
enough money to cover all of his monthly expenses.
¶ 19 On his March 2022 financial affidavit, Jon listed his base pay at Signode as being
$10,000 per month. After taxes and Jon’s $2750 maintenance payment were taken out, Jon was
left with a net amount of $4520 per month. Jon’s living expenses were $4840 per month, but that
6 amount did not include what Jon paid each month for Rachel’s college costs (the parties’
daughter) and for Jon and Rachel’s health insurance. Jon listed the value of his assets on his
financial affidavit as being $880,000, which was comprised of retirement accounts
(approximately $719,000) and non-retirement accounts (approximately $161,000). The value of
Jon’s investment accounts had dropped after he had prepared his financial affidavit, however,
because the stock market had gone down (at least through June 2022). Marjorie’s investment
accounts had dropped in value as well.
¶ 20 Jon did not own a home and had been renting a place in Villa Park, Illinois, for the past
two years. His rent was previously $1950 per month but had just recently been increased to
$1975 when he signed a two-year extension of the lease. The parties’ daughter, Rachel, lived
with him at that location when she was not in college. Rachel moved in with Jon in about June
2020. Prior to that time, Rachel had lived with Marjorie. Jon recently had some medical
problems with his inner ear and had to have two surgeries, one in December 2020 and the other
in May 2022.
¶ 21 Jon placed the $126,000 that Majorie had paid him for his share of the marital home into
his non-retirement accounts. He used a portion of that money to pay some of his attorney fees
(approximately $53,200) and also to pay some of Rachel’s college costs. Jon had paid
approximately $15,000 in February 2021, approximately $8400 in November or December 2021,
and approximately $5900 in April or May 2022 for Rachel’s college costs. The college’s
projection was that an additional $11,200 would be owed in the near future for the upcoming
spring semester, and Jon had paid $6000 or $7000 of that amount as well. Marjorie had paid
approximately $9400 in February 2021 and approximately $2000 in July 2021 but then stopped
making any payments toward Rachel’s college costs. As a result, Rachel had to take out a student
7 loan. The parties’ other three children had already completed college, and the entire cost was
paid for by the family. Jon argued that the trial court should order Marjorie to pay half of the
college costs (the parties had filed competing petitions for contribution to college costs that were
being heard at the same time as Marjorie’s petition to modify) because, according to Jon,
Marjorie had a higher net worth and more financial assets than Jon.
¶ 22 At various times during the marriage, Marjorie had been employed doing payroll and
accounting work. Jon believed that Marjorie was paid about $30 per hour for that work. The
money that Marjorie earned went into the family account. Marjorie stopped working shortly
before she filed for dissolution.
¶ 23 In approximately 1986, Marjorie earned an associate’s degree in accounting and worked
part-time at various points during the marriage. From 2015 to 2018, Marjorie worked for a
company as a staff accountant doing payroll work. She was paid $17 to $23.50 per hour.
Marjorie earned approximately $20,400 in 2015, approximately $34,600 in 2016, and
approximately $39,300 in 2017 from that work. In January 2018, however, Marjorie was laid off
from her position. As a result, she only made about $4900 that year. That was the last time that
Marjorie worked. Marjorie was not employed in 2020 or 2021 (or, presumably, in 2019), and her
only source of income during that time period was the maintenance payments that she received
from Jon. Her taxable annual income was approximately $1800 in 2020 and approximately
$16,000 in 2021. Marjorie was not currently employed and did not think that she was capable of
obtaining a job because of her age—she was 60 years old and did not believe that anyone would
hire a person that age—and because of her medical problems. Marjorie had high blood pressure,
asthma, and depression and was taking daily medications for those conditions. She had applied
for at least one part-time job recently but was not hired. Marjorie acknowledged during her
8 testimony, however, that the job that she had applied for was not in the accounting field and that
she had the same medical conditions when she was working in 2018. Marjorie indicated further
in her testimony that she had suffered some negative mental health repercussions from traumatic
events that had occurred in her life since 2017, which included the parties’ son attempting to
commit suicide, Marjorie’s mother having a stroke, and Marjorie’s brother passing away.
Marjorie was currently helping to care for her mother two days a week.
¶ 24 In her June 2022 financial affidavit, Marjorie listed her income as being $2750 per
month—the amount of monthly maintenance that Jon was currently paying to her as provided in
the July 2021 order. Marjorie’s purported expenses were about $6000 per month, which left her
with a significant shortfall every month. The shortfall had been occurring for about 15 months.
To cover the shortfall and to pay her bills and expenses each month, Marjorie had to take money
from her savings. Doing so had caused Marjorie to lose a substantial amount of the money that
she had been awarded in the dissolution. In addition, the value of Marjorie’s accounts had also
dropped due to market conditions. As a result of those two factors, Marjorie’s assets were now
significantly lower than they were when Marjorie prepared her financial affidavit.
¶ 25 After the July 2021 order was entered and Jon’s petition to modify was granted
retroactive to the date it was filed, Marjorie paid Jon $15,500 to reimburse him for five months
of maintenance that he had already paid. She also paid Jon $126,000 to buy out his interest in the
marital home. The money for those two payments came from Marjorie’s savings, which was part
of the money that she received in the dissolution.
¶ 26 As a result of buying out Jon’s interest, Marjorie now owned the marital home in Glen
Ellyn, Illinois, in her name alone. The home had six bedrooms, and Marjorie currently lived in
the home with the parties’ daughter, Courtney. Marjorie did not require Courtney to contribute to
9 the household expenses. In January 2022, Marjorie refinanced the mortgage on the home, which
allowed her to reduce the amount of her monthly mortgage payment. She obtained the loan for
the refinance by listing on the loan application that she could withdraw $2000 per month from
her retirement accounts (presumably, if necessary) to supplement the monthly maintenance
payments that she received from Jon. Marjorie indicated in her most recent financial affidavit
that the home had been appraised at $485,000. Her mortgage on the home was for approximately
$145,000, which meant that Marjorie had $340,000 of potential equity in the home. Marjorie,
doubted, however, that she could sell the home in its current condition or obtain another loan on
the home and did not know where she and Courtney would live if she sold the home. Marjorie
also did not believe that downsizing would allow her to save any money because a rental
payment would probably be more than her current monthly mortgage payment.
¶ 27 Marjorie had incurred additional credit card debt since the maintenance was reduced,
owed money to her attorney for attorney fees, and did not have the money to contribute to
Rachel’s college costs.
¶ 28 According to Marjorie, Jon had been secretive about financial matters during the parties’
marriage and had, without Marjorie’s knowledge, removed approximately $375,000 from one of
the parties’ joint accounts a few months before he moved out of the marital home in March 2018.
The trial court later ordered Jon to return those funds. Marjorie did not believe that Jon had
tendered all of his credit card, bank, investment, and retirement account statements in the current
proceedings and had suspicions that Jon was involved in other business activity (had received
other income) that he had not disclosed. Marjorie felt that Jon should pay for all of Rachel’s
college costs and that he should reimburse Marjorie for what she had paid toward those costs
(approximately $9300). Marjorie also felt that Jon’s maintenance payment should be increased
10 back to what it was previously—$5500 per month—because, among other things, Jon was fully
employed, was eligible for a bonus, and was likely going to be getting a raise in the near future
since he had been with Signode for a year. In addition, Jon was going to be getting an inheritance
from his father’s estate. Marjorie commented in her testimony that maintenance was initially set
at $5500 based upon Jon’s income and assets, not based solely upon Jon’s income alone.
Marjorie also believed that Jon should contribute toward the attorney fees that she had incurred
and had filed a separate petition that was still pending requesting that relief.
¶ 29 As of her March 2022 financial affidavit, Marjorie had about $1,144,900 in assets, which
was comprised of approximately $645,000 in retirement accounts, approximately $159,900 in
non-retirement accounts, and about $340,000 in potential home equity. Marjorie maintained,
however, that her home was not a liquid asset and re-emphasized that she did not know if she
could sell her home in its current condition.
¶ 30 After analyzing the relevant statutory factors, the trial court found that a substantial
change in circumstances had not occurred and that a modification of maintenance was
unwarranted. The trial court also found, however, that it would not have increased the
maintenance in this case, even if it had determined that a substantial change in circumstances had
occurred, because doing so would have required the trial court to deviate from the statutory
maintenance guidelines. Of relevance to this appeal, in making its ruling, the trial court noted
that: (1) it recognized what the prior trial judge had said and done at the time of the dissolution,
but the circumstances were different now than they were at that time; (2) the prior trial judge had
made her determination on maintenance based upon the income levels that then existed, but the
trial court in the current proceeding had to look at the circumstances that had occurred after the
July 2021 modification order was entered; and (3) it appeared that neither of the parties were
11 doing better than they were at the time of the dissolution. The trial court ultimately denied
Marjorie’s petition to modify, and a written order was later entered to that effect. Marjorie
subsequently appealed.
¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 32 On appeal, Marjorie argues that the trial court erred in denying her petition to modify
maintenance. Marjorie asserts that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous in two respects. First,
Marjorie contends, the trial court incorrectly found that no substantial change in circumstances
had occurred even though it was undisputed that Jon’s monthly income had more than doubled,
going from about $4200 to $10,000 per month, since the prior modification order was entered
(the July 2021 order). According to Marjorie, the trial court reached the wrong conclusion
because it misapplied the law and incorrectly considered the circumstances that had occurred
since the judgment of dissolution was entered, rather than only considering the circumstances
that had occurred since the last modification order was entered as the law required. Second,
Marjorie contends, the trial court incorrectly found in the alternative that no modification was
warranted even if a substantial change in circumstances had occurred. Marjorie maintains that
the trial court’s alternative finding was wrong as well because the trial court failed to give proper
deference to the prior trial judge’s determination—that the maintenance guidelines were not
appropriate for this case (found at the time the judgment of dissolution was entered)—or, at the
very least, failed to explain why the maintenance guidelines were now appropriate. Marjorie
asserts that contrary to the trial court’s alternative finding, the statutory factors continue to weigh
in favor of a deviation from the maintenance guidelines and the evidence presented at the hearing
on the petition to modify did not demonstrate otherwise. For both of the reasons stated, Marjorie
asks that we reverse the trial court’s judgment denying Marjorie’s petition to modify
12 maintenance, that we order an increase in Jon’s monthly maintenance payment to Marjorie, and
that we remand this case for further proceedings.
¶ 33 Jon argues that the trial court’s ruling was proper and should be upheld. In support of that
argument, Jon asserts first that the trial court correctly found that no substantial change in
circumstances had occurred under the facts of the present case. Jon points out that in making its
determination, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Marjorie’s petition that lasted
several days; considered the evidence presented, the prior maintenance orders, the credibility of
the witnesses, and the arguments of the attorneys. Jon further argues that the court analyzed and
addressed the relevant statutory factors and carefully set forth and explained its findings in its
oral ruling. Thus, Jon contends that the trial did not commit an abuse of discretion in finding that
no substantial change in circumstances had occurred. Second in support of his argument, Jon
asserts that the trial court correctly found, as an alternative finding, that an increase in
maintenance was not appropriate in this case, even if a substantial change in circumstances had
occurred. Jon contends that the trial court gave proper deference to the prior trial judge’s
determination as to the applicability of the statutory maintenance guidelines but ultimately
concluded that a deviation from the guidelines was no longer appropriate because the COVID-19
pandemic had caused a material change in Jon’s employment/income and because neither of the
parties were as well off as they were at the time of the dissolution. Jon further supports that
contention by pointing to some of the facts that were elicited at the evidentiary hearing on
Marjorie’s petition, which included that Jon’s salary was significantly less than it was at the time
of the dissolution; that Marjorie had more assets than Jon; that Jon’s current maintenance
payment was still above the statutory guidelines amount; and that the parties’ daughter, Rachel,
was now living with Jon when she was not at college, and not with Marjorie. Jon maintains,
13 therefore, that the trial court’s finding—that an increase in maintenance was not warranted—was
supported by common sense and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, for all of
the reasons stated, Jon asks that we affirm the trial court’s judgment denying Marjorie’s petition
to modify maintenance.
¶ 34 A trial court’s ruling on a petition to modify maintenance will not be disturbed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 24; In re
Marriage of Folley, 2021 IL App (3d) 180427, ¶ 34. The threshold for finding an abuse of
discretion is a high one and will not be overcome unless it can be said that the trial court’s ruling
was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or that no reasonable person would have taken the view
adopted by the trial court. See Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 36 (2009); In re Leona W., 228 Ill.
2d 439, 460 (2008). A trial court’s ruling on a petition to modify maintenance may be affirmed
on any basis supported by the record. Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 24; In re Marriage of Bostrom,
2022 IL App (1st) 200967, ¶ 59.
¶ 35 Under section 510(a-5) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act), an
award of spousal maintenance may be modified only upon a showing that a substantial change in
circumstances has occurred since the last (most recent) maintenance order was entered. See 750
ILCS 5/510 (a-5) (West 2020); Folley, 2021 IL App (3d) 180427, ¶ 35; In re Marriage of
Osseck, 2021 IL App (2d) 200268, ¶ 47. Simply put, a substantial change in circumstances exists
when either the needs of the spouse receiving maintenance, or the ability of the other spouse to
pay that maintenance, has significantly changed. See Osseck, 2021 IL App (2d) 200268, ¶ 47; In
re Marriage of Bernay, 2017 IL App (2d) 160583, ¶ 18 (indicating, although somewhat
implicitly, that the change that occurred must be significant). The party who is seeking a
modification of maintenance bears the burden of proving that a substantial change in
14 circumstances has occurred. See Folley, 2021 IL App (3d) 180427, ¶ 35. If the trial court
determines that a substantial change in circumstances exists, it may modify a maintenance award
but is not required to do so. Id. Rather, after finding that a substantial change in circumstances
has occurred, the trial court must then determine whether, and to what extent, a modification of
maintenance is warranted. Id.; Osseck, 2021 IL App (2d) 200268, ¶ 48.
¶ 36 In making that determination, the trial court must consider the same factors set forth in
section 504(a) of the Act that it considered when it initially awarded maintenance, which
include: (1) the income and property of both parties; (2) the needs of each party; (3) the realistic
present and future earning capacity of each party; (4) any impairment of the present and future
earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance due to that party devoting time to domestic
duties or having forgone or delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities due
to the marriage; (5) any impairment of the realistic present or future earning capacity of the party
against whom maintenance is sought; (6) the time required for the party seeking maintenance to
acquire appropriate education, training, and employment, and whether that party is able to
support himself or herself through appropriate employment; (6.1) the effect of any parental
responsibility arrangements and its effect on a party’s ability to seek or maintain employment;
(7) the standard of living established during the marriage; (8) the duration of the marriage; (9)
the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate, liabilities, and the needs of each of the parties; (10) all sources of public
and private income including disability and retirement income; (11) the tax consequences to each
party; (12) contributions and services by the party seeking maintenance to the education,
training, career or career potential, or license of the other spouse; (13) any valid agreement of the
15 parties; and (14) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable. 750 ILCS
5/504(a) (West 2020); Folley, 2021 IL App (3d) 180427, ¶ 36.
¶ 37 In addition to the section 504(a) factors, the trial court must also consider the factors set
forth in section 510(a-5) in determining whether, and to what extent, a modification of
maintenance is appropriate. 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2020); Folley, 2021 IL App (3d)
180427, ¶ 37. Those factors include: (1) any changes in the employment status of either party
and whether those changes were made in good faith; (2) the efforts, if any, made by the party
receiving maintenance to become self-supporting and the reasonableness of those efforts; (3) any
impairment of the present and future earning capacity of either party; (4) the tax consequences of
the maintenance payments; (5) the duration of the maintenance payments previously paid (and
remaining to be paid) relative to the length of the marriage; (6) the property, including retirement
benefits, awarded to each party under the judgment of dissolution of marriage and the present
status of the property; (7) the increase or decrease in each party’s income since the prior
judgment or order from which a modification is being sought; (8) the property acquired and
currently owned by each party after the entry of the judgment of dissolution of marriage; and (9)
any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable. 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5)
(West 2020); Folley, 2021 IL App (3d) 180427, ¶ 37.
¶ 38 In the present case, after reviewing the record and considering the legal principles that
apply to modification of maintenance awards, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding
that no substantial change in circumstances had occurred. The evidence presented at the hearing
on Marjorie’s petition to modify established without dispute that since the prior modification
order was entered in July 2021, Jon had obtained employment directly with Signode (after first
obtaining an independent contractor position at Signode through HCM) and that his monthly
16 gross income had more than doubled, increasing from approximately $4200 to $10,000 per
month. As Marjorie correctly notes, Illinois courts have regularly determined that changes in
income of more than 25% constitute a substantial change in circumstances. See Osseck, 2021 IL
App (2d) 200268, ¶ 52. Based upon that case law and the extent of the increase in Jon’s income
in the present case, we must conclude that the trial court’s finding of no substantial change in
circumstances was erroneous.
¶ 39 In reaching that conclusion, we note that while Jon tries to support the trial court’s
finding by pointing to case law that states or suggests that a change in income alone does not
generally constitute a substantial change in circumstances (see, e.g., In re Marriage of Plotz, 229
Ill. App. 3d 389, 392 (1992) (discussing a substantial change of circumstances in the context of a
request to modify child support)), we are not persuaded by that argument. We have no
disagreement with the legal principle that Jon cites as a general rule, but we also recognize that at
some point, a change in income reaches such a significant level that it must be deemed a
substantial change in circumstances, even if it is the only change that has occurred. See Osseck,
2021 IL App (2d) 200268, ¶ 52 (indicating that courts in Illinois have regularly determined that a
change in income of more than 25% constitutes a substantial change in circumstances). The
change in Jon’s monthly gross income in the present case, which more than doubled, was such a
change and constituted a substantial change in circumstances. See id. We, therefore, reject Jon’s
assertion to the contrary.
¶ 40 Although we conclude that the trial court erred by finding that no substantial change in
circumstances had occurred, we also determine, however, that the trial court ultimately did not
commit an abuse of discretion in finding that a modification of maintenance was unwarranted
(the trial court’s alternative finding). In making that finding, the trial court considered the
17 evidence that had been presented, the prior modification orders, the arguments of the attorneys,
and the relevant statutory factors. In addition, and contrary to Marjorie’s assertion, the trial court
also considered, and gave proper deference to, the prior trial judge’s determination that the
statutory maintenance guidelines should not be applied in this case. The trial court noted the
prior trial judge’s determination and stated on the record why the court was now deciding that
the maintenance guidelines should be applied—because the circumstances were different than
they were at the time of the dissolution, Jon’s income was significantly less than it was when the
prior trial judge made her maintenance determination, and neither of the parties were as well off
as they were when the judgment of dissolution was entered. The court maintenance award
($2750/month) is already above the guideline maintenance amount. The trial court’s ruling in
that regard was supported by the evidence presented at the hearing on Marjorie’s petition to
modify and by the legal principles set forth above and was not, therefore, arbitrary or
unreasonable. We, thus, conclude that the trial court properly found that a modification of
maintenance was unwarranted and properly denied Marjorie’s petition to modify. See Blum, 235
Ill. 2d at 36; Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d at 460. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.
¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page
County.
¶ 43 Affirmed.