NOTICE 2020 IL App (5th) 190155-U NOTICE Decision filed 10/14/20. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-19-0155 Supreme Court Rule 23 and changed or corrected prior to may not be cited as precedent the filing of a Petition for by any party except in the Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT _______________________________________________________________________
In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of TANYA S. STORM, ) Bond County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) and ) No. 16-D-18 ) JOSHUA W. STORM, ) Honorable ) Ronald R. Slemer, Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Overstreet and Wharton concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the only marital asset equally between the parties.
¶2 In October 2017, the circuit court of Bond County entered a written judgment
dissolving the marriage of petitioner, Tanya S. Storm (n/k/a Tanya S. Kunkel), and
respondent, Joshua W. Storm. In January 2019, the court entered a supplemental judgment
resolving all remaining issues, including the division of marital property, debts and
attorney fees. Joshua appeals, arguing that the court erred in dividing the only marital asset,
Joshua’s workers’ compensation settlement, equally between the parties. We affirm.
1 ¶3 I. Background
¶4 This appeal follows three years of protracted and acrimonious dissolution of
marriage litigation. There were numerous disputes regarding the parties’ minor children
and various instances where each party sought, and was granted, an order of protection
against the other. To the extent possible, we limit our recitation of the facts to those
pertinent to the issue raised on appeal.
¶5 The parties were married on October 1, 2005, and established a marital home in
Montgomery County, Illinois. They have two minor children: T.N.S., who was born in
2004, and J.N.S., who was born in 2009. During the marriage, Joshua worked and provided
financial support for the family while Tanya cared for the parties’ minor children. Both
parties struggled with drug addiction throughout their marriage and filed for bankruptcy in
2008.
¶6 In 2012, Joshua sustained a work-related injury and filed a workers’ compensation
claim, which remained pending for several years. The claim was still pending when the
parties separated in November 2015. Tanya moved into her father’s residence in Bond
County, and Joshua remained at the marital residence in Montgomery County.
¶7 On February 23, 2016, while the workers’ compensation claim remained pending,
Tanya filed a petition to dissolve the parties’ marriage in Bond County. Tanya alleged that
irreconcilable differences had occurred between the parties, and that both parties were
currently unemployed. Joshua filed a hand-written, pro se answer to Tanya’s petition for
dissolution on March 23, 2016. Joshua alleged that he planned to hire an attorney and have
the divorce case moved to Montgomery County, where there was a pending order of
2 protection case against Tanya. Joshua also attached various filings and orders from the
order of protection case, which indicated that the Montgomery County circuit court had
awarded Joshua temporary custody of the parties’ minor children and established a
visitation schedule for Tanya.
¶8 On April 8, 2016, the Bond County circuit court entered a written order granting
Joshua a 30-day continuance to seek counsel. The court also incorporated into its order the
portions of the Montgomery County circuit court’s order relating to child custody and
visitation. The court subsequently granted the parties’ joint motion to continue the divorce
case until the order of protection case concluded in Montgomery County.
¶9 On June 29, 2016, the divorce case resumed in Bond County. Following a hearing
where both parties appeared with counsel, the circuit court entered a written order denying
Joshua’s motion to transfer the divorce case to Montgomery County. The court also ordered
the parties to participate in mediation to resolve any issues regarding their children.
¶ 10 On August 5, 2016, Tanya filed for, and was granted, an emergency order of
protection against Joshua in Bond County (16-OP-57). As a result, the circuit court
awarded Tanya temporary custody of the children pending further hearing. On the same
date, Tanya filed a petition for modification of temporary custody, maintenance and
support, as well as a petition for a home study. Tanya alleged that she was currently
unemployed but was seeking employment and that Joshua was employed but had provided
her no financial support since their separation.
¶ 11 On August 9, 2016, Tanya obtained part-time employment as a sales associate at
Goodwill in Litchfield, Illinois. The following day, the circuit court held a hearing on
3 Tanya’s petition regarding temporary matters. Tanya was present at the hearing with
counsel but neither Joshua nor his attorney appeared, and the matter was reset for hearing
on August 17, 2016.
¶ 12 On August 17, 2016, Joshua filed the following: a counterpetition for dissolution of
marriage; a counterpetition for temporary relief; an answer to Tanya’s petition for
dissolution; an answer to Tanya’s petition for modification of temporary custody,
maintenance and support; and a financial affidavit. In his filings, Joshua claimed that he
was employed by Illinois Asphalt and Paving, while Tanya remained unemployed despite
having the ability to work. Joshua also claimed that his gross monthly income was $2000.
¶ 13 The circuit court also held a hearing on August 17, 2016, and entered an order on
August 19, 2016; however, neither the transcript from the hearing nor the court’s order
have been included in the record on appeal. The court summarized the August 17, 2016,
hearing, as well as its rulings, when it addressed all remaining temporary matters in a
written order entered on September 19, 2016. The court specifically noted in the September
19, 2016, order that the hearing held on August 17, 2016, “centered around who was the
best parent and what was in the best interests of the children.” The court also noted that,
on August 19, 2016, it denied the plenary order of protection and ordered that “the custody
return to the status quo prior to the entry of the Order of Protection in Bond County.”
¶ 14 In addressing the remaining temporary matters in the September 19, 2016, order,
the circuit court found that the children had resided with Joshua before Tanya filed for the
order of protection (16-OP-57). The court also found that both parties had engaged in
extensive drug use and were involved “in a drug culture.” While the court recognized that
4 Tanya had admitted to her drug use and entered counseling, the court concluded that the
evidence was insufficient to show it was in the best interest of the children to modify
parenting time or to make any determinations concerning the financial issues.
¶ 15 The circuit court subsequently ordered the parties to attempt mediation and to
attempt to agree on a guardian ad litem (GAL). Shortly thereafter, Tanya filed a petition
for leave to appeal, which was denied by this court on October 25, 2016.
¶ 16 On November 6, 2016, Tanya was promoted to a “Team Leader” at Goodwill and
her employment increased to full time. As a result, Tanya received documents indicating
that she was eligible for insurance benefits beginning February 1, 2017, and would begin
accruing paid time off. Tanya’s annualized estimated earnings were $17,160.
¶ 17 On July 3, 2017, following months of disputes relating to the parties’ children, the
circuit court held a hearing on temporary matters. The court ruled that the parties would
alternate weekly visitation with the children during the summer, but that Tanya would have
“primary parenting responsibility concerning school” during the school year with Joshua
having “liberal visitation, including weekend visitation.” The court also ordered Joshua “to
undergo a drug/alcohol evaluation and comply with all recommended treatment,” and
Tanya to follow-up with her recommended counseling and treatment.
¶ 18 On July 27, 2017, Tanya filed an emergency ex parte motion to restrict Joshua’s
parenting time. Tanya alleged that Joshua had failed to complete the drug and alcohol
evaluation, and that Joshua’s attorney had been unable to contact him since the July 3,
2017, hearing. Tanya also alleged that she feared for the safety of her children because an
emergency order of protection had been issued against Joshua in Montgomery County (17-
5 OP-169) following an alleged altercation with his girlfriend. The circuit court entered an
order immediately terminating Joshua’s parenting time with the children, but shortly
thereafter, the court entered an order allowing Joshua to exercise supervised parenting time
with Tanya’s approval.
¶ 19 On October 6, 2017, the circuit court entered a written order dissolving the parties’
marriage. In the order, the court noted that Joshua had recently settled his workers’
compensation claim and the proceeds, once received, would not be disbursed from Joshua’s
attorney’s trust account. While the court’s order does not list the exact amount of the
settlement proceeds, the parties’ subsequent filings indicate that the claim was settled for
$35,887.37 but the remaining balance after the deduction of costs and attorney fees was
$28,392.47.
¶ 20 Over the course of the next year, the parties exchanged discovery and numerous
petitions, motions and orders were filed in the case. These filings include the following: a
petition to intervene filed by Lisa Madigan on behalf of the Illinois Department of
Healthcare and Family Services; an order granting the petition to intervene; a petition for
rule to show cause for indirect civil contempt and request for attorney fees filed by Tanya;
a motion for contribution of attorney fees and costs filed by Joshua; an amended motion
for contribution of attorney fees and costs filed by Joshua; and a temporary order granting
Joshua supervised visitation with the children.
¶ 21 A hearing on all remaining issues, including the division of the parties’ marital
property, debts and attorney fees, was set for November 21, 2018. Both parties filed
positions statements prior to the hearing. The parties agreed that Joshua’s workers’
6 compensation settlement, valued at $28,392.47, was marital property, and that the
settlement was the only marital asset. The parties further agreed that the main issue before
the circuit court was the division of the workers’ compensation settlement, which required
consideration the factors set forth in section 503(d) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act (Act). 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2018). After reviewing each statutory
factor in her position statement, Tanya claimed she was entitled to a larger portion of the
settlement because she had custody of, and provided all financial support for, the parties’
minor children. Joshua claimed that he was entitled to the entire settlement because he had
substantial debts and difficulties obtaining employment due to his work-related injury.
Joshua specifically argued that the entire settlement “should be allocated to his debt and
the priority of said debts should be an award of attorney fees and expenses to his attorney,
Monroe D. McWard, of approximately $24,500.00.” Joshua also prepared an updated
financial affidavit, dated November 20, 2018.
¶ 22 On November 21, 2018, the case proceeded to hearing on all remaining issues. The
parties briefly discussed Joshua’s updated financial affidavit before presenting evidence.
Joshua’s updated financial affidavit listed a net monthly income of $200 for part-time labor
and no monthly expenses. The affidavit listed numerous debts, totaling over $100,000.
Tanya did not prepare an updated financial statement, due to the parties’ “extremely simple
economic situation.” According to Tanya, Joshua’s updated financial affidavit
unnecessarily complicated the issues by listing decade-old debts. The parties stipulated to
the following: Tanya received custody of the children in July 2017; Joshua paid no child
support after July 2017; and Joshua had not completed counseling or treatment.
7 ¶ 23 Tanya testified to the following details at the hearing. She was currently employed
at Goodwill and had been employed there for the last two years. She worked approximately
30 hours per week at a rate of $10.50 per hour, and her net monthly income ranged from
$800 to $900. Tanya had no monthly rent or vehicle payments because she lived with her
father and used his vehicle for transportation. She did pay for gas, groceries and other
expenses relating to childcare. Tanya received state assistance, which included a medical
card for the children’s healthcare and roughly $150 per month for food. Joshua provided
no monetary support for the children and rarely appeared for his weekly supervised
visitation with the children. Tanya estimated that she incurred $30,000 in attorney fees
during the course of the dissolution proceedings. She had paid most of the attorney fees
with her father’s assistance but still owed $1000 to $2000. Tanya did not believe that her
father expected reimbursement.
¶ 24 Joshua then testified to the following details. He currently lived with his father in
Montgomery County, although it was a “tentative situation” with no lease agreement.
Joshua confirmed that his monthly income for part-time labor was approximately $200 and
that he had no monthly expenses. He had not been gainfully employed since 2017. He had
a “permanent 25 to 30[-]pound weight limit” restriction due to his work-related injury,
which made it difficult for him to find employment. When asked if he could perform “a
cash register job” at a gas station, Joshua replied, “[e]ven those types of applications once
you write down that you had a Workman’s [sic] Comp[ensation] claim and you’re on that
type of limit, you can barely carry a bag of ice.” Joshua claimed that he consistently looked
8 for work and submitted five job applications every week. He admitted that he did not have
a valid driver’s license or vehicle, which had hindered his efforts.
¶ 25 On cross-examination, Joshua admitted that he had worked for Illinois Paving in
2016 and earned a monthly income of $2000. Joshua drove a truck for Illinois Paving but
was laid off several months after obtaining the job. Joshua believed that he was unable to
obtain gainful employment due to his current condition but admitted that he had not filed
for Social Security disability benefits. When asked how he planned to support himself,
Joshua responded, “I’m not sure yet.”
¶ 26 Joshua also testified regarding the numerous debts listed in his updated financial
affidavit. On cross-examination, Joshua acknowledged that his previous financial
affidavits from August 2016 and October 2017 did not include most of the debts he listed
in his updated affidavit. It was also established that a majority of the debts listed in Joshua’s
updated affidavit had been discharged in bankruptcy, leaving the following: (1) a $4500
debt to Joshua’s uncle for loans received during the marriage; (2) a $24,423.25 debt to
Joshua’s attorney for his representation in the dissolution and order of protection
proceedings; (3) a $23,192.32 debt to Loan-Preferred Capital for a loan received after
Tanya filed for divorce; (4) a $3576 debt to Montgomery County for certain fees and costs
associated with various felony and misdemeanor cases brought against Joshua; and (5) a
$13,900 debt to the “Landers Trust” for a default judgment entered against Joshua. Joshua
admittedly received the $4500 loan from his uncle before filing for bankruptcy but did not
list the loan as a debt on the bankruptcy schedule. Joshua intended for his uncle and
attorney to be paid out of his workers’ compensation settlement and had signed agreements
9 to that effect. The circuit court clarified that Joshua’s attorney had been paid for the work
he performed in accruing the workers’ compensation settlement.
¶ 27 During closing arguments, Tanya’s counsel specifically addressed the factors
outlined in section 503(d) of the Act and initially requested that the circuit court award
Tanya 50% of the workers’ compensation settlement. In support, Tanya’s counsel noted
that Tanya had provided all of the financial support for the parties’ minor children since
July 2017. Tanya’s counsel then asked that the court award Tanya 75% of the settlement
to offset present and future unpaid child support. Joshua’s counsel requested that the court
award Joshua 86% of the settlement due to his substantial debts and inability to obtain
gainful employment.
¶ 28 Following closing arguments, the circuit court took the matter under advisement.
The court expressed that it would review the relevant caselaw prior to issuing a ruling.
¶ 29 On January 14, 2019, the circuit court entered a written order on the remaining
issues, finding, in pertinent part, as follows:
“The Court has had ample contact with the parties. It has considered their testimony and believability.
*** Drugs have been a problem in this relationship. Tanya has undergone an evaluation and treatment. Joshua has not and was placed on felony probation the Summer of 2018 on a drug charge in another county. The previous determination of parenting time remains in effect until Joshua undergoes an evaluation and treatment.
Neither party is solely responsible for the extended litigation and animosity. It causes them to lose track of the need their children have for two parents. It is hoped that Joshua will deal with his drug problems. Each party is responsible for their own attorney fees.
10 Joshua is unemployed. Tanya works at Goodwill. The parties have very little in personal property and are to keep what is in their possession. Neither party is seeking maintenance.
The parties have incurred debt. Joshua did not notify Tanya of one lawsuit and permitted a default judgment. Joshua also claims debts to an uncle. Each party is responsible for the debt, promissory notes, or judgments in their individual name. They are jointly and severally liable for any other joint debt.
The primary asset is Joshua’s work comp settlement. *** The settlement is clearly an asset and the only real asset of the marriage. The remainder is to be divided equally. However, the amount of $660 is to be deducted from Joshua’s portion as past child support.”
¶ 30 On January 16, 2019, Joshua filed a motion to reconsider and supporting
memorandum, arguing that the circuit court erred in awarding Tanya 50% of the workers’
compensation settlement. According to Joshua, the court abused its discretion by dividing
the workers’ compensation settlement without considering the following: the parties’
marital debts and assets; the pain and suffering Joshua suffered from the accident; Joshua’s
future physical disability; and Joshua’s difficulties with future employment.
¶ 31 On February 20, 2019, the circuit court entered a written order denying Joshua’s
motion to reconsider. In the written order, the court noted that it had considered all relevant
factors. The court specifically noted that it had considered the ages of both the parties and
their children, the parties’ respective employment opportunities, as well as Joshua’s lack
of believability in relation to all aspects of the case. The court found that “[t]his might be
the only opportunity for [Joshua] to provide any funds in light of his substance abuse and
felony conviction.”
¶ 32 On February 27, 2019, Joshua filed a second motion to reconsider, arguing that the
circuit court erred in awarding Tanya 50% of the workers’ compensation settlement. On
11 March 1, 2019, Tanya filed a motion to strike and request for sanctions, arguing that
Joshua’s second motion to reconsider merely restated his first motion to reconsider. Tanya
also argued that there was no statutory or common law basis for Joshua to file the second
motion, and that he was attempting to delay the proceedings to harass her into settling for
less than half of his workers’ compensation settlement. Also, on March 1, 2019, Tanya
filed a motion to compel and request for sanctions, arguing that Joshua’s attorney had not
responded to her demands for the funds the court awarded Tanya in its January 14, 2019,
order. Tanya’s motion also alleged that the funds were being held in Joshua’s attorney’s
trust account.
¶ 33 The circuit court denied Joshua’s second motion to reconsider by docket entry on
March 4, 2019. On March 22, 2019, Joshua filed a motion for approval of security and to
stay enforcement of judgment pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 305 (eff. July 1,
2017).
¶ 34 On April 10, 2019, the circuit court held a hearing on Tanya’s motion to compel and
request for sanctions and entered a written order granting Joshua’s motion for approval of
security and to stay enforcement of judgment. The court, without addressing whether
Joshua’s notice of appeal would “be timely filed,” ordered that Joshua, or his attorney,
“shall cause” a notice of appeal to be filed on or before April 17, 2019. The court also
ordered that Joshua’s attorney transfer the funds from Joshua’s workers’ compensation
settlement, which were previously awarded to Tanya on January 14, 2019, from the trust
account to a separate account. The court further ordered that Joshua’s attorney immediately
transfer the segregated funds to Tanya if Joshua or his attorney failed to file a notice of
12 appeal by April 17, 2019. Lastly, the court denied Tanya’s motion to compel and request
for sanctions.
¶ 35 On April 16, 2019, Joshua filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court’s January
14, 2019, order, which “divided [Joshua’s] Workers’ Compensation award in half.”
¶ 36 II. Analysis
¶ 37 Although neither party raises the issue, we must first consider whether we have
jurisdiction to decide this appeal. See Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance
Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009) (“A reviewing court must ascertain its jurisdiction before
proceeding in a cause of action, regardless of whether either party has raised the issue.”).
Specifically, we must determine whether Joshua filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 38 It is well settled that “[t]he timely filing of a notice of appeal is both jurisdictional
and mandatory.” Id. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) provides in
pertinent part:
“The notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days
after the entry of the final judgment appealed from, or, if a timely posttrial motion
directed against the judgment is filed, whether in a jury or a nonjury case, within 30
days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion
directed against that judgment or order, irrespective of whether the circuit court had
entered a series of final orders that were modified pursuant to postjudgment
motions. A judgment or order is not final and appealable while a Rule 137 claim
remains pending unless the court enters a finding pursuant to Rule 304(a).”
13 “No request for reconsideration of a ruling on a postjudgment motion will toll the running
of the time within which a notice of appeal must be filed under this rule.” Ill. S. Ct. R.
303(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 39 Section 2-1203(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) provides that a party in a
nonjury case may file a postjudgment motion within 30 days after the entry of the
challenged judgment or within such further time the court grants within the 30 days or any
extensions therefore. 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2018). A postjudgment motion is “a
motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the
judgment or for other relief.” Id. Each party may make only one postjudgment motion
directed at a judgment that is otherwise final. Ill. S. Ct. R. 274 (eff. Jan. 1, 2006).
¶ 40 Motions for sanctions brought pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 “must
be filed within 30 days of the entry of final judgment, or if a timely post-judgment motion
is filed, within 30 days of the ruling on the post-judgment motion.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 137(b)
(eff. July 1, 2013). Unlike postjudgment motions, “Rule 137 motions deal with the
propriety of filings in the underlying action” and “are claims in the underlying litigation
***.” John G. Phillips & Associates v. Brown, 197 Ill. 2d 337, 342 (2001). Our supreme
court has reasoned that “a notice of appeal need not be filed until after the disposition of a
motion for sanctions” because “a notice of appeal may not be filed until after the [circuit]
court has finally disposed of all claims.” Id.
¶ 41 Here, the circuit court entered the order awarding each party 50% of the workers’
compensation settlement on January 14, 2019, and Joshua filed a postjudgment motion to
reconsider on January 16, 2019. Joshua’s motion was filed within 30 days of the court’s
14 January 14, 2019, order and, thus, was timely filed under section 2-1203(a) of the Code.
Joshua’s timely filed postjudgment motion tolled the time for filing the notice of appeal to
this court under Rule 303(a)(1). The court entered an order denying Joshua’s postjudgment
motion to reconsider on February 20, 2019, thereby resetting the 30-day time period for
filing a notice of appeal to this court. Joshua filed a second postjudgment motion to
reconsider on February 27, 2019. Joshua’s second postjudgment, although filed within 30
days of the court’s February 20, 2019, order, was impermissible under Rule 274 and did
not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal under Rule 303(a)(2). However, Tanya filed
two separate motions requesting sanctions on March 1, 2019. Tanya’s motions were filed
within 30 days of the circuit court’s February 20, 2019, order and, thus, were timely filed
under Rule 137. Because Tanya’s Rule 137 claims remained pending, the court’s January
14, 2019, order was not yet final and appealable under Rule 303(a)(1). In other words,
Joshua could not file a proper notice of appeal until the court disposed of Tanya’s Rule 137
motions. See John G. Phillips & Associates, 197 Ill. 2d at 342 (reasoning that “a notice of
appeal need not be filed until after the disposition of a motion for sanctions” because such
motion is a claim and “a notice of appeal may not be filed until after the [circuit] court has
finally disposed of all claims”).
¶ 42 The circuit court denied Joshua’s second postjudgment motion to reconsider by
docket entry on March 4, 2019. Although not entirely clear, the record indicates that the
court disposed of Tanya’s motion to strike and request for sanctions when it denied
Joshua’s second postjudgment on March 4, 2019. Tanya’s motion to compel and request
for sanctions remained pending when Joshua filed his motion for approval of security and
15 to stay enforcement of judgment on March 22, 2019. A docket entry from April 10, 2019,
indicates that the court allowed Joshua’s motion to set security and, in doing so, impliedly
denied Tanya’s motion to compel payment and request for sanctions on April 10, 2019. On
April 16, 2019, Joshua filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court’s January 14, 2019,
order. Because Joshua filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the court’s April 10, 2019,
order disposing of Tanya’s motion to compel payment and request for sanctions, Joshua’s
notice of appeal was timely filed. Thus, this court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal
and we now turn to the merits.
¶ 43 The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in dividing the only
marital asset—Joshua’s workers’ compensation settlement valued at $28,392.47—equally
between the parties. Joshua asserts that the court’s award of 50% of the settlement to Tanya
was both an abuse of discretion and against the manifest weight of the evidence. Joshua
also maintains that the court failed to consider the relevant factors set forth in section
503(d) of the Act, along with the evidence of his unemployment and significant debts. We
disagree.
¶ 44 A reviewing court will uphold a circuit court’s division of marital property absent a
clear abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Stone, 155 Ill. App. 3d 62, 72 (1987). A court
abuses its discretion where “no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the
[circuit] court.” In re Marriage of Heroy, 385 Ill. App. 3d 640, 651 (2008). Where a court’s
division of marital property is based on factual findings, a reviewing court will not reverse
the court’s decision unless the court’s findings are against the manifest weight of the
evidence. In re Marriage of Vancura, 356 Ill. App. 3d 200, 205 (2005). A factual finding
16 is against the manifest weight of the evidence where “ ‘the opposite conclusion is clearly
evident or where the court’s findings are unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on any of
the evidence.’ ” Heroy, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 663 (quoting In re Marriage of Matchen, 372
Ill. App. 3d 937, 946 (2007)).
¶ 45 Pursuant to section 503(d) of the Act, a circuit court “shall divide the marital
property without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions considering all relevant
factors, including”: (1) the parties’ respective contributions to the acquisition, preservation,
or increase or decrease in value of the marital or nonmarital property; (2) the dissipation of
marital property by either party; (3) the value of the property assigned to each party; (4) the
duration of the parties’ marriage; (5) the relevant economic circumstances of each party;
(6) the parties’ respective obligations from prior marriages; (7) any prenuptial or
postnuptial agreements between the parties; (8) each party’s age, health, occupation,
amount, and sources of income, employability, job skills, liabilities, and needs; (9) the
custodial provisions for the parties’ children; (10) whether the apportionment is in lieu of
or in addition to maintenance; (11) the reasonable opportunity of each party for future
earning or income; and (12) the tax consequences of the property division. 750 ILCS
5/503(d) (West 2018); see also In re Marriage of Faber, 2016 IL App (2d) 131083, ¶ 41.
¶ 46 Here, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding each
party 50% of the workers’ compensation settlement. Contrary to Joshua’s assertion, the
record demonstrates that the circuit court considered the relevant section 503(d) factors in
dividing the marital property. The statutory factors were discussed at length in the parties’
respective position statements filed shortly before the hearing. The parties also discussed
17 the relevant factors during closing arguments at the hearing. While the court did not
specifically reference the section 503(d) factors in its January 14, 2019, order, the court
clearly considered the economic circumstances of each party in its order. Moreover, the
court expressly stated that it considered the factors in its February 20, 2019, order denying
Joshua’s first motion to reconsider. Thus, we reject Joshua’s assertion that the court failed
to consider the relevant section 503(d) factors.
¶ 47 After carefully reviewing the record, we also cannot say that the circuit court abused
its discretion in equally dividing the parties’ marital property. It was undisputed that the
parties owned no real estate and had little personal property. The parties’ only marital asset
of value was the workers’ compensation settlement. The evidence showed that Tanya had
provided all financial support for the children after she was awarded custody in 2017. The
court considered the employment status of each party, noting that Tanya was employed at
Goodwill and Joshua was unemployed. While Joshua testified regarding his numerous
debts and his difficulties in obtaining future employment due to his work-related injury,
the court did not find him credible. The record provides ample support for the court’s
credibility determination. The court further considered the proffered evidence relating to
the parties’ liabilities, including the debts and attorney fees incurred by each party. After
considering the evidence, the court ordered that the parties were equally responsible for
any joint debts; however, each party was responsible for their individual debts and attorney
fees. In light of the foregoing, we cannot say that no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the court.
18 ¶ 48 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court properly considered the relevant factors
and evidence in dividing the only marital asset equally between the parties. Thus, we
cannot say that the court abused its discretion in awarding each party 50% of Joshua’s
workers’ compensation settlement.
¶ 49 III. Conclusion
¶ 50 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Bond
County.
¶ 51 Affirmed.