2023 IL App (1st) 221097-U
No. 1-22-1097
Order filed August 18, 2023
FIFTH DIVISION
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
In re MARRIAGE OF ) ) Appeal from the RADOSLAW MUSIEJUK ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Petitioner-Appellant, ) ) No. 2017 D 4188 and ) ) Honorable ANNA MUSIEJUK, ) Abbey Fishman Romanek, ) Judge presiding. Respondent-Appellee. )
JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Navarro concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the trial court’s order where petitioner failed to present a sufficiently complete record or a reasoned argument to support his claims.
¶2 Petitioner Radoslaw Musiejuk appeals the trial court’s order reducing his child support
payments and ordering the parties to share education expenses of their child. Appearing pro se, he
raises the following issue: did the trial court commit reversible error in modifying the amount of
child support and allocating education expenses between the parties because it failed to enforce
the parties’ marital settlement agreement? For the following reasons, we affirm. No. 1-22-1097
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Radoslaw Musiejuk and Anna Musiejuk dissolved their marriage in May 2017. The parties
executed a joint parenting agreement and a marital settlement agreement, and the judgment for
dissolution of marriage incorporated the marital settlement agreement. Under the marital
settlement agreement, Radoslaw Musiejuk was to pay Anna Musiejuk child support for the parties’
two minor children in the amount of $133.00 per week. About a year and a half later, in January
2019, Anna Musiejuk brought a petition for rule to show cause against Radoslaw Musiejuk for
failure to pay child support. While the petition was pending, Anna Musiejuk also filed a motion to
modify child support. After a hearing, the trial court modified child support to $1162.00 per month
and directed Radoslaw Musiejuk to provide “proof that the receipts that were presented in Court
today were previously tendered.” Those receipts presented at the hearing purported to represent
Radoslaw Musiejuk’s cash payments of child support.
¶5 Anna Musiejuk subsequently filed a second motion to modify child support, alleging that
she has never received the cash payments as reflected on the receipts. She averred that she signed
some of the receipts because Radoslaw Musiejuk told her that he would not pay child support if
she refused to sign. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found that there was no
compelling cause or justification for Radoslaw Musiejuk’s failure to pay child support. The trial
court set his child support arrearage at $12,510.80.
¶6 After a few months, the parties returned before the trial court on Radoslaw Musiejuk’s
petition to modify and abate child support, and he argued that his obligation—including modified
child support, mortgage contribution, arrearage payment, and attorney fees—should be abated due
to his unemployment. Anna Musiejuk also filed a motion for post high school expense
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contribution. Following a hearing, on May 31, 2022, the trial court entered an order (1) setting a
payment plan to pay off the arrearage of $7,016.52; (2) ordering him to share the college tuition
and costs for one of the children; and (3) reducing his child support obligation to $536.00 per
month. Radoslaw Musiejuk appealed.
¶7 ANALYSIS
¶8 As an initial matter, we recognize that Radoslaw Musiejuk is proceeding pro se. However,
litigants’ pro se status does not relieve them of their burden to comply with the court rules. Oruta
v. B.E.W. & Continental, 2016 IL App (1st) 152735, ¶ 30; see also In re Marriage of Hluska, 2011
IL App (1st) 092636, ¶ 57 (“Supreme court rules are not advisory suggestions, but rules to be
followed.”).
¶9 Anna Musiejuk raises a threshold issue of whether Radoslaw Musiejuk has filed a timely
notice of appeal. A reviewing court “must ascertain its jurisdiction before proceeding in a cause of
action, regardless of whether either party has raised the issue.” Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois
Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009). The timely filing of a notice of appeal is both
jurisdictional and mandatory. Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). In general, the notice of appeal
must be filed within 30 days after entry of the trial court’s final judgment. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (eff.
July 1, 2017). When a party fails to file a notice of appeal within that 30-day period, Rule 303(d)
allows the reviewing court to grant the party leave to appeal if the party has filed a motion
providing a reasonable excuse for failure to file a timely notice, accompanied by the proposed
notice of appeal, within 30 days after expiration of the time to file the timely notice. Ill. S. Ct. R.
303(d).
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¶ 10 Radoslaw Musiejuk purports to appeal the trial court’s order entered on May 31, 2022.
Having failed to file a timely notice of appeal within 30 days from that date—on or before June
30, 2022—he filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal on July 26, 2022, which we
granted. In re Marriage of Musiejuk, No. 1-22-1097 (filed Aug. 5, 2022) (order granting leave to
file late notice of appeal). Because the motion was filed within 30 days after expiration of the time
to file timely notice, Radoslaw Musiejuk’s notice of appeal was timely under Rule 303(d).
¶ 11 Anna Musiejuk contends that the issue regarding cash payments was finalized in February
2021 at the latest and that Radoslaw Musiejuk’s instant appeal is untimely as to that issue. Here,
the notice of appeal was filed on August 5, 2022 with the grant of his motion for leave to file a late
notice of appeal and is unquestionably untimely with respect to issues from February 2021. 1 See
Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (allowing up to 60 days to file a notice of appeal). In fact, Radoslaw Musiejuk
had already attempted to appeal orders addressing cash payments by filing a motion for leave to
file a late notice of appeal in June 2022. We had denied the motion as untimely. In re Marriage of
Musiejuk, No. 1-22-0782 (filed June 8, 2022) (order denying leave to file late notice of appeal).
¶ 12 Aside from the untimely appealed issue, Radoslaw Musiejuk’s remaining argument
appears to rest on a contention that the parties’ marital settlement agreement was somehow not
enforced. His argument, however, does not comply with Rule 341(h)(7). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341 (eff.
Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 341(h) sets forth requirements for the content of appellant’s briefs, providing
1 In addition, the notice of appeal does not specify any order that addressed the cash payments issue. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(b)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017). A reviewing court does have jurisdiction to consider an unspecified judgment “if it is a ‘step in the procedural progression leading’ to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal.” Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 435 (1979).
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2023 IL App (1st) 221097-U
No. 1-22-1097
Order filed August 18, 2023
FIFTH DIVISION
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
In re MARRIAGE OF ) ) Appeal from the RADOSLAW MUSIEJUK ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Petitioner-Appellant, ) ) No. 2017 D 4188 and ) ) Honorable ANNA MUSIEJUK, ) Abbey Fishman Romanek, ) Judge presiding. Respondent-Appellee. )
JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Navarro concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the trial court’s order where petitioner failed to present a sufficiently complete record or a reasoned argument to support his claims.
¶2 Petitioner Radoslaw Musiejuk appeals the trial court’s order reducing his child support
payments and ordering the parties to share education expenses of their child. Appearing pro se, he
raises the following issue: did the trial court commit reversible error in modifying the amount of
child support and allocating education expenses between the parties because it failed to enforce
the parties’ marital settlement agreement? For the following reasons, we affirm. No. 1-22-1097
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Radoslaw Musiejuk and Anna Musiejuk dissolved their marriage in May 2017. The parties
executed a joint parenting agreement and a marital settlement agreement, and the judgment for
dissolution of marriage incorporated the marital settlement agreement. Under the marital
settlement agreement, Radoslaw Musiejuk was to pay Anna Musiejuk child support for the parties’
two minor children in the amount of $133.00 per week. About a year and a half later, in January
2019, Anna Musiejuk brought a petition for rule to show cause against Radoslaw Musiejuk for
failure to pay child support. While the petition was pending, Anna Musiejuk also filed a motion to
modify child support. After a hearing, the trial court modified child support to $1162.00 per month
and directed Radoslaw Musiejuk to provide “proof that the receipts that were presented in Court
today were previously tendered.” Those receipts presented at the hearing purported to represent
Radoslaw Musiejuk’s cash payments of child support.
¶5 Anna Musiejuk subsequently filed a second motion to modify child support, alleging that
she has never received the cash payments as reflected on the receipts. She averred that she signed
some of the receipts because Radoslaw Musiejuk told her that he would not pay child support if
she refused to sign. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found that there was no
compelling cause or justification for Radoslaw Musiejuk’s failure to pay child support. The trial
court set his child support arrearage at $12,510.80.
¶6 After a few months, the parties returned before the trial court on Radoslaw Musiejuk’s
petition to modify and abate child support, and he argued that his obligation—including modified
child support, mortgage contribution, arrearage payment, and attorney fees—should be abated due
to his unemployment. Anna Musiejuk also filed a motion for post high school expense
-2- No. 1-22-1097
contribution. Following a hearing, on May 31, 2022, the trial court entered an order (1) setting a
payment plan to pay off the arrearage of $7,016.52; (2) ordering him to share the college tuition
and costs for one of the children; and (3) reducing his child support obligation to $536.00 per
month. Radoslaw Musiejuk appealed.
¶7 ANALYSIS
¶8 As an initial matter, we recognize that Radoslaw Musiejuk is proceeding pro se. However,
litigants’ pro se status does not relieve them of their burden to comply with the court rules. Oruta
v. B.E.W. & Continental, 2016 IL App (1st) 152735, ¶ 30; see also In re Marriage of Hluska, 2011
IL App (1st) 092636, ¶ 57 (“Supreme court rules are not advisory suggestions, but rules to be
followed.”).
¶9 Anna Musiejuk raises a threshold issue of whether Radoslaw Musiejuk has filed a timely
notice of appeal. A reviewing court “must ascertain its jurisdiction before proceeding in a cause of
action, regardless of whether either party has raised the issue.” Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois
Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009). The timely filing of a notice of appeal is both
jurisdictional and mandatory. Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). In general, the notice of appeal
must be filed within 30 days after entry of the trial court’s final judgment. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (eff.
July 1, 2017). When a party fails to file a notice of appeal within that 30-day period, Rule 303(d)
allows the reviewing court to grant the party leave to appeal if the party has filed a motion
providing a reasonable excuse for failure to file a timely notice, accompanied by the proposed
notice of appeal, within 30 days after expiration of the time to file the timely notice. Ill. S. Ct. R.
303(d).
-3- No. 1-22-1097
¶ 10 Radoslaw Musiejuk purports to appeal the trial court’s order entered on May 31, 2022.
Having failed to file a timely notice of appeal within 30 days from that date—on or before June
30, 2022—he filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal on July 26, 2022, which we
granted. In re Marriage of Musiejuk, No. 1-22-1097 (filed Aug. 5, 2022) (order granting leave to
file late notice of appeal). Because the motion was filed within 30 days after expiration of the time
to file timely notice, Radoslaw Musiejuk’s notice of appeal was timely under Rule 303(d).
¶ 11 Anna Musiejuk contends that the issue regarding cash payments was finalized in February
2021 at the latest and that Radoslaw Musiejuk’s instant appeal is untimely as to that issue. Here,
the notice of appeal was filed on August 5, 2022 with the grant of his motion for leave to file a late
notice of appeal and is unquestionably untimely with respect to issues from February 2021. 1 See
Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (allowing up to 60 days to file a notice of appeal). In fact, Radoslaw Musiejuk
had already attempted to appeal orders addressing cash payments by filing a motion for leave to
file a late notice of appeal in June 2022. We had denied the motion as untimely. In re Marriage of
Musiejuk, No. 1-22-0782 (filed June 8, 2022) (order denying leave to file late notice of appeal).
¶ 12 Aside from the untimely appealed issue, Radoslaw Musiejuk’s remaining argument
appears to rest on a contention that the parties’ marital settlement agreement was somehow not
enforced. His argument, however, does not comply with Rule 341(h)(7). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341 (eff.
Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 341(h) sets forth requirements for the content of appellant’s briefs, providing
1 In addition, the notice of appeal does not specify any order that addressed the cash payments issue. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(b)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017). A reviewing court does have jurisdiction to consider an unspecified judgment “if it is a ‘step in the procedural progression leading’ to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal.” Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 435 (1979). However, nothing suggests, nor is any argument made, that an order finding propriety of cash payment evidence and setting child support arrearages is a procedural step leading to the judgment specified in the notice, which is an order modifying the amount of child support based on the parties’ income and ordering the parties to share a child’s education expenses.
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that an appellant’s brief must contain an “Argument” section that includes “the contentions of the
appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record
relied on.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Here, he failed to set forth in his brief a fully developed and
reasoned analysis for his argument, hindering a meaningful review. He lists (incompletely)
multiple provisions of the marital settlement agreement, presents a few unintelligible sentences
seeking relief, and entirely fails to explain what his arguments and their bases are. An issue that is
not clearly defined and sufficient presented fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 341(h)(7) and
is forfeited. Atlas v. Mayer Hoffman McCann, P.C., 2019 IL App (1st) 180939, ¶ 33; see also
Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 370 (2010) (“An issue that is merely listed or included in a
vague allegation of error is not ‘argued’ and will not satisfy the requirements of the rule.”). The
procedural deficiencies in his brief therefore result in forfeiture of his arguments.
¶ 13 In addition to having forfeited his argument, Radoslaw Musiejuk did not provide a copy of
the transcript from hearings that precipitated any of the orders he purports to challenge. An
appellant has the burden to “present a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at trial to
support a claim of error.” Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). In the absence of such
record or an acceptable substitute, it is presumed that the trial court’s order was “in conformity
with law and had a sufficient factual basis.” Id. at 392. Radoslaw Musiejuk’s failure to provide a
sufficiently complete record thus serves as an additional basis on which to affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
¶ 14 To the extent that he argues that the trial court committed error in failing to enforce the
marital settlement agreement, it is well established that the trial court has the authority to modify
a child support provision of a dissolution judgment entered in accordance with a settlement
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agreement. Blisset v. Blisset, 123 Ill. 2d 161, 167-68 (1988); see also 750 ILCS 5/510(a), 513
(West 2018). Further, the modification of child support lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and we do not interfere with that discretion absent its abuse. In re Marriage of Rogers, 213
Ill. 2d 129, 135 (2004). Again, the lack of a cohesive legal argument for the trial court’s abuse of
discretion, combined with the deficient record, supports our conclusion that we cannot review
Radoslaw Musiejuk’s claims on the merits.
¶ 15 CONCLUSION
¶ 16 The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
¶ 17 Affirmed.
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