In re Marriage of Molone

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: September 17, 2025
• Docket: 25-0186
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0186 Filed September 17, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JENA RAE MOLONE AND LYNDON DOUGLAS MOLONE

Upon the Petition of JENA RAE MOLONE, Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning LYNDON DOUGLAS MOLONE, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hardin County,

Christopher C. Polking, Judge.

A former spouse appeals from the denial of his petition to vacate the decree

dissolving his marriage. AFFIRMED.

Randall L. Jackson of Ellis Law Offices, P.C., Indianola, for appellant.

Emily R. Lavery of Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for

appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and

Sandy, JJ. 2

BULLER, Judge.

Lyndon Molone appeals from the denial of his petition to vacate the decree

dissolving his marriage to Jena Molone, now known as Jena Auttonberry. The

parties gave differing accounts of Lyndon signing their stipulated divorce decree.

The district court found “[n]either party seems more credible than the other” but

observed that evidence in equipoise favored Jena, as Lyndon had the burden of

proof on his claims. See Iowa Rs. Civ. P. 1.1012, 1.1013.

The court found Lyndon’s signature on the acceptance of service

constituted notice as to the stipulation’s contents, the filing of which caused Lyndon

to voluntarily appear and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. And the court noted

Lyndon subsequently appeared by counsel through a general—not special—

appearance to answer a contempt and admitted in a pleading he had been served.

On Lyndon’s claims of irregularity or fraud, the court found the stipulation’s

filing style was “common practice” in the district, a typographical error was

immaterial, and Lyndon signing the stipulation cured any irregularity in the original

notice. The court observed that Lyndon did not raise any issue during the ninety-

day waiting period. And, the court found, even accepting Lyndon’s claims as true,

“his complaints would have been resolved by his reading the stipulation” and he

was “charged with knowledge of its terms” because he signed it.

We, like the court below, find Lyndon did not carry his burden to vacate the

decree. Because the district court considered all the issues presented, we agree

with its ruling, and further opinion by us would not augment or clarify existing law,

we affirm by memorandum opinion. See Iowa Ct. Rs. 21.26(1)(d) and (e).

AFFIRMED.