IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0266 Filed May 7, 2025
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF RYAN PAUL WALLER AND SASHA NICHOLE KILL
Upon the Petition of RYAN PAUL WALLER, Petitioner-Appellant,
And Concerning SASHA NICHOLE KILL, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Coleman McAllister,
Judge.
Ryan Waller appeals the district court’s decree dissolving the parties’
marriage. AFFIRMED.
Jennifer H. De Kock of Coppola Hockenberg, P.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Anjela A. Shutts and Sydnee M. Waggoner of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des
Moines, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and
Sandy, JJ. 2
AHLERS, Judge.
Ryan Waller and Sasha Kill married in 2009 and have three minor children
(born in 2008, 2011, and 2015). Ryan petitioned to dissolve the marriage in early
2023. Following a trial, the district court issued a decree dissolving the marriage
and resolving the issues raised by the parties.
Ryan appeals. He contends (1) the court erred in granting Sasha physical
care of the children instead of granting the parents joint physical care; (2) the court
incorrectly determined his income for support purposes; and (3) the court erred in
the amount and duration of spousal support awarded to Sasha. Ryan makes
several additional arguments, but for reasons we will discuss, they are not
preserved for appellate review. Sasha does not cross-appeal, but she seeks an
award of appellate attorney fees from Ryan.
I. Standard of Review
Because dissolution-of-marriage actions are equity actions, we review them
de novo. In re Marriage of Miller, 966 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 2021). As such, we
give weight to the district court’s fact findings, especially as to witness credibility,
but we are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g).
II. Physical Care
Ryan requested the court grant the parties joint physical care of their three
children, while Sasha asked for physical care to be awarded to her. In making
physical-care determinations, our first and governing consideration is the best
interests of the children. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(n). The main goal in
determining physical care is to place the children in an environment that promotes
the children’s physical health, mental health, and social maturity. In re Marriage 3
of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007). When determining whether joint
physical care is in the best interests of a child, courts consider four key,
nonexclusive factors: (1) stability and continuity of caregiving (sometimes referred
to as “approximation” of the historical caregiving arrangement); (2) the parents’
ability to communicate with and show respect to each other; (3) the degree of
conflict between parents; and (4) the degree to which parents agree about their
approach to day-to-day matters. Id. at 696–99. We also consider the factors listed
in Iowa Code section 598.41(3) (2023) and those spelled out in In re Marriage of
Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Iowa 1974). In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737
N.W.2d 97, 101 (Iowa 2007).
We start with the approximation factor. The record makes it clear that Ryan
and Sasha love their children deeply and both play an active and important role in
their daily lives. We recognize Ryan’s contributions to the household, both
financially and through his active participation in the children’s extracurricular
activities, as well as his involvement in childcare after school. Ryan works
remotely and has some flexibility to care for the children during work hours, but he
works full-time throughout the week. In contrast, Sasha has operated her own
business since 2012, which has allowed her to set her own hours. This flexibility
has enabled her to take on the responsibilities of scheduling medical
appointments, interacting with teachers, and staying home with the children when
needed. During the summer, Sasha has historically worked fewer hours to
prioritize spending time with the children and avoid the need for a daycare provider.
Both parties are active participants in the children’s lives, but a review of the record
convinces us that Sasha has historically been the primary caregiver—the same 4
conclusion reached by the district court. While this factor weighs in favor of
granting Sasha physical care, it is not a dispositive factor, as we follow a multi-
factored approach. Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 697.
The next two factors focus on the level of conflict between the parties and
their ability to communicate respectfully with one another. Here, the facts are
somewhat unusual because the parties continued to live in the same house
together with the children while their dissolution action was pending. The parties
essentially divided the house and did their best to stay in their respective areas.
Despite living in the same house, the parties did not have a substantive in-person
conversation for months and instead communicated by text, only as necessary, to
discuss children-related issues. Even with limited text communication, the parties
were frequently unproductive and disrespectful in their exchanges. While the
discord and rancor displayed in those exchanges did not sink to an alarming level,
it sunk low enough to cause the district court concern that the parties did not
“possess the ability to work together to provide for the children’s needs.” The court
observed that their “conflict, acrimony, and tension is much greater than the natural
tension and strain that arises between parties whose relationship is ending and
who are engaged in litigating a custody dispute.” Ultimately, the court concluded
that “[t]he parties’ inability to effectively communicate and to reach consensus on
important decisions about the children does not favor a joint physical care
arrangement.” As the district court had the advantage of seeing the parties
firsthand to gauge the level of discord—an advantage of which we are deprived by
being limited to reviewing the cold transcript—we give these conclusions by the 5
district court considerable weight. As a result, we conclude the second and third
factors cut against a grant of joint physical care.
The fourth factor considers the extent to which parents agree on their
approach to day-to-day matters. We do not expect absolute agreement, but “the
parents must generally be operating from the same page on a wide variety of
routine matters.” Id. at 699. For the majority of their marriage, it appears Sasha
and Ryan were operating from the same page as it relates to the children. For
example, they reached agreements on sleepover and cellphone policies and
shared the same stance on teaching respect and responsibility in their home.
However, the deterioration of their relationship has brought to light several
disagreements that had not been at issue until more recently. Sasha contends the
parties have different parenting styles, and when she tries to correct a child’s
behavior, Ryan either laughs it off or condones the behavior. The parties have
also been unable to reach a consensus on general matters, such as what school
the children will attend and how much each party is comfortable paying for
extracurricular activities. While these topics fall within the realm of legal custody,
see Iowa Code § 598.1(5) (defining “legal custody” to include making decisions
about a child’s education and extracurricular activities), disagreement about them
also impacts a physical-care determination. These two topics were highly
contested during the dissolution proceedings, with neither party willing to budge
from their own request. Further, the parties had not even discussed finances,
expenses, or Sasha’s relocation from the marital home after the parties agreed
Ryan would receive the home in the property division. This inability to 6
communicate effectively and reach necessary decisions that significantly impact
the daily routine of the children does not support a grant of joint physical care.
We acknowledge that these factors are not exclusive, and the best interests
of the children are what ultimately determine the physical-care decision. Id. at 695.
Ryan asserts that joint physical care is in the best interests of the children. He
points to Sasha’s prior agreement to joint physical care and the minor children’s
wishes for joint physical to support his argument.
As for Sasha’s prior agreement, we acknowledge that Sasha appears to
have agreed to joint physical care early in the proceedings. However, she did not
enter any binding agreement in that regard. Clearly, she changed her mind on this
topic as the case progressed, and based on the factors previously discussed, we
cannot conclude that her change of mind was unreasonable.
As to the children’s preferences, that is a factor the district court and we are
to consider. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(f). But the children’s preferences are not
controlling. See In re Marriage of Burham, 283 N.W.2d 269, 276 (Iowa 1979). The
two oldest children, aged fifteen and thirteen at the time of trial, expressed their
preference for joint physical care and a simple, week-on week-off schedule. But
after examining the entire record, the district court determined that joint physical
care was not in the children’s best interests, opting instead for granting Sasha
physical care with a parenting schedule that placed the children in her care for
eight days and in Ryan’s care for six days in any given two-week period. After
giving consideration to the children’s preferences and the district court’s better
position to gauge those preferences in relation to the ability or inability of the parties
to work together productively and respectfully, we find the district court’s resolution 7
of the physical-care dispute to be an equitable one that is in the children’s best
interests.
III. Ryan’s Income
The parties disputed Ryan’s income, which is relevant to resolving the
parties’ dispute over child and spousal support. Sasha contends Ryan’s income
is $210,000 per year, while Ryan contends it is $185,000. The district court
accepted Sasha’s calculation of $210,000 per year.
Ryan contends that the district court erred in calculating his annual income
by characterizing his 401(k) and health savings account (HSA) contributions as
additional income, asserting that they should have been treated as deductions. He
also argues the district court erroneously included his yearly stock award from his
employer as part of his liquid income for purposes of determining support amounts.
Ryan’s income fluctuates due to bonuses and stock awards he regularly
receives. In situations where a party’s income fluctuates, determining the party’s
income is not an exact science. Consequently, we give deference to the district
court’s income determination so long as it within the permissible range of the
evidence. In re Marriage of Ruba, No. 19-0365, 2019 WL 6358439, at *4 (Iowa Ct.
App. Nov. 27, 2019).
Ryan is employed by a large corporation. In addition to his base pay, he
regularly receives bonuses and stock awards. So, calculating his income should
be relatively straightforward. But we are hampered in our ability to assess the
district court’s determination of Ryan’s income by the lack of testimony or other
evidence about the various line items on his paystubs. With that limitation in mind,
our review of the record shows that Ryan’s last paycheck in 2023—a few weeks 8
before trial in this case—shows his year-to-date gross pay was $200,959. This
year-to-date figure did not include stock awarded to Ryan in 2023. The last
paycheck of 2023 shows the stock awarded to Ryan in 2023 was valued at
$41,965—which is in addition to his wages totaling $200,959. As Ryan explained
it, the stock awards are given in a dollar amount, not in the form of stock. The
awards do not immediately vest. Instead, they vest quarterly over a five-year
period. At each quarter’s vesting date, the applicable amount of stock award is
essentially used to purchase stock at the price on that date. So, the $41,965 of
stock award Ryan received in 2023 will be converted to stock quarterly from 2024
through 2028 as it vests. Until it vests, Ryan is not entitled to anything. So, if Ryan
leaves his employment, he loses any unvested parts of the stock award.
We are not persuaded by Ryan’s argument that we should not consider the
stock awards in calculating his income. Salary packages can be significantly
enhanced by non-salary items. In re Marriage of Huisman, 532 N.W.2d 157, 159
(Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Ryan has historically received the stock awards as part of
his compensation package, and there is no evidence in the record that Ryan is
leaving his employment or that stock awards will not be made in the future. As a
result, the risk of the awards not vesting is speculative. If and when Ryan leaves
his employment or is no longer receiving stock awards, that it is an occurrence that
can be taken up in a future modification action. Until then, we are persuaded that
the stock awards are part of Ryan’s compensation package that is properly
considered in calculating his income. After considering Ryan’s 2023 year-end
gross pay of $200,959 and adding the $41,965 of stock awards, the district court’s 9
determination that Ryan’s yearly income is $210,000 is well within the permissible
range of the evidence.1 See Ruba, 2019 WL 6358439, at *4.
IV. Spousal Support
Iowa recognizes four kinds of spousal support: (1) traditional;
(2) reimbursement; (3) rehabilitative; and (4) transitional. In re Marriage of Sokol,
985 N.W.2d 177, 185 (Iowa 2023). Each serves a different purpose. Id. Here, the
district court ordered Ryan to pay Sasha $2500 per month of transitional spousal
support for eighteen months. Transitional spousal support is awarded when “the
recipient spouse may already have the capacity for self-support at the time of
dissolution but needs short-term assistance in transitioning to single life.” Id.
Ryan does not challenge the district court’s decision to award transitional
spousal support, but he challenges the duration and amount. He contends $1000
per month for six months is a more equitable spousal-support award. The crux of
his argument is that Sasha deliberately minimized her income, failed to disclose
assets, and chose not to secure stable employment or permanent housing in the
months leading to trial.
Spousal support determinations are reviewed de novo, but because the
district court is given considerable latitude in these decisions, we will only disturb
the award when there has been a failure to do equity. In re Marriage of Mann, 943
1 Our methodology in calculating Ryan’s income makes it unnecessary to address
his complaint of the district court’s methodology in considering his 401(k) and HSA contributions in calculating his income, as we did not make any adjustments to Ryan’s income for those contributions. Our conclusion that the district court’s determination of Ryan’s income at $210,000 is within the permissible range of the evidence is bolstered by the fact that Ryan’s 2023 year-end paystub showed taxable income of $215,598 after accounting for his stock awards, 401(k) contributions, and HSA contributions. 10
N.W.2d 15, 20 (Iowa 2020). When deciding whether to award spousal support—
as well as determining its amount and duration—courts are to consider all of the
following:
a. The length of the marriage. b. The age and physical and emotional health of the parties. c. The distribution of property made pursuant to section 598.21. d. The educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at the time the action is commenced. e. The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the job market, responsibilities for children under either an award of custody or physical care, and the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to find appropriate employment. f. The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance becoming self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and the length of time necessary to achieve this goal. g. The tax consequences to each party. h. Any mutual agreement made by the parties concerning financial or service contributions by one party with the expectation of future reciprocation or compensation by the other party. i. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement. j. Other facts the court may determine to be relevant in an individual case.
Iowa Code § 598.21(A). Since the decision to award spousal support is based on
the specific facts of each case, the district court only needs to address those
factors that are pertinent to the case at hand. Id. § 598.21(A)(2).
By the time of their dissolution trial, the parties had been married for nearly
fifteen years. Ryan holds a bachelor’s degree and works as a senior program
manager for a large corporation. In contrast, Sasha has an associate’s degree
and has held a variety of jobs throughout her life. In 2012, she founded her own
business, which does “all sorts of digital design and web design.” However, during 11
the dissolution proceedings, she testified that she stopped actively running the
business to pursue a full-time job and focus on the children.
In support of his contention that Sasha intentionally underemployed herself,
Ryan points to the fact that Sasha obtained employment while the dissolution was
pending but then quit the job. But the record does not paint as nefarious a picture
as Ryan suggests. About fifteen months before the dissolution trial, as Sasha
began to minimize her work at her web-based business, she was hired as a
creative director by a company for approximately $90,000 per year. She only
worked there for one month. During the hiring process, she had been told the job
hours were flexible enough to allow her to remain involved with the children before
and after school. But once she started, she found out that was not the case. When
she discussed her concerns with management, the human resources manager
suggested she might explore other options, and Sasha interpreted this as the
termination of her position. We do not view Sasha leaving a job because it did not
provide the flexibility she had been promised as intentional underemployment.
In addition to arguing Sasha’s departure from the high-paying job was a
deliberate attempt to minimize her income, Ryan also contends she understates
what she could earn at her web-based business, and she has no good excuse for
failing to work that job as she did in the past. While we do agree with the district
court that Sasha’s choice to essentially put her business in neutral during the
pendency of this action was a questionable decision, we also believe she can
rebuild the business if she chooses to do so. The district court addressed this
concern by imputing an income of $60,000 to Sasha for support purposes. This
figure considers the fact that, after the salary paid to Sasha, her business earned 12
$40,673 in 2020, which Sasha testified was an unusually busy year. Between the
business’s earnings and her salary, Sasha earned a total of $53,473 that year—
her best year in the past six years for which records were provided.2 Based on our
de novo review of the record, we find the district court’s imputation of $60,000 to
Sasha to be within the permissible range of the evidence. See Ruba, 2019 WL
6358439, at *4. Given this income for Sasha, we find some amount of transitional
spousal support is warranted—a point Ryan does not challenge on appeal.
The parties have agreed throughout this proceeding that Ryan will receive
the marital home in the property division. Despite that agreement, Sasha made
no arrangements to secure her own residence. Ryan points to Sasha’s failure to
do so as a reason to reduce the duration of transitional spousal support. While we
agree that it would have been preferable for Sasha to have arranged housing for
herself and the children before trial, we acknowledge she may not have been in a
position to make such arrangements, especially before knowing how the physical-
care dispute was going to be resolved and what she would be receiving in child
and spousal support. This is precisely why the district court awarded transitional
spousal support—to help Sasha transition from married to single life. In re
Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 545 (Iowa 2022) (“[T]ransitional alimony is
appropriate when a party capable of self-support nevertheless needs short-term
2 Neither the district court nor we can determine the business’s earnings for 2023,
as Sasha did not provide much in the way of records for that year. While we do not condone Sasha’s failure to produce complete records, we note that the record shows that record-keeping is not her strong suit, so we are not persuaded that the failure to produce complete records was intentional. The record is unclear as to what efforts Ryan made to obtain Sasha’s records in a timely manner if he wanted those to present to the court. 13
financial assistance to transition from married to single life.”).
Given the disparity in incomes—$210,000 for Ryan and $60,000 for
Sasha—we find the amount of the spousal support to be within a reasonable
range, albeit at the top end of that range. As to duration, because transitional
spousal support is designed to solve a short-term liquidity issue, it should be of
short duration, generally not exceeding one year. Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 187. While
the eighteen-month award here stretches reasonableness, we are mindful of the
supreme court’s caution against undue tinkering with spousal support awards, so
we decline to modify the spousal-support award here. See id. at 182 (“The
institutional deference afforded the district court in determining spousal support
counsels against undue tinkering with spousal support awards.”). We find the
district court’s spousal support award of $2500 per month for eighteen months to
be equitable.
V. Other Issues
In addition to the aforementioned issues, Ryan requests we: (1) modify the
property division to account for Sasha’s dissipation of assets to pay for her life
coach; (2) set a valuation date for one of the financial accounts awarded to Ryan;
(3) modify the pick-up and drop-off time for holiday and summer parenting time;
(4) determine the amount each parent is required to contribute toward the
expenses for agreed-upon extracurricular activities of the children; and (5) order
spousal support to terminate upon Sasha’s remarriage or cohabitation. Sasha
contends Ryan failed to preserve error on these issues, and we agree.
Before we can consider a claim on appeal, a party must first preserve error
by raising an issue and securing a ruling on the issue from the district court. Meier 14
v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). This gives the district court an
opportunity to correct any errors at a time when corrective action can be taken. In
re Marriage of Heiar, 954 N.W.2d 464, 470 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). These error-
preservation rules also ensure that we are acting as a court of appeals, reviewing
a decision made by the district court, rather than considering an issue for the first
time on appeal. Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 537. These error-preservation requirements
apply to dissolution-of-marriage proceedings that are reviewed de novo. In re
Marriage of Huston, 263 N.W.2d 697, 699–700 (Iowa 1978).
We first address Ryan’s claim that Sasha’s payment to her life coach
constitutes dissipation of marital assets and he should therefore be entitled to an
adjustment of the property division to recoup one-half of that expense. Assuming
without deciding that Ryan raised this issue—a dubious assumption given that
Ryan’s only mention of dissipation at trial was a passing reference during closing
argument—the district court did not address it. To preserve error on an issue
raised but not decided by the district court, Ryan was required to file a motion
under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) or bring the failure to address the
issue to the district court’s attention in some other manner to preserve it. See
Meier, 641 N.W.2d 537–38. He did not do so. As such, the issue is not preserved
for our review, so we do not consider it.
Ryan also challenges three specific details of the decree. He asks us to
decide how the children’s extracurricular activity expenses will be divided;3 alter
3 It is not entirely clear from Ryan’s briefs whether he is raising this issue independently of his challenge to the physical-care determination. He appears to be asking for a division of the cost of extracurricular activities only if he were successful in obtaining a modification of the decree to grant the parties joint 15
the holiday and summer parenting schedule to make pick-up and drop-off times
consistent; and establish a valuation date for a financial institution account
awarded to Ryan. He claims these issues were raised because he testified about
them at trial and addressed them in his proposed decree. Our review of the record
finds no indication in Ryan’s testimony or proposed decree that would have alerted
the district court that these details were at issue. But even if Ryan’s testimony or
proposed decree technically raised these issues, when the decree was issued
without addressing them, Ryan made no effort to bring these matters to the district
court’s attention to address them. Ryan’s failure to notify the district court that it
neglected to address these issues and ask for a ruling on them means he failed to
preserve error on them. See id. As a result, we do not consider them.
Lastly, Ryan asks us to terminate Sasha’s spousal support upon her
marriage or cohabitation, arguing it is inequitable to require him to request a
modification if this situation were to arise. Again, Ryan has not shown that he
raised this issue to the district court. Even if he did, the district court did not
address it, and Ryan took no steps to bring this failure to the district court’s
attention. Error was not preserved, so we decline to consider this issue. See id.
physical care of the children. As Ryan has been unsuccessful on that issue, if his claim is conditional, it is moot. If Ryan’s claim is not conditioned on modification of physical care, it is not clear what the nature of his request is. Typically when, as here, one parent is granted physical care and the other parent pays child support, the parent granted physical care is responsible for the children’s expenses absent a deviation from the guidelines that did not occur here. See Heiar, 954 N.W.2d at 473. We need not try to resolve this uncertainty as to the nature of Ryan’s claim, as he failed to preserve it for our review. 16
VI. Appellate Attorney Fees
Sasha’s brief makes a passing reference to a request for an award of
appellate attorney fees from Ryan, but she did not set this out as a separate issue
heading, made no substantive argument in support of her claim, and cited no
authority in support of her passing reference, all in violation of our rules of appellate
procedure. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)–(3). We decline to develop an argument
and find authority for her. As such, we deny her request.
VII. Conclusion
Following our de novo review, we affirm the district court’s decree. The
district court correctly determined that granting Sasha physical care was in the
children’s best interests. The decree also equitably determined Ryan’s income
and equitably determined the amount and duration of spousal support awarded to
Sasha. We decline to address Ryan’s arguments that were not preserved for our
review. We deny Sasha’s request for appellate attorney fees.
AFFIRMED.