NOTICE 2024 IL App (5th) 230157-U NOTICE Decision filed 09/04/24. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0157 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of MICHAEL ROSENBERGER, ) Macon County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) and ) No. 18-D-206 ) DAWN ROSENBERGER, ) Honorable ) Phoebe S. Bowers, Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SHOLAR delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Moore and Boie concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s decision is affirmed where the court’s valuation of marital property was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, division of marital property was not an abuse of discretion, calculation of Husband’s annual gross income was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, order directing Wife to submit to quarterly drug testing was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and where the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the respondent’s request for attorney fees.
¶2 This appeal concerns the dissolution of marriage action between the petitioner, Michael
Rosenberger, and the respondent, Dawn Rosenberger. On appeal, respondent raises five issues for
this court’s review: (1) whether the trial court’s valuation of petitioner’s bank accounts and 2015
Dodge 2500 truck was against the manifest weight of the evidence, (2) whether the court erred by
allocating marital debt, (3) whether the court erred by calculating petitioner’s annual gross income 1 for purposes of awarding maintenance, (4) whether the court erred by ordering respondent to
submit to a quarterly drug test, and (5) whether the court erred by denying respondent’s request
for attorney fees. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The record in this case is extensive. We limit our recitation to those facts relevant to our
disposition of this appeal. We will recite additional facts in the analysis section as needed to
address the specific arguments of the parties. Because the parties share a last name, we will refer
to them by their first names throughout this decision.
¶5 Michael and Dawn were married on August 8, 1998. They had two biological children,
both of whom are emancipated. A third child was born to Dawn and is not the biological child of
Michael but is treated as such for purposes of this matter. On July 13, 2018, Michael filed a petition
for dissolution of the marriage. Dawn filed a response and counterpetition on January 15, 2019.
¶6 Prior to trial, the parties filed numerous motions, amended petitions, and agreed orders.
During this time, Dawn was represented by attorney Jonathan Erickson. On October 3, 2019, Dawn
filed a “Petition for Interim Attorney’s Fees” requesting that Michael be ordered to pay $4000 in
attorney fees owed and an additional $3000 as a retainer for Mr. Erickson. In response, Michael
requested the trial court order him to pay $2500 towards Dawn’s attorney fees. On October 16,
2019, the trial court granted Dawn’s petition and ordered Michael to pay $7000. Following
additional pretrial matters, Mr. Erickson moved to withdraw as Dawn’s counsel. On August 2,
2021, the court granted Mr. Erickson’s motion.
¶7 On December 2, 2021, attorney Guy S.R. Casey entered his appearance on behalf of Dawn.
On the same date, he filed a motion for continuance requesting that the trial, which was set for the
next day, be continued until January. The trial court denied the motion in part, allowed Michael to
2 begin his case-in-chief on the previously scheduled trial date of December 3, 2021, and allowed
Dawn to cross-examine Michael’s witnesses on a later trial date in January.
¶8 Trial in this cause commenced on December 3, 2021, and continued on January 21, 2022,
April 21, 2022, and May 16, 2022. On December 3, 2021, Michael began his case-in-chief and
testified on his own behalf. Michael testified that he and Dawn had three children, only one of
whom, A.R., was still a minor. Although A.R. was not his biological child, Michael testified he
had “a father/daughter relationship” with A.R. At the time he filed for divorce, A.R. was living
with him, although she saw Dawn regularly. In September or October 2020, A.R. moved in with
Dawn. Since then, Michael saw A.R. every other weekend. While living with Dawn, A.R. received
“A” grades.
¶9 In 2007, Michael began working for a construction company, Clayco, Inc. Michael testified
that, based on his W-2s, his gross income in the years 2018, 2019, and 2020 totaled $178,113.88,
$177,037.52, and $195,730.62, respectively. Michael’s most current financial affidavit, dated
November 1, 2021, was admitted as Respondent’s Exhibit 1. In his financial affidavit, Michael
reported that he earned $19,113.78 per month. Michael’s October 29, 2021, pay stub was admitted
into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit 2. Starting on September 19, 2019, Michael began paying
Dawn $1652 per month in voluntary maintenance. At the time of the trial, Michael worked in Elk
Grove Village, Illinois, and returned home every other weekend. Michael testified that throughout
the marriage, Dawn worked “[p]eriodically” and primarily stayed home to raise the children.
¶ 10 Michael testified regarding the multiple vehicles and parcels of real estate owned by the
parties. He testified the parties owned three parcels of real estate: 3329 Ferris Drive in Decatur,
Illinois; 2131 Hendrix Street in Decatur, Illinois; and 70 acres of recreational property in Fayette
County, Illinois (referred to as the “Ramsey” property). In his financial affidavit, Michael reported
3 that the Ferris Drive property was worth $126,000 with a $131,590 mortgage, the Hendrix Street
property was worth $60,000 with a $32,444 mortgage, and that the Ramsey property was worth
$210,000 with a $131,590 mortgage.
¶ 11 Relevant to this appeal, Michael testified that he drove a 2015 Dodge 2500 diesel truck.
The truck had 281,000 miles on it, and it did not have a functioning heater. On direct examination,
Michael testified that this truck had a $19,600 trade-in value based on an estimate he received from
a car dealership. On cross-examination, Dawn’s attorney presented a valuation from the National
Automobile Dealers Association (NADA). The NADA valuation showed that a 2015 Dodge 2500
truck with a diesel engine and 281,000 miles was valued at $41,150 “clean retail,” $36,725 “clean
trade-in,” $35,225 “average trade-in,” and $33,400 “rough trade-in.” According to a list of
expenses prepared by Michael, which was admitted as an exhibit, he paid $780 per month toward
the debt owed for the truck.
¶ 12 Michael testified the parties separated in 2017. He further testified that Dawn moved into
the house on Hendrix Street while he continued to occupy the marital residence on Ferris Drive.
According to Michael, following the separation, he continued to pay certain expenses for Dawn
and the children without contribution from Dawn. He testified that he paid the mortgage on the
Hendrix Street property, the mortgage and tax payments on the Ramsey property, the children’s
cell phones, some of A.R.’s extracurricular activities, and A.R.’s school fees. Lastly, Michael
testified that he and Dawn did not share any joint bank accounts; the only accounts he had were in
his own name. In his financial affidavit, Michael reported the value of his checking account was
$10,081.57 and the value of his savings account was $7001.27.
¶ 13 On April 21, 2022, on the third half-day of the trial, Dawn testified. Dawn provided
additional information regarding the parties’ marital history. Two years after the parties married,
4 Dawn graduated college with a bachelor’s degree in education. A few months later, the parties’
first child was born. At this time, Michael was working and still attending college. The parties
agreed that Dawn would stay home to care for the child and Michael would work. This
arrangement continued after the birth of the parties’ second child.
¶ 14 During the parties’ marriage, Dawn was a “full-time housewife,” taking care of the children
and managing the couple’s finances. Dawn occasionally worked outside of the home, but she never
worked a full-time job for more than a year and never earned more than minimum wage. Michael’s
income provided the family with a high standard of living. According to Dawn, she was able to
“purchase whatever [she] wanted to purchase,” and the family took multiple vacations each year.
¶ 15 In January 2018, Dawn began working as a teacher, earning approximately $26,000 per
year. She resigned from this position in September 2018 after photos were posted on Facebook of
her smoking an illegal substance. Dawn acknowledged that, at that time, she had issues with drug
addiction. Dawn testified that shortly after she resigned from her teaching position, she enrolled
in an inpatient drug rehabilitation program. Dawn completed the rehabilitation program in October
2018. Dawn also stated that she relapsed four times since she completed inpatient rehabilitation.
Dawn further admitted that the last time she used methamphetamine was in mid-March of 2022.
She stated that despite the recent relapse, she “ha[d] the drug situation under control.” Dawn stated
she never used drugs around the children.
¶ 16 Dawn further testified that she had not worked since she resigned as a teacher, although
she looked for employment and had job interviews. According to Dawn, employers were unwilling
to hire her because of the photographs of her smoking an illegal substance. Dawn also stated it was
difficult to obtain employment because her work schedule was dependent on A.R.’s school
schedule as she was responsible for driving A.R. to and from school. Dawn’s financial affidavit,
5 dated January 19, 2022, was admitted into evidence. In the affidavit, Dawn reported that the
Hendrix Street property was worth $42,000 with a $32,339.29 mortgage, that the Ferris Drive
property was worth $152,000 with a $131,090 mortgage, and the Ramsey property was worth
$210,000 with a $65,935.91 mortgage.
¶ 17 Dawn testified as to the marital debts which were listed on her financial affidavit. She
testified that each of the Hendrix Street property, the Ferris Drive property, and the Ramsey
property were subject to a mortgage. Dawn also testified that she had three “family expenses”
credit card debts that were owed at the time she and Michael separated. These “family expenses”
were identified in Dawn’s financial affidavit as a $14,130 debt to Chase Bank, a $6835.18 debt to
Citibank, and a $6002.75 debt to Barclay. Dawn’s financial affidavit included an additional debt
page, which showed she owed $5974 in student loans, $448 for medical bills, $5000 as a loan
against a life insurance policy to pay Mr. Casey’s retainer, $7753.81 to Mr. Erickson for prior legal
services, an amount to be determined for Mr. Casey’s current legal services, and $8921.28 to her
mother for daily living expenses. Dawn asserted she did not have any ability to pay Mr. Erickson’s
fees, to pay Mr. Casey’s fees, or to reimburse her mother for the expenses paid.
¶ 18 Also on April 21, 2022, Michael was recalled as witness. He testified that he received a
work bonus in the amount of $32,700 after taxes. He further stated that money was “in the
account.”
¶ 19 On May 9, 2022, Dawn filed a petition for contribution to fees and costs. In her petition,
she reported that Mr. Erickson received $10,000 in attorney fees for services previously performed,
$3000 by Dawn and $7000 by Michael pursuant to a previous order of the court. Dawn also
reported that she paid Mr. Casey a $5000 retainer. As of the date of the petition, Mr. Erickson was
still owed $7753.81 and Mr. Casey was owed $15,355. Dawn’s petition requested that Michael
6 pay the amount owed to Mr. Erickson in full, and for Michael to make contribution payments to
Mr. Casey for the amount owed and all subsequent fees and costs. During a hearing on the petition,
Michael stipulated to the amounts owed to Mr. Erickson and that the hourly rates were reasonable;
however, he disagreed that he should be responsible for payment. Dawn testified that she had no
way to pay the fees without liquidating assets she may be awarded.
¶ 20 On September 22, 2022, the court entered an order granting a judgment of dissolution of
marriage, allocating marital property, parental responsibilities, parenting time, and awarding
maintenance and child support (the Order). For purposes of allocating marital property and
awarding maintenance and child support, the court found that Michael’s gross monthly income
was $19,113.78. The court found that Dawn had not worked since September 2018, but that she
had the ability to work. The court imputed an annual income to Dawn of $24,960, or $2080 per
month.
¶ 21 Relevant to this appeal, the trial court awarded Michael his 2015 Dodge 2500 valued at
$12,895, explaining that was the value minus the debt owed. The court ordered the parties’ 2013
van to be sold with the proceeds divided equally. Ultimately, the court ordered Michael to pay
Dawn $14,773, which was one-half of the approximate value of the parties’ vehicles, trailers,
tractors, and boat that he was awarded minus one-half of the value of Dawn’s vehicle.
¶ 22 Regarding the marital debt, the Order directed Michael to pay $42,499.96 of reported
marital debt consisting of the Barclays credit card debt ($13,346.50) and the Discover credit card
debt ($29,153.46). The trial court ordered Dawn to pay her medical bills in the sum of $448, the
Country Finance Life Insurance loan in the sum of $5000, the Chase credit card in the sum of
$14,130, the Citibank judgment in the sum of $6835, the Barclay judgment in the sum of $6002.75,
and any amount owed to her mother, if truly owed.
7 ¶ 23 The trial court’s order included:
“As of 11/1/2021, according to Husband’s Financial Affidavit, he possessed approximately $17,000 in a checking and savings account at Heartland Bank & Trust. According to Wife’s Financial Affidavit dated 1/19/2022, Wife possessed a negative balance in her combined checking and savings accounts. Husband shall pay Wife the sum of $6,900 as a distribution of the parties’ bank accounts [equaling half the value of the bank accounts ($8,500) less $1,600 Wife was ordered to pay in a previous paragraph]. The sum shall be paid to Wife within the next thirty (30) days.”
¶ 24 The trial court ordered Michael to pay $57,750 in retroactive maintenance for years 2019,
2020, and 2021 and further ordered him to pay $3811 per month in maintenance for 15.93 years.
The court further ordered Michael to pay child support.
¶ 25 In awarding parenting time, the trial court noted that A.R. “has a good relationship with
both parents and wants to spend time with both of them.” The court awarded Dawn the majority
of parenting time. The Order includes:
“Husband has valid concerns about Wife’s past and current drug use. Wife testified in Court that she used drugs, particularly Methamphetamine, within the last thirty days of April 21, 2022. Husband requests that Wife submit to a hair follicle test on a quarterly basis to ensure he is aware of her drug use, if any. The Court finds this is a reasonable request and orders Wife to submit to a hair follicle test each quarter at her own expense and to provide the results to Husband within seven days.”
The Order states “[i]f Husband’s work schedule were different and he did not have to travel during
the week, it should be noted that the Court would award the majority of the parenting time to
Husband, considering Wife’s recent drug use and past history of drug use.”
¶ 26 Finally, the trial court denied Dawn’s request for contribution toward her attorney fees. In
reaching that decision, the court stated: “Wife is asking for Husband to pay the astronomical sum
of $31,190.06 in addition to the $7,000 he has already paid Mr. Erickson.” The court noted it
considered the property received by the parties, their incomes, and their financial obligations. The
court further noted that Dawn was going to receive $4917 per month in child support and
maintenance as well as “an additional arrearage payment” and “a substantial amount of marital
8 property.” The court also noted that Dawn had the ability to work at least a full-time minimum
wage job, but she chose not to. The court opined the case was not overly complicated or difficult,
as the parties did not have an overwhelming amount of assets or liabilities, neither owned
businesses or were self-employed, and many of the issues involving the children had already been
resolved. The court stated it understood Mr. Casey was the second attorney on the case and had to
review the file and get prepared but concluded: “Husband should not be responsible for Mr.
Casey’s unpreparedness or Mr. Erickson’s withdrawal from the case.”
¶ 27 On October 24, 2022, Dawn filed a posttrial motion arguing for reconsideration and
modification of certain findings and orders made within the court’s September 22, 2022, Order. A
hearing on the motion was held on December 20, 2022. Dawn argued that the court misconstrued
the evidence and facts, as well as the applicable statutes and law in relation thereto. Relevant to
this appeal, Dawn argued the valuation of the 2015 Dodge 2500 was erroneous because her NADA
valuation was based upon the high mileage and condition of the vehicle. Dawn further argued the
allocation of marital debt, including credit card debt, was erroneous because Michael testified that
indebtedness consisted of employment expenses. Dawn also argued that during the pendency of
the trial, Michael received an additional $33,000 net bonus which was placed in his savings
account, half of which should be awarded to Dawn. Further, Dawn argued Michael should be
ordered to pay all existing marital indebtedness. Dawn also argued that the court’s order that she
submit to drug testing on a quarterly basis was contrary to law and constituted an abuse of
discretion. Lastly, Dawn argued the court misconstrued the evidence and the law in relation to her
request for Michael to pay her outstanding attorney fees. In response, Michael argued that the court
did not misconstrue evidence or abuse its discretion.
9 ¶ 28 On February 10, 2023, the court entered an order amending and modifying its September
22, 2022, Order. The amended order clarified matters not at dispute on appeal and stated “all
previous orders not herein or otherwise previously modified shall remain in full force and effect.”
¶ 29 On March 13, 2023, Dawn filed her notice of appeal. 1
¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 31 On appeal, Dawn argues the trial court incorrectly valued certain marital property,
improperly divided marital debt, and miscalculated Michael’s annual income for maintenance
purposes. Further, Dawn challenges the trial court’s order requiring her to submit to quarterly drug
testing. Lastly, Dawn argues the trial court erred by denying her request for attorney fees. For the
reasons that follow, we disagree and affirm.
¶ 32 A. Valuation of Marital Property
¶ 33 We first address Dawn’s argument that the valuation of marital assets was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Dawn argues the trial court improperly valued
Michael’s bank accounts and his 2015 Dodge 2500 truck. We disagree.
¶ 34 To divide marital property under section 503(d) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act (Act), the court must first determine the value of such property. In re Marriage of
Cutler, 334 Ill. App. 3d 731, 736 (2002). Section 503(f) of the Act provides that the trial court, “in
determining the value of the marital and non-marital property for purposes of dividing the property,
has the discretion to use the date of the trial or such other date as agreed upon by the parties, or
ordered by the court within its discretion, for purposes of determining the value of assets or
property.” 750 ILCS 5/503(f) (West 2020). The valuation of marital property is generally a factual
1 The trial court’s written judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered August 28, 2023. As such, Dawn’s notice of appeal is deemed filed as of that date. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) (“A notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision, but before the entry of the judgment or order, is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry of the judgment or order.”). 10 question, which will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re
Marriage of Hubbs, 363 Ill. App. 3d 696, 700 (2006). A decision is against the manifest weight of
the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or where the trial court’s findings
are unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on the evidence. In re Marriage of Igene, 2015 IL App
(1st) 140344, ¶ 18.
¶ 35 “When a party challenges a trial court’s bench-trial ruling, we defer to the trial court’s
factual findings unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” Nokomis Quarry
Co. v. Dietl, 333 Ill. App. 3d 480, 484 (2002). When applying this standard of review, we give
great deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations, and we will not substitute our
judgment for that of the circuit court “ ‘because the fact finder is in the best position to evaluate
the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses.’ ” Staes & Scallan, P.C. v. Orlich, 2012 IL App (1st)
112974, ¶ 35 (quoting Samour, Inc. v. Board of Election Commissioners, 224 Ill. 2d 530, 548
(2007)). “A factual finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite
conclusion is clearly evident or the finding is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based in evidence.”
Samour, 224 Ill. 2d at 544. The trial court’s findings and judgment will not be disturbed “if there
is any evidence in the record to support such findings.” Brown v. Zimmerman, 18 Ill. 2d 94, 102
(1959).
¶ 36 First, Dawn contends that the trial court undervalued Michael’s bank accounts. In his
financial affidavit, dated November 1, 2021, Michael valued his checking account at $10,081.57
and his savings account at $7001.27. The trial court, in its September 22, 2022, Order, held:
“As of 11/1/21, according to Husband’s Financial Affidavit, he possessed approximately $17,000 in a checking and savings account at Heartland Bank & Trust. According to Wife’s Financial Affidavit dated 1/19/22, Wife possessed a negative balance in her combined checking and savings accounts. Husband shall pay Wife the sum of $6,900 as a distribution of the parties’ bank accounts subtracting the one-half of the mediation fee and Guardian ad Litem fee discussed in the previous paragraph.”
11 On appeal, Dawn argues Michael’s bank accounts were undervalued, because during the third day
of trial (April 21, 2022), Michael acknowledged he received a bonus check from his employer,
which after deductions, totaled $32,700. As such, Dawn argues Michael’s financial affidavit was
no longer accurate and the value of his accounts should have been increased by $32,700.
¶ 37 The court valued Michael’s bank accounts based on the date of his financial affidavit
(November 1, 2021) and the date that document was properly entered into evidence (December 3,
2021). As stated above, this cause was set for trial on December 3, 2021. Michael testified to the
accuracy of his financial affidavit on that date. The court allowed Mr. Casey to cross-examine
Michael at a later date due to Mr. Casey’s recent entry of appearance on Dawn’s behalf. Also noted
above, the trial commenced on December 3, 2021, and continued January 21, 2022, April 21, 2022,
and May 16, 2022. If not for the delay caused by Mr. Casey’s appearance just before trial,
Michael’s 2022 bonus would likely not even be at issue.
¶ 38 At the December 20, 2022, hearing on Dawn’s posttrial motion, the court reasoned “this
was a trial that took six months. It was four half-day trials. I did the best I could with what you
both gave me. I divided the marital property and the debts as equitably as I thought was appropriate
in this situation. I used the figures that you gave me.” As evidenced by the court’s September 22,
2022, Order, the court chose to value the parties’ bank accounts as of the dates of their financial
affidavits. Based on the record before us, we cannot find the opposite conclusion is clearly evident
or the finding is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based on evidence. As such, we cannot find that
the court’s valuation of the bank accounts was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 39 Next, Dawn contends that the trial court erred in valuing Michael’s 2015 Dodge 2500 truck.
In its Order, the trial court valued the vehicle at $12,895 and awarded the vehicle to Michael. The
court rejected Dawn’s proposed value of $38,950 based on the NADA valuation. As stated in the
12 Order, the trial court arrived at this value by subtracting the debt owed ($6752) from the value of
the vehicle ($19,647). The Order expressly stated that Dawn’s proposed valuation of the vehicle
did not take into account the high mileage on the vehicle or the fact that the heat did not work. At
the December 20, 2022, hearing on Dawn’s posttrial motion, the trial court expressly stated: “I
found the husband’s evidence more credible as to the value of the vehicle.” Consistent with the
valuation of the bank accounts, the court chose to value Michael’s vehicle at or near the time of
his most recent financial affidavit. Based on the record before us and the court’s reasoned order,
we cannot find that the trial court’s decision on the value of the 2015 Dodge 2500 truck was against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 40 B. Marital Property Division
¶ 41 Dawn next argues that the trial court erred in its division of the marital property of the
parties. Specifically, she argues the court abused its discretion by dividing the marital debt in
approximately equal amounts between the parties. We disagree.
¶ 42 A trial court has broad discretion in the division of marital assets, and we will reverse its
determinations only if the court has abused that discretion. In re Marriage of Wojcik, 362 Ill. App.
3d 144, 161 (2005). An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary,
fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial
court. In re Marriage of Hluska, 2011 IL App (1st) 092636, ¶ 61.
¶ 43 Section 503(d) of the Act requires a trial court to divide marital property in just proportions.
750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2020). However, it is well-settled that this does not require an equal
split, but rather the most equitable distribution in light of the statutory factors. See In re Civil
Union of Hamlin, 2015 IL App (2d) 140231, ¶ 61 (“An equitable property division does not
necessarily mean an equal distribution; a party may receive a greater share of the property if the
13 relevant factors warrant the result.”); In re Marriage of Heroy, 385 Ill. App. 3d 640, 661 (2008)
(an unequal division of marital property may be appropriate depending on the circumstances of
each case). “The touchstone of proper apportionment is whether it is equitable in nature, with each
case resting on its own facts.” In re Marriage of Nuechterlein, 225 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (1992).
¶ 44 The relevant statutory factors to consider when dividing marital property are: the
contribution of the parties to the marital property; the value of the property set apart for each
spouse; the duration of the marriage; the relevant economic circumstances of the parties upon
distribution of the property; the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income,
vocational skills, and employability of the parties; the custodial provisions for any children;
whether apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance; and the reasonable opportunity
of each spouse to acquire capital assets and income in the future. 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2020).
¶ 45 In its September 22, 2022, Order, the trial court stated:
“The parties have significant marital debt, which should be distributed equitably. Husband shall pay the credit card debt owed to Barclays ($13,346.50) and Discover ($29,153.46). Wife shall pay her medical bills in the sum of $448, the Country Finance Life Insurance loan in the sum of $5,000, the Chase credit card in the sum of $14,130, the Citibank Judgment in the sum of $6,835, the Barclay Judgment in the sum of $6,002.75. Wife testified she owes her mother in the sum of $8,921, but no promissory note or other evidence was presented showing that is a valid debt. In any event, Wife shall pay the debt to her mother if it is truly owed.”
¶ 46 Here, Dawn contends that the trial court erred in its awarding of the marital assets.
Specifically, she argues the “nearly equal” division of marital debt constituted an abuse of
discretion. Dawn asserts she was allocated $41,336.75 of the debt; however, $8921 of that amount
was an unverified amount allegedly owed to Dawn’s mother. Michael was allocated $42,499.96
of the parties’ marital debt. In its oral pronouncement following argument on Dawn’s motion to
reconsider, the court stated, in part: “I did the best I could with what you both gave me. I divided
the marital property and the debts as equitably as I thought was appropriate in this situation.” Given
14 the evidence and the well-reasoned order of the trial court, we decline to substitute our judgment
for that of the trial court. We cannot find that the trial court’s allocation of marital debt was
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted.
As such, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in diving marital property.
¶ 47 C. Calculation of Husband’s Annual Gross Income
¶ 48 Dawn next argues that the trial court erred in calculating Michael’s annual gross income
for maintenance purposes. Specifically, she argues the court’s determination of Michael’s gross
annual income was erroneous, because it relied exclusively on his financial affidavit. Further, she
argues the court disregarded Michael’s pay stub which was admitted into evidence as Respondent’s
Exhibit 2. We disagree.
¶ 49 A trial court’s factual findings regarding a maintenance determination are reviewed under
the manifest weight of the evidence standard. In re Marriage of Sturm, 2012 IL App (4th) 110559,
¶ 3. “Findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is
clearly evident or where the court’s findings are unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on any of
the evidence.” Id. Section 504 of the Act authorizes the trial court to grant a maintenance award
for either spouse in a dissolution of marriage. 750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2020). The amount of
maintenance is calculated based on the parties’ income. Id. § 504(b-1)(1)(A).
¶ 50 In its September 22, 2022, Order, the trial court found a “a maintenance award is
appropriate after having considered the relevant statutory factors.” The trial court’s September 22,
2022, Order includes:
“The Court finds Husband’s monthly gross income in 2021 is $19,114, which is $229,368 annually. Wife’s imputed income is $24,960, so beginning January 2021, Husband’s maintenance obligation to Wife is $3,811 per month. *** The maintenance obligation should last for 15.93 years, due to the date of the filing of the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage. The Court finds that January 2019 begins the duration of the maintenance award. This maintenance award is for a fixed term and may
15 be modified or terminated only upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances as provided by statute.”
¶ 51 Here, Dawn argues the trial court improperly calculated Michael’s gross income which in
effect reduced the maintenance award. In his financial affidavit and testimony, Michael reported
that his gross monthly income totaled $19,113.78. In its September 22, 2022, Order, the court
adopted this evidence, and found that Michael’s monthly gross income is $19,114, or $229,368
annually. Dawn argues Michael’s pay stub supersedes his financial affidavit and testimony.
Michael’s pay stub showed he received $240,677.77 between January 1, 2021, and October 26,
2021. Thus, Dawn argues the court erred by finding Michael’s gross income was $229,368 and
that the maintenance award should be recalculated. In response, Michael argues Dawn’s reliance
upon his pay stub is misplaced. Specifically, he alleges the “income” to Michael in the pay stub
includes per diem, a car allowance, and reimbursements. Michael asserts that during the time
period in question, he received $116,839.44 in regular hourly pay, $20,240 in “SUPER PAY” and
$43,700 in bonus pay for a total of $180,779.44.
¶ 52 Seemingly, the trial court determined Michael’s income based on his financial affidavit
which was properly admitted into evidence on the first day of trial. The trial in this cause
commenced on December 3, 2021, and continued on January 21, 2022, April 21, 2022, and May
16, 2022. Thus, the record demonstrates that the trial spanned over the course of six months. The
trial court was in the best position to weigh the credibility of the evidence and the witnesses’
testimony. We cannot say that the opposite conclusion is clearly evident, or the finding is arbitrary,
unreasonable, or not based on evidence. As such, we find that the trial court’s maintenance award
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
16 ¶ 53 D. Directing Wife to Submit to Drug Testing
¶ 54 Next, on appeal, Dawn contends that the trial court’s order directing her to submit to
quarterly drug testing was improper. Specifically, Dawn argues that order is erroneous because the
trial court failed to first make a finding that she engaged in conduct that seriously endangered
A.R.’s mental, moral, or physical health or that significantly impaired her emotional development.
Further, Dawn argues that even if the court had made such a finding, the restriction imposed was
not tailored to protect A.R. and was therefore improper. We disagree.
¶ 55 In allocating parenting time, “[i]t is presumed both parents are fit and the court shall not
place any restrictions on parenting time as defined in Section 600 and described in Section 603.10,
unless it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent’s exercise of parenting time would
seriously endanger the child’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.” 750 ILCS 5/602.7(b)
(West 2020). A “ ‘[r]estriction of parenting time’ means any limitation or condition placed on
parenting time, including supervision.” Id. § 600(i).
¶ 56 A trial court’s determination that a parent’s conduct endangered her child’s mental, moral,
or physical health or significantly impaired her child’s emotional development is reviewed under
the manifest weight of the evidence standard. In re Marriage of Mayes, 2018 IL App (4th) 180149,
¶ 59. A determination will be found to be against the manifest weight of the evidence if, “upon
review of the entire record, the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” Id. The restriction imposed
by the court will not be reversed absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Id. ¶ 61. An abuse
of discretion occurs when “the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 36 (2009). A trial court’s determination regarding child
custody is given great deference because that court is in a superior position to judge the credibility
17 of the witnesses and determine the best interests of the child. In re Marriage of Iqbal, 2014 IL App
(2d) 131306, ¶ 55.
¶ 57 In its September 22, 2022, Order, the trial court ordered Dawn to submit to a quarterly drug
test and to provide the results to Michael within seven days. In its Order, the court stated:
“Husband has valid concerns about Wife’s past and current drug use. Wife testified in Court that she used drugs, particularly Methamphetamine, within the last thirty days of April 21, 2022. Husband requests that Wife submit to a hair follicle test on a quarterly basis to ensure he is aware of her drug use, if any. The Court finds this is a reasonable request and orders Wife to submit to a hair follicle test each quarter at her own expense and to provide the results to Husband within seven days. If Husband’s work schedule were different and he did not have to travel during the week, it should be noted that the Court would award the majority of the parenting time to Husband, considering Wife’s recent drug use and past history of drug use.”
In its oral pronouncement following Dawn’s posttrial motion, the court stated, “There should not
be an issue with the hair follicle test unless there’s a problem. It’s not a hard thing to go do. That
is staying in the Order.” In her brief before this court, Dawn notes that after she testified on April
21, 2022, and admitted her drug use, A.R. was removed from her custody by the Department of
Children and Family Services.
¶ 58 We do not agree with Dawn that the court’s order for her to submit to drug testing is a
“restriction” on parenting time. The trial court’s Order awarded Dawn the majority of parenting
time. The Order does not provide for any remedy or condition on the results of the drug test. Dawn
admitted to using methamphetamine within the last 30 days of April 21, 2022. An order to submit
to drug testing is not a “restriction” of parenting time, but rather is used to ensure the best interests
of the child. The drug testing requirement of the Order is to confirm Dawn is not actively using
methamphetamine or other illegal substances while caring for A.R. The trial court was in the best
position to hear the testimony of the parties, make credibility determinations, and determine what
was in the best interests of A.R. We decline to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court’s.
18 As such, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s order directing her to submit to quarterly drug
testing was improper.
¶ 59 E. Attorney Fees
¶ 60 Finally, Dawn contends that the trial court erred by denying her request for attorney fees.
The allowance of attorney fees and the amount awarded are decisions within the sound discretion
of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Baniak,
2011 IL App (1st) 092017, ¶ 9. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is
arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by
the trial court. In re Marriage of Buonincontro, 2022 IL App (2d) 210380, ¶ 41. Ordinarily, the
primary obligation for the payment of attorney fees rests on the party on whose behalf the services
were rendered. In re Marriage of Kane, 2016 IL App (2d) 150774, ¶ 22. However, section 508 of
the Act authorizes the trial court to order a party to pay a reasonable amount of the other party’s
attorney fees. 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2020).
¶ 61 In determining whether to award attorney fees under section 508 of the Act, “[t]he trial
court must (1) consider[ ] the financial resources of the parties and (2) make its decision on a
petition for contribution in accordance with subsection (j) of Section 503.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 19. Subsection 503(j) provides “[a]ny
award of contribution to one party from the other party shall be based on the criteria for division
of marital property under this Section 503 and, if maintenance has been awarded, on the criteria
for an award of maintenance under Section 504.” 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(2) (West 2020). The burden
is on the party seeking the fees to produce detailed facts and computations upon which the claim
for fees is predicated. In re Marriage of Agostinelli, 250 Ill. App. 3d 492, 503 (1993).
19 ¶ 62 In this case, Dawn argues Michael should pay all attorney fees owed to both of her
attorneys, Mr. Erickson and Mr. Casey. Michael, pursuant to a previous court order, paid $7000 to
Mr. Erickson. As such, Dawn is requesting the balance of her attorney fees owed ($23,190.06) be
paid by Michael.
¶ 63 The trial court set forth its reasoning in denying Dawn’s request for attorney fees in its
Order. The court considered the property received by each party and their respective incomes and
financial obligations as a result of the Order. The court considered Dawn’s potential and current
income, child support, maintenance, arrearage payments, and marital property. Specifically, the
court imputed for Dawn in the sum of $24,960 per year, the equivalent to a full-time, minimum
wage job, and found she had the ability to pay her own attorney fees. Further, in its written Order,
the court opined “Husband has already contributed $7,000 to Wife’s attorney’s fees. In addition,
the amount Mr. Casey has charged Wife (over $20,000) over a period of six months is
unreasonable. This case was not overly complicated or difficult. The parties did not have an
overwhelming amount of assets or liabilities.” The court’s findings are supported by the evidence
and the record on appeal. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court’s decision to deny
Dawn’s request for attorney fees was not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, and as such, was not
an abuse of discretion.
¶ 64 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 65 The trial court’s valuation of marital property was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence, its division of marital property was not an abuse of discretion, its calculation of
Husband’s annual gross income was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, its order
directing Wife to submit to quarterly drug testing was not against the manifest weight of the
20 evidence, and it did not abuse its discretion in denying the respondent’s request for attorney fees.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Macon County.
¶ 66 Affirmed.