2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U Nos. 2-24-0390 & 2-24-0440, cons. Order filed December 24, 2024
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re MARRIAGE OF S.F., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Lake County. Petitioner-Appellee and ) Cross-Appellant, ) ) and ) Nos. 20-D-905 ) 23-OP-2596 ) S.G.S., ) ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant and ) Rhonda K. Bruno, Cross-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Kennedy and Justice Mullen concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Regarding respondent’s appeal, the allocation of parenting time and responsibilities would not be disturbed where respondent failed to establish that the trial court improperly excluded or withheld evidence or that the trial court’s ultimate determination was erroneous; respondent’s challenge to the dissolution judgment dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction; regarding petitioner’s cross-appeal, allocation judgment remanded for modification to reflect the statutory requirement that a hearing be held prior to any change to the restrictions on respondent’s parenting time.
¶2 On July 13, 2020, petitioner, S.F., filed a petition for the dissolution of his marriage to
respondent, S.G.S.. On July 16, 2024, the trial court entered two orders: a dissolution judgment 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
and an allocation of parental responsibilities and parenting plan judgment. Respondent filed a
notice of appeal and petitioner filed a notice of cross-appeal from those orders. We affirm in part,
remand for modification in part, and dismiss in part.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 As this case has been pending for over four years, a complete recitation of the facts would
be lengthy. We thus limit our recitation to those facts relevant to our disposition of this appeal and
include additional facts in the analysis section as needed to address the parties’ specific arguments.
The parties were married in 2007 and had two children: R.S., born in 2008, and A.S., born in 2017.
In July 2020, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. In December 2021, the trial
court granted respondent’s motion to appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL). In September 2022, the
trial court appointed Dr. David Finn to conduct an evaluation pursuant to section 604.10(b) of the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/604.10(b) (West 2020)).
¶5 On October 6, 2022, the parties entered an agreed order providing that respondent would
vacate the marital home within five days, petitioner would have exclusive possession of the home,
and that the parties would have equal parenting time with A.S., as R.S. was then in residential
treatment for mental health issues.
¶6 On December 13, 2022, petitioner filed an emergency petition to compel residential
treatment, for restricted parenting time with both children, and other relief. Petitioner alleged that
R.S., at the direction of respondent, made a false disclosure of sexual abuse against him while she
was in residential treatment and respondent then tried to get an order of protection against him.
The abuse was reported to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) but
determined to be unfounded and the order of protection was denied. Petitioner alleged that
-2- 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
respondent was engaging in a course of conduct to alienate R.S. from petitioner and exclude him
from treatment decisions as to R.S..
¶7 A hearing on the petition commenced the same day. The GAL testified that she viewed
R.S.’s advocacy center interview where R.S. made allegations of sexual abuse. The GAL did not
believe R.S. was being truthful because she kept saying the same thing over and over and did not
provide any details of the alleged abuse. The GAL also testified that respondent had once asked
her what circumstances would warrant supervised visitation and the GAL told her that it was
warranted in cases of serious endangerment, such as when a parent is a drug addict or a child
molester. Due to that conversation, the GAL had concerns that the sexual abuse allegations were
prompted by respondent as a litigation strategy.
¶8 The GAL also testified that a treatment facility, where R.S. was attending a daily outpatient
program, reached out to the GAL because respondent told them that petitioner was under a no-
contact court order and the facility wanted a copy of the court order. Once respondent realized
that the GAL was having contact with that facility, respondent stopped sending R.S. there for
treatment. After R.S. missed two days of treatment, the GAL sent an email saying that R.S. should
resume treatment as there was a previous court order that required the parties to follow the
treatment recommended by the professionals and, after missing a third day, R.S. would get kicked
out of the program. R.S. did not show up for the third day and was kicked out of the program.
The GAL testified that the decision to take R.S. out of the treatment program was not in R.S.’s
best interest. R.S. had also attended eight different treatment facilities in the last eight months,
and had not attended school since May 2022, and these circumstances were also not in her best
interest. The GAL believed that respondent could make better decisions as to what was in the best
interest of R.S.
-3- 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
¶9 Respondent testified that R.S. was, in terms of parenting time, solely under respondent’s
care. She stopped sending R.S. to school because she was being bullied. Respondent denied that
she stopped sending R.S. to the treatment facility because the facility was communicating with
petitioner and the GAL, and denied telling anyone that there was a no-contact order with petitioner.
Respondent also denied coaching R.S. into saying that she was sexually abused by petitioner.
¶ 10 Following argument, the trial court found the GAL credible and respondent not credible.
Nonetheless, the trial court stated that it was hesitant to remove respondent’s parenting time for
fear that it would be detrimental to R.S.’s mental stability, which was the utmost concern. The
trial court was still deeply concerned about respondent’s manipulation, false information, and bad-
mouthing of petitioner. The trial court was troubled that R.S. had been in eight different treatment
facilities. The trial court believed that respondent was putting her anger and frustration with
petitioner ahead of R.S.’s medical needs. The trial court stated that there was reasonable evidence
to infer that respondent coached R.S. to make the sexual abuse allegations. The trial court found
that respondent did not always act in R.S.’s best interest. The trial court also found that
respondent’s behavior, interaction, and medical decisions regarding R.S. seriously endangered
R.S.’s mental health and emotional development. The trial court granted all medical decision-
making responsibility to petitioner.
¶ 11 On November 17, 2023, the parties appeared for status of Dr. Finn’s report, which was
provided only to the court and counsel, but not directly to the parties. Based on that report, which
is not included in the record on appeal, petitioner filed an emergency petition for order of
protection and to terminate respondent’s parenting time. The trial court admitted Dr. Finn’s report
into evidence and heard testimony from him. Dr. Finn testified that respondent posed a substantial
-4- 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
and serious danger to the children and that he planned to make a report to DCFS. He summarized
his findings as follows:
“[M]y findings in this case in summary are that [R.S.’s] allegations of sexual abuse
are not plausible. That her [allegations] have been influenced if not supported and
validated by her mother talking about dreams and God that she had and [R.S.] has been
kept in a perpetual state of distress in which her distress is being used as proof of this
alleged sexual abuse almost ten years from the time she was four years old with nobody
hearing, seeing, experiencing anything related to this sexual or alleged sexual abuse or it
even coming up until after an order had been entered allowing for the reunification therapy
with her father.
The allegations were investigated by DCFS. That was the second DCFS report.
The allegations were unfounded. There was no police investigation and, again, when I
spoke to [R.S.] she told me that the statement from her mother which [R.S.] certainly uses
as confirmation that this alleged decade long abuse was occurring.”
Dr. Finn further testified that, to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, R.S. and A.S.
were seriously endangered by contact with respondent. He opined that contact with respondent
should be limited. Dr. Finn opined that it was in the children’s best interests for petitioner to have
sole parental and medical decision-making authority. Dr. Finn noted that R.S.’s medical condition
had deteriorated over the last year while in the sole care of respondent despite having access to
appropriate medical care.
¶ 12 Dr. Finn further testified that he had concerns about A.S., because A.S. was also starting
to make sexualized references related to time with petitioner and respondent had made reference
-5- 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
to A.S. taking naked showers with petitioner. When asked to discuss his opinion as to respondent
and Munchausen syndrome by proxy (MSBP), Dr. Finn stated:
“So [respondent] has contributed to this constellation of symptoms with [R.S.]
without any basis. And in doing so, you know, really has kind of, you know, placed this
illness on [R.S.] that [R.S.] does not have. I believe that there is some secondary gain for
[respondent].
I think it has to do with her anger at [petitioner]. I think it has to do with her
possibly feeling more confident that she’s the only person who could take care of [R.S.].
That contributes to the problem because [R.S.] has to be sick in order for [respondent] to
have somebody to take care of, which I think is the reason that it’s unlike people who are
truly traumatized who figure out how to best deal with that trauma and move on.
[R.S.] is kept in this perpetual state of illness, again, without any clear basis for her
being ill other than, you know, these kind of, you know, vague statements about dad being
an alcoholic, dad being a narcissist, so the allegations did not start with sexual abuse. They
raised to a level of sexual abuse whether coincidentally or not after the Court entered an
order for [R.S.] and [A.S.] to begin [reunification therapy].”
¶ 13 Respondent testified that she did not coach R.S. into making a false claim of sexual abuse
and denied telling R.S. that she had dreams about R.S.’s sexual abuse. She also disagreed with
Dr. Finn’s testimony that R.S.’s mental health was declining.
¶ 14 Following argument, the trial court entered a lengthy oral ruling and a subsequent written
order. The trial court found that respondent engaged in conduct that seriously endangered the
children’s physical, moral, and emotional health and negatively impacted their emotional
development. The trial court granted petitioner all parenting time and sole decision-making
-6- 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
authority for the children. The parties’ attorneys were prohibited from disseminating Dr. Finn’s
report to their clients—it was limited to court, counsel, and to treatment providers if deemed
necessary by the GAL. The trial court allowed respondent to send the children short cards or
letters, which were to be sent to the children’s therapist for review and delivery if the letters were
appropriate. Based on Dr. Finn’s recommendation, the trial court required respondent to enroll in
therapy with Dr. Chinni Chilamkurti (Dr. Chinni) for a minimum of 26 sessions after which
respondent “would submit to a limited scope update of Dr. Finn’s evaluation to determine if any
type of parenting time, beginning with therapeutic reunification, is recommended as being in the
best interest of the children.”
¶ 15 The trial court also granted petitioner’s emergency petition for order of protection and
subsequently entered a two-year plenary order of protection. Respondent filed a notice of appeal
from the two-year plenary order of protection, which was docketed in this court as case No. 2-24-
0390.
¶ 16 On January 23, 2024, the parties entered an agreed order providing that any documents
produced by Dr. Finn pursuant to a subpoena would be given to the GAL and then disseminated
by her pursuant to court order; the documents were not to be shared with the parties or the children.
On February 13, 2024, respondent filed a motion to compel Dr. Finn to comply with her subpoena.
She argued that she needed the requested documentation for her own expert, Dr. Jack Joseph, and
without it she was prejudiced in preparing her case.
¶ 17 On March 19, 2024, discovery closed pursuant to a May 2023 order setting that as the date
as the deadline. On that same date, the trial court granted the motion to withdraw of respondent’s
sixth attorney but admonished the parties that the trial date, set almost a year earlier as May 13,
2024, would not be changed.
-7- 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
¶ 18 Thereafter, a seventh attorney filed an appearance on behalf of respondent. Respondent
filed a motion to continue trial, to compel Dr. Finn to comply with her subpoenas, and for the
appointment of Dr. Joseph to perform a parenting evaluation pursuant to section 604.10(c) of the
Act (id. § 604.10(c)). She also filed a motion to reopen discovery and for leave to issue subpoenas
to all the children’s various mental health professionals who were treating them. She also filed
leave of court to cross-examine Dr. Finn about a section 604.10(b) report Dr. Finn wrote in an
unrelated case, alleging that, under similar facts where there were false allegations of sexual abuse,
Dr. Finn recommended that the parties have joint parenting.
¶ 19 Respondent’s motions were argued at a hearing on April 24, 2024. A transcript of the
hearing is not included in the record on appeal. In a written order, the trial court denied the
motions. The trial court noted that respondent was responsible for many delays in this case—Dr.
Finn’s report was delayed due to the voluminous information provided by respondent and
respondent caused delays by repeatedly changing attorneys during the case. The trial court
observed that respondent had not started the therapy required by the November 2023 order that
would allow her to seek some level of parenting time, which showed that respondent will not
adhere to court orders that are in the best interest of the children. The trial court also noted that
the GAL stated that: R.S. was doing well with petitioner; for the first time in a year and a half R.S.
was not in a hospitalization program but was attending school and seeing a therapist once a week;
and that it was not in the children’s best interest to participate in another 604.10 evaluation. The
trial court granted respondent’s motion to allow cross-examination of Dr. Finn with a 604.10(b)
evaluation he did in another case, as long as any identifying information was redacted. The trial
court denied the motions to continue trial, extend discovery deadlines, subpoena mental health
professionals, and appoint a 604.10(c) evaluator on the basis that it was not in the best interest of
-8- 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
the children because they needed finality regarding school and parenting schedules. The trial court
found that respondent’s failure to attend therapy to regain parenting time, and her desire to subject
them to more 604.10 interviews, showed “a complete lack of interest in [the children’s] welfare.”
¶ 20 At the end of April, respondent filed more motions, which the trial court denied. As
relevant here, the trial court denied respondent’s motion for leave to amend her Rule 213(f)
disclosures, “as coming eight days prior to trial and no previous disclosure of said witness,
including [Rule] 213(f)(3) witness, Dr. Joseph, who has been known to [respondent] since January
2024 and not disclosed. The deadlines for [respondent’s] witness disclosures have passed.”
¶ 21 Three days before trial, respondent filed a motion alleging that some of the mental health
and school professionals she subpoenaed for trial stated that they would not appear, and requesting
leave for them to appear and testify at trial. The trial court denied the motion, explaining that
“neither R.S. or [petitioner] will execute releases,” that the subpoenas did not conform “with the
requirements of 740 ILCS 10/110 in form and language,” and were not “accompanied by a court
order permitting testimony.” The trial court also denied respondent’s request for R.S. to testify at
trial, finding that it would be “seriously detrimental to the mental and psychological health of the
minor child.”
¶ 22 A trial on the petition for dissolution was held over seven days beginning on May 13, 2024,
and ending with closing argument on June 4, 2024. On July 16, 2024, the trial court entered a 15-
page judgment for dissolution and a 36-page judgment addressing the allocation of parental
responsibilities and a parenting plan. In the dissolution judgment, the trial court addressed
property distribution, child support, childcare costs and expenses, health insurance, and
contribution to attorney fees.
-9- 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
¶ 23 In the allocation judgment, the trial noted that it heard testimony from the parties, the GAL,
Dr. Finn, James Jones of DCFS, and various other witnesses called by both sides. The trial court
essentially found the GAL, Jones, petitioner, and Dr. Finn to be credible, and that respondent was
not credible. The trial court also noted that, after trial but prior to its ruling, respondent’s attorney
withdrew and respondent filed an appearance pro se.
¶ 24 The trial court found that respondent had coached R.S. to make the allegations of sexual
abuse that started in September 2022. The trial court noted that Jones testified that he told the
GAL that he believed respondent was coaching R.S. to make the sexual abuse allegations. The
GAL testified that a treatment provider, from one of the partial hospitalization programs attended
by R.S., also felt respondent was coaching R.S. to make the allegations. The GAL also testified
that she believed respondent schemed up the allegation of sexual abuse after a conversation where
respondent asked her what would be necessary for petitioner to only be allowed supervised visits.
The GAL did not believe the sexual abuse allegations because R.S. stated that the rape happened
millions of times, including times when she had no contact with petitioner and was exclusively
with respondent, and because R.S. was unable to explain what rape means. Dr. Finn also testified
that he did not believe the abuse occurred.
¶ 25 The trial court noted that in September 2022, after it entered an order requiring
reunification therapy between R.S. and petitioner, R.S. attempted suicide and was hospitalized.
The trial court outlined the series of residential treatment programs and partial hospitalization
programs that R.S. participated in from September 2022 until January 2024. The trial court noted
that a letter from one of R.S.’s most recent therapists, who treated R.S. weekly, indicated that R.S.
had not reported any physical, sexual, emotional or mental abuse since moving in with petitioner.
- 10 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
¶ 26 Parenting time was allocated entirely to petitioner, pending respondent’s compliance with
the November 2023 order to attend 26 therapy sessions with Dr. Chinni. The trial court noted that
respondent testified at trial that she would not attend therapy with Dr. Chinni because she does not
have MSBP. The trial court found that parenting restrictions were necessary, stating that:
“Dr. Finn testified that [respondent] fit the criteria *** for [MSBP] by keeping R.S. in a
perpetual state of illness when there was no empirical evidence to support the allegations
of sexual abuse. Dr. Finn discussed in detail, in his 33-page report, how [respondent]
seriously endangered both children, encouraging R.S. to believe she had been sexually
abused, keeping her in perpetual distress and by bribing A.S. with toys and telling him to
be careful around his father, not keep secrets from [respondent] and R.S. and telling A.S.
he ‘would go to hell’ if he went to India [with petitioner]. Dr. Finn testified that
[respondent] made R.S. watch videos, for hours, of [petitioner] drinking in the basement
of the marital home and telling R.S. [petitioner] was an alcoholic.”
The trial court also stated that respondent “repeatedly made poor decisions regarding R.S.’s care,
including lying to [one treatment facility] that [petitioner] had a no contact order in place.” The
trial court concluded that respondent continued to seriously endanger both children’s emotional
well-being and should not have any decision-making responsibilities of any kind. The trial court
stated that respondent “shall have no parenting time of any kind until she complies with the [trial
court’s November 2023 order] which requires her to attend 26 sessions with Dr. Chinni. Once she
has done so, the parties may agree on a parenting schedule or return to Court.” The trial court set
forth a parenting schedule to take effect when respondent’s parenting time resumed.
¶ 27 Respondent filed a timely notice of appeal from this order and petitioner filed a timely
notice of cross-appeal. This appeal was docketed in this court as appeal No. 2-24-0440. On August
- 11 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
27, 2024, this court granted respondent’s pro se motion to consolidate this case with appeal No. 2-
24-0390 and ordered that appeal No. 2-24-0440 would be the lead case.
¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 29 On appeal, respondent argues that, with respect to the dissolution judgment, the trial court
erred in setting child support. With respect to the allocation judgment, respondent argues that the
trial court erred in barring relevant evidence, withholding evidence, relying on an improper
diagnosis of MSBP, and in setting parenting restrictions. On cross-appeal, petitioner argues that,
in the allocation judgment, the trial court erred to the extent that it did not require a hearing prior
to respondent resuming parenting time.
¶ 30 A. Jurisdiction
¶ 31 “A reviewing court must ascertain its jurisdiction before proceeding in a cause of action,
regardless of whether either party has raised the issue.” Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers
Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009). “An order is final and appealable if it terminates the
litigation between the parties on the merits or disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the
entire controversy or a separate part thereof.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage
of Gutman, 232 Ill. 2d 145, 151 (2008). Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8,
2016):
“[i]f multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal may
be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims
only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for
delaying either enforcement or appeal or both.”
“[A] ‘claim’ is any right, liability or matter raised in an action.” Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant
Church of Hinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 465 (1990). “Absent a Rule 304(a) finding, a final order
- 12 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
disposing of fewer than all of the claims is not an appealable order and does not become appealable
until all of the claims have been resolved.” Gutman, 232 Ill. 2d at 151. There are limited
exceptions to this rule. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 304 (b) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) (allowing for the appeal of
certain specified judgments without 304(a) findings). As relevant here, Rule 304(b)(6) allows for
the immediate appeal from any “custody or allocation of parental responsibilities judgment or
modification of such judgment entered pursuant to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act [citation] or Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 [citation].” Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(6) (eff.
Mar. 8, 2016).
¶ 32 In the present case, at the time the parties filed their notices of appeal, various petitions and
a motion remained pending. These matters were outlined in an order dated July 23, 2024.
Specifically, on July 12, 2024, respondent filed numerous petitions for rule to show cause and a
motion to amend errors on financial calculations and documents. On July 3, 2024, petitioner filed
a petition for rule to show cause regarding temporary child support and respondent filed a motion
to dismiss that petition. In addition, there were three petitions for attorney fees and costs filed by
various counsel that had represented respondent. The July 23 order set these petitions and motion
for hearing in September 2024, but there is no indication in the record that the trial court ever ruled
on these matters.
¶ 33 As these matters remain unresolved, the July 2024 dissolution judgment does not constitute
a final, appealable order until the outstanding issues are decided or the trial court issues a Rule
304(a) finding. See Gutman, 232 Ill. 2d at 151. We thus lack jurisdiction to address the sole issue
raised on appeal that pertains to the dissolution judgment—respondent’s contention that the trial
court erred in its child support determination. However, under Rule 304(b)(6), the July 2024
allocation of parental responsibilities and parenting plan judgment is immediately appealable
- 13 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
without the need for a Rule 304(a) finding. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to address the other
arguments raised by respondent on appeal, as well as the issue presented in petitioner’s cross-
appeal, all of which challenge the allocation judgment.
¶ 34 B. Respondent’s Appeal
¶ 35 1. Evidentiary Rulings
¶ 36 Respondent’s first contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in barring relevant
evidence. Specifically, she contends that the trial court erred in not allowing her expert witness,
Dr. Joseph, to testify; wrongly quashing her subpoena for several of R.S.’s treating therapists;
limiting her cross-examination of Dr. Finn; and excluding relevant medical records. The trial
court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Miller, 2015
IL App (2d) 140530, ¶ 32. Abuse of discretion is the most deferential standard of review, next to
no review at all. People v. Weeks, 2011 IL App (1st) 100395, ¶ 30. An abuse of discretion occurs
where the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person
would agree with the position taken by the trial court. Control Solutions, LLC v. Elecsys, 2014 IL
App (2d) 120251, ¶ 38.
¶ 37 a. Dr. Joseph
¶ 38 Respondent argues that the trial court erred in denying her April 2024 motion to amend her
Rule 213(f) witness disclosures (see Ill. S. Ct. Rule 213(f) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018)) and thus barring
testimony from her expert witness, Dr. Joseph. Supreme Court Rule 213 requires a party—upon
request—to identify their witnesses at trial and provide information about the witness’s anticipated
testimony. Ill. S. Ct. R. 213(f) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018). Rule 219(c) authorizes a trial court to prescribe
sanctions, including barring witnesses and exhibits, when a party fails to comply with the trial
court’s orders regarding discovery. Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(c) (eff. July 1, 2002). That determination is
- 14 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
guided by consideration of six factors. These are: (1) the surprise to the adverse party; (2) the
prejudicial effect of the testimony; (3) the nature of the testimony; (4) the diligence of the adverse
party; (5) the timely objection to the testimony; and (6) the good faith of the party calling the
witness. Sullivan v. Edward Hospital, 209 Ill. 2d 100, 110 (2004) (referred to as the Sullivan
factors). “No single factor is determinative, as each case presents a unique factual situation which
must be taken into consideration when determining whether a particular sanction is proper.” Li
Jun Huang as Next Friend of Zhaung v. Uribe, 2020 IL App (1st) 192037, ¶ 44.
¶ 39 Respondent acknowledges that Dr. Joseph was precluded from testifying because she did
not make a timely disclosure of him as an expert witness, but argues that the application of the six
Sullivan factors compel the conclusion that the trial court erred in excluding Dr. Joseph’s
testimony. We disagree. The trial court found that respondent hired Dr. Joseph in January 2024,
yet did not move to disclose him as an expert witness until four months later, which was a month
after discovery closed and about two weeks before trial started—a trial date that had been set a
year prior. The trial court also found that allowing such a late disclosure would be prejudicial to
petitioner as he would have insufficient time to prepare for Dr. Joseph’s testimony. Additionally,
the trial court noted that Dr. Joseph’s testimony would have limited value because, while he did
review Dr. Finn’s report, he did not speak to petitioner or the children. The record demonstrates
that the trial court gave thoughtful consideration to respondent’s request for a late witness
disclosure and we cannot say its determination was an abuse of discretion. Miller, 2015 IL App
(2d) 140530, ¶ 32.
¶ 40 Respondent argues that the first Sullivan factor weighs in her favor because there was no
surprise to petitioner as opposing counsel knew of her intention to call Dr. Joseph as an expert
witness since January 2024, because of a written motion she filed. However, the portion of the
- 15 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
record cited by respondent relates to a different witness she moved to disclose late—her therapist,
Dr. Kohut. Respondent also does not provide a citation to the record for her written motion. The
written motion respondent refers to could be her December 2023 motion to release Dr. Finn’s
report, wherein she stated that she had the right to call an expert, or her February 13, 2024, motion
to compel Dr. Finn to comply with her subpoena, wherein she stated that she needed the requested
documentation for her own expert, Dr. Joseph. However, the statements buried in these motions
cannot serve as a Rule 213(f) witness disclosure, which required her to identify the subject matter
of the testimony, the expert’s conclusions and opinions along with their supporting bases, the
expert’s qualifications, and any reports prepared by the expert regarding the case. See Ill. S. Ct.
Rule 213(f)(3).
¶ 41 Respondent also argues that the third Sullivan factor weighs in her favor because Dr. Joseph
could have testified that she did not have MSBP. This argument is unpersuasive as the trial court’s
allocation judgment was not based on a diagnosis of MSBP. Rather, it was based on a finding that
respondent engaged in behavior that seriously endangered the children’s emotional and physical
well-being, such as perpetuating false claims of sexual abuse against petitioner, trying to damage
the relationship between petitioner and the children, and making poor decisions as to R.S.’s
healthcare. Accordingly, even if Dr. Joseph was able to testify that respondent did not suffer from
MSBP, the third Sullivan factor would still not weigh in her favor.
¶ 42 Respondent contends that the fourth Sullivan factor, diligence of the adverse party, weighs
in her favor because Dr. Finn did not provide the necessary information for Dr. Joseph to complete
his evaluation and render a report. However, as noted by the trial court, Dr. Finn’s compliance
with subpoenas, and Dr. Joseph’s alleged inability to complete a report, does not provide a reason
for respondent’s failure to timely disclose Dr. Joseph as an expert witness. Respondent has thus
- 16 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
failed to establish any error in the trial court’s order barring her late disclosure of Dr. Joseph as an
expert witness.
¶ 43 Respondent argues that Besco v. Henslee, Monek, & Henslee, 297 Ill. App. 3d 778 (1998),
supports a conclusion that the trial court erred in barring Dr. Joseph’s testimony. That case is
distinguishable from the present case on its facts. In Besco, both parties were responsible for
numerous delays in the discovery process, no trial date had been set, the parties were in the early
stages of discovery, and the expert testimony at issue was critical to the case. Id. at 783. Here,
the trial date had been set a year prior, respondent was solely responsible for not disclosing Dr.
Joseph sooner, and Dr. Joseph’s testimony would have limited value because he never spoke to
petitioner or the children.
¶ 44 b. Mental Health and School-Related Professionals
¶ 45 Respondent’s next contention is that the trial court erred in quashing her subpoenas for
several therapists and school related professionals to testify at trial. Respondent contends that
these professionals could have undermined Dr. Finn’s testimony and argues that the trial court’s
reason for quashing the subpoenas—that R.S.’s mental health was not at issue—was error.
Respondent fails to cite the pages of the record that identify the subpoenas she is arguing about or
the trial court’s alleged order quashing those subpoenas. Further, she fails to cite any authority to
support her contention that R.S.’s mental health was at issue. Illinois Supreme Court Rule
341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) requires an appellant’s brief to contain argument supported by
citations of relevant authority and the pages of the record relied on. Failure to provide such
citations in support of an argument forfeits the argument for review. In re Estate of Feinberg,
2014 IL App (1st) 112219, ¶ 29 (argument forfeited for failure to cite relevant pages in the record);
- 17 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
Kic v. Bianucci, 2011 IL App (1st) 100622, ¶ 23 (argument forfeited for failure to cite relevant
authority). Accordingly, this argument is forfeited.
¶ 46 Even absent forfeiture, respondent’s argument is without merit. The record indicates that,
on May 10, 2024, after the professionals refused to comply with the subpoenas, respondent filed a
motion for the court to compel her subpoenaed professionals to testify at trial. The trial court
denied that motion because the subpoenas were not in compliance with section 10 of the Mental
Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/10 (West 2022)), which
required that certain language be included in the subpoenas, and that the subpoenas include either
a court order authorizing the subpoena or written consent of the person whose records were being
sought. The trial court explained that the subpoenas did not have the requisite language, did not
include a court order, and that R.S. and petitioner refused to sign the required releases. As such,
her subpoenas were not quashed; instead, they were found to be legally improper.
¶ 47 c. Limiting Cross-Examination of Dr. Finn
¶ 48 Respondent next argues that the trial court erred in not allowing her to cross-examine Dr.
Finn as to a section 604.10(b) report he authored in another unrelated case. Respondent has failed
to provide citation to the relevant pages of the record in support of her argument and it is thus
forfeited. Feinberg, 2014 IL App (1st) 112219, ¶ 29. We would also find the argument forfeited
because respondent failed to cite any relevant authority. Kic, 2011 IL App (1st) 100622, ¶ 23.
Where an appellant has failed to support his or her arguments with citations to authority, this court
will not research the issues on the appellant’s behalf. See id. (noting that this court is not a
depository in which the appellant may dump the burden of argument and research). Here, at trial
on May 15, 2024, the trial court asked respondent whether she could provide any authority to
support the use and disclosure of Dr. Finn’s report in another unrelated case in light of the
- 18 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
requirement of section 604.10(b) (750 ILCS 5/604.10(b) (West 2022)) that such reports be limited
to the court and the attorneys in the particular case for which such a report is written. Respondent
did not provide any authority for that proposition at trial or on appeal.
¶ 49 The only authority respondent cites on appeal is for the proposition that an expert witness
is subject to cross-examination to discredit his testimony even if “such examination must
incidentally raise another matter.” See People v. Charleston, 132 Ill. App. 3d 769, 776 (1985).
That case involved cross-examination of an expert witness regarding a testing error made in a prior
unrelated case. Id. However, that case also points out that matters of impeachment are within the
trial court’s discretion. Id. Here, the trial court’s decision to bar cross-examination related to Dr.
Finn’s examination and conclusions in an unrelated case was not an abuse of discretion. At issue
in this case was the best interests of the children and our supreme court has stated that “[a]
determination of the best interests of the child cannot be reduced to a simple bright-line test, but
rather must be made on a case-by-case basis, depending, to a great extent, upon the circumstances
of each case.” In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316, 326 (1988). Accordingly, conclusions
Dr. Finn reached in another unrelated custody case, with its own unique circumstances, are not
applicable in the present case and respondent has thus failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
¶ 50 In so ruling, respondent argues a finding of error is supported by the fact that the trial court,
prior to trial, indicated that the use of Dr. Finn’s report from a different case would be allowed.
However, it is well settled that a trial court has the power to change its interlocutory rulings.
People v. Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶ 31.
¶ 51 d. Medical Records
¶ 52 Respondent argues that the trial court erred in excluding medical records that could have
demonstrated that R.S.’s mental health problems were the result of being bullied at school and not
- 19 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
because of respondent’s influence or behavior. The pages of the record cited show that the trial
court excluded the subject medical records because respondent did not have a medical professional
that could provide testimony about the meaning of the medical records and the trial court would
not allow respondent, as a lay person and not a medical professional, to testify as to the meaning
of the medical records. Respondent has failed to city any authority or develop any argument to
show that this ruling was an abuse of discretion and the argument is thus forfeited. Kic, 2011 IL
App (1st) 100622, ¶ 23.
¶ 53 2. Reliance on Improper Diagnosis
¶ 54 Respondent next argues that the trial court erred in relying on Dr. Finn’s opinion that
respondent suffered from MSBP and that this error was the reason for the trial court’s requirement
that she attend 26 therapy sessions prior to resuming parental visitation. The record refutes this
contention. Dr. Finn did not medically diagnose respondent with MSBP. Rather, he testified that
respondent’s behaviors were merely consistent with that disorder. When asked whether he would
diagnose respondent with that disorder, he responded only: “If I was diagnosing I would.” He also
testified that the reason for noting the possibility of MSBP was only to provide a possible
explanation for respondent’s behavior with respect to her parenting decisions.
¶ 55 Moreover, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Dr. Finn did diagnose respondent
with MSBP, the record shows that the trial court’s parenting allocation was not based on that
diagnosis. Rather, it was based on respondent’s harmful behavior, which included damaging
petitioner’s relationship with the children, perpetuating false allegations of sexual abuse and
alcoholism, and making poor decisions regarding R.S.’s health care. Further, the trial court found
that respondent seriously endangered her children in December 2022, which was a year before Dr.
- 20 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
Finn even issued his report. The record demonstrates that the requirement for respondent to attend
therapy prior to resuming parenting time was not based on a diagnosis of MSBP.
¶ 56 3. Withholding of Evidence
¶ 57 Respondent’s next contention is that the trial court erred in not allowing her to view Dr.
Finn’s report after trial when her attorney withdrew and she filed a pro se appearance. This
argument is without merit. The record shows that Dr. Finn’s report was only distributed to the
court and counsel based on the requirements of section 604.10(b) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/604.10(b)
(West 2022)) (requiring evaluator to send written report to parties’ counsel and to the court), and
on Dr. Finn’s recommendation that, to protect the safety of the children, it not be distributed to the
parties. In July 2024, after the trial court granted respondent’s counsel’s motion to withdraw and
respondent filed a pro se appearance, respondent filed a motion to obtain a copy of Dr. Finn’s
report because, as she was representing herself, she argued she was entitled to see it. In her
appellant brief, respondent states that her motion was “to no avail.” However, there is no
indication in the record that the trial court ever ruled on that motion. Where a party fails to request
a ruling on a motion, it is presumed that the motion was abandoned. Jackson v. Alvarez, 358 Ill.
App. 3d 555, 563 (2005). A party cannot appeal an issue raised by motion where the motion was
not ruled upon. See People v. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d 376, 414 (1986) (“Because the defendant did not
obtain a ruling on the question, he cannot now complain that the court erred.”). Moreover, to the
extent that there was a ruling on the motion and respondent has simply failed to cite the relevant
portion of the record, or include the ruling on the motion in the record on appeal, the argument is
forfeited. Feinberg, 2014 IL App (1st) 112219, ¶ 29 (failure to cite to the record forfeits an issue);
Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391 (1984) (“From the very nature of an appeal it is evident
that the court of review must have before it the record to review in order to determine whether
- 21 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
there was the error claimed by the appellant.”) Accordingly, the present issue is either not
appealable or forfeited.
¶ 58 4. Parental Allocation
¶ 59 Respondent’s final contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in restricting her
parenting time and parental responsibilities. Under the Act, the trial court must consider the
children’s best interests in allocating parenting time and parental responsibilities. 750 ILCS
5/602.5, 602.7 (West 2022). Section 603.10 governs restrictions on parenting time. Id. § 603.10.
Restricting parenting time under section 603.10 is a two-step process. In re Marriage of Mayes,
2018 IL App (4th) 180149, ¶ 58. First, the trial court must make a factual determination that the
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the parent’s conduct seriously endangered the
child’s mental, moral, or physical health or significantly impaired the child’s emotional
development. Id.; 750 ILCS 5/603.10(a) (West 2020). On appeal, we consider whether the court’s
finding of serious endangerment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mayes, 2018 IL
App (4th) 180149, ¶ 59. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence when, upon
review of the entire record, the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Id.
¶ 60 Next, if the trial court finds that a parent’s conduct seriously endangered his or her child,
then the court must determine what restrictions are necessary to protect the child. Mayes, 2018 IL
App (4th) 180149, ¶ 58; 750 ILCS 5/603.10(a) (West 2020). Among other restrictions, the court
may order “a reduction, elimination, or other adjustment of the parent’s decision-making
responsibilities or parenting time, or both”; may “[restrain] a parent’s communication with or
proximity to the other parent or the child”; and may “[require] a parent to complete a treatment
program.” 750 ILCS 5/603.10(a)(1), (4), (8) (West 2020).
- 22 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
¶ 61 We review the trial court’s determination that certain restrictions are necessary for an abuse
of discretion. Mayes, 2018 IL App (4th) 180149, ¶ 61. A trial court abuses its discretion when
the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would
take the view adopted by the trial court. In re Marriage of Dea, 2020 IL App (1st) 190234, ¶ 18.
Decisions adjudicating parenting issues are entitled to a “strong and compelling presumption” in
favor of validity “because [the trial court] is in a superior position to evaluate the evidence and
determine the best interests of the child.” In re Marriage of Agers, 2013 IL App (5th) 120375,
¶ 25.
¶ 62 In the present case, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding of serious endangerment
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Petitioner filed for dissolution in 2020 and the
record shows that the parties continued to live in dysfunction under one roof for quite a period of
time. Two years later, R.S. started to have mental health issues and shortly thereafter made false
allegations of sexual abuse against petitioner. The trial court found credible evidence from the
GAL, DCFS investigator, and Dr. Finn that respondent had perpetuated R.S.’s false allegations of
sexual abuse against petitioner. Dr. Finn also testified that respondent was beginning to perpetuate
false allegations of a sexual nature from A.S. against petitioner. The record also shows that
respondent told the children lies about petitioner, lied to R.S.’s treatment providers, and made
decisions regarding R.S.’s healthcare that were not in R.S.’s best interest. Dr. Finn noted that,
despite receiving appropriate medical treatment, R.S.’s condition continued to deteriorate while in
respondent’s care. However, since the children were placed in the sole care of petitioner, the
evidence indicates that R.S.’s condition was improving, she was attending school and weekly
therapy, and she had not been hospitalized.
- 23 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
¶ 63 Additionally, we cannot say that the parenting restrictions imposed on respondent were an
abuse of discretion. The restrictions placed on respondent’s parenting time are appropriate
restrictions under the plain language of section 603.10 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/603.10(a)(1), (4),
(8) (West 2022)), which allows for an elimination of parenting time and decision-making
responsibilities, restricting communication, and requiring a parent to complete a treatment program
such as attending therapy. Section 603.10 also allows for any other restrictions that protect the
safety and welfare of the child, such as limiting respondent’s access to the children’s medical
information. See id. § 603.10(a)(9). These restrictions were supported by the testimony of the
GAL and Dr. Finn.
¶ 64 Respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding petitioner’s testimony
credible, and in finding R.S. credible when she made statements adverse to respondent but
incredible when she made statements against petitioner. The trial court is in the best position to
evaluate the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses. Staes & Scallan, P.C. v. Orlich, 2012 IL App
(1st) 112974, ¶ 35. We give great deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations, and we
will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Id.; see also In re Estate of Lambrecht,
375 Ill. App. 3d 865, 871 (2007) (the trier of fact is in a position superior to a court of review to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, to judge their credibility, and to determine
the weight their testimony should receive). Here, upon our own review of the record, we hold that
there is no reason to depart from the trial court’s credibility determinations. Further, the testimony
of Dr. Finn and the GAL supported the trial court’s conclusion that R.S.’s allegations, that she was
sexually abused by her father, were untrue and were instead the result of respondent’s manipulation
of her impressionable young child.
- 24 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
¶ 65 Respondent also asserts that there was no evidence to support a determination that her
behavior seriously endangered R.S.’s mental health because the evidence showed that R.S. was
receiving mental health treatment before the issue of sexual abuse was ever mentioned and that
R.S. was being bullied at school. This argument is without merit. The petition for dissolution was
filed in 2020 and R.S.’s mental health issues first appeared in 2021. Dr. Finn testified that he was
aware that there was some reference to R.S. being bullied at school. However, he opined that,
based on his evaluation, R.S.’s distress was due to the divorce, the parties contentious relationship,
and respondent’s conduct in perpetuating false claims of sexual abuse and alcoholism and in
alienating the children from petitioner. Based on the testimony of Dr. Finn and the GAL, there
was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination that respondent’s conduct
seriously endangered R.S.’s mental and emotional well-being.
¶ 66 Finally, respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring her to attend
26 therapy sessions with Dr. Chinni and never explained why a different therapist could not satisfy
the court. Respondent notes that even the GAL recommended that respondent see Dr. Chinni “or
someone who has been approved and has the same qualifications as a Dr. Chinni.” Respondent
states that she should be allowed to resume parenting time as she has been in weekly therapy with
her own therapist for three years. In so arguing, respondent fails to cite any authority for the
proposition that the trial court erred in requiring her to see a specific therapist and the argument is
thus forfeited. Kic, 2011 IL App (1st) 100622, ¶ 23. Forfeiture aside, the trial court’s order for
respondent to attend therapy sessions with Dr. Chinni was entered in November 2023. Since that
time, respondent has not attended the therapy sessions and never moved to amend that order or
request that the trial court identify a different therapist. As noted above, section 603.10(a)(8) states
- 25 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
that the trial court may require a parent to complete a treatment program. 750 ILCS 5/603.10(a)(8)
(West 2022). Thus, respondent has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
¶ 67 C. Petitioner’s Cross-Appeal
¶ 68 On cross-appeal, petitioner argues that paragraph 2.5 of the allocation judgment must be
modified to conform to the requirements of section 603.10(b) of the Act. Paragraph 2.5 of the
allocation judgment states that:
“Beginning the summer of 2025, and assuming [respondent] complies with the Court’s
November 17, 2023[,] order and her parenting time has resumed, each parent shall have
three (3) weeks of vacation parenting time. If [respondent] has not complied with the
Court’s November 17, 2023[,] order, she shall not have any summer vacation or parenting
time.”
Section 603.10(b) of the Act provides, in relevant part:
“The court may modify an order restricting parental responsibilities if, after a hearing, the
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a modification is in the child’s best
interests based on (i) a change of circumstances that occurred after the entry of an order
restricting parental responsibilities; or (ii) conduct of which the court was previously
unaware that seriously endangers the child.” Id.
Petitioner argues that, even if respondent completes the required therapy sessions set forth in the
November 2023 order, the Act requires the trial court to hold a hearing before respondent can
resume her visitation.
¶ 69 To address petitioner’s argument, we must engage in statutory construction. The primary
objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.
State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 56. The most reliable indicator
- 26 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id.
Statutory construction is a question of law, subject to de novo review. In re Marriage of Harms
& Parker, 2018 IL App (5th) 160472, ¶ 24.
¶ 70 Under the plain language of section 603.10(b) of the Act, the trial court must hold a hearing
before it may modify an order restricting parental responsibilities. In this case, the November
2023 order and the July 2024 allocation judgment clearly restricted respondent’s parenting time.
The trial court’s November 17, 2023, order requiring respondent to attend therapy, stated that
“[a]fter a minimum of 26 sessions with Dr. Chinni, Respondent should submit to a limited scope
update of Dr. Finn’s evaluation to determine if any type of parenting time, beginning with
therapeutic reunification, is recommended as being in the best interest of the children.” This order
clearly contemplated further proceedings after the 26 therapy sessions were completed and did not
allow visitation to resume automatically.
¶ 71 However, the allocation judgment did not necessarily contemplate further proceedings.
While petitioner relies on paragraph 2.5, we will utilize paragraph 2.1 to demonstrate the point. In
paragraph 2.1 of the allocation judgment, the trial court stated that respondent “shall have no
parenting time of any kind until she complies with the Court’s November 17, 2023[,] order ***
which requires her to attend 26 sessions with Dr. Chinni. Once she has done so, the parties may
agree on a parenting schedule or return to Court.” This language allows the parties to reach an
agreement for respondent’s parenting time to resume. This conflicts with the requirement of
section 603.10(b) that, before parental restrictions can be modified, a hearing must be held. 750
ILCS 5/603.10(b) (West 2020); see also In re E.F., 2014 IL App (3d) 130814, ¶ 45 (trial court
must comply with statutory hearing requirements). Moreover, in granting parenting time, the trial
court must act in the children’s best interests (750 ILCS 5/602.5, 602.7 (West 2020)) and it is well
- 27 - 2024 IL App (2d) 240440-U
settled that a party cannot bargain away his or her children’s best interests (see, e.g., In re Marriage
of Case, 351 Ill. App. 3d 907, 912 (2004) (“parents may create an enforceable agreement for
modification of child support only by petitioning the court for support modification and then
establishing, to the court’s satisfaction, the parties’ agreement is in accordance with the children’s
best interests”)). Accordingly, we remand for modification of the allocation judgment to clarify
that, even after respondent completes the requisite 26 therapy sessions with Dr. Chinni, there must
be compliance with the hearing requirements of section 603.10(b) of the Act before any
modification to respondent’s parenting restrictions.
¶ 72 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 73 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed in part
and remanded in part, and the appeal is dismissed part.
¶ 74 Affirmed in part; dismissed in part; cause remanded.
- 28 -