In re Marriage of Villela
This text of 2019 IL App (1st) 190200-U (In re Marriage of Villela) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
2019 IL App (1st) 190200-U
THIRD DIVISION December 18, 2019
No. 1-19-0200
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re MARRIAGE OF ) ) CARLOS VILLELA, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Petitioner, ) Cook County ) and ) 2010 D 9098 ) MARTHA VILLELA, ) Honorable ) Robert W. Johnson, Respondent-Appellant, ) Judge Presiding ) (Bradley Chelin, Appellee.) ) _____________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Howse and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Affirmed. Because petitioner did not attach transcript of hearing on her attorney’s fee petition and meaningful review of circuit court’s order cannot be had without the transcript, presumption of correctness governs this case.
¶2 In 2013, petitioner Martha Villela and Carlos Villela divorced. A judgment of dissolution
of marriage was entered, which included a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA). No. 1-19-0200
¶3 Shortly thereafter, problems arose. In rapid succession, each party accused the other of
materially violating the terms on the MSA. These accusations were memorialized in dueling
petitions for rule to show cause that Martha and Carlos filed against one another. Around
December 2013, Martha hired attorney Bradley Chelin, the appellee in this appeal.
¶4 On May 3, 2017, the circuit court entered an order directing Carlos to contribute $21,620
towards Martha’s post-decree legal fees. In total, from December 2013 to January 2018, Chelin
racked up $34,839 in attorney fees.
¶5 In December 2017 and January 2018, the court entered a series of orders directing Carlos
to turnover to Chelin $21,620 upon the sale of certain investment property in Chicago. That sale
took place on January 25, 2018. The same day, Carlos tendered a check to Chelin for $22,135.
¶6 On September 13, 2018, Chelin was granted leave to withdraw as Martha’s attorney. On
October 11, 2018, Martha hired attorney Joseph Gettleman.
¶7 On October 24, 2018, Chelin filed a “Petition for Setting Final Attorney’s Fees and Costs
and to Clarify Prior Contribution Orders.” In that petition, Chelin explained that from December
2013 to January 2018, he racked up $34,839 in fees. Of that amount, $18,050 had been paid to
Chelin by Martha, and $900 had been paid to Chelin by Carlos’s tenants during citation
proceedings, leaving an unpaid balance in the amount of $15,889. In his petition, Chelin sought,
among other things, permission from the court to withdraw the funds from the January real estate
sale from his IOLTA account to satisfy the remaining balance due.
¶8 On December 3, 2018, the court held a four-hour hearing on Chelin’s petition. According
to Chelin, “[n]o court reporter was present at this hearing, and there is no transcript.” Our review
of the record confirms that assertion.
2 No. 1-19-0200
¶9 On January 4, 2019, the court entered an order stating that the May 3, 2017 order was
“deemed to be an award of contribution of attorney’s fees” and that “the award of contribution is
properly payable to Attorney Chelin.” In the same order, the court (1) awarded Chelin $3,654 in
fees for work performed between May 4, 2017 and January 25, 2018; (2) allowed Chelin to
withdraw $15,889 from his IOLTA account to satisfy the total remaining balance for attorney’s
fees that Martha owed to Chelin
¶ 10 In her appellate brief, Martha, who is now proceeding pro se, raises two main arguments.
First, she contends that the circuit court erred during the January 4, 2019 hearing by failing to
consider documentary evidence (check stubs) which she claims would have negated Chelin’s
claim that Martha owed an additional $15,889. And second, she contends that Chelin’s fees were
unreasonable under Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5.
¶ 11 To resolve these issues, we need to know what evidence the court had before it when it
ruled. And to know what evidence the court had before it when it ruled, we need a transcript of
the January 4, 2019 hearing. We do not have that transcript. Without it, we have no way of
knowing what evidence was presented to the court. We have no basis for finding error in
anything the trial court did.
¶ 12 When this court is faced with an inadequate record on appeal, as is the case here, supreme
court precedent requires that we presume that the circuit court’s order was in conformity with the
law and properly supported by the evidence. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 393 (1984). We
have no basis to take any action other than to affirm the trial court’s judgment. 1
¶ 13 Affirmed.
1 Martha sought leave to amend her reply brief and provide us with additional information that was not contained in the record on appeal. We denied that motion. “To the extent that arguments in a brief rely on documents that are not properly part of the record, the reviewing court will disregard them.” Garvy v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 2012 IL App (1st) 110115, ¶ 26. 3
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