In re Marriage of Trulson

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: July 3, 2024
• Docket: 23-0732
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0732 Filed July 3, 2024

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF HOLLY LYNN TRULSON AND TIMOTHY TODD TRULSON

Upon the Petition of HOLLY LYNN TRULSON, Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning TIMOTHY TODD TRULSON, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B. Hanson,

Judge.

Timothy Trulson appeals the property division in the decree dissolving the

parties’ marriage. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

Katherine S. Sargent, Des Moines, for appellant.

Jamie J. Maguire of Flanagan Law Group, PLLC, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Langholz, JJ. 2

AHLERS, Judge.

At the time of the dissolution of their marriage, Holly Trulson and Timothy

Trulson had been married for twenty-eight years. The fighting issue in their

dissolution-of-marriage action was how to equitably divide their property. See Iowa

Code § 598.21(1) (2021) (requiring the court in a dissolution-of-marriage action to

divide the property of the parties). Unable to resolve their dispute over property

division, the parties had a trial and the district court divided the property in its

decree dissolving the marriage. Timothy appeals, claiming the division of property

was not equitable. More specifically, the appeal focuses primarily on the parties’

retirement accounts and benefits.

As to the nature and value of the parties’ retirement accounts and benefits,

at the time of dissolution, Holly had an individual retirement account (IRA) valued

at $137,000. Timothy had a Roth IRA, which the parties agreed to value at

$115,906.1 In addition to her IRA, Holly had accumulated retirement benefits

through her work. As a public-school teacher since before she married Timothy,

Holly has been paying into the Iowa Public Employee’s Retirement System

(IPERS). In its decree dividing the marital property, the district court valued Holly’s

IPERS account at $219,684 based on the refund value stated on a recent annual

statement.

As to the division of the parties’ retirement accounts and benefits, the district

awarded Holly her IPERS account and Timothy both his Roth IRA and Holly’s IRA.

1 Timothy withdrew money from his Roth IRA while this dissolution action was

pending, reducing the value of the account. He agreed that for purposes of valuing and dividing the marital property, his Roth IRA should be valued at its balance prior to his withdrawals. 3

After dividing up the rest of the marital property, the court ordered Holly to pay

Timothy a property equalization payment of $54,949. As the other terms of the

property division are not at issue, we do not detail them.

After the court filed its decree dividing the parties’ property, Timothy filed an

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion asking the court to modify its ruling.

He argued that the court did not properly value Holly’s IPERS account and it should

be divided using the Benson formula; both parties should retain their respective

IRAs; and the resulting division should result in Holly paying him a larger

equalization payment. The court held a hearing on the motion during which the

court explained it did not believe an equal division of property was necessary in

this case given Timothy’s past poor financial practices. The court ultimately denied

Timothy’s motion. Timothy appeals, again raising the arguments from his

1.904(2) motion. Holly asks us to affirm the district court’s ruling and seeks

appellate attorney fees.

We review dissolution-of-marriage actions de novo. In re Marriage of

McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013). “Accordingly, we examine the

entire record and adjudicate anew the issue of the property distribution.” Id. We

are not bound by the district court’s findings, but we will only disturb its ruling if we

find it failed to do equity. Id. Additionally, we will affirm the court’s valuation of

assets if it is within the range of permissible evidence. Id. at 679.

I. Valuation and Division of IPERS Benefits

In a dissolution action, the court is tasked with equitably dividing the parties’

property. Iowa Code § 598.21(5). Determining an equitable division necessarily

involves placing a value on the property to be divided. Retirement accounts and 4

benefits are divisible marital property. In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242,

248 (Iowa 2006). As such, they need to be valued.

In this case, the sticking point is valuing Holly’s IPERS benefits. There are

two types of pension plans—defined-benefit plans and defined-contribution plans.

In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Iowa 1996). The difference

between the two is that under a defined-benefit plan the future benefit is specified

in advance based on a formula or schedule whereas under a defined-contribution

plan the contributions are specified without a predetermined benefit. Id. Both

types of plans can be factored into the property division by using the present-value

method (i.e., taking a stream of future payments or a lump sum amount and

discounting it to “current dollars” to reach its present value) or the percentage

method (i.e., awarding the parties a specified percentage of the pension payable

in the future at the time the benefits are paid). Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 248–49.

However, valuing a defined-benefit plan using the present-value method “is a

complicated process that requires actuarial science.” Id. at 248. Because of the

complexity of trying to discount a defined-benefit plan to present value, the

“normally desirable” and “more attractive” method for dividing such benefits is the

percentage method. Id. at 248–49; see also In re Marriage of Brown, 776 N.W.2d

644, 649 (“Although both methods may be used to divide a defined-benefit plan,

we have expressed a preference for the percentage method.”).

IPERS is a defined-benefit plan. Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 249. So, while it is

possible to value the plan using the present-value method, doing so would require

actuarial-science evidence. Id. at 248. But neither party presented actuarial-

science evidence to establish the present value of Holly’s IPERS benefits. Instead, 5

the court accepted the “refund value” provided in an annual summary statement

as the value of the benefits. The statement explained that the refund value

consists of Holly’s “own contributions plus interest and . . . a portion of [her]

employer’s contributions plus interest.” It clarified that the “refund value does not

reflect the value of [Holly’s] potential future lifetime monthly benefits.”

Besides the fact the statement itself acknowledges the refund amount does

not reflect the value of the benefits, our supreme court has also rejected this

method of valuing an IPERS plan. Brown, 776 N.W.2d at 651 (finding it

impermissible to value IPERS benefits based on contribution information on a

statement because “[t]his figure does not accurately value the present worth of the

benefits”). That is because future IPERS benefits are not based on contributions;

instead, they are based on a percentage of the employee’s average wages. Id.

Because the refund value of Holly’s IPERS benefits does not accurately reflect

their present value, the district court did not accurately value Holly’s IPERS

benefits when it valued the account at the refund value. It simply could not

determine the present value without the necessary actuarial evidence, which

neither party provided.

As there was no actuarial evidence to find the present value of Holly’s

IPERS account, we find it appropriate to use the other accepted valuation and

division method—the percentage method, also known as the Benson formula. See

Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 248; see also In re Marriage of Miller, 966 N.W.2d 630, 634

n.2 (Iowa 2021) (defining the Benson formula and explaining it originated in

Benson, 545 N.W.2d at 254–55); In re Marriage of Ocean, No. 22-1664, 2024 WL

697757, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2024) (Ahlers, J., concurring in part and 6

dissenting in part) (“The only fair way to value the IPERS benefits, in the absence

of any actuarial-based evidence of their value, is to divide them using the Benson

formula.”). Under this method, “the non-pensioner spouse is awarded a

percentage (frequently fifty percent) of a fraction of the pensioner’s benefits (based

on the duration of the marriage), by a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO),

which is paid if and when the benefits mature.” Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 250. “The

fraction represents the portion of the pension attributable to the parties’ joint marital

efforts. The numerator in the fraction is the number of years the pensioner accrued

benefits under the plan during the marriage, and the denominator is the total

number of years of benefit accrual.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

To effectuate the percentage method of dividing Holly’s IPERS account, we

modify the parties’ dissolution decree to provide for a QDRO that awards Timothy

a portion of Holly’s IPERS benefits that is equal to fifty percent of Holly’s IPERS

monthly benefits multiplied by a fraction of which the numerator is the number of

years Holly was both married to Timothy and covered by IPERS and the

denominator is the total number of years Holly is covered by IPERS.2

Timothy points out that Holly can influence her IPERS benefits depending

on what options she chooses both in choosing her retirement plan and in dividing

the IPERS benefits via QDRO. Timothy asks that the QDRO include directives

limiting Holly’s decision making with respect to her IPERS account.3 We do not

2 If the IPERS plan administrator uses a different unit of measure than years to

determine Holly’s term of coverage under IPERS, then the QDRO shall use that alternative unit of measure. 3 For example, Timothy asks that Holly be required to “designate [him] to receive

a 100% joint and survivor annuity” upon her retirement.” 7

have adequate information in our record to make such directives. Instead, we

remand the case with the direction that the parties cooperate in preparing a QDRO

acceptable to the plan administrator that includes deciding which of the various

options available are fair to the parties. If the parties cannot agree on the terms of

the QDRO or its options, either party may seek court intervention. The district

court will then determine, with or without a hearing as the court deems appropriate,

the terms of the QDRO and its options. The terms should be fair to both parties

by equally dividing the marital portion of Holly’s IPERS benefits.

As Timothy recognizes and requests, the division of Holly’s IPERS benefits

requires us to modify other aspects of the property distribution to ensure it remains

equitable. Accordingly, we conclude each party should be awarded the party’s own

IRA rather than awarding both to Timothy. So although Holly’s IPERS benefits will

be shared with Timothy as described, we modify the decree to award Holly her IRA

valued at $137,000.

With the above modifications put into effect, we provide a snapshot of the

parties’ resulting financial picture with the following recapitulation statement:

Item # Description of Asset/Debt Holly Timothy 1 House $283,100 2 IPERS Divided Divided 3 IRA (Holly) $137,000 4 Roth IRA (Timothy) $115,906 5 IRA (previously cashed) $33,134 6 Disability ins. (previously cashed) $7,236 7 Nissan X-Terra $11,610 8 Honda Del Sol $3,000 9 2002 Mustang Gift 10 2005 Lexus Gift 11 Premarital property (excluded) ($55,000) 12 Gift—payment on house (excluded) ($30,000) 8

13 Other property & debts Equal Equal

14 Total Before Equalization Payment $335,100 $170,886 15 Equalization Payment by Holly ($82,107) $82,107 16 Resulting Total $252,993 $252,993

We provide these explanatory notes about the statement:

Item #2: Although the lack of actuarial evidence in the records prevents us

from placing a value on Holly’s IPERS benefits, by dividing those benefits using

the Benson formula as directed in this opinion, the IPERS benefits accrued during

the marriage are equally divided regardless of their value.

Item #3: As previously noted, although the district court awarded Holly’s

IRA to Timothy, because we have modified the decree to divide the IPERS benefits,

we find it appropriate to award Holly her IRA valued at $137,000.

Items #5 & #6: Many years before the parties separated, Timothy cashed

in an IRA with a value of $33,134 and a disability insurance policy with a value of

$7236. The district court found Timothy dissipated the assets and included their

values as assets received by Timothy. We express no opinion on the propriety of

the district court applying the dissipation doctrine, see In re Marriage of Kimbro,

826 N.W.2d 696, 700–01 (Iowa 2013) (permitting the court to include dissipated

assets in the marital estate when assets are disposed of during the period of

separation), to events occurring many years before the parties separated. As

neither party challenges the district court’s ruling on the treatment of those items,

we include the value of these no-longer-existing assets on Timothy’s side of the

ledger. 9

Items #9 & #10: The parties agree that the two vehicles listed were given

to Holly as gifts from Holly’s father. The district court determined the values of

these vehicles should not be included in assessing the division of the marital

property, and neither party challenges that decision on appeal. As a result, we also

exclude the value of these vehicles from consideration.

Items #11 & #12: The district court determined that Holly used $55,000 of

funds she accumulated before the marriage to invest in the parties’ first house and

that such funds account for a like amount of equity in the current house awarded

to Holly (Item #1). The district court excluded that $55,000 from division, which is

reflected on the above statement as a deduction on Holly’s side of the ledger.

Likewise, the district court excluded an additional $30,000 that Holly received as a

gift from her father toward the purchase of the house. We note that premarital

property and gifted property are not treated the same under the Iowa Code.

Premarital property may be included in the divisible estate. McDermott, 827

N.W.2d at 678. Property received via gift, on the other hand, is generally excluded

from division unless equity demands otherwise. Id. We express no opinion on the

propriety of the district court setting aside as Holly’s separate property both her

premarital funds and funds received as a gift, as neither party raises any objection

to the district court’s actions. So, like the district court, we treat these two items as

Holly’s separate property, the value of which should be deducted from Holly’s side

of the ledger.

Item #13: The parties presented little to no evidence of the value of any

other assets or debts. This suggests that the parties generally agree that the other

assets and debts have been divided to their satisfaction and are generally equal in 10

value. Consistent with this suggestion is that both parties submitted as exhibits a

proposed property distribution scheme. Neither party’s proposed-distribution

exhibit included any significant details about any other assets or debts. So, we

treat the district court’s division of all other assets and debts not shown in the above

recapitulation statement as being equal to both parties.

As the above recapitulation statement shows, Holly comes out with

$164,214 more marital net worth than Timothy, so some balancing is needed to

achieve equity. While we do not always require mathematical equality in achieving

the equitable division of property required by the Iowa Code, we generally start

with the premise that equal is fair. Kimbro, 826 N.W.2d at 703–04.

Here, we see no persuasive reason why an equitable division of property

should not be equal, especially when Holly has already received the substantial

benefit of having $55,000 of potentially divisible premarital property set aside as

her separate property not subject to division as well as having Timothy treated as

if long-gone assets still exist and were awarded to him. Finding equality to be fair

here, we modify the decree to replace the $54,949 property settlement obligation

set by the district court with the obligation for Holly to pay Timothy a property

settlement payment of $82,107, effectively equalizing the parties’ net worths. The

district court determined that 120 days is an appropriate period within which to

require Holly to make the property settlement payment, and we do the same. Holly

shall pay Timothy the $82,107 property settlement payment within 120 days of

issuance of procedendo.

In summary, we modify the district court’s decree to award Holly’s IRA to

her instead of Timothy. We also modify to require division of Holly’s IPERS benefits 11

pursuant to the Benson formula, as detailed earlier in the opinion, including

remanding the case to give the parties (or the court, upon inability of the parties to

reach an agreement) an opportunity to determine the details of the QDRO to

effectuate the goal of equal division of the marital portion of the IPERS benefits.

Finally, we modify the decree to change Holly’s property settlement-payment

obligation to Timothy from $54,949 to $82,107. All other terms of the district court’s

decree not modified in this opinion shall remain unchanged.

II. Appellate Attorney Fees

Finally, we address Holly’s request for $5000 in appellate attorney fees.

“Appellate attorney fees are not a matter of right, but rather rest in this court’s

discretion.” McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 687 (citation omitted). When considering

an appellate-attorney-fee request, we consider the needs of the requesting party,

the other’s ability to pay, and the merits of the claims. Id. Here, because Timothy

was successful in his appeal to modify the property division, the parties have

comparable earning capacity, and the parties have received equal amounts of the

marital net worth, we decline to award Holly appellate attorney fees. Costs of

appeal are assessed to Holly.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.