2020 IL App (1st) 191007-U No. 1-19-1007 Fourth Division September 30, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
) In re MARRIAGE OF ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court CAMILLE WINSTON, ) of Cook County. ) Petitioner-Appellant, ) No. 16 D6 30434 ) and ) The Honorable ) Bonita Coleman, TRUMANE HAMPTON, ) Judge Presiding. ) Respondent-Appellee. ) ) ______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lampkin and Reyes concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The trial court’s temporary order allocating parental responsibilities is not properly before this court, as the appellant failed to file a petition for leave to appeal the order; even if it was properly before this court, any review would be moot, as the temporary order was superseded by the trial court’s final judgment of allocation of parental responsibilities. (2) The final judgment of allocation of parental responsibilities is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, where the trial court found that it was in the best interest of the minor to adopt the parties’ agreed parenting plan, and there is nothing in the record to support any claims of error. No. 1-19-1007
¶2 The instant pro se appeal arises from proceedings related to the dissolution of the marriage
of petitioner Camille Winston and respondent Trumane Hampton. According to Winston,
during a hearing on an order considering visitation, the trial court sua sponte entered an order
granting primary parenting time to Hampton, when such relief was never requested, which
Winston claims renders the order void. Additionally, Winston challenges a later judgment
allocating parental responsibilities, which she claims was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Winston and Hampton were married in 2013. On May 2, 2016, Winston filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage, in which she requested that she be awarded all decision-making
responsibility for their daughter K.H., who was two years old at the time. Winston also alleged
in the petition that an order of protection had been entered involving the parties and K.H.
concerning domestic violence; the order of protection does not appear in the record on appeal,
but Hampton admitted the existence of the order of protection in his answer to the petition. In
his answer, Hampton also contested the paternity of K.H., and admitted the allegations in the
petition in which Winston alleged that it would be in the best interests of K.H. that Winston
have all decision-making responsibility for her. The court ordered paternity testing; an order
regarding paternity does not appear in the record on appeal, but the parties’ subsequent actions
concerning allocation of parenting time suggest that the issue of paternity has been resolved.
¶5 On July 27, 2017, the trial court entered an order setting forth a temporary parenting
schedule, in which Hampton was given parenting time every Wednesday evening, every other
Saturday, and every other Sunday. On September 20, 2017, Hampton filed a petition for rule
to show cause why Winston should not be held in indirect civil contempt, alleging that he had
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been denied parenting time with K.H. in violation of the court’s July 27, 2017, order. Hampton
alleged that his counsel had attempted to reach out to Winston and her counsel to resolve the
situation, but all efforts had been fruitless. Hampton sought the following relief:
“A. That this Honorable Court enter a Rule to Show Cause against [Winston] to
show cause, if any, why she should not be held in contempt of this Court for failure to
comply with said Order of this Court.
B. That this Court enter an Order that sanctions be imposed on [Winston] for her
contumacious conduct in refusing and failing to comply with the Order entered by this
Court and for her abuse of allocated parenting time.
C. That this Court enter an order assessing attorney’s fees of [Hampton] against
[Winston] for the preparation and presentation of this matter;
D. For such other and further relief as Equity deems just.”
On September 25, 2017, the trial court set the petition for rule to show cause for hearing on
November 8, 2017, and ordered “[a]ll parties to appear.”
¶6 On November 8, 2017, the trial court entered an order on the petition for rule to show cause.
The order provided, in full:
“This matter coming before the Court on status on prove-up and hearing on
Respondent’s Rule to Show Cause for mom’s failure to allow Respondent parenting
time, both Counsels being present along w/ the parties (however, petitioner leaving
court before case was re-called) and the Court being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
(1) That as of this date, residential placement of the minor child shall be with the
Father (Respondent) until further order of the court.
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(2) That return of the minor child to mom’s custody will NOT be deemed an
emergency.
(3) Mom (petitioner) shall tender her full address to counsel, in order for
Respondent to retrieve the minor child.
(4) Father’s (Respondent’s) child support is abated until further order of the court.
(5) That Respondent’s Rule to Show Cause is entered and continued to January 10,
2018 @ 9:30 am.” (Emphasis in original.)
¶7 On November 9, 2017, Winston filed a pro se motion for “emergency custody.” In the
motion, Winston claimed that she believed that K.H. would be in “immediate danger” if left in
the custody of Hampton, who she claimed had been violent with both Winston and K.H. in the
past. Winston claimed that Hampton had a substance abuse problem with alcohol and had lost
his home, and that he had previously been convicted of child endangerment for leaving K.H.
in the home unattended when she was six weeks old.
¶8 On November 13, 2017, Winston filed a pro se motion to vacate, in which she requested
that the court’s November 8, 2017, order be vacated. Winston claimed that she was present at
the hearing, but that the case was passed and that, by the time it was re-called, she had to leave
to pick her children 1 up from school.
¶9 On November 14, 2017, the trial court entered an order on Winston’s emergency motion,
finding that “Petitioner’s Motion does NOT constitute an Emergency (per the Judge’s previous
order entered on 11/8/17)” (emphasis in original) and entering and continuing the motion to
1 It appears from the record on appeal that Winston has two children. However, K.H. is the only child she shares with Hampton.
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the next court date on January 10, 2018. The court order further provided that “Respondent
will have possession of minor until further order of the court.”
¶ 10 On December 1, 2017, Winston, represented by new counsel, filed another motion to vacate
the November 8, 2017, order. In the motion, Winston claimed that Hampton had not, to date,
filed any petition for an allocation of parental responsibilities, nor had he filed any other
pleading requesting to be the residential parent of K.H. Notwithstanding the fact that such relief
had never been requested, the trial court’s November 8 order gave Hampton possession of K.H.
At the time of the court’s ruling, Winston was not in court, as she had to leave to pick up her
children from school. The matter had been passed in order to allow the parties to discuss
alternate pick-up and drop-off locations for Hampton’s parenting time, but Winston was forced
to leave prior to those arrangements being finalized. It was unclear why Winston’s counsel was
not present when the case was re-called, and Winston had mistakenly assumed that her counsel
would continue to represent her in her absence. Prior to the November 8 order, Winston had
been the primary caregiver for K.H. since her birth, and the court’s order did not explain the
basis for naming Hampton as the residential parent, nor did it contain any consideration of the
factors set fact in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750
ILCS 5/602.7 (West 2016)). The order also did not grant Winston any parenting time with
K.H., and Winston had been able to arrange only limited parenting time with Hampton.
¶ 11 Winston further claimed that Hampton was living in a two-bedroom apartment with six
children and four adults, and that it was unclear where K.H. was sleeping. Winston also pointed
to a documented history of domestic violence between the parties, with Hampton convicted of
domestic violence and spending 90 days in jail after threatening Winston with a firearm.
Finally, Hampton had previously been charged with endangering the life of a child under 18
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for his treatment of K.H. Accordingly, Winston claimed that it was not in the best interest of
K.H. to be placed in the residential care of Hampton, and requested that the November 8, 2017,
order be vacated.
¶ 12 On December 19, 2017, the trial court entered an order granting Hampton 28 days to
respond to Winston’s motion to vacate. The order also granted Winston parenting time on
Christmas Eve, as well as on alternating Fridays and Saturdays. The court also entered a
separate order referring the parties to mediation concerning allocation of parenting time and
parental responsibilities. On January 12, 2018, the trial court entered an agreed order granting
Winston additional parenting time on alternating Wednesday afternoons.
¶ 13 On March 21, 2018, the trial court entered an order on Winston’s motion to vacate the
November 8, 2017, order, which provided:
“(1) The Court finds that the [Motion] to Vacate would require a finding of the best
interests of the parties’ minor child, and as such would need a GAL appointed to assist
the court with that determination.
(2) The appointment of a GAL is hereby continued as the parties reached a full
agreement as to parenting time. Said [agreement] is as follows
(a) Respondent shall have parenting time every Sunday at 2 pm until 2 pm on
Wednesdays.
(b) Petitioner shall have parenting time every Wednesday at 2 pm until Saturday
at 10 am.
(c) The parties shall alternate Saturday overnights.
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(d) The above-referenced schedule shall commence March 21, 2018. Petitioner
shall have the overnight on March 24, 2018. The pickup/dropoff location shall stay
as previously ordered.
(3) This matter is hereby continued for entry of allocation or appointment of a GAL
to May 14, 2018 @ 9:30 am.
(4) Respondent’s pending petition is hereby entered and continued.”
¶ 14 On May 14, 2018, the trial court entered an order appointing a guardian ad litem for K.H.
with respect to the issues of an allocation of parental rights and responsibilities and for
parenting time.
¶ 15 On July 23, 2018, Winston filed a petition for an order of protection on behalf of herself
and K.H., alleging that during the exchange of K.H. on July 18, Hampton became verbally
abusive toward Winston, including threatening to beat her. Winston alleged that she was fearful
of Hampton, especially given his former history of verbal harassment and physical abuse.
Hearing on the order of protection was set for October 17, 2018, but no disposition of the order
appears in the record on appeal.
¶ 16 On December 19, 2018, Hampton filed a counterpetition for dissolution of marriage, in
which he alleged that it would be in the best interest of K.H. for both parents to share joint
decision-making responsibility. Hampton’s counterpetition sought residential custody of K.H.,
with Winston having “reasonable visitation.”
¶ 17 On April 29, 2019, the trial court entered a “Final Judgment Regarding Allocation of
Parental Responsibilities, Allocation of Parenting Time & Agreed Parenting Plan,” which
found that the parties had entered into an agreed parenting plan, which included an allocation
of parental responsibilities and allocation of parenting time, and which found that it was in the
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best interests of K.H. for the agreed parenting plan to be adopted and approved by the court.
The court found that the plan “is reasonable and in the best interests of the minor child and
such Parenting Plan is not unconscionable.”
¶ 18 The parenting plan provided that “the parties hereto agree that the following allocation of
decision-making and significant decision-making between the parties is in the best interests of
their minor child. Therefore, the parties shall implement and employ the decision-making
processes and mechanisms set forth below.” The plan provided that both parties would share
responsibility for all major decisions relating to K.H.’s education, but that Hampton’s
residential address would be K.H.’s residential address for school enrollment purposes.
Hampton was also designated as the parent with the majority of the parenting time, and was
designated K.H.’s custodian for any purposes that required the designation of a custodian.
Winston was entitled to parenting time on alternating weekends and on alternating Wednesday
nights. 2 The agreement also provided for alternating holidays and vacation time.
¶ 19 On May 13, 2019, Winston filed a pro se notice of appeal, in which she stated that she was
appealing the trial court’s April 29, 2019, order and seeking “reversal of final judgement of
allocation of parental responsibilities[,] allocation of parenting time[,] and agreed parenting
plan.” This appeal follows.
¶ 20 ANALYSIS
¶ 21 On appeal, Winston challenges both the November 8, 2017, order in which the court
temporarily ordered residential placement of K.H. to be with Hampton, and the April 29, 2019,
order entering the judgment of allocation of parental responsibilities. We note that Hampton
2 The order stated that the provision concerning alternating Wednesdays was by order of the court, not by agreement.
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did not file a brief on appeal, so we take the appeal on Winston’s pro se brief and the record
alone. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133
(1976). We also note that, although we granted Hampton leave to file a supporting record
containing transcripts of several court hearings, no such supporting record was ever filed, so
the record on appeal consists of the common-law record alone. The lack of transcripts means
that we are unable to know exactly what occurred during any of the court hearings, or what led
to the entry of certain orders. Our supreme court has instructed that, where the record is not
sufficiently complete to support a claim of error, “it will be presumed that the order entered by
the trial court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis.” Foutch v.
O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). Thus, if Winston’s claims rely on facts not apparent
from the documents contained in the common-law record, we must presume that the trial court
acted appropriately. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392 (“Any doubts which may arise from the
incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.”).
¶ 22 We first consider our jurisdiction over Winston’s appeal. It is our duty to determine
whether we have jurisdiction, regardless of whether the issue is raised by the parties. Secura
Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009) (“A reviewing
court must ascertain its jurisdiction before proceeding in a cause of action, regardless of
whether either party has raised the issue.”); A.M. Realty Western L.L.C. v. MSMC Realty,
L.L.C., 2016 IL App (1st) 151087, ¶ 67 (“Although neither party raises the issue of jurisdiction,
an appellate court has an independent duty to consider whether or not it has jurisdiction to hear
an appeal.”). The question of whether we have jurisdiction over an appeal presents a question
of law, which we review de novo. In re Marriage of Demaret, 2012 IL App (1st) 111916, ¶ 25;
In re Marriage of Gutman, 232 Ill. 2d 145, 150 (2008). De novo consideration means we
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perform the same analysis that a trial judge would perform. XL Specialty Insurance Co. v.
Performance Aircraft Leasing, Inc., 2019 IL App (1st) 181031, ¶ 62.
¶ 23 “Appellate jurisdiction is confined to reviewing final judgments unless the order to be
reviewed comes within one of the exceptions for interlocutory orders specified by the supreme
court.” Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Rosewell, 262 Ill. App. 3d
938, 950 (1992). In the case at bar, we have jurisdiction to review the trial court’s April 29,
2019, order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(6) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Under Rule
304(b)(6), “[a] custody or allocation of parental responsibilities judgment or modification of
such judgment entered pursuant to the [Marriage Act]” is immediately appealable. Ill. S. Ct.
R. 304(b)(6) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Since the trial court’s April 29, 2019, order was a final
judgment of allocation of parental responsibilities, we have jurisdiction to consider it.
¶ 24 However, the trial court’s November 8, 2017, order is not such an order. Instead, it appears
that the trial court sua sponte ordered a temporary allocation of parental responsibilities to
Hampton during a hearing on Hampton’s petition for rule to show cause. The only basis we
have discovered for appealing such an order would be found in Illinois Supreme Court Rule
306(a)(5) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019), which provides for permissive appeals “from interlocutory orders
affecting the care and custody of or the allocation of parental responsibilities for
unemancipated minors or the relocation (formerly known as removal) of unemancipated
minors, if the appeal of such orders is not otherwise specifically provided for elsewhere in
these rules.” See In re Marriage of Kostusik, 361 Ill. App. 3d 103, 109 (2005) (“Rule 305(a)(5)
is the vehicle by which to seek review of interlocutory child custody orders”). However,
appeals under Rule 306(a)(5) require the appellant to first file a petition for review with the
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appellate court, which the court then grants or denies. Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(b)(1) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019).
This procedure was not followed in the case at bar.
¶ 25 We note that, in certain cases, courts have been willing to recharacterize appeals as
petitions to leave for appeal under Rule 306(a)(5) when the parties failed to follow the proper
procedures. See Kostusik, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 112-13 (collecting cases). However, those cases
involved circumstances “where the parties seeking review have relied on erroneous law or
erroneous cases in failing to evoke Rule 306(a)(5).” Kostusik, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 112. No such
circumstance exists here. Moreover, Winston’s notice of appeal does not identify the
November 8, 2017, order as one that she is appealing, further distinguishing it from cases in
which courts have recharacterized a notice of appeal as a petition for leave to appeal under
Rule 306(a)(5). 3 Accordingly, we cannot find that we have jurisdiction over the November 8,
2017, order under Rule 306(a)(5).
¶ 26 There is one last possibility for appellate jurisdiction, however, even if Winston has not
properly filed a petition for leave to appeal the November 8, 2017, order. While, under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017), a notice of appeal “shall specify the
judgment or part thereof or other orders appealed from and the relief sought from the reviewing
court,” our supreme court has made clear that a notice of appeal is to be construed liberally.
See People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2008). “The notice of appeal should be considered as
a whole and will be deemed sufficient to confer jurisdiction on an appellate court when it fairly
and adequately sets out the judgment complained of and the relief sought, thus advising the
3 We also note that, while Winston filed a pro se notice of appeal, and is proceeding pro se on appeal, she was represented by counsel during the initial stages of the instant appeal, from May 20, 2019, until counsel was given leave to withdraw on August 28, 2019. Accordingly, if any error in the jurisdictional basis for the instant appeal was due to Winston’s status as a pro se appellant, such error could have been remedied by counsel.
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successful litigant of the nature of the appeal.” General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d
163, 176 (2011). “ ‘Where the deficiency in notice is one of form, rather than substance, and
the appellee is not prejudiced, the failure to comply strictly with the form of notice is not fatal.’
” Smith, 228 Ill. 2d at 105 (quoting Lang v. Consumers Insurance Service, Inc., 222 Ill. App.
3d 226, 230 (1991)). Thus, our supreme court has long held that a judgment that is not specified
in the notice of appeal is nonetheless reviewable “if it is a ‘step in the procedural progression
leading’ to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal.” Burtell v. First Charter Service
Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 435 (1979) (quoting Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d
1252, 1254 (3d Cir. 1977)); see In re Marriage of O’Brien, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 23 (finding a
denial of petition for substitution of judge was a “step in the procedural progression leading to
the final judgment” specified in the notice of appeal).
¶ 27 In the case at bar, we cannot find that the November 8, 2017, order was a step in the
procedural progression leading to the entry of the April 29, 2019, judgment. The court’s
temporary order, even if improperly entered, would not have an effect on the final judgment
allocating parental responsibilities. See Jiffy Lube International, Inc. v. Agarwal, 277 Ill. App.
3d 722, 726 (1996) (finding that “[w]here an order has the possibility of rendering all
subsequent orders void, then we find that such an order is a step in the ‘procedural progression’
leading to the order specified in the notice of appeal”). Any findings made in the temporary
order are not binding on the trial court, and it was required to conduct a hearing regarding the
final allocation of parental responsibilities de novo, considering all of the factors that related
to the best interests of the child. In re Marriage of Fields, 283 Ill. App. 3d 894, 902, 904 (1996).
¶ 28 Furthermore, even if the November 8, 2017, order could be construed as a step in the
procedural progression leading to the entry of the April 29, 2019, judgment, the nature of the
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November 8 order would render any review of it moot. “A temporary order—by its very
nature—is provisional in character and continues only during the pendency of the action.”
(Emphasis in original.) Fields, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 901. Accordingly, when the matter that is
the subject of the temporary order comes before the court for a hearing on the merits, “the
temporary order has fulfilled its purpose and is superseded by the final—or permanent—
order.” Fields, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 901; Kostusik, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 108 (“when the permanent
custody order is entered, the temporary custody order is superseded”). “Once the trial court
enters the final order, an assumption arises that the court has thereby adjusted for any inequity
in its temporary orders.” Fields, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 901. In the case at bar, once the trial court
entered the April 29, 2019, final judgment of allocation of parental responsibilities, the
November 8, 2017, order was superseded and there was no longer any relief that could be
afforded Winston. See Maroney v. Maroney, 109 Ill. App. 3d 162, 167 (1969) (“The question
of the propriety of the temporary order is now moot. The temporary order has been superseded
by the permanent order entered by the court ***. [Citation.] The defendant now has custody
by virtue of this permanent order and not by virtue of the temporary order.”); Moseley v.
Goldstone, 89 Ill. App. 3d 360, 365-66 (1980) (“[T]he issue of visitation during the pendency
of the action is moot because nothing can be done to remedy the denial of visitation for a time
period which has already passed; consequently, no useful purpose can be served in considering
the denial of the specific visitation requests.”). Consequently, the only order for which Winston
may seek relief is the April 29, 2019, judgment of allocation of parental responsibilities.
¶ 29 We turn, then, to Winston’s argument concerning that judgment. As noted, on April 29,
2019, the trial court entered a “Final Judgment Regarding Allocation of Parental
Responsibilities, Allocation of Parenting Time & Agreed Parenting Plan,” which found that
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the parties had entered into an agreed parenting plan, which included an allocation of parental
responsibilities and allocation of parenting time, and which found that it was in the best
interests of K.H. for the agreed parenting plan to be adopted and approved by the court. The
court found that the plan “is reasonable and in the best interests of the minor child and such
Parenting Plan is not unconscionable.” On appeal, Winston claims that the judgment is against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 30 “[C]ustody proceedings under the [Marriage Act] are guided by the overriding lodestar of
the best interests of the child or children involved.” In re A.W.J., 197 Ill. 2d 492, 497-98 (2001).
When deciding issues pertaining to allocation of parental responsibilities, the trial court has
broad discretion, and its judgment is afforded great deference because the trial court is in a
superior position to judge the credibility of witnesses and determine the best interests of the
child. In re Marriage of Debra N., 2013 IL App (1st) 122145, ¶ 45. Accordingly, we will not
reverse a trial court’s judgment on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. In re Marriage of Iqbal, 2014 IL App (2d) 131306, ¶ 55. “A judgment is against the
manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.” In re
Parentage of J.W., 2013 IL 114817, ¶ 55. “In determining whether a judgment is contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence, the reviewing court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the appellee. [Citation.] Where the evidence permits multiple reasonable
inferences, the reviewing court will accept those inferences that support the court’s order.
[Citation.]” In re Marriage of Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489, 516 (2004).
¶ 31 Under section 602.7 of the Marriage Act, “[u]nless the parents present a mutually agreed
written parenting plan and that plan is approved by the court, the court shall allocate parenting
time.” 750 ILCS 5/602.7 (West 2018). In the case at bar, the judgment entered by the court
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shows that the parties did, in fact, enter into an agreed parenting plan. 4 When the parties have
agreed on a parenting plan, section 602.10(d) of the Marriage Act provides that “[t]he
agreement is binding upon the court unless it finds, after considering the circumstances of the
parties and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties, that the agreement is not in
the best interests of the child.” 750 ILCS 5/602.10(d) (West 2018). In making a best-interests
determination, section 602.7(b) provides that the court “shall consider all relevant factors,”
including a list of 17 separate factors set forth in the statute. 750 ILCS 5/602.7(b) (West 2018).
¶ 32 In the case at bar, Winston claims that the trial court failed to properly weigh these factors,
especially the wishes of the child, the child’s needs, and the child’s adjustment to her home,
school, or community. See 750 ILCS 6/602.7(b)(2), (6), (8) (West 2018). Winston also claims
that there was no home study conducted and that the guardian ad litem did not properly
represent K.H.’s best interests. However, there is nothing contained in the record on appeal to
support her claims. The judgment entered by the trial court expressly provides that it had
considered the relevant factors set forth in section 602.7 of the Marriage Act and that the court
found that it would be in the best interest of K.H. that the agreed parenting plan be adopted by
the court. Accordingly, under section 602.10(d), the court properly entered a judgment
allocating parental responsibilities pursuant to that plan. To the extent that Winston claims that
the trial court or guardian ad litem made comments during court hearings that show that the
best interest determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the lack of any
transcripts of those hearings proves fatal to Winston’s claims of error. As noted, as the
4 We note that Winston claims on appeal that she did not agree to the parenting plan. However, the parenting plan bears Winston’s signature, and the trial court’s judgment specifically states that the parenting plan was agreed to by the parties (other than a single provision providing for Winston’s parenting time on alternating Wednesdays). We find no support for the claim that the agreed parenting plan was not, in fact, agreed to.
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appellant, Winston bears the burden of providing a sufficiently complete record of the
proceedings at trial to support her claims of error, and in the absence of such a record on appeal,
“it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and
had a sufficient factual basis.” Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. Here, in the absence of any evidence
showing otherwise, we must presume that the trial court’s April 29, 2019, judgment of
allocation of parental responsibilities was proper. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
¶ 33 CONCLUSION
¶ 34 The trial court’s November 8, 2017, order is not properly before this court on appeal, as
Winston failed to file a petition for leave to appeal from that order, as required. However, even
if it had been properly presented, any review of that order would be moot, as it was a temporary
order that was superseded by the trial court’s final judgment of allocation of parental
responsibilities. The trial court’s final judgment, entered April 29, 2019, is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence, where the order provides that the court considered all of the
relevant best-interest factors and, given the lack of transcripts, there is nothing in the record on
appeal to support any claims of error.
¶ 35 Affirmed.