NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2024 IL App (3d) 230399-U
Order filed September 26, 2024 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit, LESLIE GRAY ROBBINS, ) Du Page County, Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee and ) Cross-Appellant, ) Appeal No. 3-23-0399 ) Circuit No. 21-D-1121 and ) ) EDWARD WEST ROBBINS, ) ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant and ) Maureen R. Riordan, Cross-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Holdridge and Albrecht concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s finding that the funds in an income retirement account were marital property was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court erred in holding that the wife failed to present a prima facie case for dissipation. Reversed and remanded with directions and for further proceedings.
¶2 Respondent, Edward West Robbins, appeals from the trial court’s ruling that an income
retirement account was marital property. Petitioner, Leslie Gray Robbins, cross-appeals from the trial court’s ruling denying her dissipation claim. For the following reasons, we reverse as to
those challenged portions of the trial court’s dissolution judgment and order denying
reconsideration and remand the cause with directions and for further proceedings consistent with
this decision.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Leslie and Edward were married on June 3, 2006, and have two minor children. On June
16, 2021, Leslie filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. The parties entered into an agreed
allocation of parental responsibilities and an equal parenting time schedule, and that agreement is
not at issue on appeal.
¶5 A. Pretrial Proceedings
¶6 Extensive pretrial litigation ensued on issues pertaining to the marital estate, including
Leslie’s dissipation claim. Namely, on April 6, 2022, Leslie filed a petition for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, requesting that Edward be enjoined from
unilaterally accessing the parties’ marital assets. Leslie asserted that, between October 19, 2021,
and January 18, 2022, Edward liquidated and transferred a total of $76,000 from the parties’
marital brokerage account into his personal bank account—$29,000 on October 19, 2021;
$25,000 on November 17, 2021; and $22,000 on January 18, 2022. Edward filed a motion to
strike and dismiss the petition, arguing, inter alia, that Leslie failed to plead the requisite
irreparable harm, as there were no allegations that Edward in fact dissipated the subject funds,
the marital estate was worth approximately $1.5 million, and Edward owns a business and earns
a steady income from that business. On June 10, 2022, following a hearing, the trial court
granted Edward’s motion but allowed Leslie leave to refile.
2 ¶7 Thereafter, on November 30, 2022, Leslie filed a notice of intent to claim dissipation at
trial, in accordance with the statutory requirements set forth in section 503(d)(2) of the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act). 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(2) (West 2022). Leslie
asserted that Edward made additional withdrawals from the marital brokerage account, depleting
the account’s balance from $158,000 to zero during a 15-month time period. Edward filed a
response, arguing that Leslie failed to establish that Edward used the funds for a nonmarital
purpose and thus failed to establish a prima facie case for dissipation and that he withdrew the
funds and transferred them into his checking account to pay “marital, family expenses.”
¶8 B. Trial
¶9 Trial on the various disputed issues occurred over a period of five days in February 2023.
Witnesses included both parties and Edward’s mother. In addition, Leslie called an expert
witness on the issue of Edward’s income, and both parties called expert witnesses regarding the
valuation of Edward’s business. We recount the evidence as it pertains to the issues on appeal—
the allocation of a Roth income retirement account (IRA) and the dissipation claim.
¶ 10 With respect to the Roth IRA, Edward testified that, in 2002 (four years before his
marriage to Leslie), he converted a traditional IRA into the Roth IRA at issue here. Edward
identified a 2002, IRA conversion form showing that he converted a traditional IRA into Roth
IRA x2523, and a March 2003 statement for Roth IRA x2523. The next account statement
Edward identified for the Roth IRA was a March 31, 2007, statement with a different account
number—namely Roth IRA x5294. Edward testified, over Leslie’s counsel’s objection for lack
of foundation and that it called for a conclusion, that the accounts were one and the same Roth
IRA, although he acknowledged that he did not have a document evidencing this. The March 31,
2007, statement contained a graph showing the monthly value of the account for the prior 12
3 months and in the “Retirement Activity Summary,” stated that no contributions were made in
2006 (the year in which Edward and Leslie were married) or to date in 2007. Edward further
testified that he made no contributions to the Roth IRA during that time. The March 31, 2007,
statement further reflected that the value of the Roth IRA was $80,000 as of May 2006, which
was just prior to the parties’ June 3, 2006, wedding.
¶ 11 For the years 2007 through 2012, Edward provided no account statements for the Roth
IRA but testified that he did not make any contributions to the Roth IRA in those years. The
parties’ joint federal tax returns for 2007 to 2013 and an attached “IRA Information Worksheet”
for each year were introduced into evidence. While Leslie’s counsel objected to admission of the
worksheets for lack of foundation because the worksheets are neither signed nor filed, the trial
court overruled the objection and admitted the worksheets along with the tax returns, which were
self-prepared by Edward. The IRA Information Worksheet is a three-page form, stating at the top
“Keep for your records,” and setting forth, inter alia, sections to record the “Basis (Contribution
and Conversion History),” “Excess Contributions,” and “Contributions” for a Roth IRA. Edward
testified that, as reflected on the 2007 to 2013 worksheets, he made no contributions to his Roth
IRA during those years and that the basis in the Roth IRA remained precisely the same from
2006 to 2013. Moreover, Edward testified that he could not have contributed to a Roth IRA in
any of those years because his adjusted gross income, as reflected on the tax returns, was above
the maximum level allowed for Roth IRA contributions. Leslie’s counsel had objected to the
testimony, arguing that it assumes facts not in evidence and calls for a conclusion and an opinion
as to the IRS limits—an opinion for which, counsel argued, Edward was not qualified to testify.
However, the trial court overruled the objection, stating, “If he knows, overruled. You can
answer.”
4 ¶ 12 Edward did provide account statements for Roth IRA account x5294 for the years 2013
through 2022, reflecting that no contributions were made to the account during that time. Edward
likewise testified that he made no contributions to the Roth IRA for those years. The final
statement introduced (December 2022) reflected an ending account value of $487,424.
¶ 13 With respect to the dissipation claim, Edward testified regarding his withdrawals and
depletion of the $158,000 from the brokerage account during the 15-month time frame. Edward
did not dispute the withdrawals, confirmed that he was the sole authorized signatory on the
brokerage account, and acknowledged that he transferred the funds into his sole checking
account. Edward testified that his annual income was $50,000 at the time and that he needed the
funds to pay household and child-related expenses. Edward further testified that he paid his
personal credit cards from his checking account, including paying credit card bills in the amount
of $18,810 in October 2021. Edward acknowledged that the credit card bills included charges for
his attorney fees. Edward also acknowledged that, with the exception of a $20,000 payment to
Leslie’s expert witness, none of the withdrawn funds were given to Leslie, who had moved out
of the marital home in March 2022. Leslie introduced text messages and e-mails between the
parties reflecting Leslie’s objections to Edward’s use of the funds.
¶ 14 At the conclusion of Leslie’s case-in-chief, Edward’s counsel orally moved for a directed
finding on Leslie’s dissipation claim on the ground that Leslie failed to provide any evidence that
the funds were used for a nonmarital purpose. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that,
to shift the burden of proof regarding dissipation, there must first be a preliminary showing of
dissipation and finding that Leslie failed to establish a prima facie showing of dissipation. The
trial reasoned,
5 “I’ve again gone through the testimony that we’ve taken; the testimony from
[Edward] regarding his spending, I'll say where his funds were used for legal fees,
mortgage payments, children’s camps, et cetera, et cetera; the testimony from [Leslie]
this morning was that she was aware that these amounts were being removed from the
retirement accounts in order to pay for the mortgage, the living expenses. According to
[Edward’s] response, she also got a $20,000 advance from those funds. Respectfully, I
don’t find that there’s been any evidence or testimony that these funds were used for a
nonmarital purpose, and therefore, the motion for a directed finding is going to be
granted.”
However, the trial court subsequently granted in part Leslie’s counsel’s oral motion for
reconsideration, citing Edward’s testimony that he used some of the funds for his attorney fees
and reasoning that use of marital funds for attorney fees may amount to dissipation.
¶ 15 C. Dissolution Judgment
¶ 16 Following the close of evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement and
thereafter issued its dissolution judgment on April 5, 2023. We recount those portions of the
dissolution judgment relevant to the issues on appeal and outline the overall distribution of the
marital estate as context for the parties’ arguments on appeal. The trial court set forth its findings
with respect to the value of the parties’ marital estate and then found a 55/45 division to be
equitable, with Leslie receiving 55% and Edward receiving 45%. This included an award of
$225,000 to Leslie for her interest in the marital residence and a net award of approximately
$12,000 for her interest in Edward’s business (valued at $104,400) after deducting her 45% share
of Edward’s father’s loan to the business. Regarding the parties’ debt, which the trial court found
to be substantial, the trial court ordered each party to pay the credit card debt in their own name,
6 with Leslie’s estimated to be between $24,910 and $32,921 and Edward’s estimated to be
$29,506. The trial court also ordered Edward to pay Leslie monthly child support in the amount
of $200—an upward deviation from the statutory guidelines based upon the parties’ relative
incomes (Edward: $100,000 in imputed income for 2022; Leslie: $65,941 in gross income for
2022); ordered Edward to pay 60% and Leslie 40% of child-related expenses; and barred Edward
from receiving maintenance from Leslie but reserved for three years the issue of potential
maintenance from Edward to Leslie.
¶ 17 The dissolution judgment included a section titled “Non-Marital Property,” in which the
trial court found that certain mineral rights were Leslie’s nonmarital property and, following
extensive findings on the issue, that a Charles Schwab investment account containing
approximately $1 million that Edward received in July 2022 upon the death of his father (as a
remainder beneficiary of a trust that had been created by Edward’s grandfather) was Edward’s
nonmarital property. The trial court then concluded that “the remaining claims for non-marital
property [which included the Roth IRA claim] were not traced by clear and convincing
evidence” and ordered all marital retirement accounts to be divided on a 55/45 basis as of March
31, 2023, with Leslie receiving 55% of the account and Edward receiving 45% of the account.
¶ 18 Regarding the dissipation claim, the trial court noted that it had granted an oral motion
for a directed finding pursuant to section 2-1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735
ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 2022) (“Motion in non-jury case to find for defendant at close of plaintiff’s
evidence”)), finding that Leslie had not made a prima facie showing of dissipation but thereafter
reconsidered its ruling and reinstated the dissipation claim only as it pertained to attorney fees.
However, noting that it nonetheless maintained the discretion as to whether to award dissipated
funds, the trial court declined to order Edward to reimburse Leslie for his use of the funds to pay
7 attorney fees. In doing so, the trial court reasoned, “This case was heavily litigated, and the Court
notes both parties incurred substantial legal fees.” Accordingly, the trial court denied the
dissipation claim.
¶ 19 D. Posttrial Proceedings
¶ 20 Both parties filed motions to reconsider the dissolution judgment. Leslie moved for
reconsideration of the trial court’s finding that the Charles Schwab investment account was
nonmarital property, and Edward moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s finding that the
Roth IRA was marital property. Edward asserted that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that
his Roth IRA was acquired and funded prior to the marriage and that he did not contribute any
additional funds to the Roth IRA during the marriage. Thus, Edward argued that he traced the
source of the funds by clear and convincing evidence.
¶ 21 Following briefing and argument, on August 2, 2023, the trial court denied both motions
to reconsider. As for the Charles Schwab investment account, the trial court reviewed the
evidence and reiterated that Edward proved by clear and convincing evidence that the account
was his nonmarital property. Regarding the Roth IRA, the trial court reasoned that, while
Edward testified that “it was the same account as the 2003 IRA and the account numbers were
different,” and “2006 was, at least, referenced on that initial graph that the account was, in fact,
open in 2006,” there was nonetheless a “gap in time from 2007 to 2012 where we have no
account statements.” The trial court further reasoned, “[W]hile I do appreciate that there are the
IRS information worksheets that are attached to the tax returns, those worksheets do specifically
state at the top that they are for taxpayer records only. Those are not filed and, respectfully, I do
not find that they meet the high burden of clear and convincing evidence to show that this was
[Edward’s] nonmarital property; so, respectfully, the motion to reconsider is going to be denied.”
8 ¶ 22 Edward timely filed a notice of appeal from the dissolution judgment and the order
denying reconsideration. Leslie thereafter timely filed a notice of cross-appeal from the
dissolution judgment and the order denying reconsideration.
¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 24 On appeal, Edward seeks reversal of the trial court’s finding that the Roth IRA was
marital property. He argues that he met his burden of tracing the source of the funds in the
account by clear and convincing evidence. Alternatively, Edward argues that the trial court
should have minimally reimbursed his nonmarital estate for the $80,000 value of the Roth IRA
before the parties’ marriage. Leslie counters that the trial court’s finding that Edward failed to
adequately trace the source of the funds in the Roth IRA was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence because Edward failed to adequately document the source of the funds. Leslie also
argues that Edward forfeited his alternative claim that his nonmarital estate should be reimbursed
$80,000 by failing to raise the issue in the trial court.
¶ 25 On cross-appeal, Leslie seeks reversal of the trial court’s denial of her dissipation claim.
She argues that the trial court erred in holding that she failed to establish a prima facie case for
the entirety of her dissipation claim and also challenges the trial court’s denial of the claim as to
attorney fees. Edward responds that Leslie failed to meet her initial burden of showing that
dissipation occurred and that the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying the
dissipation claim as to attorney fees.
¶ 26 We address each issue in turn.
¶ 27 A. Roth IRA
¶ 28 In distributing a marital estate, the trial court must first determine what constitutes marital
property and what constitutes nonmarital property. In re Marriage of Dhillon, 2014 IL App (3d)
9 130653, ¶ 30. A trial court’s classification of property will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 29. A trial court’s finding is against the
manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent from the
record or if the finding is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based on the evidence. Id.
¶ 29 Whether property is classified as marital or nonmarital is governed by section 503 of the
Act (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2020)). Marital property means all property, including debts and
other obligations, acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage. Id. § 503(a). Section
503(a) sets forth exceptions known as nonmarital property. Id. Among the exceptions are
“property acquired before the marriage, except as it relates to retirement plans that may have
marital and non-marital characteristics.” Id. § 503(a)(6); In re Marriage of Budorick, 2020 IL
App (1st) 190994, ¶ 40.
¶ 30 Retirement plans are further addressed in section 503(b)(2) of the Act, which provides
that individual retirement accounts acquired by or participated in by either spouse after the
marriage and before a dissolution judgment are presumed to be marital property but that the
presumption may be overcome by showing through clear and convincing evidence that the
property was acquired by a method listed in section 503(a). 750 ILCS 5/503(b)(2) (West 2020);
Marriage of Budorick, 2020 IL App (1st) 190994, ¶ 41. The party claiming the property is
nonmarital bears the burden of rebutting the presumption. Marriage of Budorick, 2020 IL App
(1st) 190994, ¶ 41. Any doubts as to the classification of the property will be resolved in favor of
finding the property to be marital property. Id.
¶ 31 Edward posits that the Roth IRA was nonmarital property under the Act because he
funded it before the marriage and he made no contributions to the account during the marriage. A
party claiming that a retirement account is nonmarital may meet its burden of overcoming the
10 presumption of marital property by tracing, through clear and convincing evidence, that the
property was acquired before the marriage. See In re Marriage of Stuhr, 2016 IL App (1st)
152370, ¶ 52. “ ‘Tracing of funds is a procedure which allows the court to find that property
which would otherwise fall within the definition of marital property is actually nonmarital
property under one of the statutory exceptions.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Jelinek, 244 Ill.
App. 3d 496, 504 (1993)). Tracing requires that the source of the funds be identified by clear and
convincing evidence. Id. ¶¶ 52-55. Clear and convincing evidence is that “quantum of proof that
leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder as to the truth of the proposition in
question.” Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213 (1995).
¶ 32 Edward challenges the trial court’s finding that he did not trace the funds in his Roth IRA
by clear and convincing evidence. He argues that the documentary evidence and his
uncontroverted testimony established that the Roth IRA predated the parties’ marriage and that
he made no contributions to the account during the marriage. Edward cites the March 2002 IRA
conversion form showing that, several years before the parties’ marriage, he converted a
traditional IRA into Roth IRA x2523, the March 2003 statement for Roth IRA x2523, and the
March 2007 account statement for the Roth IRA ending in x5294. Leslie points to the obvious
discrepancy in the account numbers, while Edward cites his unrefuted testimony that the
accounts were one and the same, albeit acknowledging the lack of supporting documentation for
his assertion that the account numbers changed at some point between 2003 and 2005. Further,
the March 31, 2007, statement listed balances for Roth IRA x5294 dating back to March 2006—
several months before the parties’ June 2006 wedding—thereby establishing that the Roth IRA
existed before the parties’ marriage. Indeed, the trial court recognized as much in noting that
“2006 was, at least, referenced on that initial graph that the account was, in fact, open in 2006.”
11 ¶ 33 As for contributions, while Edward introduced account statements for the most recent
years, 2013 through 2022, showing that he made no contributions to the Roth IRA, he did not
introduce account statements for the years 2007 to 2012. The trial court focused on the years
without account statements in finding that the Roth IRA was marital property, reasoning that the
IRA Information Worksheets are for taxpayer records only and not filed and therefore, “I do not
find that they [the worksheets] meet the high burden of clear and convincing evidence to show
that this was [Edward’s] nonmarital property.” (Emphasis added.) However, this finding
disregards Edward’s uncontradicted testimony. In addition to the worksheets, Edward testified
unequivocally that he did not make any contributions to the Roth IRA for the years without
account statements or any other year during the marriage. “[A] party’s testimony may be
sufficient to trace whether marital funds were contributed to nonmarital property.” Marriage of
Stuhr, 2016 IL App (1st) 152370, ¶ 55 (citing In re Marriage of Henke, 313 Ill. App. 3d 159, 174
(2000) (the wife’s testimony was sufficient to trace the contributions of the marital estate to the
nonmarital property by clear and convincing evidence)). While uncontradicted testimony, if
inherently unreasonable or improbable, need not be believed (see Marriage of Stuhr, 2016 IL
App (1st) 152370, ¶ 55), here, the trial court made no credibility findings with respect to
Edward’s testimony, and there is nothing in the record to suggest his testimony was incredible.
Indeed, in addition to his uncontradicted testimony, Edward introduced into evidence the parties’
joint federal tax returns for 2007 to 2013 as well as the attached IRA Information Worksheets for
each year reflecting that he did not make any contributions to the Roth IRA in those years and
that the basis in the Roth IRA remained precisely the same. Moreover, Edward testified that he
could not have contributed to a Roth IRA in any of those years because his adjusted gross
12 income, as reflected on the tax returns, was above the maximum level allowed for Roth IRA
contributions.
¶ 34 Accordingly, this case is simply unlike the cases upon which Leslie relies, where the trial
court’s classification of a financial account was held to be against the manifest weight of the
evidence given the spouse’s uncorroborated or incredible testimony and absence of documentary
evidence. See Marriage of Budorick, 2020 IL App (1st) 190994, ¶ 47 (the wife’s uncorroborated,
“perfunctory, affirmative response to a leading question by her counsel as to the nonmarital
source of the funds” in a retirement plan did not amount to clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to overcome the presumption of marital property); Marriage of Dhillon, 2014 IL App
(3d) 130653, ¶ 32 (the husband’s testimony, “which the trial court found to be completely
lacking in credibility,” was insufficient to meet his burden of tracing the funds in a savings
account by clear and convincing evidence). Here, given the documentary evidence presented at
trial, as well as Edward’s uncontroverted testimony regarding the tax returns and worksheets and
that he did not contribute to the Roth IRA during the marriage, the trial court’s finding that
Edward failed to trace the funds was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 35 We therefore reverse the trial court’s finding that the Roth IRA was marital property
subject to allocation and remand the matter to the trial court for entry of an order awarding the
Roth IRA to Edward as his nonmarital property. In light of our holding, we need not address
Edward’s alternative argument that the trial court should have minimally reimbursed his
nonmarital estate for the $80,000 value of the Roth IRA before the parties’ marriage.
¶ 36 B. Dissipation
¶ 37 When dividing marital property, the trial court is required to consider all relevant factors,
including those listed in section 503(d) of the Act. 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2020). Among the
13 enumerated factors are “the dissipation by each party of the marital or non-marital property.” Id.
§ 503(d)(2); In re Marriage of Romano, 2012 IL App (2d) 091339, ¶ 86. Dissipation is the use of
marital assets for the sole benefit of one spouse for purposes unrelated to the marriage while the
marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown. In re Marriage of O’Neill, 138 Ill. 2d 487,
497 (1990). The party alleging dissipation must first make a prima facie showing that dissipation
has occurred. In re Marriage of Hamilton, 2019 IL App (5th) 170295, ¶ 78. Once this showing
has been made, the burden shifts to the party charged with dissipation to show with clear and
specific evidence how the funds were spent. Id.
¶ 38 Whether a party’s conduct constitutes dissipation depends on the facts and circumstances
of the particular case. Id. The trial court’s factual findings concerning dissipation will not be
reversed on appeal unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the court’s
final distribution of property is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Vancura,
356 Ill. App. 3d 200, 204-05 (2005). Here, the procedural context is such that we are also
reviewing the trial court’s grant of Edward’s motion for a directed finding as to the entirety of
the dissipation claim pursuant to section 2-1110 of the Code on the basis that Leslie failed to
present a prima facie case as to all but the attorney fee portion of the dissipation claim. The
parties agree that the standard of review for this issue is de novo. See Marriage of Romano, 2012
IL App (2d) 091339, ¶ 100 (in ruling on a motion for a directed finding, if the trial court finds
that the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case as a matter of law, the standard of
review on appeal is de novo). We begin with this issue.
¶ 39 Leslie argues that she established a prima facie case of dissipation due to the undisputed
evidence that Edward, within a 15-month time span after she filed her dissolution petition,
depleted the entire $158,000 in their marital brokerage account. She also points out that Edward
14 was the only signatory on the account and transferred the money to his personal checking
account over Leslie’s objection. We agree that that this evidence met Leslie’s burden of making
a preliminary, prima facie showing at to the entirety of her dissipation claim. In squarely
addressing the question of what a spouse needs to show to make a prima facie showing of
dissipation, the court in Marriage of Hamilton noted that, “in many cases, the prima facie
evidence of dissipation consists of large withdrawals of cash from the parties’ bank accounts.”
Marriage of Hamilton, 2019 IL App (5th) 170295, ¶ 80 (citing, inter alia, Marriage of Dhillon,
2014 IL App (3d) 130653, ¶¶ 9, 11 (the spouse essentially depleted the marital funds in a savings
account by making a few large transfers over a short period of time); Vancura, 356 Ill. App. 3d
at 203 (the spouse cashed a $ 16,000 check made out to a family business without the wife’s
knowledge); Henke, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 177 (the spouse took an IRA distribution of $33,669)).
Moreover, a large withdrawal is just one way to make a prima facie showing of dissipation. Id. A
prima facie showing of dissipation may also be established by showing that funds withdrawn or
spent by a spouse over a period of months or years added up to a substantial amount. Id. ¶¶ 82-84
(collecting cases).
¶ 40 Here, Edward did not dispute that the amount of $158,000 taken from the parties’
brokerage account was substantial, and the record supports Leslie’s characterization of the
amount as substantial when considered in the context of the entirety of the marital estate. The
account was depleted within a 15-month time period, including $76,000 between October 2021
and January 2022. Accordingly, given the evidence presented, the trial court erred in holding that
Leslie failed to establish a prima facie case of dissipation. See id. The trial court reasoned that
Leslie did not present evidence that the funds were used for a nonmarital purpose (other than for
attorney fees) and granted Edward’s motion for a directed finding on this basis. But this confuses
15 Leslie’s burden to make a prima facie case with Edward’s ultimate burden to show how the
funds were spent. Leslie did not bear the initial burden on the latter issue. See id. ¶ 80 (“It is
clear that the party claiming dissipation is not required to demonstrate that the funds at issue
were used for a purpose unrelated to the marriage.”). Rather, she bore the initial burden of
making a prima facie showing of dissipation, which she did by evidencing Edward’s depletion of
the brokerage account, so as to shift the burden to Edward to demonstrate with clear and specific
evidence how the funds were spent. See id. ¶¶ 78, 80. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s
grant of Edward’s motion for a directed finding on the dissipation claim and remand for
consideration of the dissipation claim.
¶ 41 In this regard, we note that there did not appear to be any dispute that $20,000 of the
challenged funds were given to Leslie for her legal expenses. Also, while the trial court found
that Edward’s use of the funds to pay an unidentified amount in attorney fees amounted to
dissipation (see In re Marriage of Berberet, 2012 IL App (4th) 110749, ¶ 58 (“The use of marital
assets to pay fees to one’s attorney for the costs of the divorce constitutes dissipation of marital
assets.”)), it nonetheless declined to order Edward to reimburse Leslie, reasoning that the case
was heavily litigated and both sides incurred substantial legal fees. “Even where dissipation is
established, the circuit court ‘is not required to charge against a party the amounts found to have
been dissipated but may do so.’ ” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 51 (quoting In re Marriage of
Murphy, 259 Ill. App. 3d 336, 340 (1994)). Here, the trial court’s directed finding on the
dissipation claim precluded it from considering the entirety of Leslie’s dissipation claim which
should be reconsidered in its entirety on remand. Accordingly, upon remand, the trial court shall
consider the dissipation claim in its entirety in resolving the claim and any impact on the division
of marital property.
16 ¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 43 For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County
and remand the cause with directions and for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
¶ 44 Reversed and remanded.