NOTICE 2021 IL App (4th) 200326-U FILED This Order was filed under September 14, 2021 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the NO. 4-20-0326 Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the LISA ROMERO, ) Circuit Court of Petitioner-Appellee, ) Champaign County and ) No. 17D567 JOHN B. LEVOLD, ) Respondent-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Randall B. Rosenbaum, ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Holder White concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings, concluding respondent demonstrated the trial court’s classification of both the rental income from petitioner’s nonmarital property and his Roth individual retirement account were erroneous but his other contentions of error were meritless.
¶2 In December 2017, petitioner, Lisa Romero, filed a petition to dissolve her marriage
to respondent, John B. Levold. The parties had been married since December 1999. No children
were born or adopted during the marriage. The matter proceeded to trial concerning the disposition
of property on April 12, April 25, and July 23, 2019. Following the trial and the receipt of written
closing arguments, the trial court issued a written opinion and order. Respondent thereafter filed a
motion to reconsider, which raised various challenges to the court’s findings in its opinion and
order. After receiving a response from petitioner, the court entered another written opinion and order, rejecting all of respondent’s challenges. Respondent now appeals.
¶3 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erroneously (1) classified rental income
from petitioner’s nonmarital property as nonmarital property or, alternatively, declined to accord
him a credit for his contributions to that nonmarital property, (2) classified his Roth individual
retirement account (IRA) as marital property, (3) classified the entirety of his State Universities
Retirement System (SURS) account as marital property, (4) valued the marital residence and
vehicles, (5) valued the parties’ retirement accounts, and (6) refused to offset petitioner’s share of
the marital property by the rental income lost from the two marital properties. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 The following is gleaned from the record presented as it relates to the issues
presented in this appeal.
¶6 A. Rental Income From Nonmarital Property
¶7 Prior to the parties’ marriage, petitioner purchased a residential property located at
409 Irvine Road in Champaign, Illinois (409 Irvine). The parties then resided at 409 Irvine after
their marriage. They later purchased and moved into a residential property located at 1919 Trout
Valley in Champaign (1919 Trout). To purchase 1919 Trout, the parties obtained a loan which was
secured by a mortgage against 409 Irvine. In addition, the parties purchased two investment
residential properties in Champaign located at 2815 Natalie Drive (2815 Natalie) and 2619 Natalie
Drive (2619 Natalie).
¶8 After moving into 1919 Trout, the parties, who worked full-time at the University
of Illinois, began renting out 409 Irvine and then did so for approximately eight years. They also
rented out 2815 Natalie and 2619 Natalie. Both parties showed the properties to prospective tenants
-2- and signed leases. Petitioner handled all the financial matters related to the properties. She
established three separate checking accounts for the properties. She deposited the rent payments
for the properties into the associated checking accounts and paid related expenses, such as property
taxes and condominium fees, from those funds. Respondent, in turn, handled most of the
maintenance related to the rental properties. With respect to 409 Irvine, the division of labor was
consistent with the other rental properties. The leases for 409 Irvine were signed by both parties
and directed the tenants to pay rent to petitioner. Respondent testified he made substantial
improvements to 409 Irvine over the years by painting, replacing carpeting, staining a deck door,
repairing parquet flooring, and redoing a ceiling in a garage. Petitioner testified she paid more than
$40,000 on the loan which was secured by a mortgage against 409 Irvine with rent payments she
obtained from 409 Irvine.
¶9 Petitioner sought an amount in excess of $40,000 for the payment of marital debt,
the loan which was used to purchase 1919 Trout, with her nonmarital property, the rental income
from 409 Irvine. Respondent objected, arguing, even though 409 Irvine was petitioner’s nonmarital
property, any rental income from 409 Irvine was marital property. Accordingly, respondent sought
one-half of the rental income from 409 Irvine or, to the extent the trial court found the rental
income was nonmarital property, reimbursement for his personal efforts which improved the
nonmarital property. In response, petitioner maintained the rental income from 409 Irvine was
nonmarital property, asserting it was “not attributable to the personal effort of a spouse.” She
further argued respondent did not present evidence indicating his personal efforts related to 409
Irvine were significant and resulted in substantial appreciation.
¶ 10 The trial court first considered whether the rental income from 409 Irvine was
marital or nonmarital property. The court acknowledged, because the rental income was acquired
-3- during the marriage, it was petitioner’s burden to show the rental income was nonmarital property.
Turning to the relevant statutory language, the court noted income from a nonmarital asset is
nonmarital property only if it is not attributable to the personal efforts of a spouse. The court found
the statutory language was vague:
“What does ‘attributable’ mean? Is it that the spouse helped create
the income? Is it that there is an ongoing effort to produce the
income? Most importantly, does there have to be a certain amount
of personal effort for the entire income to be marital?”
The court concluded, “Because of the vagueness of the statute, the Court is not inclined to find
that [respondent’s] personal efforts rose to a specific level to convert the entire rental income over
the [eight] years into marital income.” The court acknowledged its finding was a “close call.” The
court next considered whether the parties were entitled to their respective requests for
reimbursement related to 409 Irvine. As to petitioner, the court found petitioner was entitled to a
$20,000 credit as she had been paying a marital debt with the nonmarital rental income. As to
respondent, the court found respondent was not entitled to reimbursement as he had not established
his efforts were significant and resulted in substantial appreciation.
¶ 11 Respondent challenged the trial court’s finding that the rental income from 409
Irvine was nonmarital property in his motion to reconsider. Respondent argued the evidence
showed the rental income was “attributable to the personal efforts of both spouses.” The trial court
rejected respondent’s challenge. In doing so, the court noted, “The analysis turns on whether the
rental income was attributable to the personal efforts of [r]espondent.”
¶ 12 B. Respondent’s Retirement Accounts
¶ 13 Respondent had a SURS account and a Roth IRA. As to the SURS account,
-4- respondent presented an exhibit which suggested he had 20.5 years of service credit as of
December 2018. Respondent testified only about the value of his SURS account. As to the Roth
IRA, petitioner presented an exhibit indicating the account had a value of $7,431 at the end of
2017, and respondent presented an exhibit indicating the account had a value of $8,398 at the end
of 2019. Respondent testified to his belief that he started a “small IRA, a few thousand dollars,
prior to the marriage.” Respondent was asked about the last time he contributed to his Roth IRA,
to which he testified, “I don’t know.”
¶ 14 Respondent sought the entirety of his SURS account and Roth IRA. Petitioner did
not object to respondent being awarded the Roth IRA but argued she should be accorded part of
his SURS account.
¶ 15 The trial court, when addressing respondent’s SURS account, acknowledged the
possibility a year of service credit could have been acquired prior to the marriage. The court found,
in the absence of any testimony concerning the service credit, the entirety of the SURS account
was marital property. As to the Roth IRA, the court found, based upon the limited evidence
presented, the account was marital property.
¶ 16 Respondent challenged the trial court’s finding concerning his Roth IRA in his
motion to reconsider. Respondent asserted the evidence established the account was created prior
to the marriage and no funds were added during the marriage. As to the court’s finding concerning
his SURS account, respondent, before suggesting the court’s valuation was incorrect, stated, “the
Court appropriately identifies [respondent’s] SURS [account] as entirely marital in nature.” The
court rejected respondent’s challenge concerning his Roth IRA, finding respondent’s testimony
indicating he did not know when he last contributed to the account along with the account’s
increase in value was sufficient to classify the account as marital property. Moreover, the court
-5- noted even if its classification was in error, it would not have likely affected the equitable division
of property given the sizeable marital estate.
¶ 17 C. Valuation of the Marital Residence
¶ 18 In September 2008, the parties purchased 1919 Trout for $363,000. In the years that
followed, the parties completed several updates and improvements to the marital residence. Both
parties presented testimony from expert witnesses concerning the residence’s value. Each expert
reached a valuation and explained how they reached that valuation. Respondent’s expert valued
the residence at $522,000. Petitioner’s two experts valued the residence at $405,000 and $412,000.
Respondent testified about the residence and his belief its unique qualities made it stand out among
other houses in its price range. Respondent provided valuations from two websites indicating the
residence had a value of $491,300 and $484,370.
¶ 19 Petitioner argued the trial court should value the marital residence at $412,000.
Conversely, respondent argued the court should value the residence at $520,000.
¶ 20 The trial court provided a detailed review of the testimony presented. The court
acknowledged respondent’s reliance on valuations from websites but declined to give any weight
to those valuations as it had no information about the methodology used to reach the valuations.
After reviewing the conflicting testimony, the court valued the marital residence at $412,000.
¶ 21 Respondent challenged the trial court’s valuation of the marital residence in his
motion to reconsider. Respondent argued the court erroneously ignored the evidence he presented.
The court rejected respondent’s challenge, making clear it considered respondent’s evidence,
except for the online valuations, in reaching its valuation.
¶ 22 D. Valuations of the Marital Vehicles
¶ 23 Both parties testified about obtaining valuations of the marital vehicles from the
-6- Kelly Blue Book website. Petitioner offered printouts from the website indicating her marital
vehicle had a value between $10,271 and $10,727 and respondent’s marital vehicle had a value of
$4377. As to her marital vehicle, petitioner testified, even though the printout did not indicate her
vehicle had a convertible hardtop, the sports package she selected as an option on the website
included a convertible hardtop. As to respondent’s marital vehicle, petitioner acknowledged the
information she provided to reach the valuation was based upon her best recollection. Respondent
offered a printout from the website indicating his marital vehicle had a value of $1786. Respondent
testified his estimate included his vehicle’s actual features and mileage. Instead of a printout from
the website for petitioner’s vehicle, respondent offered a prepared “Settlement proposal,” which
indicated petitioner’s marital vehicle had a value of $14,995. Respondent testified the information
he provided to reach the valuation for petitioner’s vehicle included the fact she had a convertible
hardtop.
¶ 24 Petitioner argued the trial court should value the marital vehicles based upon the
information she provided. Conversely, respondent argued the court should value the marital
vehicles based upon the information he provided.
¶ 25 The trial court found petitioner’s evidence more reliable. The court valued
petitioner’s marital vehicle at $10,727 and respondent’s marital vehicle at $4377.
¶ 26 Respondent challenged the trial court’s valuations of the marital vehicles in his
motion to reconsider. Respondent argued the court should not have relied on the valuations from
the Kelly Blue Book website without any information about its methodology and should not have
valued petitioner’s vehicle so low given her admission her valuation did not include information
about the convertible hardtop. The court rejected respondent’s challenge, noting petitioner testified
about her belief the convertible hardtop was part of the sports package.
-7- ¶ 27 E. Valuations of the Retirement Accounts
¶ 28 Petitioner presented valuations of her retirement accounts as of March 2019.
Respondent, in turn, presented valuations of his retirement accounts as of December 2018. On the
last day of trial, the trial court permitted the parties to submit a list of agreed-upon valuations. The
parties did not provide such a list. Respondent provided updated valuations as of June 2019.
Petitioner did not provide updated valuations, and respondent did not seek an order requiring
petitioner to provide such valuations.
¶ 29 The trial court valued petitioner’s retirement accounts as of March 2019 and
respondent’s retirement accounts as of June 2019.
¶ 30 Respondent challenged the trial court’s valuations of the parties’ retirement
accounts in his motion to reconsider. Respondent argued the court should have assigned valuations
based on information from the same period. The court rejected respondent’s challenge, noting the
court had to exercise its discretion in determining an appropriate period to value the retirement
accounts in the absence of agreed-upon valuations.
¶ 31 F. Lost Rental Income
¶ 32 Prior to the commencement of the dissolution proceedings, petitioner informed
respondent of her desire to sell 2815 Natalie and 2619 Natalie, to which respondent, ultimately,
did not object. Petitioner contacted a licensed real estate agent to list the two properties for sale.
At the time the properties were listed for sale, they were occupied by tenants. Petitioner later, over
respondent’s objection, decided not to renew any leases while the properties were listed for sale.
Petitioner testified she made that decision based upon the advice of her listing agent and because
she wanted to better prepare the properties for sale. The listing agent testified the occupancy by
the tenants made showings difficult and it was much easier to have showings after the tenants
-8- vacated the properties. In addition, the listing agent was able to give suggestions, such as stripping
wallpaper, which she believed would make the properties sell faster after the tenants vacated the
properties. The parties followed the listing agent’s suggestions, and the properties later sold.
¶ 33 Respondent argued the trial court should offset petitioner’s share of the marital
property by the rental income lost from the two marital properties. Petitioner did not respond to
respondent’s argument.
¶ 34 The trial court found, while both parties had valid reasons to rent or not rent the
marital properties while they were listed for sale, neither party’s reason was more compelling than
the other. The court refused to offset petitioner’s share of the marital property.
¶ 35 Respondent challenged the trial court’s finding in his motion to reconsider.
Respondent asserted petitioner’s belief it would be easier to sell the properties without tenants was
not a valid reason for not renting out the marital properties. The trial court rejected respondent’s
challenge, noting petitioner’s belief was supported by the testimony from the listing agent.
¶ 36 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 37 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erroneously (1) classified rental income
from petitioner’s nonmarital property as nonmarital property or, alternatively, declined to accord
him a credit for his contributions to that nonmarital property, (2) classified his Roth IRA as marital
property, (3) classified the entirety of his SURS account as marital property, (4) valued the marital
residence and vehicles, (5) valued the parties’ retirement accounts, and (6) refused to offset
petitioner’s share of the marital property by the rental income lost from the two marital properties.
¶ 38 First, respondent complains about the trial court’s classification of the rental
income from petitioner’s nonmarital property, 409 Irvine, as nonmarital property. Specifically,
respondent argues the court’s finding petitioner had met her burden of proof “is contrary to the
-9- manifest weight of the evidence” given the parties’ “similar personal efforts with the rental
business and improvements to the house during the same time that it was being rented.” In
response, petitioner maintains the rental income is nonmarital property, asserting it was not
attributable to the personal efforts of respondent.
¶ 39 Respondent’s complaint is not a challenge to the evidence presented. Instead, it is
a challenge to whether the trial court’s classification can be sustained based upon the undisputed
facts gleaned from evidence presented. Stated differently, the dispute centers on the legal effect of
settled facts. Under these circumstances, our review is de novo. In re Marriage of Abrell, 386 Ill.
App. 3d 718, 724, 898 N.E.2d 1163, 1169 (2008) (“[W]hen no disputed facts or issues of witness
credibility are at issue, a de novo standard of review will be applied.”).
¶ 40 Section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750
ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2018)) begins by defining marital property as “all property *** acquired by
either spouse subsequent to the marriage.” Section 503 then lists exceptions which are known as
nonmarital property. 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(1)-(8) (West 2018). Among those exceptions is “income
from [property acquired before the marriage] if the income is not attributable to the personal effort
of a spouse.” 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(8) (West 2018). Where it is shown the property was acquired
after the marriage, there is a statutory presumption the property is marital, and the party claiming
the property as nonmarital has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence the property
falls within one of the exceptions. 750 ILCS 5/503(b)(1) (West 2018).
¶ 41 Here, the rental income from petitioner’s nonmarital property was acquired during
the marriage. Accordingly, there is the statutory presumption the income is marital, and petitioner
has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence the income “is not attributable to the
personal effort of a spouse.” The evidence shows petitioner handled all the financial matters related
- 10 - to the property, respondent handled most of the maintenance related to the property, and both
parties showed the property to prospective tenants and signed leases. Regardless of whether the
relevant inquiry concerns the personal effort of the owning spouse, the non-owning spouse, or
either spouse, we find petitioner has not proven by clear and convincing evidence the rental income
was “not attributable to the personal effort of a spouse.” 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(8) (West 2018).
Therefore, we find the trial court erroneously classified the rental income as nonmarital property.
See In re Marriage of Schmitt, 391 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1018, 909 N.E.2d 221, 229 (2009) (“Section
503(a)(8) of the Act provides that income from nonmarital property of a spouse becomes marital
income unless the spouse claiming that it is nonmarital proves by clear and convincing evidence
that the income is ‘not attributable to the personal efforts of [the] spouse.’ ”).
¶ 42 Second, respondent complains about the trial court’s classification of his Roth IRA
as marital property. Specifically, respondent argues the court’s classification was erroneous given
the evidence indicating he owned the account prior to the marriage. Petitioner does not respond to
¶ 43 Again, respondent’s complaint is not a challenge to the evidence presented. Instead,
it is a challenge to whether the trial court’s classification can be sustained based upon the
undisputed facts gleaned from evidence presented. Under these circumstances, our review is
de novo. Marriage of Abrell, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 724.
¶ 44 Nonmarital property includes “property acquired before the marriage.” 750 ILCS
5/503 (West 2018). However, there is a statutory presumption that any IRA “participated in by
either spouse after the marriage and before a judgment of dissolution of marriage *** [is] presumed
to be marital property.” 750 ILCS 5/503(b)(2) (West 2018).
¶ 45 Here, the evidence concerning respondent’s Roth IRA was limited—it indicates
- 11 - respondent owned the account prior to the marriage, the value of the account increased during the
marriage, and respondent did not know when he last contributed to the account. The evidence was
seemingly limited because petitioner did not object to respondent being accorded the account.
While the trial court ostensibly inferred from the limited evidence that respondent participated in
the IRA during the marriage, we find that inference, which again petitioner does not present any
argument supporting on appeal, unnecessary and unwarranted. Given the arguments, or lack
thereof, by petitioner, we find the trial court erroneously classified respondent’s Roth IRA as
marital property.
¶ 46 Third, respondent complains about the trial court’s classification of the entirety of
his SURS account as marital property. Specifically, respondent argues the court’s classification
was erroneous given the evidence indicating service credit was earned prior to the marriage.
Petitioner does not respond to respondent’s argument.
¶ 47 Again, respondent’s complaint is not a challenge to the evidence presented. Instead,
it is a challenge to whether the trial court’s classification can be sustained based upon the
undisputed facts gleaned from evidence presented. Under these circumstances, our review is
¶ 48 It is well established that any doubts as to the classification of property should be
resolved in favor of finding the property to be marital. In re Marriage of Budorick, 2020 IL App
(1st) 190994, ¶ 41; In re Marriage of Stuhr, 2016 IL App (1st) 152370, ¶ 51, 56 N.E.3d 525; In re
Marriage of Romano, 2012 IL App (2d) 091339, ¶ 45, 968 N.E.2d 115.
¶ 49 Here, setting aside the fact respondent agreed with the court’s classification of his
SURS account in his motion to reconsider, the evidence indicating respondent had 20.5 years of
service credit does not, by itself, preclude a finding that the account is marital property. Respondent
- 12 - presented no evidence as to how the service credit was acquired. Without more information, there
are doubts as to the proper classification of the property, which are resolved in favor of finding the
property to be marital. Therefore, we find the trial court did not err when it classified the entirety
of the SURS account as marital property.
¶ 50 Fourth, respondent complains about the trial court’s valuations of the marital
residence and vehicles. Specifically, respondent argues the court’s valuations were erroneous
given the evidence he presented. In response, petitioner contends the court’s valuations were
appropriate given the evidence she presented.
¶ 51 Respondent’s complaints are challenges to the evidence presented. They are
challenges to whether the trial court’s valuations can be sustained based upon the evidence
presented. Under these circumstances, we review the trial court’s valuations to determine whether
they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hubbs, 363 Ill.
App. 3d 696, 703-04, 843 N.E.2d 478, 485-86 (2006).
¶ 52 “It is the responsibility of the trial court to resolve conflicting testimony concerning
the valuation of marital assets.” In re Marriage of Heroy, 385 Ill. App. 3d 640, 663, 895 N.E.2d
1025, 1047 (2008). A trial court’s valuation will not be reversed on appeal unless “ ‘the opposite
conclusion is clearly evident or where the court’s findings are unreasonable, arbitrary, and not
based on any of the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Matchen, 372 Ill. App. 3d 937,
946, 866 N.E.2d 683, 691 (2007)).
¶ 53 Here, the trial court received conflicting evidence concerning the valuations of the
marital residence and vehicles and, ultimately, relied upon the evidence presented by petitioner.
Respondent does not argue petitioner’s evidence was incredible; instead, he simply argues the trial
court should have reached a valuation based upon his evidence. Considering the evidence and
- 13 - arguments presented, we cannot say the court’s valuations based upon petitioner’s evidence were
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 54 Fifth, respondent complains about the trial court’s valuations of the parties’
retirement accounts. Specifically, respondent argues the court erred in valuing the parties’
respective retirement accounts based on information from different periods. Petitioner does not
respond to respondent’s argument.
¶ 55 Respondent’s complaint is not a challenge to the evidence presented. Instead, it is
a challenge to whether the trial court’s valuations can be sustained where they are based on
information from different periods. Under these circumstances, our review is de novo.
¶ 56 Section 503 of the Act states a trial court “has the discretion to use the date of the
trial or such other date as agreed upon by the parties, or ordered by the court within its discretion,
for purposes of determining the value of assets or property.” 750 ILCS 5/503(f) (West 2018).
¶ 57 Here, the trial court, recognizing the parties had presented valuations of the
retirement accounts from different periods, permitted the parties to submit a list of agreed-upon
valuations. For reasons unknown to this court, the parties did not submit agreed-upon valuations,
which resulted in the court having to value the retirement accounts based on information from
different periods. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court committed error when
it valued the parties’ respective retirement accounts based on information from different periods.
¶ 58 Last, respondent complains about the trial court’s refusal to offset petitioner’s share
of the marital property by the rental income lost from the two marital properties. Specifically,
respondent argues petitioner’s share of the marital property should have been offset because it was
her unilateral decision to not continue to rent out the properties which resulted in the lost income.
In response, petitioner contends she had a valid reason not to continue to rent out the properties.
- 14 - ¶ 59 Respondent’s complaint is a challenge to the ultimate division of the marital
property. It is a challenge to whether the trial court’s division can be sustained based upon the
undisputed facts. Under these circumstances, we review the trial court’s division to determine
whether it resulted from an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sanfratello, 393 Ill.
App. 3d 641, 648, 913 N.E.2d 1077, 1084 (2009).
¶ 60 An “equitable division depends on more than merely an analysis of dollars and
cents.” In re Marriage of Abu-Hashim, 2014 IL App (1st) 122997, ¶ 22, 14 N.E.3d 524. A trial
court’s division of marital property will not be reversed on appeal unless “no reasonable person
would take the view adopted by the trial court.” In re Marriage of Wojcik, 362 Ill. App. 3d 144,
161, 838 N.E.2d 282, 297 (2005).
¶ 61 Here, the evidence shows respondent’s decision not to rent out the marital
investment properties during the pendency of the dissolution proceeding was based upon the
advice of her listing agent, who testified and confirmed the occupancy by tenants made showings
difficult. In addition, the evidence indicates the vacatur of the tenants allowed the parties to address
the suggestions which the listing agent believed would make the properties sell faster. From this
evidence, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to offset petitioner’s
share of the marital property by the lost rental income.
¶ 62 In summary, all of respondent’s contentions of error are meritless except for his
contentions concerning the trial court’s classification of the rental income from petitioner’s
nonmarital property and his Roth IRA. Having concluded the court should have classified the
rental income as marital property, we find the matter must be remanded for the court to vacate its
award of a $20,000 credit to petitioner for her payment of the parties’ marital debt with the rental
income and for the court to determine, either through a stipulation of the parties or a limited
- 15 - evidentiary hearing, the net income realized from 409 Irvine and whether any of that income was
used to pay for marital expenses. Having also concluded the court should have classified
respondent’s Roth IRA as nonmarital property, the court on remand should award respondent that
account. After doing the above, the court should issue a new equitable division of the marital
property.
¶ 63 In reaching this decision, we choose to comment on the property issues presented
in this case. The parties did not succinctly explain the issues in this case to the trial court or this
court. This court, and undoubtedly the trial court who drafted a 17-page opinion and order followed
by a 7-page opinion and order, dedicated substantial time and resources to deciphering the issues
presented. A more careful effort to set forth the issues before the trial court would have avoided
parts of this appeal and ultimately resulted in outcomes acceptable by the parties.
¶ 64 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 65 We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.
¶ 66 Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded with directions.
- 16 -