In re Marriage of Thomas

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 242491

SECOND DIVISION July 21, 2026

No. 1-24-2491

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

In re MARRIAGE OF ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of DARRYL THOMAS, ) Cook County, Illinois ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) No. 17 D 630062 and ) ) REGINA THOMAS, ) Honorable Bonita Coleman ) Judge Presiding Respondent-Appellant. ) ___________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices McBride and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 This is an appeal from a judgment of marital dissolution between Darryl and Regina

Thomas. Regina challenges the trial court’s allocation of marital property. The court allocated

half of Regina’s pension and half the equity in her home to Darryl. In our view, the court abused

its discretion in failing to properly consider that Regina is the sole provider and caregiver for

Regina’s and Darryl’s disabled adult son. We thus modify the distribution of property such that

Regina is allocated two-thirds of her pension and two-thirds of the equity in her home.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Darryl and Regina married on October 5, 1993. Each had a child that predated the

marriage, though Darryl’s did not reside with him. They had a child together before their No. 1-24-2491

marriage as well—Darryl Jr., whom they sometimes called “D.J.” and sometimes “Junior.”

(Regina calls him “Junior” on appeal, so we will, too.) Junior was born in 1992 with significant

heart and lung afflictions and developmental disabilities. As an adult, Junior remains unable to

live independently.

¶4 The parties lived together for 20 years until, in 2013, Darryl was incarcerated for 20

months on a domestic-battery conviction (not involving Regina). He was released in 2015, at

which time Regina and Darryl separated, though still married. So it helps to differentiate between

their first 20 years, from 1993 to 2013, when they were married and cohabitating, and the

remaining years up to the present, when they were separated.

¶5 I. 1993 to 2013

¶6 After their marriage in 1993, the parties lived together with Regina’s child and Junior in

the home of Darryl’s mother. In 2000 or 2001, they bought a home in Riverdale. The court found

that, over the first 20 years of marriage, each spouse contributed financially to the marriage and

to the care and needs of Junior and Regina’s child. Regina had a more traditional wage-earning

job with the Chicago Transit Authority (“CTA”), which among other things earned her a

pension. The trial court noted that Regina provided no evidence of her salary or earnings during

the marriage. (She retired in 2024 and receives a pension of $4,374 per month.)

¶7 Darryl, who appeared pro se, testified that his education was limited to a GED and he

“always worked” during the marriage or sought unemployment benefits when he was between

jobs (it appears he received benefits at various periods in 2002, 2007, and 2010). His jobs

included work as a cook, material handler, and forklift driver. Some were traditional W-2 wage-

earning jobs, others not; Darryl would sometimes seek day-labor work. Regina attempted to

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prove that Darryl was jailed more than once during this time for traffic-related offenses, but the

evidence was excluded for lack of foundation or on hearsay grounds.

¶8 Darryl had an extramarital affair during their marriage and fathered three children out of

wedlock. He has no relationship with those children but is obligated for child support.

¶9 Regina handled the finances. She filed for personal bankruptcy protection twice over

unpaid income taxes, once in 2006 and again in 2011. The testimony was vague on the

circumstances accompanying these bankruptcy filings. Though Regina blamed their financial

problems on Darryl, the trial court found that “Regina filed bankruptcy petitions individually

without explanation as to credible and specific factors that led to the bankruptcy and/or how

Darryl’s actions or inactions factored into the need to file for debtor’s relief.”

¶ 10 As noted, in 2013, Darryl was imprisoned for 20 months on a domestic-battery

conviction involving the mother of his out-of-wedlock children.

¶ 11 II. 2015 to Present

¶ 12 Darryl was released in 2015, but the parties had separated by then. Darryl moved in with

his sister. Darryl filed for divorce in 2017. Regina filed cross-petitions in 2018. The proceedings

moved slowly. Darryl moved back into the Riverdale home in 2019; he paid rent to Regina and

slept in the basement with his dog.

¶ 13 The Riverdale home was sold in 2022 or 2023. According to Regina, the sale price was

$103,000, the proceeds of which paid off a $90,000 mortgage. Regina testified that a $1,000 net

profit remained after associated fees and costs. Regina used the profit to pay for expenses

associated with moving out of a sold home.

¶ 14 Darryl claimed he did not know the house had been sold until he was suddenly ordered to

leave. He testified that Regina handled the entire transaction, from selecting a realtor through

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closing, without his knowledge; he testified that he has never seen the details of the transaction.

He claimed that Regina sold the house to a co-worker.

¶ 15 Regina testified that Darryl selected the realtor and knew full well that the house was

being sold. The trial court found that Regina testified “incredibly” on this point and likewise

noted that Regina presented no documentary evidence of the sale of the Riverdale home.

¶ 16 From September 2017 until June 2022, Darryl worked as a forklift operator for Gotham

Greens. He was then fired in a “mass layoff” and collected unemployment benefits. He worked

for Skyline Furniture as a fabricator—applying fabric to the wood furniture—until he was

injured on that job in June 2023. He received workers’ compensation benefits until he was

cleared for return to work, by which point the job was no longer open for him. But he testified

that he would be physically unable to perform that job, in any event.

¶ 17 Though he did not specify how he was injured, Darryl testified that he had a hip

replacement and “had to have [his] spine bone cut, and they put rods and screws in [his] spine

because [his] spine is pushed up against [his] nerve that goes all the way down [his] leg. So it’s

kind of impossible for [him] to work.” He receives shots for the pain from a doctor who has

recommended that a “monitor” be placed under his skin, but he is afraid of that procedure. He

testified that, if he walks more than a few hours, the pain is excruciating.

¶ 18 Regina bought a home in Matteson in 2023 and lives there with Junior. She owes about

$181,000 on the home, which is valued at approximately $205,000. She retired from the CTA in

2024. Darryl currently lives in Calumet Park in an apartment with monthly rent of $900.

¶ 19 Regina’s only disclosed income was her monthly CTA pension of $4,374. Her son Junior

receives $943 a month in SSI benefits. Darryl receives biweekly unemployment benefits of $421,

or a $915 monthly benefit. To make ends meet, Darryl sells his blood plasma.

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¶ 20 Regina incurred debt since the 2013 separation, about $15,000 in credit-card bills and

roughly $20,000 in federal income tax debt. The court found this debt to be personal to Regina,

who offered no evidence that any of this debt was incurred for the marital estate.

¶ 21 III. Closing Arguments

¶ 22 In closing, Darryl (self-represented) argued that he was being unfairly demonized. He

said that he did his best to provide income during the marriage and that, while he committed

adultery, neither spouse was faithful to the other during the marriage.

¶ 23 Regina (via counsel) stated that there was no point in seeking child support from Darryl,

as he would be unable to pay. Counsel argued for a “status quo” allocation, meaning Regina

keeps what is hers, and Darryl keeps what is his. He noted that Junior was disabled, was unable

to work, and brought in only $943 a month in Social Security disability income. Counsel said

“it’s not enough to support him and his needs” and that Darryl provides “no child support,” “no

money for his child.”

¶ 24 Counsel asked the court to balance “Regina’s positive contribution, her responsible

conduct as opposed to Darryl’s negative contribution, his irresponsible conduct.” Counsel further

argued that Darryl “isn’t entitled to support from my client. My client, give him money out of

her pension? She’s to support him? Anything that she has to give out of the pension will hurt the

household and *** the child as a result.”

¶ 25 IV. Court Ruling

¶ 26 The court ordered that the CTA pension be divided equally between Regina and Darryl.

The court further ordered that Darryl was entitled to half the equity in Regina’s current home.

Each party would take their own debt and keep their own cars (Regina, a 2017 Mercedes; Darryl,

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a 2005 Chevy Tahoe). The court ordered mediation on Darryl’s visitation with Junior. The court

denied maintenance to either party.

¶ 27 As noted, the court found that each spouse contributed to the marital estate during the

marriage. The court rejected Regina’s attempt to “demonize” Darryl “without credible evidence

connecting and showing the adverse impact on the value of the marital assets to Darryl’s

criminal conviction and incarceration, alleged domestic battery toward her and extramarital affair

resulting in the birth of children during the marriage.” The court emphasized its duty to divide

the marital estate “without regard to marital misconduct.” See 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2022).

¶ 28 The court found that Darryl consistently contributed to the marriage and family when

able. The court was skeptical that Regina fully disclosed her income, finding it hard to believe

that someone who received W-2 income would have such difficulty paying income taxes (though

no evidence was tendered and no finding was made as to what, if any, withholdings Regina

selected on her W-4 form while employed). This appeal followed.

¶ 29 ANALYSIS

¶ 30 Regina argues on appeal that the court erred in giving half her monthly pension to Darryl

and in not setting up a trust for Junior, their disabled adult son. Darryl, who appeared pro se in

the trial court, did not file a response brief. We took this case on the appellant’s brief only. And

we start by considering our jurisdiction, which we have a duty to address even if the parties do

not raise a challenge. People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2008).

¶ 31 I. Jurisdiction

¶ 32 The trial court signed and dated its final judgment on November 1, 2024. But for reasons

unclear to us, the order was not e-filed (that is, uploaded onto the circuit court clerk’s electronic

filing system) until November 6. Regina filed her notice of appeal on December 6, 2024.

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¶ 33 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) provides, in relevant part, that

“[t]he notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the

entry of the final judgment appealed from.” (Emphasis added.) That prompts the question of

when the court “entered” its judgment—on November 1, when it was signed and dated, or on

November 6, when it was filed with the clerk. If it was the latter, Regina’s notice of appeal was

timely. But if the order was “entered” on November 1, the notice of appeal was untimely, and we

must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d at 104; Secura Insurance Co.

v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 217 (2009).

¶ 34 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 272 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) answers the question. Titled “When

Judgment is Entered,” that rule reads, in pertinent part:

“If at the time of announcing final judgment the judge requires the submission of

a form of written judgment to be signed by the judge or if a circuit court rule requires the

prevailing party to submit a draft order, the clerk shall make a notation to that effect and

the judgment becomes final only when the signed judgment is filed.” Id.

¶ 35 At first blush, this rule might appear to apply only to situations where the court first

makes an oral ruling, followed later by a written order. Indeed, one of the principal reasons the

rule was adopted was to address confusion when an oral ruling is made on a different date than

the written judgment is signed, so parties did not have to guess about the timing of their appeal

rights. See Stoermer v. Edgar, 104 Ill. 2d 287, 293 (1984) (“Rule 272 was intended ‘to resolve

the difficulties which had arisen regarding the timeliness of an appeal where an oral

announcement of judgment from the bench antedated the entry of a written judgment order’

***.” (quoting West v. West, 76 Ill. 2d 226, 233 (1979))).

¶ 36 But our supreme court has now made clear that the overriding purpose of Rule 272 is “to

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establish a uniform date for determining when judgments are considered entered” and that “the

record date is the controlling date for the entry of all judgments.” People v. Perez, 2014 IL

115927, ¶ 17 (emphasis in original).

¶ 37 To put a finer point on it: “under Rule 272, the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal

begins to run when the written judgment order is ‘filed with the clerk of court.’ ” Id. ¶ 22

(quoting Granite City Lodge No. 272, Loyal Order of the Moose v. City of Granite City, 141 Ill.

2d 122, 126 (1990)).

¶ 38 So the fact that the court signed and dated the order on November 1, 2024, is of no

significance. The operative trigger is the date the signed order was filed with the circuit court

clerk. Here, that date was November 6, 2024. Regina filed her notice of appeal 30 days later, on

December 6, 2024. The notice of appeal was timely, and we have jurisdiction.

¶ 39 II. Allocation of Assets

¶ 40 Regina claims the trial court erred in allocating half her CTA pension to Darryl. She

argues that the court did not sufficiently account for the fact that she cares for Junior, their

dependent, disabled adult son. She also argues that the court erred in finding that each party

contributed to the marital estate. At a minimum, she says, the court should have created a trust

for Junior under state law.

¶ 41 To the extent the trial court made factual findings, we review them for manifest error.

In re Marriage of Romano, 2012 IL App (2d) 091339, ¶ 44. We will reverse those findings only

if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Id. We are likewise deferential to the court’s

allocation decisions. We will not reverse the court’s distribution of marital property “unless the

court clearly abused its discretion.” In re Marriage of DeRossett, 173 Ill. 2d 416, 422 (1996).

¶ 42 The gravamen of Regina’s argument is that she alone cares for Junior, and taking away

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half her pension hinders her ability to do so. She acknowledges that she can’t count on Darryl for

child support, but she argues that it should be Darryl, not her, who bears that brunt.

¶ 43 Section 503(d) of the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act provides several factors

to consider in dividing marital property. See 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2022). They include:

(1) each party’s contribution to the marital property;

(2) the dissipation by each party of the marital property;

(3) the value of the property assigned to each spouse;

(4) the duration of the marriage;

(5) the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse when the property is divided;

(6) any obligations and rights arising from a prior marriage;

(7) any prenuptial or postnuptial agreements;

(8) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,

employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties;

(9) the custodial provisions for any children;

(10) whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance;

(11) the income-generating potential of each spouse; and

(12) the tax consequences of the property division upon the respective economic

circumstances of the parties. Id.

¶ 44 The trial court considered each of these factors to the extent applicable. The court

rejected Regina’s claim that she contributed much more financially to the marriage than Darryl,

noting that she never showed how much money she earned with the CTA at any given time,

much less that it significantly exceeded Darryl’s contribution. And the trial court reasoned that

Darryl’s financial contributions and care for both Regina’s child and their child, Junior, over the

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20-year marriage allowed Regina to work full-time and earn a retirement pension that was

indisputably marital property.

¶ 45 Those findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Though Regina’s

government job provided more stable income, she never proved that she provided more income

than Darryl. And non-financial contributions obviously matter, too. The court correctly noted

that Darryl’s contributions to the care of the two resident children helped Regina work a full-

time job that has now given her this pension.

¶ 46 Armed with those facts, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Darryl

was entitled to some portion of the marital property—Regina’s CTA pension and the equity in

her home. The court could have reasonably determined that it would be inequitable to deny

Darryl any portion of the marital property.

¶ 47 But the court abused its discretion in the division it chose. We agree with Regina that the

court did not adequately account for the fact that Regina is the sole caregiver and financial

support for Junior, their adult disabled son. It is uncontested that Darryl has no means to provide

financially for Junior, leaving it all to Regina. As Regina’s counsel correctly noted, even if the

court ordered support from Darryl, he could not pay it.

¶ 48 To split the marital property equally but then place all the burden of care and support of a

disabled adult child on Regina, absolving Darryl of any responsibility, is a result we cannot

accept. Unlike most children, unfortunately, Junior will not grow up, so to speak; he will always

be dependent on someone else for care and support. That person, under the circuit court’s ruling,

will always be Regina, while Darryl walks away with half the marital property.

¶ 49 And because the record shows that Darryl cannot be counted on for financial support of

Junior, the equitable thing to do is to modify the division of property. Children, once they

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achieve majority status, do not typically factor into the division of property. But this case

presents the rather unique situation where three adults are affected by the distribution of marital

property, and Regina is responsible in all respects for two of the three. The division of property

should reflect that fact.

¶ 50 We have authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) to

“enter any judgment and make any order that ought to have been given or made,” including

modifying the trial court’s judgment. McGinley Partners, LLC v. Royalty Properties, LLC, 2021

IL App (1st) 200390, ¶ 56; Turner v. Firstar Bank, N.A., 363 Ill. App. 3d 1150, 1165 (2006);

Nemeth v. Banhalmi, 125 Ill. App. 3d 938, 972 (1984).

¶ 51 We thus modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect the following division of marital

property: Regina is entitled to two-thirds of her CTA pension and two-thirds of the equity in her

home, and Darryl is entitled to one-third of Regina’s CTA pension and one-third of the equity in

her home. The matter is remanded so the trial court may take whatever steps necessary, if any, to

enforce this modified judgment.

¶ 52 The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

¶ 53 Affirmed as modified and remanded.

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In re Marriage of Thomas, 2026 IL App (1st) 242491

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 17-D- 630062; the Hon. Bonita Coleman, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys David Gotzh, of Chicago, for appellant. for Appellant:

Attorneys No brief filed for appellee. for Appellee:

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