In re Marriage of W

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 251315-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-1315 July 7, 2026 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re MARRIAGE OF TYLER W., ) Appeal from the Petitioner-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of and ) Knox County SARAH W., n/k/a/ JANAI P., ) No. 23DC68 Respondent-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) James G. Baber, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Doherty and Grischow concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding respondent forfeited her claims by failing to comply with the briefing requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶2 In May 2024, the marriage of petitioner, Tyler W., and respondent, Sarah W., now

known as Janai P., was dissolved. The trial court reserved ruling on issues relating to allocation

of parental responsibilities. From January to September 2025, the court conducted several

evidentiary hearings. In October 2025, the court entered a judgment allocating majority parenting

time and sole significant decision-making responsibilities to Tyler, with Sarah being allocated a

six-week reunification period, followed by parenting time every other weekend. Sarah appealed.

¶3 On appeal, Sarah pro se argues (1) the proceedings below denied her the right to

due process, (2) the trial court’s parenting decision was against the manifest weight of the

evidence, and (3) the court’s allocation of sole significant decision-making authority to Tyler violated her rights under the United States Constitution. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 In September 2001, Tyler and Sarah were married. The marriage produced two

children: E.W. (born in December 2006) and L.W. (born in October 2011).

¶6 In December 2023, Tyler filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Tyler was

represented by counsel, whereas Sarah proceeded pro se. In February 2024, the trial court

entered a written order temporarily designating Tyler as the majority parent, with parenting time

granted to Sarah. In May 2024, the court entered an order dissolving the parties’ marriage while

reserving the issue of allocation of parental responsibilities.

¶7 In July 2024, Sarah filed a pro se motion to modify allocation of parental

responsibilities. In her motion, Sarah alleged there was a substantial change in circumstances in

that she obtained housing. She requested the trial court grant her significant decision-making

responsibilities and custody of the children.

¶8 On January 10, 2025, Tyler filed his proposed parenting plan. The plan applied

only to L.W., as E.W. had turned 18 years old. The same day, Sarah filed another pro se motion

to modify allocation of parental responsibilities.

¶9 On January 13, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the allocation of parental

responsibilities. Following Tyler’s testimony, the court continued the hearing.

¶ 10 The parenting hearing resumed on February 14, 2025. Counsel filed an entry of

appearance on behalf of Sarah. On Sarah’s motion and over Tyler’s objection, the court granted a

continuance to allow Sarah’s counsel to prepare for the remainder of the parenting hearing.

¶ 11 The parenting hearing resumed on February 20, April 4, and April 7, 2025, where

Sarah, E.W., and Tyler testified. In August 2025, the trial court separately ordered that L.W.

-2- attend school in person, denying Sarah’s request that L.W. be homeschooled. The court further

ordered L.W. to remain unvaccinated, as requested by Sarah, pending the court’s final order.

¶ 12 The parenting hearing concluded on September 8, 2025. Following arguments, the

trial court took the matter under advisement. Sarah then interjected and requested that the court

discharge her attorney for not presenting certain evidence and for resting the case without her

permission. On September 22, 2025, the court entered a written order allowing Sarah’s counsel

to withdraw from the case.

¶ 13 In an October 2025 letter, the trial court adopted Tyler’s proposed parenting plan,

with modifications to parenting time. The court thereafter entered its written order. The order

granted Tyler sole decision-making responsibilities for L.W., including significant educational

and medical decisions. Tyler was designated the majority parent. Sarah’s parenting time would

start with a six-week reunification period. Once the reunification period was completed, she

would parent L.W. every other weekend.

¶ 14 In November 2025, Sarah filed a pro se “Motion to Reconsider and/or Vacate

Judgment.” Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Sarah appealed.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 Initially, we must address the delay in the issuance of this disposition. As a matter

involving the custody of a minor, this case is subject to expedited disposition under Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018), which requires the appellate court to issue its

decision within 150 days after the filing of the notice of appeal, except for good cause shown.

Here, the notice of appeal was filed on December 5, 2025, making our decision due by May 4,

2026. On January 9, 2026, we dismissed the appeal after Sarah failed to timely file a docketing

statement. Sarah filed a motion to reconsider, which this court allowed on January 27, 2026. On

-3- March 10, 2026, we granted Sarah’s motion for an extension of time to file an appellant’s brief,

and the brief was not filed until March 24, 2026. After Tyler filed his appellee’s brief on April

14, 2026, Sarah filed a motion for leave to file a late reply brief on April 26, 2025, and a motion

to supplement her reply brief on April 30, 2026. Both motions were taken with the case on May

11, 2026. Although every effort was made to comply with the deadline under Rule 311(a)(5), we

find good cause exists for filing this decision beyond the deadline.

¶ 17 On appeal, Sarah argues (1) she was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to

present her case, denying her the right to due process, (2) the trial court’s parenting decision was

against the manifest weight of the evidence, and (3) the court’s decision allocating significant

decision-making authority solely to Tyler violated her rights under the first and fourteenth

amendments of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. I, XIV).

¶ 18 Tyler argues that Sarah’s pro se brief fails to comply with our supreme court

rules, rendering her arguments forfeited under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1,

2020). Our supreme court rules governing the form and content of appellate briefs are “not mere

suggestions.” Niewold v. Fry, 306 Ill. App. 3d 735, 737 (1999). “They have the force of law, and

the presumption must be that they will be obeyed and enforced as written.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Billerbeck v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 292 Ill. App. 3d 350, 353 (1997).

¶ 19 Rule 341(h)(2) requires the appellant’s brief to include an introductory paragraph

stating the nature of the action and of the judgment appealed from. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(2) (eff.

Oct. 1, 2020). Here, the required introductory paragraph is absent from Sarah’s brief. Rule

341(h)(3) requires the appellant to “include a concise statement of the applicable standard of

review for each issue, with citation to authority.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(3) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Here,

Sarah contends the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard applies to the trial court’s

-4- parenting decision, but she cites no authority supporting its application. For her remaining two

arguments, she does not identify any standard of review.

¶ 20 Rule 341(h)(6) requires that the appellant’s brief “contain the facts necessary to

an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment, and

with appropriate reference to the pages of the record on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct.

1, 2020). Here, Sarah’s statement of facts, constituting barely one page of her brief, does not

contain any citations to the record. Her statement of facts also omits many of the facts needed to

understand the case. As just one example, the trial court held four separate hearings on the issue

of allocating parental responsibilities, yet Sarah entirely fails to summarize any of the testimony

or evidence presented at those hearings. Her statement of facts is further marred by

argumentative assertions that do not fairly characterize the proceedings below.

¶ 21 Rule 341(h)(7) requires that the argument section of an appellant’s brief “contain

the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the

pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Here, Sarah has failed

to set forth a cogent legal argument supported by relevant authority. Perplexingly, while Sarah

included a table of authorities, referencing several constitutional provisions and federal and state

case law, almost none of these authorities are explained or cited in the argument section of her

brief. In fact, the argument section contains a single citation to general authority stating that a

parent’s right to parent and educate her own child is a fundamental right. See Pierce v. Society of

the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).

¶ 22 Moreover, Sarah fails to develop any meaningful legal argument demonstrating

how (1) she was denied due process, (2) the trial court erred in its parenting decision, or (3) her

federal constitutional rights were violated. First, Sarah alleges she was denied due process

-5- because counsel rested her case before presenting additional testimony and evidence. However,

Sarah never explains who the additional witnesses were or what was contained in the additional

evidence. She essentially asks this court to accept her contentions as true without attempting to

prove them. This court will not reverse the trial court’s decision based on mere speculation.

¶ 23 Next, Sarah contends the trial court’s parenting decision was against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Without any citation to the record or legal authority, she baldly asserts

the court “allowed ongoing noncompliance and interference to persist without meaningful

remedy” and that “the court’s own findings *** do not reflect a balanced or complete evaluation

of the evidence.” The remainder of her argument appears to be an overview of her

homeschooling plan. At no point does she meaningfully address the court’s findings of fact or

decision regarding the allocation of parental responsibilities.

¶ 24 Finally, Sarah claims, by allocating significant educational and medical

decision-making responsibilities solely to Tyler, the trial court violated her first amendment right

to the free exercise of religion and her fourteenth amendment right to direct the upbringing and

education of her child. Again, without citation to the record or authority, she vaguely asserts the

court rejected her parenting plan “without a finding of harm” and failed to “incorporate

reasonable safeguards and less restrictive alternatives” in its parenting decision. Sarah does not

show how these alleged errors amount to a violation of her constitutional rights. We further note

that she claims the court erroneously rejected her parenting plan, yet neither she nor her counsel

filed a proposed parenting plan, despite repeated reminders by the court to do so.

¶ 25 It is well settled that the appellate court is not a depository into which the

appellant can dump the burden of argument and research. In re Marriage of Hundley, 2019 IL

App (4th) 180380, ¶ 82. The reviewing court will not act as an advocate or seek error in the

-6- record in the absence of a clearly developed legal argument. In re N.F., 2020 IL App (1st)

182427, ¶ 30. Sarah’s pro se status does not relieve her of the duty to comply with the appellate

practice rules required of attorneys. See Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 528 (2001)

(“Pro se litigants are presumed to have full knowledge of applicable court rules and

procedures.”). Accordingly, we find Sarah has forfeited her arguments due to the multiple fatal

deficiencies in her brief. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“[P]oints not argued are

forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for

rehearing.”).

¶ 26 Finally, we address Sarah’s motions, which were taken with the case. In April

2026, she filed with this court a motion to file a late reply brief and a motion to file a

supplemental reply brief. Because Sarah has forfeited the arguments in her appellant’s brief for

failing to comply with Rule 341(h), we find that further briefing will not assist us in disposing of

this appeal. Thus, the motions are denied.

¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 29 Affirmed.

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