In re Marriage of Treva S.

2024 IL App (5th) 240615-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: October 17, 2024
• Docket: 5-24-0615
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2024 IL App (5th) 240615-U NOTICE Decision filed 10/17/24. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-0615 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of TREVA S. ) Johnson County. ) Petitioner-Appellant, ) ) and ) No. 20-D-22 ) DREW T., ) Honorable ) Sarah K. Tripp, Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Vaughan and Justice Sholar concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Where appellant Treva S. failed to comply with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) in filing her brief with this court, she forfeited any arguments challenging the trial court’s order.

¶2 Treva S. appeals from the trial court’s May 7, 2024, order modifying parenting

responsibilities regarding health and medical care but denying her requests for modification of

parenting responsibilities for extracurriculars and modification of parenting time. Because we find

that Treva S. forfeited her challenge to these rulings by failing to comply with Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 341(h)(7), we must affirm the order entered by the trial court. 1

1 Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018), our decision in this case was due on or before October 4, 2024, absent good cause shown. Both parties sought and were given extensions of time in which 1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Treva S. (Treva) and Drew T. (Drew) were married in 2015 and are parents of two boys

born during the marriage, Han. T. (born March 17, 2017) and Har. T. (born December 11, 2018).

The parties were divorced on July 13, 2021. The 2021 judgment of dissolution contained a

paragraph limiting contact between Treva and Drew. Only child-related contact was allowed,

which was restricted to text or email. The parenting plan provided for the parties to have alternating

weeks with the boys.

¶5 On October 27, 2022, Treva filed her petition to modify parenting time and responsibilities

alleging that there had been a substantial change of circumstances necessitating modifications to

the original order and claiming that the children’s present environment seriously endangered the

boys’ mental and moral health and would impair their emotional development. In her petition,

Treva alleged numerous specific instances involving Drew beginning nine days after entry of the

July 2021 parenting plan. These instances included Drew allegedly using profane language in the

presence of the boys, Treva blocking Drew’s phone, the boys being banned from their daycare

because of Drew’s behavior, lack of structure for the boys during their weeks with Drew, his

pending Jackson County criminal case for battery and physical damage to property over $500,

Drew being a “bully” and a “narcissist,” and Treva not being able to communicate with Drew

because “he does not know how to communicate without harassing, belittling and being a terrible

person.”

¶6 Treva filed a petition for an order of protection against Drew on November 1, 2022, for an

incident the previous evening when Drew took the boys from Treva. Treva and Drew both claimed

they had Halloween parenting time. Drew allegedly used inappropriate language in front of the

to file their briefs, and Drew T. filed a motion to strike the appellant’s brief and dismiss the appeal, which was denied. Consequently we find good cause for issuing a decision after the due date. 2 boys. In her petition, Treva alleged: “His abusive behavior continues and I am scared he will take

the kids and run.” The trial court entered an emergency order but later denied Treva’s request for

a plenary order.

¶7 On March 25, 2024, Treva filed another petition for an order of protection against Drew.

At issue was an allegation that on March 22, 2024, she received a text message from Drew’s

neighbor, Ashton Crites, who informed her that there had been an incident where the boys were

left unsupervised, and later Drew was allegedly heard yelling at Han. T. to “shut the fuck up.”

Items were heard being thrown about in Drew’s apartment. Han. T. exited the apartment and was

crying. Treva also listed previous incidents in her petition, including a time in October 2023 when

Drew allegedly held Har. T. upside down by a leg and yelled at him, and Drew not supervising the

children by leaving them in the car when he entered a store. Treva alleged: “I am scared that if

Drew continues to have the children without help then there will be something that happens where

the children are harmed.” The trial court heard the emergency order of petition on the date it was

filed. Drew was present for the hearing; the trial court declined to enter the emergency order and

set the matter for a plenary hearing the following week. The plenary hearing was held on April 1,

2024, after which the trial court declined to enter a plenary order but stated that it believed that the

incidents Treva alleged did occur. The court then restricted Drew’s parenting time to occur when

his current wife, Breanna, is home pending the court’s ruling on Treva’s petition to modify

parenting time and responsibilities, concluding that any additional restrictions should be imposed

by Judge Tripp, who was assigned to that case.

¶8 A court-appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) for the children met with both parents and

visited both homes while the two boys were present. The GAL then filed a report recommending

some modifications to the parenting plan. The GAL prefaced his recommendations by stating that

3 his concern with Drew was that he “still has issues to address and the improvements made in

relation to the children’s behavior have occurred in spite of Father’s behavior, not because of

Father’s improvement since being with [his current wife].” He recommended that both parties

utilize a specific communication application “for any and all communication or notifications

regarding the children.” The GAL recommended that Treva be awarded sole decision-making for

health and extracurriculars and that Drew undergo anger management classes and counseling to

assist in his impulse control issues. Finally, the GAL recommended a modification in parenting

time consistent with the order previously entered by the judge in the recent order of protection—

allowing Drew to only exercise parenting time if his current wife, Breanna, is present. However,

the GAL recommended that after Drew completed anger management and counseling, the court

should revisit the issue. Finally, the GAL recommended that both boys engage in counseling “to

assist with the goal of addressing any potential impulse control issues.”

¶9 On May 7, 2024, the trial court entered its judgment order following a two-day hearing.

The court concluded that there had been a substantial change of circumstances (750 ILCS

5/610.5(c) (West 2022)) warranting a need for modification of the July 13, 2021, parenting plan.

The court concluded that it was in the best interest of the boys to make the following modifications:

(1) Treva would receive sole decision-making responsibility for health and medical care issues due

to the parties’ inability to work together, (2) both Treva and Drew must utilize the GAL-

recommended communications application, (3) there would be no change to the joint decision-

making responsibility for extracurriculars, and (4) the parenting time should return to one week on

and one week off as under the original plan.

4 ¶ 10 The trial court’s order expressly referenced applicable statutory requirements, its

consideration of testimony and arguments of counsel, and the GAL’s recommendations, and

stated:

“Under the law, it is presumed that both parties are fit, and the Court

shall not place restrictions on parenting time, unless it is proven by a preponderance

of the evidence that a parent’s exercise of parenting time would seriously endanger

the child’s physical, mental, moral or emotional health. While the Court notes that

the *** actions of [Drew] towards the minor children (at times) were inappropriate

and in poor judgment, the Court finds that [Treva] has failed to establish that

[Drew’s] exercise of unrestricted parenting time would seriously endanger the

child[ren]’s physical, mental or emotional health. The Court does believe it would

be in the best interest of the children for [Drew] to undergo an Anger Management

evaluation and any recommended treatment to address [Drew’s] impulse/anger

issues, that not only affect his parenting but have also been a significant hindrance

in his ability to co-parent and communicate regarding the children with [Treva].”

¶ 11 Treva appeals from the trial court’s May 7, 2024, judgment order, arguing that the trial

court erred in not modifying parenting time and failing to give her sole decision-making

responsibility over extracurricular activities. She also contends that the trial court failed to find

that the children were seriously endangered by Drew.

¶ 12 After Treva filed her opening brief in this appeal, on August 1, 2024, Drew’s attorney filed

a motion to strike Treva’s brief and dismiss the appeal on the basis that the brief failed to comply

with the mandates of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Because of these

flaws in the brief, Drew argued that he was unable to ascertain the foundations of Treva’s alleged

5 arguments, and thus did not know how to respond to some arguments raised in her brief. This court

denied Drew’s motion on August 13, 2024, noting that while Treva’s brief “provides scant

argument and authority *** counsel for appellant is a licensed attorney capable of following

Supreme Court Rules” and that any argument Treva failed to raise in her brief would be forfeited.

In re Marriage of Reicher, 2021 IL App (2d) 200454.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 “represents our supreme court’s considered opinion of the

format that best facilitates the clear and orderly presentation of arguments.” Hall v. Naper Gold

Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 15. Moreover, the procedural rules which govern

the content and form of briefs on appeal “are mandatory and not suggestions.” Litwin v. County of

La Salle, 2021 IL App (3d) 200410, ¶ 3.

¶ 15 At issue is Treva’s attorney’s compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7),

which addresses the argument section of the brief and mandates:

“The appellant’s brief shall contain the following parts in the order named:

***

(7) Argument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and

the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record

relied on. Evidence shall not be copied at length, but reference shall be made to the

pages of the record on appeal where evidence may be found. Citation of numerous

authorities in support of the same point is not favored. Points not argued are

forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition

for rehearing.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

6 ¶ 16 Treva’s first argument challenges the trial court’s decision not to modify parenting time

and decision-making for extracurriculars. She identifies the correct standard of review as the

manifest weight of the evidence. See In re Marriage of Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489, 515 (2004); In re

Marriage of Burns, 2019 IL App (2d) 180715, ¶ 24; In re Marriage of Romano, 2012 IL App (2d)

091339, ¶ 44. Treva also cites to the relevant statutes that guide trial courts on issues involving

modification of parenting time and duties, noting that the trial court must consider the child’s best

interest and must also conclude that there has been a substantial change in circumstances before

modification is warranted. 750 ILCS 5/602.5(c)(5), 602.7 (West 2022). However, she makes no

articulate argument in support of her challenges to the trial court’s ruling. She simply asserts

generalized error by the trial court without citing any specifics. Treva asserts speculative factual

arguments about the court’s decision not to modify extracurricular decision-making duties. For

example, even though Drew complied with the soccer extracurricular schedule for Han. T during

the spring 2024 season, Treva “argues” that Drew was only “on board” because Han. T. had

achieved “all star” status. She then speculates that: “Had Drew determined that he didn’t want

[Han. T.] to play soccer in the spring, it is doubtful that [Han. T.] would [participate while] on

Drew’s time.”

¶ 17 Regarding parenting time, Treva concludes that “Judge Tripp did not address the remaining

evidence of all of the issues the parties had with the parenting time.” Without identifying what

“remaining evidence” she was referring to, she only cited the statute listing the relevant factors to

be considered by the trial court. Id. § 602.7. As another example, Treva “argues,” without any

citation to the record, that because Han. T. was living with Drew during the first week of

kindergarten, Han. T.’s action in kicking a girl in the stomach was “environmentally” Drew’s fault

because he had allegedly kicked the children in the past.

7 ¶ 18 An appellant’s brief should direct the other party and the reviewing court in detail to the

arguments made and the relief sought. In Treva’s first section requesting reversal of the trial court’s

ruling on extracurricular decision-making duties, we are unable to determine if she is arguing that

the trial court improperly failed to weigh a statutory factor (id. § 602.5); if the court failed to

consider some or all of the statutory factors (id.); or if the court’s factual findings were unsupported

by evidence. In the second section of Treva’s brief requesting reversal of the trial court’s decision

not to modify parenting time, she again generally asserts error and asks us to reverse. Whether the

trial court erred in its factual findings involving serious endangerment of the children cannot be

determined based upon her conclusory argument alone. Critically, Treva’s brief fails to cite to any

fact in the record, or any relevant caselaw, to support her blanket conclusion that the trial court’s

decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence, and thus, was contrary to the

manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 19 Although Treva copied portions of the trial court’s findings at the conclusion of the hearing,

the trial court’s written order, and the text of relevant statutes, this does not cure the failure of her

brief to include an argument containing her contentions and the reasons therefor, with citations of

the authorities and the pages of the record relied on. Treva did cite to the cases of In re Marriage

of Mayes, 2018 IL App (4th) 190149, and In re Marriage of Hipes, 2023 IL App (1st) 230953, but

failed to make any argument regarding how the facts in those cases are in any way analogous to

the facts in this case.

¶ 20 As the court stated in Marriage of Reicher, 2021 IL App (2d) 200454, ¶ 33: “This court is

not a repository into which a party may dump the burden of argument and research.” A court of

review is entitled to have issues on appeal clearly briefed and legal argument presented. Holmstrom

v. Kunis, 221 Ill. App. 3d 317, 325 (1991). The appellate court has no responsibility to search the

8 record and/or craft legal analysis to develop a party’s argument when an appellant has not made a

good-faith effort to comply with Illinois Supreme Court rules. Hall, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151,

¶ 15 (quoting In re Estate of Parker, 2011 IL App (1st) 102871, ¶ 47). We are cognizant that

forfeiture of arguments on appeal is a harsh sanction and “is appropriate only when the violations

of procedural rules hinder our review.” Id. (citing In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill. 2d 123, 132

(2005)). However, where the arguments of counsel contained in the brief are conclusory and fail

to cite applicable law, forfeiture of the arguments is circumstantially appropriate. Id.

¶ 21 “Generally, we presume that a trial court knows the law and follows it accordingly.” In re

Custody of G.L., 2017 IL App (1st) 163171, ¶ 43 (citing In re Alexander R., 377 Ill. App. 3d 553,

556 (2007)). Accordingly, because Treva has forfeited any argument that the trial court’s findings

were against the manifest weight of the evidence, we affirm.

¶ 22 Affirmed.