In re Marriage of Lugo

2025 IL App (1st) 231478

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 231478 No. 1-23-1478 First Division May 12, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois ERIC LUGO, ) ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) and ) No. 2018 D 530308 ) CAREY LUGO, ) Honorable ) D. Renee Jackson Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION

¶1 This case stems from dissolution of marriage proceedings between petitioner-appellee, Eric

Lugo (Eric), and respondent-appellant, Carey Lugo (Carey), pursuant to the Illinois Marriage and

Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2018)). In April 2018, Eric filed

a petition for dissolution, alleging irreconcilable differences. Eric requested that both parties be

responsible for decision-making for the party’s minor child, A.L. Finally, he waived child support

and asked that both parties be barred from receiving maintenance. Carey filed no response. No. 1-23-1478

¶2 Following a court order in August 2018 requiring the parties to file financial affidavits, the

case languished for a variety of reasons, including Carey’s failure to file a financial affidavit,

failure to respond to discovery, and changing of counsel on the eve of trial. Additionally, prior to

the start of the first scheduled trial date in 2020, Eric filed a motion in limine barring Carey’s

testimony on any financial matters, including any need for maintenance. Carey was given an

additional 28 days to comply with outstanding discovery. She again failed to comply, and the court

entered an order barring her testimony as to such matters.

¶3 After more continuances and the appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL), a bench trial,

followed by a hearing on Carey’s petition for contribution for attorney fees, was held over the

course of a year. Finally, on July 14 and July 17, 2023, respectively, the trial court denied Carey’s

request for fees and entered a dissolution judgment. Relevant here, the court denied maintenance

to Carey and granted her 30% of Eric’s pension. Additionally, the court denied Carey’s request for

unsupervised parenting time and required her to pay for 100% of parental supervision fees, as well

as 50% of the minor child’s healthcare expenses.

¶4 Now on appeal, Carey argues that the trial court made multiple errors in its related rulings.

Specifically, she contends that (1) the court abused its discretion when it barred her from testifying

as to financial matters; (2) the court’s finding that grounds for dissolution of marriage was against

the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) the court erred when it denied Carey’s request for

maintenance; (4) the court abused its discretion by only awarding 30% of Eric’s marital pension

to her, as well as failing to address a second account; (5) the court abused its discretion by ordering

her to pay for 50% of the minor child’s healthcare expenses, 60% of parenting coordinator costs,

and 100% of supervised visitation costs; and (6) the court abused its discretion in denying her

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petition for contribution to her attorney fees. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of

the trial court.

¶5 I. BACKGROUND

¶6 A. The Parties’ Divorce Proceedings

¶7 The following facts are derived from the record on appeal. 1 Eric and Carey were married

on December 28, 2007, in Illinois. The marriage resulted in two children, Jillian 2 and A.L. At the

time of the filing of Eric’s petition, Jillian was emancipated and A.L. was eight years old, and Eric

lived in La Grange, Illinois, while Carey lived in Chicago.

¶8 Sometime in 2014 or 2015, 3 the parties separated. On April 25, 2018, Eric filed a pro se

form order petition for dissolution in the circuit court of Cook County. Therein, he alleged that the

parties had separated on or about January 2014, that irreconcilable differences had caused an

irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, efforts at reconciliation had failed, and future efforts

would be impractical and not in the best interest of the family. Eric further alleged that he was

employed as an electrical apprentice and that Carey was unemployed but asserted that both were

capable of supporting themselves and should be barred from receiving maintenance or child

support. Eric also sought a majority of parenting time for A.L., despite alleging that both parties

were fit and proper to have joint decision-making responsibilities.

¶9 On July 10, 2018, Carey filed an appearance, identifying Michael Walsh as counsel. An

appearance was filed on Eric’s behalf in August 2018.

1 The record reflects that Judge Joan M. Kubalanza first presided over this case up until her retirement, followed by Judge D. Renee Jackson. 2 The parties’ eldest daughter’s name is spelled differently throughout the record. 3 The parties disagree as to the precise date of separation.

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¶ 10 1. Pretrial Proceedings

¶ 11 On August 2, 2018, the trial court entered an order setting the case for status and ordered

the parties to exchange financial affidavits within 28 days. Eric subsequently propounded

discovery to Carey within the court-ordered deadline. He also filed his financial affidavit with

supporting documents. 4

¶ 12 The matter was continued multiple times for status on settlement and parenting plans. On

September 27, 2019, on the court’s own motion, a GAL was appointed for A.L., with Eric to pay

a majority of the GAL’s costs. In a separate order, Carey was granted supervised parenting time

every other weekend with A.L., and Eric was to enroll her in therapy. The matter was continued

for status in light of a pending Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) investigation

against Carey. 5

¶ 13 On December 12, 2019, the court entered an order requiring Carey to undergo drug and

alcohol testing and a psychological evaluation. Both parties and the GAL were ordered to research

options for low-cost drug and alcohol evaluations, as well as a visitation supervisor.

¶ 14 On February 2, 2020, the court entered various orders allowing Carey to have supervised

parenting time with Metropolitan Family Services (MFS) on a temporary basis. Carey was to pay

for the visits on a sliding scale fee schedule. Eric was also ordered to research insurance coverage

for a parenting capacity evaluation. Lastly, Carey was ordered to undergo further drug testing.

¶ 15 2. Proceedings Related to Carey’s Discovery Sanction

4 The affidavit does not appear in the record on appeal, but Carey attaches it to the appendix of her brief. We discuss the propriety of this attachment later. 5 There is no documentary evidence in the record regarding this investigation.

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¶ 16 On October 1, 2020, Eric’s counsel propounded additional discovery to Carey. The next

day, on October 2, 2020, Carey’s counsel, Walsh, filed a motion to withdraw. Therein, counsel

stated that he and Carey had “reached an impasse with regard to the strategy and the direction” of

the case and that Carey had “expressed extreme disappointment in the representation provided by

counsel.” Walsh further asserted that he had not had any recent communication with her.

¶ 17 On November 16, 2020, Eric filed a motion in limine to bar Carey from testifying to certain

financial matters or calling any additional witnesses not previously disclosed pursuant to Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (eff. July 1, 2002). Therein, Eric asserted that, after the matter had

been set for trial, he had propounded discovery to Carey. She had failed to respond, and according

to Eric, her attorney had indicated that it was “unlikely that any responses would be forthcoming.”

As such, Eric requested that Carey be barred from testifying as to (a) her income, expenses, assets,

and liabilities; (b) her current employment and work history; (c) the value of any marital or

nonmarital assets or liabilities; (d) her wishes as to the allocation of assets and liabilities; and

(e) any need for financial support, including child support and maintenance. Eric further requested

that Carey pay any reasonable attorney fees and costs expended in bringing the motion, and that

the court impose a monetary penalty for failure to comply with discovery.

¶ 18 On November 19, 2020, an order was entered requiring Carey to undergo a parental

capacity evaluation, as well as to engage in recommended services as determined by the evaluation.

That same day, an additional agreed order, entered by Judge Kubalanza, continued trial to March

22, 2021. The order further stated that no other continuances would be granted. Carey was further

ordered to immediately schedule and “fully cooperate” in completing the evaluation at risk of

having her parenting time reduced. The court also entered and continued Carey’s counsel’s motion

to withdraw. Finally, the agreed order entered and continued Eric’s motion in limine. However, it

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expressly ordered Carey to provide responses to Eric’s discovery requests within 28 days and

warned that “[i]f Carey fail[ed] to provide responses to Eric’s requests, she shall be barred from

testifying regarding financial issues.”

¶ 19 The case continued to be delayed due to Carey’s failure to complete the evaluation and her

drug and alcohol testing. Over Eric’s objection, the March 22, 2021, trial date was stricken and a

pretrial conference set for July 15, 2021.

¶ 20 Following the pretrial conference, in an order entered by Judge Jackson, Carey’s counsel’s

motion to withdraw was continued to August 25, 2021, and Carey was given 21 days to retain new

counsel. The order further stated that new counsel had to be “ready to proceed to trial” at a

rescheduled trial date in November. Finally, the order also delineated the issues at trial, stating:

“6. This [c]ourt recognizes that the main focus of the trial will be parenting issues,

that there are limited marital assets, and that the issues of maintenance and child support

will be straightforward in nature and of minimal focus at trial. Further, this [c]ourt has

previously ordered on November 19, 2020, that Carey shall be barred from testifying on

any financial issues for her failure to provide answers to [Eric’s] discovery requests, and

said order remains in effect.

7. While this [c]ourt is not re-opening discovery, the parties may exchange witness

lists, exhibits to be used at trial, and any motions in limine by November 4, 2021. The same

shall be provided to the [c]ourt seven days before trial, on November 11, 2021.”

¶ 21 On August 25, 2021, the court granted Walsh’s motion to withdraw. Carey was granted an

additional 21 days to obtain new counsel or file a pro se appearance. The order further stated that

the case would proceed to trial on November 18, 2021, “with or without [Carey] having counsel

pursuant to this [c]ourt’s order of July 15, 2021.”

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¶ 22 3. Continued Pretrial Proceedings

¶ 23 On September 16, 2021, Eric filed a motion for default against Carey for her failure to file

an appearance. On September 28, 2021, new counsel filed an appearance on Carey’s behalf and

propounded discovery to Eric a few days later. In particular, Carey’s counsel included an Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 213(f) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) witness disclosure, indicating that, besides

identifying Eric as an adverse witness, she would be her sole witness and would testify to,

inter alia, lifestyle, standard of living, marital assets, income and expenses, and employment.

¶ 24 On November 18, 2021, Carey filed a petition for contribution to final attorney fees and

costs. Therein, Carey asserted that she had borrowed money from her mother to pay her past fees

and was unable to pay her outstanding balance. In support of her request, she attached her own

affidavit and that of her counsel. In her affidavit, she asserted that her gross income in 2020 was

$1,238.00, and that she lacked sufficient resources to pay her remaining balance, which her

counsel’s affidavit averred was $886.25.

¶ 25 4. Trial

¶ 26 Trial commenced on November 18, 2021, but, over Eric’s objection, was continued to May

10, 2023, for various reasons, 6 including Carey’s purported contraction of COVID-19, as well as

her failure to disclose her bankruptcy filing in federal court. 7

¶ 27 a. Eric Lugo

6 See court orders of February 18, 2022; June 21, 2022; July 12, 2022; October 25, 2022; November 3, 2022; December 7, 2022; January 12, 2023; April 11, 2023; May 10, 2023. 7 On February 18, 2022, the second day of trial, Eric’s counsel reminded the court that Carey had been barred from testifying as to financial issues. On the court’s inquiry, Eric’s counsel replied that Carey had never responded to discovery initially propounded in 2019, that a motion to compel had been filed, and that conferences had been held with the previous judge regarding this issue. We find neither the purported motion nor any showing of a conference between the parties and the judges in the record. According to Carey’s opening brief, no such motion was ever filed.

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¶ 28 On direct examination by his counsel, Eric testified as follows. He was 45 years old and

lived in Shorewood, Illinois, with his fiancé Kristen Calhoun, A.L., and his two children with

Kristen. 8 He had graduated from high school, attended some college, and had completed electrical

trade school. He was employed as an electrician and worked for the International Brotherhood of

Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 134 union chapter.

¶ 29 Eric and Carey had been married since December 28, 2007, but had been separated since

2014, or about eight and a half years ago, while living in Missouri. The separation followed an

argument in which Carey became physically abusive towards him. Eric left the home and traveled

to his mother’s residence in LaGrange, Illinois. Upon arrival, he retrieved a voicemail from Carey

on his mother’s machine, in which Carey stated that she was “going to drive the kids off a cliff” if

Eric did not return. Eric called the police, and Carey was placed under psychological evaluation

for 72 hours.

¶ 30 In March 2014, Eric had been living with his mother and Carey had moved back to Illinois.

One day, he dropped the children off at Carey’s mother’s home but returned after Jillian called

him and told him to do so. Although he did not witness Carey become violent with anyone, there

were police on the scene when he arrived, and Carey was arrested. Eric subsequently filed for an

emergency order of protection on behalf of the children, which lasted for one year.

¶ 31 In 2018, when Eric filed for divorce, he had still been living with his mother. He did not

know where Carey had been living at the time but knew at some point she had been living with

8 Kristen Calhoun, Eric’s fiancé, also testified that the two had been a couple since December 2017, had lived together since January 2018, and had been engaged since March 2020.

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her boyfriend. At the end of 2018 or beginning of 2019, Carey moved out of her boyfriend’s home

and back in with her mother.

¶ 32 Eric believed it was in A.L.’s best interest to require Carey to continue with weekly

supervised visitation based on past drug use, past physical abuse, and an unstable housing situation.

To his knowledge, she had not exercised any supervised visitation. Eric made all major decisions

for A.L. with regard to school, healthcare, religion, and extracurricular activities. He had initially

sought joint decision-making responsibility but now believed he could not make those decisions

with Carey because she would become “hostile” and “argumentative” with him during

disagreements. He did not believe Carey’s mother should continue as visitation supervisor.

¶ 33 A copy of Eric’s financial affidavit was admitted into evidence. He testified that there had

been no substantial changes other than “normal” gains and losses to his income, assets, insurance,

or retirement plans since filing. He had not incurred any major debts with the exception of attorney

fees. He had a retirement pension account through IBEW, which he joined in January 2015 after

he and Carey had been separated for a year. As of November 2021, the pension was valued at

$80,000 but had decreased since the beginning of trial. Carey had not contributed to the account.

Eric wished to waive maintenance and child support for both parties, as Carey had not contributed

to any household expenses or child support from the time of separation. He did not believe Carey

was entitled to a portion of his retirement account, and the two did not share any bank accounts or

assets.

¶ 34 On cross-examination, Eric testified as follows. When asked why he did not file for divorce

until 2018, he stated that he could not afford to do so in 2014. He testified that he earned

approximately $80,000 in 2021 but was challenged by Carey’s counsel as to whether he had earned

more based on his financial affidavit. He had one checking account, one savings account, and a

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“vacation account” with Great Lakes Credit Union. Upon inquiry about a “John Hancock

retirement plan” valued at $80,000, which was listed on his affidavit, Eric testified that his pension

was a “lump sum,” and did not know if the pension plan was considered a savings plan. He did not

have retirement benefits with G&M Electric, his union’s employer.

¶ 35 Eric reiterated that Carey was not entitled to maintenance as she had not asked for any

financial assistance since their separation. He was unaware of her current occupation or income

given her failure to file a financial affidavit. He believed Carey was capable of supporting herself

as she was a high school graduate, had gone to trade school to become a certified nurse’s assistant,

and believed she had also completed dental trade school.

¶ 36 On redirect examination, Eric testified that, to his knowledge, he did not have any other

pension plans other than the one at John Hancock.

¶ 37 b. Dr. Alan Childs and the GAL

¶ 38 Dr. Alan Childs and the GAL testified in Eric’s case in chief. Dr. Alan Childs testified that

he was a licensed clinical psychologist and had been appointed to conduct Carey’s evaluation. In

May 2021, he authored a report that provided four specific recommendations, namely that (1) Eric

retain major decision-making abilities with regard to A.L., (2) Carey participate in individual

therapy with a provider certified in substance abuse disorders, (3) Carey continue psychiatric

services, and (4) Carey continue supervised visitation with A.L. through a neutral agreed-upon

supervisor.

¶ 39 The GAL 9 testified that she had authored a report in October 2019 regarding the allegations

of Carey’s physical violence towards her family. She had also provided three sets of individual

9 Neither the GAL nor Dr. Childs’ report appears in the appellate record.

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recommendations in this case, including one set to Carey. Her specific recommendations aligned

with Dr. Childs’s recommendations. The GAL also believed that reunification therapy with A.L.

was not possible at the time as Carey had failed to follow prior court recommendations by not

seeking drug treatment or individual counseling and delaying in the completion of her evaluation.

¶ 40 On cross-examination, the GAL testified that, although there were costs for supervised

visitation, the GAL was aware of Carey’s financial status and knew that MFS had a sliding fee

schedule based on income.

¶ 41 c. Carey Lugo

¶ 42 On direct examination by her counsel, Carey testified as follows. She and Eric were

married in 2007 and moved to Missouri in 2010 and lived there until 2014. Carey had been the

primary caretaker for A.L. between 2009 and 2014. Eric’s involvement had been “financial” as he

was traveling for his job. In July 2014, after living with her mother in Illinois, Eric and the children

moved out of the home and Carey remained. From 2014 to 2019, Eric lived with his mother in

LaGrange. In 2019, Carey left her mother’s house to live with her boyfriend. Carey was currently

living with her mother in a four-bedroom house.

¶ 43 Carey had not been working in 2014 as she suffered from low chronic back pain as a result

of an injury in 2008, resulting in a bulging disc and linear tear. She was due for surgery this

upcoming summer. Carey denied that she currently had an alcohol problem but admitted that she

had been previously prescribed Xanax and oxycodone for her back pain and that she had abused

the medication. Between January 2014 and November 2019, Carey completed various stints of

outpatient treatment for drug and alcohol abuse, which included stays in a psychiatric ward and in

the intensive care unit at various facilities in the state. She had also been investigated by DCFS

sometime in 2014. In the summer of 2015, she had been convicted of driving under the influence

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and attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. She was currently seeing a psychiatrist and was

required to provide drug and alcohol drops for another doctor, which had all come back “clean.”

¶ 44 Carey testified to wanting unsupervised parenting time with A.L. as she believed A.L. was

safe with her because she was no longer consuming alcohol. She admitted to slapping A.L. and

believed her eldest daughter had called DCFS. In the event supervised visitation continued, Carey

believed her mother would be appropriate as a supervisor. She also sought reunification therapy

between herself, A.L., and Eric and to be included in decisions regarding A.L.’s education,

healthcare, and extracurricular activities.

¶ 45 Over Eric’s counsel’s objection, Carey testified that she was in need of spousal

maintenance and also sought a portion of Eric’s retirement accounts. Over a subsequent objection,

Carey testified that she also wanted Eric to contribute to her attorney fees. She was “42, 43” years

old, had attended high school, and had gone to trade school as a certified nursing assistant and as

a dental assistant, which she had received licensure for in 2003 and 2019, respectively. 10 She was

currently employed as a babysitter for her niece and worked three times a week for nine hours a

day. When asked about how much she was paid per month, Eric’s counsel objected to this line of

questioning, which the court sustained.

¶ 46 On cross-examination, Carey testified as follows. She agreed that reunification therapy was

necessary but did not believe that the GAL’s recommendations for drug and alcohol classes should

be followed. Carey admitted that she had never scheduled a supervised visit with MFS. Carey

denied that her alcohol abuse had led to physical violence between herself and her family members.

She admitted to pleading guilty in 2014 to battery of her eldest daughter and that an order of

10 Carey later testified that she had been certified as a dental hygienist.

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protection had been entered against her from 2014 to 2015. She admitted that, as part of her

sentence, she had been ordered to undergo substance abuse screening and parenting classes and

had been placed under supervision. In 2015, she had pled guilty to domestic battery against her

eldest daughter and had also been arrested in 2017 for shoving her in the presence of the police. In

2017, she had also been arrested for domestic battery involving her brother. She denied telling Eric

that she would give up custody of A.L. due to her internal family struggles.

¶ 47 5. Hearing on Petition for Contribution of Attorney Fees

¶ 48 On November 3, 2022, the court began a separate hearing for Carey’s petition for

contribution of attorney fees, which concluded on May 10, 2023.

¶ 49 a. Eric

¶ 50 Upon adverse examination by Carey’s counsel, Eric testified that he lived with his fiancé

in a house that she had purchased for $400,000 in February 2022. He was not on the title or the

mortgage. He paid her $1,200 in monthly rent, and the monthly mortgage payment was $2,000.

Eric had paid $20,000 in attorney fees and still owed about $3,000. Eric had not paid Carey any

maintenance since their separation in 2014 and had only contributed to her medical insurance. He

had not paid her attorney fees. He did not recall the last time Carey had worked full-time but

believed it was in 2014. He was unaware of her having any assets.

¶ 51 b. Carey—Day 1

¶ 52 On direct examination by her own counsel, Carey testified as follows. She had retained her

current attorney on September 27, 2021, and had paid him a $5,000 retainer that she borrowed

from her mother. She had also borrowed money from her mother on various occasions to pay her

continuing legal bills. In total, she had borrowed $14,277.14, which she was expected to repay.

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Currently, she had a remaining balance of $1,462.50 and did not have any assets to pay her current

fees or to repay her mother. 11

¶ 53 Over Eric’s counsel’s objection, Carey testified that she babysat for her niece two days a

week during the school year. 12 She was paid $100 a week. She was trying to secure supplemental

income but struggled to do so due to her lower-back injury and was currently seeing a specialist

for the pain. She had last worked a full-time job in 2019 and had not “really earned anything”

since. She lived with her mother, received food stamps, and had a pending application for Social

Security benefits.

¶ 54 On cross-examination, Carey testified that her previous attorney, Walsh, had represented

her for three years. She had paid him $1,500 and had previously owed him a balance. However,

she had filed for bankruptcy in February 2021 and believed the balance was cleared.

¶ 55 At this point in the hearing, Eric’s counsel ceased questioning and indicated that she could

not proceed as she had been unaware of the bankruptcy filing. Carey’s counsel responded that he

had not represented Carey at that time and was also unaware of it. The court stopped the

proceeding, indicating that it could not continue due to Carey’s “unclean hands.” It further

admonished Carey, noting that she had been barred from testifying to financial information due to

her own failure to comply with discovery, and had she complied, her bankruptcy filing would have

likely come to light. The court then continued the hearing to another date.

¶ 56 c. Carey—Day 2

11 Both parties stipulated to the reasonableness of Carey’s attorney fees. 12 Eric’s counsel again objected on the basis of Carey being barred to testify to financial issues. The court overruled the objection and allowed Carey to provide testimony relative to her work income.

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¶ 57 At the continued hearing for fees, the parties informed the court that they had learned that

Carey had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on November 4, 2021, and that her debt had been

discharged on February 2, 2022.

¶ 58 Carey’s adverse examination continued. She had obtained a dental hygienist certificate in

2019 but had never been employed in the field. She had never filed a petition for temporary

maintenance. She had never paid child support because she was told that it did not have to be paid.

She confirmed that she had discharged $67,042.35 in debt through her bankruptcy filing, and

Walsh had been one of her creditors. She estimated her fees to be around $5,000. She had applied

for disability benefits in 2008, but the claim was denied, and she had not reapplied thereafter.

¶ 59 On redirect examination, Carey testified that she had filed for bankruptcy because she had

owed $30,000 in relation to a car accident. She had not held a job since receiving her dental

hygienist certificate. She estimated that she had applied to 10 different jobs, with her last

application occurring in 2020. She believed that her inability to find a job in the field had been due

in part to the COVID-19 pandemic.

¶ 60 6. Trial Court’s Ruling on Attorney Fees

¶ 61 On July 14, 2023, the trial court entered a written order denying Carey’s petition for

contribution pursuant to sections 503(j)(1)-(5) and 508 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(j)(1)-(5), 508

(West 2018)). 13

¶ 62 7. Trial Court’s Dissolution Judgment

¶ 63 On July 17, 2023, the trial court entered a dissolution judgment. Relevant here, the trial

court found that Eric had proven by “competent and relevant evidence” in showing that grounds

13 The court’s findings on the petition for contribution and ultimate dissolution judgment are discussed more fully in our resolution of the issues presented on appeal.

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for divorce, namely irreconcilable differences, existed. The court further found that neither party

had filed a petition or requested maintenance throughout the duration of the case and, after

considering the relevant evidence regarding the parties’ financial positions, both were barred from

receiving maintenance. As to the parties’ marital assets, the court determined that Eric’s IBEW

pension fund, worth approximately $80,000, was marital property and awarded 30% of the pension

to Carey. Next, the court ordered Eric to maintain health insurance for A.L., with Carey to

reimburse Eric for 50% of all healthcare costs and each to equally share 50% of out-of-pocket

expenses for medical, dental, and vision expenses. The court also denied Carey’s request for

unsupervised parenting time and ordered that supervised visitation continue with Carey

responsible for 100% of the cost. Finally, the court reiterated that each party was responsible for

their respective attorney fees and costs. The court concluded that its judgment was final with no

just reason to delay enforcement or appeal.

¶ 64 On August 16, 2023, Carey filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 65 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 66 A. Jurisdiction

¶ 67 Although not raised by either party, it is our independent duty to assess our jurisdiction in

reviewing this appeal, which is only established when a party files a timely notice of appeal. See

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. John J. Rickhoff Sheet Metal Co., 394 Ill. App. 3d 548, 556

(2009); see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017).

Although liberally construed, a notice confers jurisdiction regarding only those judgments or parts

thereof specified in the notice. People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 104-05 (2008). Even so, “[a]n appeal

from a final judgment draws into issue all previous interlocutory orders that produced the final

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judgment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of Gabriel, 2020 IL App (1st)

182710, ¶ 33.

¶ 68 “A petition for dissolution advances a single claim; that is, a request for an order dissolving

the parties’ marriage.” In re Marriage of Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d 114, 119 (1983). However, a

dissolution proceeding involves numerous ancillary issues, including property disposition and

support, and thus do not represent “separate, unrelated claims,” but rather,

“separate issues relating to the same claim.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. In her notice of appeal, Carey

did not expressly request review of the discovery sanction, the propriety of which is raised in this

appeal. Even so, because the sanction was related to the court’s maintenance award, we have

jurisdiction to consider it.

¶ 69 B. Preliminary Matters

¶ 70 Eric raises a litany of concerns related to Carey’s brief. First, he argues that her statement

of facts violates Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(i) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) by failing to include all the

facts relevant to the case, including the existence of an agreed order that led to Carey being barred

from testifying as to financial matters. Second, he contends that she violated Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 342 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019) by including his financial affidavit as an exhibit to her appendix

when it is not included in the record. Third, Eric asserts that Carey violated Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 342 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019) by failing to provide a table of testimony. Finally, Eric asserts that

Carey failed to provide appropriate citation to the record and/or supporting authority as required

by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶ 71 As the appellant, Carey had the burden of presenting a sufficiently complete record to

support her claims for error. Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 319 (2003)

(citing Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984)). We observe that Carey failed to provide

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for the inclusion of any trial records or exhibits, including the GAL’s report, copies of Eric’s

financial records, or anything she might have submitted during trial. As such, when the record on

appeal is incomplete, a reviewing court may “indulge in every reasonable presumption favorable

to the judgment from which the appeal is taken, including that the trial court ruled or acted

correctly.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fraser v. Jackson, 2014 IL App (2d) 130283, ¶ 22.

It appears that Carey attempted to remedy this omission by affixing Eric’s financial affidavit to

the appendix of her brief. Although our rules require the filing of such an appendix, we cannot

consider the affidavit in our resolution of the case, given that it was not included in the record on

appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(9) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020); Ill. S. Ct. R. 342 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019); Oruta

v. B.E.W., 2016 IL App (1st) 152735, ¶ 32 (courts shall disregard any documents included in an

appendix to a brief that were not included in the record on appeal).

¶ 72 Finally, regarding Carey’s purported violations of the statement of facts and her failure to

provide appropriate citations in support of her arguments, we consider each instance along with

our consideration of her issues on appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (appellant’s

brief must contain citations of authority in accordance with his or her contentions on appeal); Ill.

S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (appellant’s statement of facts must contain an accurate and

fair recitation of facts necessary to an understanding of the case). Nevertheless, we admonish Carey

for her failure to adhere to our supreme court rules, which “are not advisory suggestions, but rules

to be followed.” In re Marriage of Hluska, 2011 IL App (1st) 092636, ¶ 57.

¶ 73 C. The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act

¶ 74 The Act “was enacted to create a uniform law governing domestic relations.” In re

Marriage of Thompson, 79 Ill. App. 3d 310, 313 (1979). “[A] trial court’s authority to act in

dissolution proceedings is conferred only by statute” and “[t]he trial court may not rely upon its

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general equity powers.” In re Marriage of Ignatius, 338 Ill. App. 3d 652, 657 (2003); see In re

Marriage of Blum, 377 Ill. App. 3d 509, 526 (2007) (“The dissolution of marriage is entirely

statutory in origin and nature, and courts in dissolution cases must exercise their powers within the

limit of Act.”), rev’d on other grounds by Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21 (2009). However, the Act

is also to be “liberally construed” to “promote its underlying purposes.” 750 ILCS 5/102 (West

2018). Such purposes include “promot[ing] the amicable settlement of disputes that have arisen

between parties to a marriage” (id. § 102(3)), “ensur[ing] predictable decision-making for the care

of children and for the allocation of parenting time and other parental responsibilities” (id.

§ 102(5)), determining the best interest of children borne to the marriage (id. § 102(7)), “mak[ing]

reasonable provision for support during and after an underlying dissolution of marriage” (id.

§ 102(8)), and “eliminat[ing] the consideration of marital misconduct in the adjudication of rights

and duties incident to dissolution of marriage” (id. § 102(9)). Finally, before judgment, a court

must consider and make provisions for issues such as allocation of parental responsibility,

maintenance for either spouse, or disposition of property. Id. § 401(b).

¶ 75 1. Grounds for Dissolution

¶ 76 We begin with Carey’s argument that the trial court erred when it found that grounds for

dissolution existed, as our disposition of that issue will inform the scope of our review.

Specifically, Carey contends that Eric failed to establish that irreconcilable differences had caused

the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and that future attempts at reconciliation would be

impracticable and not in the best interest of the family. Carey points out that Eric’s petition only

alleged irreconcilable differences, and he made no attempt to conform his pleadings to the proof

presented. As such, Carey maintains that the court’s finding was against the manifest weight of

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the evidence. In support, but without any accompanying analysis, Carey cites In re Marriage of

Rittmeyer, 107 Ill. App. 3d 892 (1982). 14

¶ 77 Preliminarily, Eric responds that Carey fails to support her contention with any citation to

the record in violation of Rule 341(h)(7). Substantively, Eric contends that the record is replete

with evidence that the parties’ marriage was irretrievably broken, notably shown through: (a) his

petition; (b) his testimony that he and the children fled the marital residence because Carey was

addicted to drugs, had physically abused him, and had threatened to kill herself and the children;

(c) their nine-year separation prior to the entry of the dissolution judgment; and (d) both parties

engaging in other relationships, including Eric living with, becoming engaged to, and fathering

two children with another. As such, Eric concludes, the evidence showed that he did not wish to

remain married to Carey, which established irreconcilable differences that led to the irretrievable

breakdown of the marriage, citing In re Marriage of Smoller, 218 Ill. App. 3d 340 (1991).

¶ 78 In reply, Carey shifts the focus of her contention. Rather than address Eric’s assertion

regarding the breakdown, Carey posits that Eric never presented any evidence to show that there

were efforts made to reconcile or that future attempts to reconcile would be impractical or not in

the best interest of the family.

¶ 79 Pursuant to section 401 of the Act, the court must make a finding that “[i]rreconcilable

differences have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and the court determines that

efforts at reconciliation have failed or that future attempts at reconciliation would be impracticable

and not in the best interests of the family.” 750 ILCS 5/401(a) (West 2018). “Irreconcilable

differences ha[ve] been defined as the existence of marital problems which have so impaired the

14 Rittmeyer was decided under a prior version of the Act, which required proof of a specific ground for dissolution. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, ¶ 401.

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marriage relationship that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed” and an

“irretrievable breakdown of a marriage has been defined as where either or both parties are unable

or refuse to cohabit and there are no prospects for a reconciliation.” In re Marriage of Bates, 141

Ill. App. 3d 566, 570 (1986).

¶ 80 The court’s finding as to whether the petitioner has failed to establish grounds for

dissolution is assessed under the manifest weight of the evidence standard. In re Marriage of

Kirkpatrick, 329 Ill. App. 3d 202, 212 (2002). “Findings are against the manifest weight of the

evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the court’s findings are

unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on any of the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Marriage of Brill, 2017 IL App (2d) 160604, ¶ 30.

¶ 81 Initially, we note that Carey failed to file an answer to the petition or a counterpetition

denying that irreconcilable differences existed, thereby admitting the allegations therein. See In re

Marriage of Epting, 2012 IL App (1st) 113727, ¶ 30 (by failing to file an answer to the divorce

petition, appellant failed to deny allegation that parties lived in Illinois for 90 days and thus it was

deemed admitted); see also Roth v. Roth, 45 Ill. 2d 19, 23 (1970) (The “purpose of pleading is to

develop the issues to be determined. A failure to respond to an adversary pleading may constitute

an admission of all the facts well pleaded by the adversary and admissions thus drawn from a

failure to plead may be considered as evidence.”).

¶ 82 Further, and notwithstanding the substantial trial testimony, Carey cites nothing in the

record to support her contention. It is not the function of this court to comb the record in support

of a party’s claim. Having presented nothing in support of her argument, we deem the issue

forfeited. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020); Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive

Condominium Ass’n, 401 Ill. App. 3d 868, 881 (2010) (mere contentions without citation to

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authority merit no consideration on appeal); International Union of Operating Engineers Local

965 v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel, 2015 IL App (4th) 140352, ¶ 20 (a party forfeits

review of issue on appeal by failing to support its argument with citation to authorities).

¶ 83 However, even a cursory review of the record reveals sufficient evidence to support the

court’s determination. Specifically, as noted by the court, the parties’ formal separation in 2014

occurred after Eric vacated the joint residence due to Carey’s alleged physical abuse, as well as

after Carey’s threat to hurt herself and the children if he did not return. 15 In the years apart, both

Carey and Eric became involved in other relationships. Additionally, although it is true that Carey

testified to wanting reunification therapy with A.L. and Eric, the record shows that both parties, as

well the GAL, testified to Eric and Carey having very little communication since their separation.

See In re Marriage of Kenik, 181 Ill. App. 3d 266, 273-74 (1989) (relevant considerations

regarding parties living separate lives include whether the parties had ceased marital relations, as

well as the type of communication or lack thereof).

¶ 84 Moreover, even if the court were to disregard all of the evidence concerning the breakdown

of the marriage, section 401(a-5) of the Act specifically provides that if the parties had lived

separate and apart for a period of at least six continuous months immediately preceding the

dissolution judgment, there is an irrebuttable presumption of irreconcilable differences. See 750

ILCS 5/401(a-5) (West 2018). The record reflects that Carey and Eric have not lived together since

at least 2015. Accordingly, we can find no error based on this record.

¶ 85 2. Rule 219(c) Discovery Sanction

15 There is some conflicting testimony between Eric and Carey regarding the date of separation.

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¶ 86 In little more than three paragraphs, one of which is devoted entirely to a recitation of the

factors relevant to a determination of the propriety of discovery sanctions, Carey contends that

imposition of sanctions against her was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

¶ 87 In paragraph one of her argument, Carey contends that the trial court abused its discretion

by barring her testimony to any financial matters, which in turn affected many of the court’s

decisions, such as maintenance and attorney fees. 16 She asserts that Eric did not propound

discovery until October 1, 2020, when the trial had originally been set for November 19, 2020,

and where the case had been pending for more than two years. Although Carey admits that she did

not respond to Eric’s discovery requests for almost a year after discovery was propounded, she

notes that Eric failed to engage in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(k) (eff. July 1, 2014)

communications prior to filing his motion in limine.

¶ 88 In paragraph two, citing In re Marriage of Booher, 313 Ill. App. 3d 356 (2000), and In re

Marriage of Liszka, 2016 IL App (3d) 150238, Carey sets forth, verbatim, the six factors stated

therein relevant to an analysis of the court’s exercise of discretion in imposing sanctions. She then

concludes that barring a witness’s testimony is a drastic measure and should only be imposed when

a party unreasonably fails to comply with the court’s discovery rules.

¶ 89 In her third and final paragraph on the issue, Carey states that she was barred from offering

testimony on financial matters because she “did not answer written discovery 9½ months after

petitioner first requested the information.” Further, she again notes that, by the time of the request,

no motion to compel had been filed, and no Rule 201(k) conference had been held nor was there a

16 We preface our discussion with the acknowledgement that the sanction against Carey was entered pretrial by Judge Kubalanza. However, the barring of certain financial testimony reemerged as a topic of discussion throughout the trial proceedings, and the overall sanction was reaffirmed by Judge Jackson.

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letter submitted by Eric. Carey also posits that barring testimony as to her “paltry income as a

babysitter” was a drastic sanction. Further, she asserts that the record reveals that she suffered from

a substance abuse problem, did not have significant resources, was unemployed, and not seeking

child support. Accordingly, from Carey’s perspective, evidence not provided through discovery

but presented at trial would not have resulted in a surprise to Eric. Finally, she maintains that

because all of this information was known to Eric, none would have had any “prejudicial effect”

if she had been permitted to testify.

¶ 90 Eric refutes Carey’s assertion that he did not propound discovery until October 1, 2020,

given that she had been ordered by the court to produce a financial affidavit in August 2018 and

he had first served discovery requests on her a month later. Further, given that the sanction order

was entered a year prior to the start of trial, Carey could have availed herself at any time to relieve

herself from the sanction. Moreover, Eric maintains that the sanction was proper given Carey’s

“longstanding, outright refusal to respond to any discovery” and that the sanction was entered after

an agreed order between the parties, which allowed Carey more time to respond to the requests.

Thus, Eric reasons that Carey was barred by her own agreement and conduct.

¶ 91 Carey’s reply brief states simply that “no further argument is made” on her behalf.

¶ 92 “Discovery is intended to be, and should be, a cooperative undertaking by counsel and the

parties conducted largely without court intervention.” Custer v. Cerro Flow Products, Inc., 2019

IL App (5th) 190285, ¶ 32. When disagreements or perceived abuses of discovery arise, the trial

court is authorized to enter orders supervising such activities. Id.; see Ill. S. Ct. R. 201(c) (eff. July

1, 2014). Further, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (eff. July 1, 2002) authorizes a trial court to

impose a sanction on a party who unreasonably fails to comply with the court’s discovery rules or

orders. Booher, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 359 (citing Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., 181 Ill. 2d

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112, 120 (1998)). Relevant here, one such sanction includes barring a witness from testifying as

to a certain issue. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(c)(iv) (eff. July 1, 2002). The trial court’s decision to

sanction will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Booher, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 359.

¶ 93 Generally, “barring a witness’s testimony is a drastic sanction and should be exercised with

caution.” Liszka, 2016 IL App (3d) 150238, ¶ 33. As Carey correctly notes in the second paragraph

of her argument, courts utilize various factors to determine if a trial court abused its discretion in

issuing its sanction, including (1) surprise to the adverse party, (2) prejudicial effect of the

proffered evidence or testimony, (3) nature of the evidence or testimony, (4) diligence of the

adverse party in seeking discovery, (5) timeliness of the adverse party’s objection to the evidence

or testimony, and (6) good faith of the party offering the evidence or testimony. Id.¶ 32. No single

factor is determinative, with each case to be considered on its own unique facts. Id.

¶ 94 The sanctions issue is arguably one of the most significant in this appeal. Yet, other than

citation to the various factors, Carey offers little in the way of actual argument to persuade this

court that the court abused its discretion in barring her testimony. Even accepting that Eric would

have been neither surprised nor prejudiced by Carey’s nondisclosure, we can find no abuse of the

court’s discretion in barring Carey’s testimony on the matters sought to be disclosed in discovery.

¶ 95 The record reveals that the trial court ordered the parties to file their respective financial

affidavits at the start of the litigation in August 2018. Although Carey asserts that Eric did not seek

discovery until October 2020, the record reflects that he initially propounded discovery on August

21, 2018, and filed his own affidavit the same day. Then, for reasons not apparent from the record,

Eric did not propound discovery again until October 1, 2020, with an October 29, 2020, due date.

After learning from Carey’s former counsel that Carey would not respond to Eric’s discovery

requests, Eric then filed a motion in limine on November 16, 2020, three days before a set trial

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date of November 19, 2020. However, the November 19 trial date was stricken, and trial continued

to be rescheduled due to Carey’s issues with her former counsel and her need to find a new

attorney, as well as her continued delay in completing her drug testing and parental capacity

evaluations. Ultimately, and pursuant to the parties’ “Agreed Order,” trial was then rescheduled to

commence in March 2021.

¶ 96 We note that here on appeal, Carey fails even to acknowledge the “Agreed Order” in which

the possibility of the discovery sanction is included. In that order, Carey was given an additional

28 days to respond to outstanding discovery. The order also expressly provided that failure to

comply would result in the sanction at issue. Ultimately, Carey did not comply, and on July 15,

2021, an order was entered barring her from testifying to such matters that her discovery responses

would have addressed. As was pointed out by Eric, the sanction order was entered a year before

trial actually commenced. Yet, Carey made no attempt to purge the sanction by complying with

the discovery request or to seek reconsideration of the same.

¶ 97 Despite Carey’s dilatory litigation tactics, she was still granted some leeway to provide

relevant testimony. Notably, during trial and the hearing on contribution, and despite the sanction

in place, the court allowed Carey’s limited testimony on income, housing situation, and bankruptcy

filing. Contra Booher, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 360 (finding prejudicial effect and nature of the evidence

factors too great where party could only cross-examine witness on information covered under

direct examination and could not present any evidence of his own); Smith v. P.A.C.E., 323 Ill. App.

3d 1067, 1076-77 (2001) (reversing sanction where it prohibited the sanctioned party from calling

himself as his own witness and thus denied the party a trial on the merits).

¶ 98 Although the sanction here was stringent, we do not believe it was unwarranted. The record

reflects numerous instances of the trial court warning Carey of the consequences of her actions.

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See In re Marriage of Keegan, 2022 IL App (2d) 190495, ¶ 52 (even if court did not list specific

reasons for entering discovery sanction, record was replete of incidents of court warning litigant

of consequences for failure to comply). Further, although Eric did not file a motion to compel or

attempt to engage in Rule 201(k) communications, there is enough in the record demonstrating

Eric’s persistence in attempting to encourage Carey’s compliance with discovery. The record also

reflects his cooperation to have her meet such deadlines. “To allow a party to defy a discovery

order without facing sanctions can be likened to a dog without teeth—all bark and no bite. A

pattern of dilatoriness should not be tolerated, as it hurts the opposing party and is a burden on the

court system.” Locasto v. City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 113576, ¶ 37. Finding no abuse of

discretion, we affirm the trial court’s imposition of the sanction.

¶ 99 3. The Marital Estate and Property Division

¶ 100 Carey argues, without citation to any case or statutory provision, that the trial court abused

its discretion in awarding only 30% of Eric’s IBEW pension to her, as well as failing to address

the marital portion of Eric’s “second” retirement account. She contends that the evidence showed

that Eric had two retirement plans, one with John Hancock valued at $80,000, and one through his

pension with IBEW Local 134, which was separate and independent.

¶ 101 Eric preliminarily responds that Carey’s argument on this issue is forfeited as she failed to

cite any authority as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

Forfeiture aside, Eric contends that Carey misrepresents the evidence at trial, where he only

testified to a single pension and denied having an additional savings plan. Moreover, Eric points

out, Carey made no attempt to determine further information as to the possibility of a second plan.

Substantively, Eric maintains that the court’s decision to grant 30% of the pension to Carey was

reasonable, given Carey’s failure to participate in financial discovery or respond to Eric’s petition,

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as well as the fact that Carey never contributed to any of the childcare or household expenses while

they lived together.

¶ 102 Carey’s argument, not unlike much of her brief, suffers from conclusory statements,

undeveloped arguments, and on this issue, not even one citation to authority. Further, Carey failed

to provide a full record for consideration as to whether Eric had multiple pensions. It is well

established that “mere contentions, without argument or citation of authority, do not merit

consideration on appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Palm, 401 Ill. App. 3d at 881. We

are not inclined to overlook her noncompliance with the rules which govern appeals. To do so

would sanction that same conduct which resulted in barred testimony below. The issue is forfeited.

See International Union of Operating Engineers Local 965, 2015 IL App (4th) 140352, ¶ 20. Thus,

we decline consideration of this argument.

¶ 103 4. Denial of Maintenance and Income Imputation

¶ 104 Carey next claims error in the court’s maintenance determination, which also involved the

court imputing a certain level of income to Carey.

¶ 105 Generally, courts are empowered to determine entitlement to and details concerning a

maintenance award for “either spouse in amounts and for periods of time as the court deems just.”

750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2018). When a party challenges the trial court’s factual findings

regarding maintenance, a reviewing court will affirm unless the court’s findings were clearly

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Brill, 2017 IL App (2d) 160604, ¶ 30. The court’s

ultimate decision to award or deny maintenance will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.

In re Marriage of Walker, 386 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1041 (2008); see In re Marriage of Johnson,

2016 IL App (5th) 140479, ¶ 93; Liszka, 2016 IL App (3d) 150238, ¶ 74. “An abuse of discretion

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occurs where no reasonable person would adopt the view taken by the trial court.” Walker, 386 Ill.

App. 3d at 1041.

¶ 106 At the outset, Carey challenges the trial court’s preliminary findings that she had failed to

file a petition or request spousal maintenance throughout the proceedings. Carey contends that she

did not have to do so in order to have a maintenance request considered, citing as support In re

Marriage of Hochleutner, 260 Ill. App. 3d 684 (1994).

¶ 107 Preliminarily, the record reflects that Eric’s petition sought a determination that Carey was

not entitled to maintenance. Further, we find nothing in the record to indicate that Carey ever filed

any formal request for consideration of maintenance, a fact highlighted by the trial court in its

dissolution judgment. The record does, however, include a July 15, 2021, order indicating that the

“main focus” at trial would be parenting issues, as the parties had “limited marital assets” and that

the “issues of maintenance and child support [would] be straightforward in nature and of minimal

focus at trial.” In that same order, the court reaffirmed its previous warning to Carey that her failure

to comply with discovery had resulted in the barring of any testimony regarding her financial

situation. Thus, the record shows that the court anticipated considering evidence as to the issue of

Eric’s request for denial of maintenance and thus, implicitly, whether Carey was entitled to any at

all.

¶ 108 We acknowledge having held in the past that, even without a formalized request for

maintenance, courts may utilize their statutory powers to award maintenance based on the

circumstances of the case. Specifically, Hochleutner, the single case cited by Carey and decided

by the Second District, holds as much. 17 In Hochleutner, the petitioner filed for divorce and

17 Hochleutner was decided prior to amendments of the maintenance provision in the Act.

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requested that the respondent be denied maintenance. 260 Ill. App. 3d at 685. The respondent never

filed a response, which was acknowledged by the trial court in its final judgment, where it stated

that it was “operating under some difficulty” given the lack of responsive pleading. Id. at 687-88.

Ultimately, however, the court determined that it could consider the maintenance request based on

the petitioner’s express request to deny it and thus ordered the petitioner to pay the respondent

maintenance following an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 685, 687-88. Even though the petitioner

neither objected to the award nor filed a postjudgment motion, he appealed. Id. at 685.

¶ 109 On appeal, the petitioner argued that the court had exceeded its authority in ordering

maintenance in the absence of a responsive pleading requesting it and where no evidence had been

presented in support. Id. at 685-86, 688-89. The appellate court rejected this argument, holding

that the respondent’s failure to plead did not divest the trial court of its statutory authority to

determine that maintenance was appropriate, given that the petitioner had raised the issue in his

filings, an evidentiary hearing had been conducted that included testimony as to the relevant factors

such as income and standard of living, and the petitioner had not objected to the request. Id. at

689-91. The court further reasoned that, where the statute authorized a maintenance award under

“just or equitable terms, all that [was] required to sustain the award [was] that the recipient be

entitled to it and the award be equitable.” Id. at 691.

¶ 110 Although the facts of Hochleutner are somewhat similar to the facts here, we believe that

one of the key distinguishing features underlying the court’s decision there was that the petitioner

had failed to object to consideration of the maintenance request beyond the initial request for

denial. On this point, we find a more recent case, In re Marriage of Salvetiu, 2023 IL App (1st)

211162-U, decided here in the First District, instructive.

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¶ 111 In Salvetiu, the petitioner was ordered to pay maintenance to the respondent after his

petition failed to request denial. Id. ¶¶ 6, 13. The petitioner subsequently filed a motion to vacate

the judgment, arguing in part that the respondent had never filed a pleading requesting such

support. Id. ¶ 14. The trial court denied the motion. Id. ¶ 15. On appeal, the petitioner argued that

the trial court had been “without jurisdiction” to award maintenance without a responsive pleading

on file. Id. ¶ 18. Although we acknowledged that Hochleutner was instructive as to the trial court’s

ability to award maintenance based on the Act, we nevertheless rejected the petitioner’s argument.

Id. ¶¶ 20-23. Specifically, we determined that the limited record showed the petitioner’s

“acquiesce[nce]” to the trial court’s consideration of maintenance, where the record showed a court

order indicating that maintenance would be at issue at trial, and that the petitioner had failed to

object to such an agenda throughout the duration of the proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 24, 27-30.

¶ 112 In contrast here, the facts show that Eric did not engage in any similar acquiescence with

regard to the court’s maintenance determination. Eric’s petition expressly sought denial of both

child support and maintenance. Eric was then diligent in proffering his own financial information

and in his attempts to receive the same from Carey. When it was clear that Carey was not

cooperating, he filed a motion in limine to bar any evidence she may have sought to introduce at

trial for purposes of maintenance determinations. Further, at trial, Eric’s counsel was steadfast in

objecting to any testimony regarding Carey’s financial status at trial and during the fee petition

hearing, even though the record reflects that the trial court allowed for some leeway on Carey’s

part. Accordingly, the court’s failure to award maintenance appears based on more than Carey’s

failure to request the same but also on the manner in which the case progressed in conjunction with

Eric’s consistent and vocal opposition to the same. As noted prior, Carey exhibited a lackadaisical

approach to her case, which included a lack of any formal request to receive maintenance, her

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consistent delay throughout the proceedings that culminated in a highly preclusive discovery

sanction, and what the trial court termed as “unclean hands” throughout the litigation.

¶ 113 We also observe that, in the section of her brief challenging the court’s maintenance

determination and related income imputation, Carey failed to cite any supporting legal authority

beyond the relevant provisions of the Act. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (appellant

must support appeal with citation of the authorities and pages of the record relied upon); 23-25

Building Partnership v. Testa Produce, Inc., 381 Ill. App. 3d 751, 755 (2008) (“[A] reviewing

court is entitled to have the issues on appeal clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and a

cohesive legal argument presented,” as the “appellate court is not a depository in which the

appellant may dump the burden of argument and research.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

Thus, because Carey continues to exhibit indifference to established court rules and procedures,

we need not address any additional argument related to the trial court’s maintenance

determinations. Accordingly, we find all of Carey’s related challenges to the court’s maintenance

determination to be forfeited.

¶ 114 5. Childcare Expenses and Visitation Provisions

¶ 115 Carey next challenges various portions of the court’s dissolution judgment addressing

Carey’s responsibilities related to A.L.’s healthcare and childcare. Specifically, Carey argues,

again without citation to authority, that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Carey to

pay 50% of A.L.’s health insurance and medical costs, 60% of the parenting coordinator’s costs,

and 100% of costs for supervised visitation. Carey characterizes this portion of the order as

“punishment,” given the evidence established that Eric earned significantly more than she did, and

that the ordered costs would in effect prevent her from seeing A.L.

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¶ 116 Eric responds that Carey again fails to cite any authority to support her contentions.

Notwithstanding, Eric contends that Carey owes her daughter a duty of support, which she had

failed to do for years prior, citing In re Marriage of Turk, 2014 IL 116730. Further, Eric continues,

the record reflects that it was Carey’s own conduct that necessitated such parenting requirements.

Finally, Eric asserts that the court properly determined that Carey should handle the financial

responsibility of such expenses.

¶ 117 We agree with Eric that Carey’s argument as to both these issues is deficient and again in

violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). As she fails to cite any

relevant legal authority, including the applicable statutory provision or any case law in support of

her contentions, we deem both arguments forfeited.

¶ 118 6. Petition for Contribution to Carey’s Attorney Fees

¶ 119 Finally, Carey argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her petition for

contribution to her attorney fees. Preliminarily, Carey again notes that, due to the sanction issued

against her, she could not demonstrate her lack of ability to pay her fees. Substantively, Carey

challenges the court’s finding that she was able to pay her fees, given the parties’ financial

disparities and that her bankruptcy filing was of no relevance to her legal fees. Eric responds that

the court’s denial of the petition was reasonable, given that Carey was found to be voluntarily

underemployed, her lack of credibility as to her overall financial position, her lack of evidence

showing that she had borrowed money to pay her previous fees, and her conduct that led to

prolonged litigation.

¶ 120 “ ‘As a general rule, attorney fees are the responsibility of the party who incurred [them].’ ”

In re Marriage of Evanoff, 2016 IL App (1st) 150017, ¶ 56 (quoting In re Marriage of Nesbitt, 377

Ill. App. 3d 649, 656 (2007)). However, various sections of the Act permit a trial court to order

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one party to contribute to the other party’s reasonable attorney fees in light of the parties’

respective financial positions. See 750 ILCS 5/503(j), 508 (West 2018). To obtain attorney fees

under the Act, the party seeking them must establish his or her inability to pay the fees and the

other spouse’s ability to do so. See In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶¶ 15-19. Nothing

in section 501 or any other section of the Act, however, requires a court to “equalize” attorney fees

between the parties. Liszka, 2016 IL App (3d) 150238, ¶ 60.

¶ 121 Preliminarily, we again observe that Carey has cited only one case, In re Marriage of Patel,

2013 IL App (1st) 112571, mainly for the general proposition that the seeking spouse must

establish inability to pay. Thus, Carey’s fee argument, like many of her others here on appeal, runs

afoul of Rule 341(h)(7). Regardless, the trial court’s decision is amply supported.

¶ 122 In its order addressing Carey’s fee petition, the court made the following findings. Carey

was employed as a part-time babysitter. However, the court considered her to be “voluntarily

underemployed,” as it believed that she could have been earning around $84,860 if she worked

full-time and utilized her dental hygienist and certified nurse’s assistant licenses, citing a 2022

statistic from the United States Bureau of Labor. 18 The court further found that she lived with her

mother at virtually no cost, received government benefits from the Supplemental Nutrition

Assistance Program, and had a pending Social Security disability claim, though we observe that it

was also her testimony that the claim may have been denied. Regarding Carey’s previous payments

to her attorney, the court observed that she had already paid her current counsel $14,277.14 as of

November 3, 2022, which apparently had been provided via loan by her mother. However, the

18 Carey challenged the trial court’s imputation of income to her in her section of her brief concerning maintenance determinations. We acknowledge that the portion of the Act concerning the propriety of attorney fees overlaps with considerations used to assess whether maintenance is appropriate. See 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(2) (West 2018). However, because Carey has forfeited that argument, we presume, without deciding, that the court’s imputation was correct.

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court noted, Carey had provided no evidence to substantiate that. Additionally, the court asserted

that Carey’s bankruptcy filing “raise[d] suspicion regarding her overall financial position or

resources,” given that it appeared that Carey had been discharged of most, if not all, of her financial

obligations. However, the court reiterated that it did not have the full picture of Carey’s finances

given her failure to file a response to Eric’s petition and comply with discovery.

¶ 123 In comparison, when examining Eric’s financial status, the court observed that Eric

retained full-time employment as an electrician and earned around $87,000 annually. The court

reasoned that this level of income was “nearly equivalent” to what Carey could have made if she

fully utilized her training and worked full-time. The court also noted that it was both parties’

testimony that Eric had been the primary breadwinner, that the two had kept separate finances, and

that Eric had been fully responsible for A.L. since separation. Finally, with regard to Eric’s legal

fees, the court found that Eric had paid his attorney $20,000, and still owed $2,000 as of the

November 3, 2022, trial date.

¶ 124 On balance, the court stated that although it had been given a more complete picture of

Eric’s finances, it was unable to do so with Carey given her conduct and “unclean hands”

throughout the litigation. As such, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to show that

she was unable to pay her remaining fees of less than $2,000. If anything, the court observed,

Carey’s recent bankruptcy discharge “potentially [left] her in a better financial position than Eric,”

who had incurred significant costs in the case due to Carey’s dilatory litigation strategy.

¶ 125 Carey’s failure to meet her burden on her fee contribution request was due to her own

actions stemming from her failure to engage in the discovery process. After reviewing the record,

we again do not find that the court abused its discretion in denying Carey’s petition for

contribution.

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¶ 126 In sum, we reiterate that much of our order today has largely been premised on Carey’s

failure to participate in her own case at both the trial and appellate court levels, which in turn has

resulted in a lack of evidence to sustain her claims. We do not take lightly the effect of the sanction

on the outcomes at trial. However, one of the purposes of the dissolution statute is to effectuate

cooperation and good faith effort by the parties, which was not shown here. For the reasons stated,

we affirm the trial court’s orders in their entirety.

¶ 127 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 128 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 129 Affirmed.

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In re Marriage of Lugo, 2025 IL App (1st) 231478

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2018-D- 530308; the Hon. D. Renee Jackson, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Mark T. Hickey, of Tinley Park, for appellant. for Appellant:

Attorneys Myra A. Foutris, of Foutris Law Office, Ltd., of Chicago, for for appellee. Appellee:

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