In re Marriage of Ryali

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 17, 2026
• Docket: 3-25-0057
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2026 IL App (3d) 250057-U

Order filed June 17, 2026

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit, MADHAVI ELLORA RYALI, ) Du Page County, Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-25-0057 and ) Circuit No. 17-D-1074 ) SUNIT SINGLA, ) ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant. ) James F. McCluskey, ) Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Anderson and Peterson concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: (1) The trial court’s modification of parental responsibilities and parenting time was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. (2) The trial court did not err in restricting Sunit’s parenting time. (3) The trial court’s denial of the Petition for Rule to Show Cause relating to Sunit’s parenting time was not an abuse of discretion. (4) The trial court’s rulings regarding the admission of recordings were not an abuse of discretion.

¶2 The petitioner, Madhavi Ellora Ryali, filed a Petition to Modify Parenting Agreement and

Allocation Judgment and a Petition for Rule to Show Cause. In the Petition for Rule to Show Cause, she alleged that the respondent, Sunit Singla, failed to abide by the terms of the Allocation

Judgment. Sunit filed a Motion for Make-Up Parenting Time, Attorney’s Fees and Costs, and

Other Relief, and a Petition for Rule to Show Cause, alleging that Madhavi failed to provide him

with parenting time. Madhavi then filed a Petition to Modify Allocation Judgment and Other

Relief, requesting that she be allowed to enroll the minor child, L.S., in a private school. The trial

court granted Madhavi’s Petition to Modify Parenting Agreement and Allocation Judgment,

ordering that Madhavi have all decision-making and parenting time and that Sunit have no

parenting time. The trial court also granted Madhavi’s Petition to Modify Allocation Judgment and

Other Relief and allowed Madhavi to enroll L.S. in private school. The trial court denied Sunit’s

Petition for Rule to Show Cause. On appeal, Sunit argues that the trial court erred in granting

Madhavi sole decision-making authority for the children; ordering no parenting time for Sunit;

allowing Madhavi to enroll L.S. in private school; and denying Sunit’s request to find Madhavi in

indirect civil contempt for failing to provide him with parenting time. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Madhavi and Sunit are parents of two minor children: namely, R.S. and L.S. The allocation

of parental responsibilities and parenting time for the children was reduced to writing in a detailed

Parenting Agreement and Allocation Judgment entered on March 13, 2018. The parties’ marriage

was dissolved pursuant to an agreed Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage entered on March 19,

2018. The Allocation Judgment granted Madhavi final decision-making authority related to

medical and extracurricular activities and designated her address as the children’s residential

address for school enrollment purposes. The Allocation Judgment also provided that regular

parenting time be divided, with Madhavi having four days per week and Sunit having three days

2 per week during the school year. The parties were awarded an equal parenting schedule during the

summer months.

¶5 On September 22, 2022, Madhavi filed an Emergency Petition for Order of Protection

against Sunit, which was granted. The Emergency Order of Protection named Madhavi and the

children as protected parties. The Emergency Order provided that Sunit was to have no parenting

time with the children; listed Madhavi’s residence, employer, and the children’s school as

protected locations; prevented Sunit from contacting Madhavi or the children; and awarded

physical possession of the children to Madhavi.

¶6 On September 6, 2022, Madhavi filed a Petition to Modify Parenting Agreement and

Parenting Plan. Madhavi requested an order requiring Sunit to attend parenting counseling;

granting her sole decision-making authority for the children; and designating her as the sole

residential parent. Madhavi also filed a Petition for Rule to Show Cause, requesting that Sunit be

held in indirect civil contempt for his alleged violations of the Allocation Judgment relating to the

administration of medication to the children, cancelling the babysitter during his parenting time,

disparaging Madhavi to the children, making long calls to the children on school nights, and

refusing to allow Madhavi telephone access to the children during his periods of parenting time.

¶7 On September 22, 2022, the trial court entered an order appointing Dr. Mark Goldstein to

conduct an investigation and evaluation pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/604.10(b) in the order of

protection case. The trial court specifically instructed that the investigation provide information

and recommendations to assist the court in determining the necessity for restrictions of Sunit’s

parenting time.

3 ¶8 On January 4, 2023, Dr. Goldstein issued an interim report, recommending that Sunit begin

parenting time with the children, but that it be limited to one lunch or dinner for up to two hours

per week, to take place at a public restaurant, without Madhavi’s presence.

¶9 The Emergency Order of Protection was extended various times during the pendency of the

proceedings. On February 6, 2023, it was extended again, but was modified to allow parenting

time for Sunit and contact between the parties for parenting time exchanges. Sunit’s parenting time

was limited to one lunch or dinner for up to two hours per week, to take place at a public restaurant,

with exchanges to occur at the DuPage Family Center. A Guardian ad Litem (GAL)was also

appointed on that date.

¶ 10 On February 20, 2023, Dr. Goldstein issued his complete child custody evaluation report.

Dr. Goldstein recommended a step-up schedule for Sunit’s parenting time, ultimately leading to

one dinner per week and alternate weekends from Friday after school until Monday morning; an

alternating holiday schedule; vacation parenting time; joint decision-making authority for the

children’s medical care; continuing enrollment of the children in their current schools; permitting

the children to choose their own activities; and daily contact between the children and the other

parent. The recommendation also included that Sunit enroll in individual therapy with a focus on

anger management, and that his parenting time be contingent on his participation in individual

therapy. Finally, Dr. Goldstein recommended continuation of the children’s current therapy and

reunification therapy for Sunit and the children.

¶ 11 On April 17, 2023, Madhavi voluntarily dismissed the Petition for Order of Protection, and

the GAL provided the trial court with her initial report. Based on that report, the parties agreed to

follow the GAL’s recommendations, which included increasing Sunit’s parenting time to four

hours per week in a public place.

4 ¶ 12 On May 16, 2023, Sunit filed a Motion for Makeup Parenting Time, Attorneys’ Fees and

Costs, and Other Relief, requesting an immediate return to the schedule set forth in the Allocation

Judgment. He also requested make-up parenting time from the date the Order of Protection was

entered and fees and costs associated with Dr. Goldstein and the GAL.

¶ 13 On June 12, 2023, Sunit’s parenting time was increased to every other weekend for four

hours on Saturday and four hours on Sunday and alternating weekday dinner for up to three hours.

Sunit was also granted daily phone contact with the children. Additionally, a reunification therapist

was appointed for Sunit and the children.

¶ 14 The GAL issued an updated recommendation on July 28, 2023. Among her recommendations

was slow, incremental increases in Sunit’s parenting time. She opined this schedule was in the best

interests of the children. The GAL issued another updated written recommendation on October 2,

2023, again recommending slow, incremental increases in Sunit’s parenting time. In accordance

with these recommendations, Sunit’s parenting time was increased and he was ordered to enroll

and participate in cognitive behavioral therapy. The GAL subsequently gave an oral report to the

trial court, recommending that Sunit’s parenting time be limited per the prior order increasing his

time to four hours per week.

¶ 15 On February 5, 2024, Madhavi filed an Emergency Petition to Modify Parenting Time and

Other Relief, seeking to reduce Sunit’s parenting time. The trial court did not grant the Emergency

Petition, but set it for hearing. On February 15, 2024, Madhavi filed an Amended Petition to

Modify Parenting Agreement and Allocation Judgment.

¶ 16 The matter proceeded to trial on the pending petitions on March 15, 2024, and continued for

four additional days thereafter. We recount the trial testimony necessary to address the issues

raised on appeal.

5 ¶ 17 The GAL testified regarding her investigation and her three written reports. The GAL

testified consistently with her reports and provided the trial court with her recommendations. She

interviewed the parties, the children, the children’s therapists, a social worker, and the court-

ordered reunification therapist. She also reviewed Dr. Goldstein’s child custody evaluation report.

The GAL provided several examples of Sunit’s anger toward the children, including swearing at

R.S. when R.S. declined to attend her grandfather’s funeral; punching a wall, breaking a light

switch/plate, and turning over a hamper full of clothes in front of the children; and screaming and

using profanity, causing the minor L.S. to urinate on herself. She testified that R.S. threatened to

run away and self-harm, and that the children were afraid of Sunit. She opined that Sunit’s

emotional outbursts of anger during his communication with the children affected their emotional

well-being. In her report, she referenced her interviews with the children’s respective therapists.

R.S.’s therapist reported that R.S. had anxiety due to the trauma she was experiencing, which

included memories of physical abuse she witnessed between her parents. The therapist further

advised that as soon as Sunit’s parenting time increased, she saw an increase in R.S.’s anxiety. The

therapist also reported to the GAL that R.S. is afraid of Sunit and has gone into “survival mode.”

L.S.’s therapist similarly opined that L.S. is very afraid of Sunit, reporting that L.S. said Sunit

frequently yelled at her and she felt she “could not do anything right.” L.S.’s therapist also advised

the GAL of her concerns about the “toll this is taking on [L.S.] and that L.S. was not sleeping well,

sometimes falling asleep in class. The therapist believed that Sunit engaged in conduct that

seriously endangered L.S.’s mental health and impaired her emotional development, and

recommended temporarily suspending Sunit’s parenting time until Sunit “gets help.”

¶ 18 The GAL recommended that Madhavi have final decision-making authority over the

children’s educational, medical, and extracurricular activities. She further recommended that

6 Sunit’s parenting time be suspended until the children’s therapists deemed it appropriate or the

children initiated the resuming of parenting time with Sunit. The GAL also recommended that

reunification therapy between Sunit and the children continue, and that both children and parents

should continue with therapy. She testified that once Sunit’s parenting time resumed, it should be

contingent on his continued participation in therapy. Finally, the GAL recommended that Sunit

attend a parenting course specifically tailored to adolescent girls, and that the parties continue to

communicate through a parenting app.

¶ 19 Sunit also testified at trial. Sunit denied that his daughters were afraid of him and claimed

Madhavi was the reason for his problems with the children. He testified that Madhavi used the

Order of Protection to restrict his parenting time. The trial court found that he downplayed his bad

conduct with the children. The trial court also found that he did not accept any accountability for

the situation with the children.

¶ 20 Madhavi testified regarding the ongoing problems between Sunit and the children. She

testified that she encouraged the children to visit with Sunit, but she would not force the children

to see Sunit. Madhavi also testified that the reunification therapist recommended she not force the

children to go for parenting time and specifically advised that Madhavi not force the children into

the vehicle for parenting time. Madhavi stated that she never cancelled Sunit’s parenting time, and

testified regarding the parenting time and recommendations made to her by the GAL, the

reunification therapist, and the children’s therapists. All of the professionals recommended that

she not force the children to go with Sunit.

¶ 21 Madhavi sought to introduce a series of video recordings as evidence. The recordings

depicted interactions between the parties from 2015 and 2016, some years prior to the entry of the

agreed Allocation Judgment. Sunit objected to the admission of the recordings, arguing they were

7 outdated, lacked foundation, and were taken in violation of the Eavesdropping Act, as they were

taken without his knowledge or consent. The trial court considered the arguments of the parties

and reviewed the content and context of the recordings. The trial court denied the admission of the

recordings, finding them to be irrelevant, and that the remoteness in time outweighed any

evidentiary value. According to the trial court’s findings, the recordings were made more than

eight years before the most recent disputes between the parties; were made prior to the entry of the

agreed Allocation Judgment; and did not address the current issues before the trial court.

¶ 22 The trial court issued its written ruling on December 27, 2024. The trial court made specific

findings as to the credibility of the witnesses, finding Madhavi to be credible and Sunit to be not

credible. The trial court also found the GAL to be credible and found her investigation to be

“thorough.” The trial court found the GAL’s testimony provided the court with “extensive global

insight into the family dynamics of the parties as it relates to parenting time.” The trial court found

that the school social worker, the reunification therapist, and all treating therapists agreed with the

GAL’s recommendations. Further, the trial court found that a substantial change in circumstances

occurred since the entry of the Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage in that Sunit’s conduct caused

a limitation in his parenting time requiring a modification of the Allocation Judgment. The trial

court also found that Sunit having any parenting time with the children seriously endangered their

physical, mental, moral, and emotional health and significantly impaired their emotional

development. The trial court found it was in the best interests of L.S. that she be enrolled in and

attend Vine Academy; that the taping of the conversation between Sunit and R.S. did not violate

Sunit’s expectation of privacy; and that Madhavi did not violate the Allocation Judgment in that

not forcing the children to go with Sunit during his parenting time was reasonable and not willful

and contumacious. The trial court ordered Sunit’s parenting time suspended indefinitely,

8 continuation of reunification therapy, individual therapy for Sunit, that Sunit enroll and attend a

parenting course specifically tailored to adolescent girls, and that the parties continue to

communicate through the parenting app. The trial court further ordered that Madhavi shall have

final decision-making authority regarding all signification and major decisions involving the

children.

¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 24 On appeal, Sunit argues that (1) the trial court’s ruling reducing his parenting time and

decision-making authority was in error; (2) the trial court erred in denying his Petition for Rule to

Show Cause relating to Madhavi’s interference with his parenting time; (3) the trial court erred in

allowing Madhavi to enroll the minor child L.S. in the Vine Academy without his consent; (4) the

Guardian ad Litem’s report improperly referenced recordings that violated the eavesdropping

statute, upon which the trial court relied; (5) the trial court erred in ruling the improper recording

was not a violation of his expectation of privacy; and (6) the trial court erred when it considered

the 2015 and 2016 video tapes in its ruling.

¶ 25 A. Allocation of Parenting Time and Decision-Making

¶ 26 Sunit’s first argument is that the trial court’s ruling that reduced his parenting time and

decision-making authority was erroneous. The trial court suspended Sunit’s parenting time until

further order and modified the allocation of decision-making authority to provide Madhavi with

final decision-making authority regarding all significant decisions involving the children. We

review whether a trial court’s decision regarding custody is contrary to the manifest weight of the

evidence. In re Marriage of Katsap, 2022 IL App (2d) 210706, ¶ 24 (decision-making); In re

Marriage of Virgin, 2021 IL App (3d) 190650, ¶ 44 (parenting time).

9 ¶ 27 Section 603.10 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act provides for the

restriction of a parent’s decision-making responsibilities and parenting time as a result of a parent’s

conduct. 750 ILCS 5/603.10 (West 2022). Section 603.10(a) reads:

“After a hearing, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that

a parent engaged in any conduct that seriously endangered the child’s mental,

moral, or physical health or that significantly impaired the child’s emotional

development, the court shall enter orders as necessary to protect the child.” Id. §

603.10(a).

Orders necessary to protect a child may include, inter alia, a reduction, elimination, or other

adjustment of the parent’s decision-making responsibilities or parent time, or both decision-

making responsibilities and parenting time. Id. § 603.10(a)(1).

¶ 28 The serious-endangerment standard is an “onerous, stringent, and rigorous” burden to meet.

In re Marriage of Diehl, 221 Ill. App. 3d 410, 429 (1991). This is because liberal parenting time

is the rule and restricted parenting time is the exception. Heldebrandt v. Heldebrandt, 251 Ill. App.

3d 950, 957 (1993). Restricting parenting time or parental responsibilities is a two-step process.

First, the trial court must make a factual determination that the evidence demonstrates, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that a parent has engaged in any conduct that seriously endangered

the child. 750 ILCS 5/603.10(a) (West 2022 If the trial court finds the evidence is sufficient to

make such a determination, it must then enter orders necessary to protect the child. Id. In doing so,

the trial court must exercise its discretion in selecting appropriate restrictions to parenting time or

parental responsibilities to provide for the child’s safety and welfare. Id. § 603.10(a)(1-9).

¶ 29 The evidence adduced at trial was that Sunit responded to heated situations by using

profanity and threatening punishment, as well as an inability of Sunit to control his anger. In her

10 written report, the GAL opined that the children’s present environment with Sunit caused

significant distress to the children. Each of the children’s therapists reported concerns about Sunit’s

lack of accountability and desire for control, and that his actions would continue to cause serious

psychological, emotional, and mental damage to the children. R.S.’s therapist reported that when

R.S. felt overwhelmed, she verbalized suicidal thoughts and thoughts of self-harm. R.S. was

prescribed a mood stabilizer, the dosage of which was increased in January 2024. The therapist

also reported that R.S. had body and somatic issues, such as headaches and trouble sleeping. L.S.’s

therapist reported concerns that Sunit’s behavior was escalating, causing L.S. to “spiral,” and

further reported that L.S. was afraid of Sunit. According to the therapist, L.S. felt a lack of control

over her own life and the therapist was concerned that Sunit did not seem to care about the impact

his behavior had on L.S.

¶ 30 Based on the evidence presented, we find the restrictions to Sunit’s parenting time and

decision-making was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. While Sunit contended his

behavior was not inappropriate or harmful to the children, the trial court concluded otherwise.

¶ 31 B. Petition for Rule to Show Cause

¶ 32 Sunit next argues that the trial court erred in denying his Petition for Rule to Show Cause

relating to the denial of his court-ordered parenting time by Madhavi. The standard of review for

the denial of a petition for rule to show cause is an abuse of discretion. Eckerty v. Eastern Illinois

Foodbank, 2022 IL App (4th) 210537, ¶ 31-32.

¶ 33 Contempt of court is defined as “conduct calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct a

court in its administration of justice or to derogate from its authority or dignity or bring the

administration of law into disrepute.” In re Estate of Melody, 42 Ill. 2d 451, 452 (1969). Generally,

civil contempt occurs when a party fails to do something ordered by the trial court, resulting in the

11 loss of a benefit or advantage to the opposing party. In re Marriage of Charous, 368 Ill. App. 3d

99, 107 (2006). A contempt of court order is used as a means to control conduct either by punishing

an offender who obstructs or embarrasses the court in its administration of justice or by coercing

compliance with court orders. Id. Contempt is characterized as either direct or indirect. Indirect

contempt of court refers to contumacious actions that occur outside of the courtroom. Id. The

existence of a court order and proof of willful disobedience of that order are essential to any finding

of indirect contempt. In re Marriage of Tatham, 293 Ill. App. 3d 471, 480 (1997). “The burden

initially falls on the petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged

contemnor has violated a court order.” Charous, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 107. If a preponderance of the

evidence is established, the burden then shifts to the alleged contemnor to show that

noncompliance with the trial court’s order was not willful or contumacious and that he had a valid

excuse for failure to follow the court order. Id. at 107-08.

¶ 34 Civil contempt proceedings have two fundamental attributes: (1) the contemnor must be

capable of taking the action sought to be coerced and (2) no further contempt sanctions are imposed

upon the contemnor’s compliance with the pertinent court order. In re Marriage of Sharp, 369 Ill.

App. 3d 271, 279 (2006). “One of the chief characteristics of civil contempt is that the contemnor

must ‘hold the keys to the cell,’ i.e., he must have it within his power to purge himself by

complying with the court’s order.” Pancotto v. Mayes, 304 Ill. App. 3d 108, 111 (1999) (citing In

re Marriage of Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d 26, 44 (1990)). Contempt based on past actions which

cannot be undone means that the contemnor lacks the ability to purge the contempt because the

purpose of civil contempt is to compel compliance with court orders, not to punish. In re Marriage

of O’Malley, 2016 IL App (1st) 151118, ¶ 26. “Therefore, whenever a court order cannot be

complied with, there cannot be a finding of civil contempt.” Id. Whether a party is guilty of civil

12 contempt is a question for the trial court and its decision will not be disturbed unless it is against

the manifest weight of the evidence or the record demonstrates an abuse of discretion. Charous,

368 Ill. App. 3d at 108 (citing In re Marriage of Logston, 103 Ill. 2d 266, 286-87 (1984)). A trial

court abuses its discretion “only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by it.”

In re Marriage of Lyman, 2015 IL App (1st) 132832, ¶ 89.

¶ 35 In this case, the trial court found that Sunit established a prima facie case for indirect civil

contempt of court and the burden shifted to Madhavi to demonstrate that her failure to provide

Sunit with parenting time was not willful or contumacious, but based upon a valid excuse. See In

re Marriage of Barile, 385 Ill. App. 3d 752, 758-59 (2008); Charous, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 107-08.

¶ 36 We agree with the trial court that Madhavi had a valid excuse for not obeying the Allocation

Judgment regarding Sunit’s parenting time. Based on the record before us, the evidence supports

the trial court’s denial of the Petition for Rule to Show Cause. The children’s therapists, the

reunification counselor, and the GAL each advised Madhavi that she should not force the children

to go to parenting time with Sunit. The trial court found that Madhavi had not willfully violated

the order regarding parenting time; that her actions were not willful and contumacious; and that not

forcing the children to go with Sunit during his parenting time was reasonable under the

circumstances. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Petition for

Rule to Show Cause.

¶ 37 C. Admission of Recordings

¶ 38 Finally, Sunit argues that certain inadmissible evidence was admitted and considered by the

trial court in its ruling.

¶ 39 Sunit argues that the GAL’s report improperly referenced improper recordings in violation

of the Eavesdropping Act. In support, he argues that evidence obtained in violation of the

13 Eavesdropping Act (720 ILCS 5/4-15 (West 2022) is not admissible in civil and/or criminal

proceedings and, as such, the GAL could not have considered the recording because the recording

was unlawful and evidence related to the recording was inadmissible under the statute.

¶ 40 Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court did rely on the recording, Sunit has failed to show

how he was prejudiced by the recording. The court finds In re Marriage of Karonis, 693 N.E. 2d

1292, 1286 (1998) to be factually similar to the case before us. Karonis involved a custody dispute

in which the husband claimed the GAL listened to recordings of telephone conversations between

the husband and the children in violation of the eavesdropping statute. In Karonis, the court noted

that the husband assumed the tapes were recorded in violation of the eavesdropping statute, but

found his argument to be irrelevant, as regardless of the violation, neither the tapes nor the contents

were used as evidence at trial or relied upon by the trial court. Id. The Karonis court noted that the

statute requires the GAL to protect the best interest of the child, and that reviewing the tapes

materially advanced the GAL’s ability to determine and defend the child’s interests. Id. A litigant

is not prejudiced where the GAL listens to information that may be inadmissible at trial and that

“compelling reasons of public policy dictate that the GAL perform duties essential to the health

and welfare of the child whom the GAL represents.” Id. As similarly so in Karonis, the trial court

did not rely upon the recordings. Sunit’s argument is unpersuasive.

¶ 41 Sunit also argues that the trial court erred in relying on certain recordings that were made

in 2015 and 2016 in its ruling, as the trial court did not allow for the admission of those recordings

into evidence. We also find this argument to be unpersuasive. At trial, the court sustained Sunit’s

objection to the admission of the 2015 and 2016 recordings. In its ruling, the trial court did not

refer to the 2015 and 2016 recordings. Sunit argues, however, that the trial court’s reference to a

tape recording of Sunit yelling and swearing in its ruling was error, as that recording references

14 the 2015 and 2016 recordings, which were found to be inadmissible by the trial court. The trial

court specifically found “[t]he taping of the conversation between Sunit and his oldest daughter

[R.S.] by speaker phone at the residence of Madhavi, while Madhavi was present did not violate

Sunit’s expectation of privacy. Further, the Court did not consider that conversation in rendering

its judgment order.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court’s reference to the recordings, if erroneous

at all, would be harmless error. See Inman v. Howe Freightways, Inc., 2019 IL App (1st) 172459,

¶ 157 (noting that harmless error occurs when, despite the presence of an error, it appears no harm

was done, and reversible error occurs when the error appears to have affected the outcome of the

trial).

¶ 42 In summary, the professionals in this matter—including the court-appointed custody

evaluator, the children’s therapists, the GAL, and the reunification counselor—all recommended

restrictions on Sunit’s parenting time. The trial court found that Madhavi’s testimony was credible

and that Sunit’s testimony was not credible. The trial court also found the GAL to be credible. On

appeal, we cannot reweigh the credibility of the witnesses, and based on the appellate record, we

cannot say that the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Karonis, 296 Ill. App. 3d

at 88. Accordingly, we find no claims of error.

¶ 43 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 44 The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.

¶ 45 Affirmed.