In re Marriage of Webb

2020 IL App (2d) 180805-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 15, 2020
• Docket: 2-18-0805
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2020 IL App (2d) 180805-U No. 2-18-0805 Order filed April 15, 2020

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

In re the MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court MIHEE WEBB, ) of Winnebago County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 14-D-113 ) BRIAN WEBB, ) Honorable ) Ronald A. Barch, Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Schostok and Brennan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Respondent’s petitions to substitute for cause and motion for sanctions were properly denied; affirmed.

¶2 This is the third time we consider an appeal brought by respondent, Brian Webb, against

petitioner, Mihee Webb. See In re Marriage of Webb, 2016 IL App (2d) 141228-U; In re Marriage

of Webb, 2014 IL App (2d) 140688-U. The parties were married in 1985 and their marriage

produced eight children. In 2013, Mihee filed a petition to dissolve the parties’ marriage in

Stephenson County, where they resided at the time. Her petition alleged two grounds: first, that

there were irreconcilable differences between her and Brian and, second, that Brian was guilty of 2020 IL App (2d) 180805-U

acts of mental cruelty (750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2012)). Prior to a hearing, Mihee

withdrew the irreconcilable-differences claim and proceeded solely on the allegation of mental

cruelty. After a hearing, the trial court found that Mihee had not established grounds of mental

cruelty and the case was voluntarily dismissed.

¶3 Two weeks later, Mihee filed a dissolution petition in Winnebago County alleging, inter

alia, irreconcilable differences. The underlying proceedings proved beyond contentious.

Throughout this case, there were dozens of motions and petitions related to child support,

contempt, visitation, and attorney fees. Furthermore, as we have noted before, “[a]t every turn,

Brian filed motions to reconsider or [to] vacate various court orders and to strike Mihee’s pleadings

***.” In re Marriage of Webb, 2016 IL App (2d) 141228-U, ¶ 5. In fact, Brian’s pleadings became

so vexatious that two trial court judges temporarily barred him from filing any pleadings without

first obtaining leave. Nevertheless, the record is replete with a number of pleadings by Brian

alleging that the whole matter should be dismissed on the basis of res judicata. As we explained

in a prior appeal however, res judicata did not apply and this matter was properly before the trial

court. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. That brings us to the instant appeal.

¶4 Relevant here, on July 15, 2014, the trial court, Judge Stephen Nordquist, entered an

interim order allocating parenting time to both parties. On July 29, 2014, Mihee and the children’s

guardian ad litem (GAL) filed a petition for an emergency and plenary order of protection alleging

that Brian had concealed the children and refused to exchange all of the children with Mihee. The

trial court held a hearing and found that Brian had not complied with the visitation order and that

his behavior, both in and out of court, endangered the children. As a result, the trial court restricted

Brian to supervised visitation only.

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¶5 In June 2015, Brian filed a petition for substitution of judge for cause alleging that Judge

Nordquist was prejudiced against him. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(3) (West 2016). Judge Nordquist

submitted an affidavit stating that he was not biased against Brian and was capable of fairly

presiding over the matter. On July 20, 2015, a hearing on Brian’s petition was held before Judge

Rosemary Collins. At that hearing, Judge Collins stated that she had reviewed the entire court file,

including transcripts, and determined that while Judge Nordquist had ruled against many of Brian’s

motions, Judge Nordquist had not displayed any actual bias against him. At the hearing, Brian

conceded that “the bulk of [his] arguments” was that Judge Nordquist “didn’t follow the law.”

Judge Collins explained that while Brian might disagree with Judge Nordquist’s rulings, she saw

no evidence of prejudice in the record or of any bias stemming from an extrajudicial source.

Accordingly, Judge Collins denied Brian’s petition and the case was sent back to Judge Nordquist.

¶6 Judge Nordquist conducted a hearing and entered an order in September 2015 finding

irreconcilable differences between the parties. Then, in December 2015, Brian filed a motion to

impose sanctions on Mihee and alleged that she made false statements in her petition for an order

of protection. Specifically, Brian alleged that he had not concealed or threatened to conceal the

children. Brian sought $6,500 to compensate him for the costs of supervised visitation, GAL fees,

and additional attorney fees because of “[Mihee’s] phony order of protection.” Mihee filed a

response denying the allegation and reaffirming her statements in the petition for the order of

protection. In January 2016, the trial court issued a two-page memorandum decision denying

Brian’s motion for sanctions.

¶7 Pursuant to a prior administrative order (17th Judicial Cir. Adm. Order 2017-07), in March

2018, the case was transferred from the calendar of Judge Nordquist to Judge Ronald Barch.

Ultimately, a dissolution judgment, which incorporated a marital settlement agreement, was

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entered in August 2018. The judgment resolved all of the pending dissolution issues with the

exception of child support.

¶8 In September 2018, Brian filed a petition to substitute Judge Barch for cause, alleging that

Judge Barch had improper ex parte communications with Mihee’s attorneys regarding child

support calculations. Judge Barch found that Brian’s petition failed to meet the threshold

requirements to trigger a hearing and denied the petition without referring it to another judge.

¶9 Meanwhile, the trial court’s dissolution judgment stated that it was immediately appealable

pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), and Brian filed a notice of

appeal from that judgment. The parties then submitted their appellate briefs. Once briefing was

completed, we examined the record and determined that Brian’s notice of appeal was premature

(and the Rule 304(a) finding was improper) as there were still several motions and the issue of

child support pending in the trial court. We initially dismissed the appeal. Brian then timely filed

a supplement to the record showing that those matters had been resolved in the trial court and we

vacated our dismissal. Now, with our jurisdiction established, we proceed to the merits.

¶ 10 On appeal, Brian challenges the denial of his December 2015 motion for sanctions and the

denials of his two motions for substitution of judge. Mihee responds that the motions were all

properly denied. We agree with Mihee.

¶ 11 We note that Brian’s appellate brief consists of a 42-page argumentative statement of facts,

followed by seven pages of argument which do not cite to the record or any pertinent authority.

Given these and other deficiencies in Brian’s brief, we would be well within our rights to strike

the brief and dismiss this appeal for repeated noncompliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341

(eff. May 25, 2018). See, e.g., Burmac Metal Finishing Co. v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co.,

356 Ill. App. 3d 471, 478 (2005). However, we choose to overlook these errors as in the interest

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of providing a complete resolution to this matter.

¶ 12 Turning to the merits, first, we determine that Brian’s petitions to substitute Judge

Nordquist and Judge Barch were so vague and conclusory that no hearing on the petitions was

required. A petition for substitution for cause must comply with the requirements of 735 ILCS 5/2-

1001(a)(3). Relevant here:

“To meet the statute’s threshold requirements, a petition for substitution must allege

grounds that, if true, would justify granting substitution for cause. Where bias or prejudice

is invoked as the basis for seeking substitution, it must normally stem from an extrajudicial

source, i.e., from a source other than from what the judge learned from her participation in

the case before her. A judge’s previous rulings almost never constitute a valid basis for a

claim of judicial bias or partiality.” In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d 519, 554 (2010)

(citations omitted).

A petition that fails to meet these requirements may be justifiably denied without the need for a

hearing. Id.; see also In re Marriage of O’Brien, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 30.

¶ 13 Here, Brian’s substitution petitions consisted of bald accusations that Judge Nordquist and

Judge Barch were prejudiced merely because they had ruled “against” him. Neither petition alleged

prejudice from an extrajudicial source and, so, neither petition satisfied the threshold requirements

to even warrant a hearing. See In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d at 554-56. Thus, Brian received

more process than was due when Judge Nordquist referred his first petition for a hearing before

Judge Collins. Brian’s petition against Judge Barch alleged that Judge Barch “initiated” an

improper “ex parte communication” with both Mihee’s attorney and Brian’s attorney during one

of the periods of time when Brian was represented by counsel. The allegedly improper

communication appears to be the court’s request that the parties submit written arguments on

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Brian’s motion to reconsider child support. Brian complained that he was not given “an

opportunity to respond” to Mihee’s arguments, but the defect in Brian’s complaint should be

obvious: Brian was represented by counsel at the time and the court communicated with Brian’s

counsel, which necessarily means the communication was - - ex parte. Accordingly, there was no not

error in either Judge Collins’ or Judge Barch’s decision to deny Brian’s petitions.

¶ 14 Similarly, we find no error in the trial court’s January 2016 summary denial of Brian’s

motion for sanctions. See Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Otis Elevator Co., 297 Ill.App.3d 383,

394 (1998) (noting that summary denial of sanctions is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion).

As noted, an order of protection was entered and continued in this case, and a finding of serious

endangerment was made, on the basis of Mihee’s statements that Brian refused to exchange the

children with Mihee and actively concealed their whereabouts. Mihee’s statements were

corroborated by the children’s GAL, whom Brian also denied access to the children. Brian’s 15-

page motion for sanctions, however, merely asserted that Mihee’s sworn statements were false and

listed some of his litigation expenses. In the prayer for relief, Brian sought “compensation” in the

amount of $6,500, and implored the court to lift its “lawless July 15, 2014 temporary child custody

order.”

¶ 15 Whether Brian’s motion is considered under 750 ILCS 60/226 (West 2014) or Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. July 1, 2013), the result is the same. A party seeking such sanctions

has the burden of establishing that he or she actually incurred fees by reason of the untrue

pleadings. Conversely, “[i]f untrue portions of the pleading would not actually affect the outcome

of the case, recovery of fees unrelated to the specific untrue statements is not allowed.” Patton v.

Lee, 406 Ill. App. 3d 195, 199-200 (2010). Here, Brian’s motion failed to specify which of Mihee’s

statements were untrue and failed to explain how any of his “expenses” was directly related to her

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allegedly untrue statements. Instead, Brian simply “listed expenses generally related to the

litigation as a whole.” Id. at 198. Therefore, Brian’s motion failed the threshold requirements for

the imposition of sanctions as well, and the trial court did not err in summarily denying his motion.

¶ 16 In sum, we determine that Brian’s claims of error lack merit. Therefore, we affirm the

judgment of the Circuit Court of Winnebago County.

¶ 17 Affirmed.

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