In re Marriage of Orton

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 29, 2025
• Docket: 24-0891
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0891 Filed October 29, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ALISHA ANNE ORTON AND ROBERT STEPHEN ORTON

Upon the Petition of ALISHA ANNE ORTON, Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

And Concerning ROBERT STEPHEN ORTON, Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott J. Beattie, Judge.

A husband and wife appeal the terms of their dissolution decree.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS AND REMANDED.

David E. Brick and Allison M. Steuterman of Brick Gentry, P.C., West Des

Moines, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Anjela Shutts and Katelyn Kurt of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for

appellee/cross-appellant.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and

Chicchelly, JJ. 2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

This appeal involves the terms of the decree dissolving the marriage of

Alisha and Robert Orton. Robert appeals the calculation of his annual income and

the spousal support awarded to Alisha. Alisha cross-appeals, arguing the district

court should have awarded a property equalization payment or otherwise asks us

to find the premarital agreement unenforceable. Alisha further requests appellate

attorney fees. Upon our review, we affirm the district court and remand for a

determination of appellate attorney fees.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Robert and Alisha were married in 2006 and have four children. Robert was

born in England and moved to Iowa in 2003 on a short-term visa. He inherited

several properties in England, which he sold for $650,000, and formed

Knightsbridge Homes, LLC.

Robert and Alisha met in 2005 and began dating. In February 2006, Alisha

found out she was pregnant with the couple’s baby. Robert agreed to get married

if Alisha signed a premarital agreement that protected his businesses and other

assets.

Robert’s attorney drafted a premarital agreement and arranged for an

attorney to meet with Alisha and advise her on the premarital agreement. Upon

the attorney’s review, the attorney recommended to Alisha that Robert’s separate

property be limited to the $650,000 he brought to his company in cash. The

attorney drafted a second premarital agreement reflecting that change. 3

When Alisha presented Robert with the new draft, he refused to sign it and,

after a discussion, Alisha signed the original draft. Alisha informed her attorney in

writing that despite their discussion, she decided to sign the original.

During the parties’ eighteen-year marriage, Robert’s businesses grew

exponentially. After Robert and his business partner decided to build homes

independently, the partner returned Robert’s original investment and Robert

formed Orton Homes, LLC (“Orton Homes”). Much of the family’s expenses were

paid by Orton Homes. Alisha remained a stay-at-home mom throughout the

marriage. Over the years, Robert created several additional business entities.

Robert’s business assets are currently encumbered by $79,566,877 in debt, which

he personally guaranteed.

During the marriage, Robert and Alisha also jointly owned several

properties. At the time of trial, the parties owned a home in West Des Moines

valued at $2,600,000 and a vacation home on West Lake Okoboji valued at

$1,940,000. Additionally, Robert and Alisha agreed to have Orton Homes

construct a home to her specifications which she would own free of any debt upon

the entry of the dissolution decree.

Robert’s reported income during the marriage varied from year to year.

According to his 2018 to 2022 joint tax returns, Robert’s annual income was as

follows:

2018 $ 454,986 2019 $ 163,889 2020 $ 728,494 2021 $1,599,387 2022 $ 81,632 4

At the trial, the district court heard expert testimony from two experts and

determined Robert’s actual annual income was $1,196,597. Throughout the

marriage, Robert paid approximately $39,247 in monthly personal expenses from

his businesses. Based on the district court’s income determination, it ordered

Robert to pay $3104.96 per month in child support and awarded Alisha spousal

support in the amount of $20,000 per month until either party dies, or Alisha

remarries. Robert now appeals and Alisha cross-appeals.

II. Standard of Review

Because dissolutions of marriage are equitable proceedings, our review is

de novo. In re Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016). We give

weight to the factual findings of the district court, especially when considering the

credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. Id. We will disturb those

findings only if they fail to do equity. Id. “There are no hard and fast rules

governing the economic provisions in a dissolution action; each decision depends

upon the unique circumstances and facts relevant to each issue.” In re Marriage

of Gaer, 476 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Iowa 1991).

III. Premarital Agreement

First, we address Alisha’s challenge to the premarital agreement. Alisha

does not argue that the premarital agreement is unenforceable but instead argues

that (1) the terms of the premarital agreement require a division of business assets,

and (2) equity requires division of the assets even if the agreement does not

require it. We disagree and find the district court properly interpreted the premarital

agreement. 5

Alisha first asserts we “declined to enforce the prenuptial agreement” in our

unpublished decision In re Marriage of McCabe, No. 20-1121, 2022 WL 468738,

at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2022) and invites us to do the same here. However,

in McCabe we found the “premarital agreement was procedurally unconscionable,

and therefore unenforceable.” 2022 WL 468738, at *2. Alisha does not raise an

unconscionability challenge here,1 and we decline to address an issue not raised

on appeal.

Next, we turn to the interpretation of the premarital agreement. “As a

general rule, prenuptial agreements are favored and should be construed liberally

to carry out the intention of the parties.” In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 561

N.W.2d 94, 96 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997); see also Iowa Code § 596.5 (2024). “[W]e

construe and treat antenuptial agreements in the same manner as we do ordinary

contracts.” In re Marriage of Christensen, 543 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa Ct. App.

1995).

We turn to the text of the premarital agreement. The disputed portion of the

premarital agreement states:

The parties agree that all property belonging to husband at the commencement of the marriage shall remain the separate property of husband. Husband shall have sole management and control over his separate property, and his separate property shall be subject to his disposition in the same manner as if no marriage had been entered into between the parties.

After considering the premarital agreement as a whole, we find the intent of the

parties was to keep Robert’s companies as separate property. We deny Alisha’s

1 Alisha not only does not raise a challenge to the validity of the agreement but

concedes it was signed after she had the opportunity to consult with counsel. 6

request to treat the companies as a marital asset to divide, and we affirm the district

court’s enforcement of the premarital agreement. See In re Marriage of Hansen,

No. 17-0889, 2018 WL 4922992, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2018) (enforcing

premarital agreements to carry out the intent of the parties).

This conclusion is further supported by the evidence in the record of the

circumstances that led to the signing of the premarital agreement. Prior to signing

the premarital agreement, Alisha consulted with an attorney. Alisha’s attorney

made several edits to the agreement to emphasize that the parties would only not

have an interest in the other’s then-existing separate property. But that is not the

version of the agreement Alisha signed. She signed the original version that did

not include those edits despite the advice of her attorney and despite her

understanding that signing it could put her at a disadvantage. Therefore, we must

enforce the premarital agreement that the parties signed and give it the force the

parties intended.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s interpretation and application of

the parties’ premarital agreement.

IV. Annual Income Determination

The parties dispute Robert’s income determination, which is necessary to

resolve the issues of child support and spousal support. Both parties presented

expert testimony at trial. The district court found Alisha’s expert more credible and

adopted his expert opinion when setting Robert’s annual income at $1,196,597.

Robert’s expert utilized the five-year average of Robert’s income which was

$605,678. But he argued that two years were outliers and should be excluded

from the income determination. He then averaged the other three years and gave 7

an opinion that Robert’s income for spousal and child support should be

approximately $450,000.

Alisha’s expert determined Robert’s five-year average income was

$1,196,597. He reached this number by including the distributions Robert had

taken from his companies over the same five-year period as the taxable income

used by Robert’s expert. He found Robert had taken on average $566,480 in

distributions.

We determine the parties’ incomes from the most reliable evidence

presented. In re Marriage of Powell, 474 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 1991). Generally,

the best evidence of income comes from completed income tax returns. In re

Marriage of Hansen, 886 N.W.2d 868, 876 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016). But that income

“may not necessarily equate to a party’s adjusted net income on their tax return.”

Id. This may be especially true when calculating self-employed income or income

generated from a closely held corporation. See, e.g., In re Marriage of

Wiedemann, 402 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1987) (“It is not uncommon for an owner

to cover many normal personal living expenses through the corporation or to over-

depreciate or undervalue inventory, all of which would decrease profits while

increasing the owner’s standard of living or the actual value of the company’s

assets.”); In re Marriage of McKamey, 522 N.W.2d 95, 99 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994)

(concluding that district court properly increased self-employed husband’s income

by amounts taken from business for personal use but claimed as business

expenses on husband’s tax returns).

We defer to the district court’s determination of the experts’ credibility. See

In re Marriage of Schildberg, No. 05-0081, 2005 WL 3115872, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. 8

Nov. 23, 2005) (“Normally, we defer to a district court’s assessment of ‘dueling’

expert witnesses because that court is in a better position to judge the credibility

of witnesses.”). And on our review, we find Alisha’s expert accurately calculated

Robert’s income by factoring in distributions from the businesses. McKamey, 522

N.W.2d at 99. So, we affirm the district court’s income determination.

V. Spousal Support Award

Robert next claims he should not be required to pay spousal support to

Alisha in the amount of $20,000 per month. He argues (1) traditional spousal

support is not available due to the length of the marriage and (2) the district court

did not properly consider Alisha’s earning capacity. We disagree.

While this court reviews spousal support awards de novo, we “afford

deference to the district court for institutional and pragmatic reasons” and disturb

its “determination of spousal support only when there has been a failure to do

equity.” In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Iowa 2023) (cleaned up).

“Spousal support is not an absolute right; rather, its allowance is determined based

on the particular circumstances presented in each case.” In re Marriage of Mills,

983 N.W.2d 61, 67 (Iowa 2022). Iowa courts are “to equitably award spousal

support by considering” the criteria listed in Iowa Code section 598.21A(1). Mauer,

874 N.W.2d at 107.

“In applying these statutory criteria, our precedents have recognized four

forms of spousal support deemed equitable: traditional, reimbursement,

rehabilitative, and transitional.” Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 185. Each type has a

different goal, and the amount and duration of a spousal support award “should be

tailored to achieve the underlying equitable purpose of the spousal support award.” 9

Id. While these categories are not mutually exclusive, and hybrid awards are

permitted, courts are not “free to award spousal support not corresponding to any

recognized category of support.” Id. at 186.

This case involves an award of traditional spousal support. “The purpose

of a traditional or permanent alimony award is to provide the receiving spouse with

support comparable to what he or she would receive if the marriage continued.” In

re Marriage of Hettinga, 574 N.W.2d 920, 922 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (en banc). In

accordance with this purpose, therefore, “[t]raditional or permanent alimony is

usually payable for life or for so long as the dependent is incapable of self-support.”

Id.

Marriages lasting twenty years or more are generally considered long-term

and qualify for traditional spousal support. In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402,

410–11 (Iowa 2015). However, marriages lasting less than twenty years may

qualify. In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 543 (Iowa 2022); In re

Marriage of Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d 481, 486–87 (Iowa 2012) (affirming a

traditional alimony award following a sixteen-year marriage). The award and

duration of a traditional alimony award “is primarily predicated on need and ability.”

Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 411 (citation omitted). The earning capacity of the parties is

the driving focus in this analysis. Id.

Robert and Alisha were married for eighteen years at the time of trial. The

district court found lifetime spousal support was equitable “[due to the length of the

relationship and marriage.” Throughout the marriage, Alisha has worked part-time

sporadically. She does not hold any higher education except attending some

community college courses before the marriage. The district court found Alisha’s 10

annual income is $21,840. On the other hand, Robert runs a home-building

company with a net monthly income of $60,000.

Next, we turn to Alisha’s need for the level of support. Alisha’s limited

education and work experience negatively impact her earning capacity. But in

addition, over the course of the marriage it is clear that Alisha became accustomed

to a lifestyle that her earning capacity could not support. Based on our review of

the record, we agree with the district court’s finding that the parties lived a “lifestyle

of significant means.” The lifestyle the parties were accustomed to is a factor in

determining need for spousal support. See Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 415 (noting the

goal of spousal support is “to live in a fashion that approaches the lifestyle to which

she was accustomed in the marriage”); Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d at 543 (“Ideally, the

support should be fixed so the continuation of both parties’ standard of living can

continue, if possible.” (citation omitted)). The record shows the parties’ monthly

household expenses were supported by approximately $39,000 coming in from the

businesses on top of Robert’s income. These monthly expenses during the

marriage included three homes valued at over $5,500,000, regular nanny services,

private school tuition for the children, regular house cleaners, vehicles valued at

$211,346, jewelry and designer handbags valued at $400,000, boats and docks at

Lake Okoboji, and expensive house furnishings valued at $200,000. In addition,

even after considering the earning capacity of the parties and the property

settlement Alisha received, Alisha currently has little to no retirement assets. So,

we find Alisha has established a need for a significant spousal support award.

Based on our de novo review and consideration of the statutory factors, we

agree with the district court that traditional spousal support in the amount of 11

$20,000 per month is equitable and appropriate under the unique circumstances

before us. See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(a)–(j).

VI. Appellate Attorney Fees

Finally, Alisha requests appellate attorney fees. An award of appellate

attorney fees is not a matter of right but rests in this court's discretion. See In re

Marriage of Towne, 966 N.W.2d 668, 680 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021). Our “controlling

consideration” is the parties’ relative financial positions, but we also consider the

merits of the appeal and “whether a party has been obliged to defend the trial

court’s decision on appeal.” In re Marriage of Michael, 839 N.W.2d 630, 639 (Iowa

2013).

Because Alisha was required to defend the appeal and prevailed, as well

as her income relative to Robert, we find an award of appellate attorney fees is

appropriate. However, Alisha should not be awarded appellate attorney fees for

her cross-appeal. But because she has not provided an affidavit of attorney fees

with documentation to support her request, we remand to the district court to

determine the amount of Alisha’s appellate attorney fees and enter judgment

against Robert in a reasonable amount. See Towne, 966 N.W.2d at 680

(remanding for the district court to calculate “reasonable and necessary fees”

incurred on appeal).

VII. Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s determination of Robert’s income and the

amount of spousal support awarded to Alisha. We further affirm the district court’s

enforcement of the parties’ premarital agreement. We find Alisha is entitled to 12

appellate attorney fees and remand to the district court for a determination of a

reasonable amount.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.