NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 230316-U NOTICE Decision filed 12/18/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0316 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of KATHLEEN A. LANGE, ) St. Clair County. ) Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 19-D-705 ) DAVID A. LANGE, ) Honorable ) Stacy L. Campbell, Respondent-Appellant and Cross-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Sholar 1 concurred in the judgment. ∗
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s November 22, 2022, order (a) classifying certain farm real estate, the Gorham Farm, as marital property was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, (b) setting the amount of child support was not an abuse of discretion, and (c) awarding the parties joint parenting time and responsibilities was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, the circuit court’s order denying petitioner’s request to re-open proofs was an abuse of discretion.
¶2 Respondent, David A. Lange, appeals the circuit court’s order classifying certain farm real
estate, the Gorham Farm, as marital property. Petitioner, Kathleen A. Lange, cross-appeals the
circuit’s order setting the amount of child support and awarding the parties joint parenting time
1 Justice Sholar was substituted to the panel after oral argument was held. She has reviewed the parties’ briefs and listened to the oral argument recording in this case. ∗ Justice Welch fully participated in this decision prior to his passing earlier this year. 1 and responsibilities. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the findings
and judgment of the circuit court.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Pre-Trial
¶5 Kathleen Lange and David Lange were married on April 16, 2011. On September 9, 2019,
Kathleen filed her petition for dissolution of marriage. The parties had two minor children, J.L.
and A.L. On June 4, 2020, the circuit court entered a temporary parenting order that provided,
inter alia, that David would have parenting time with the children each week from Tuesday at 7
a.m. until Thursday at 7 a.m. and alternate weekends from Friday at 2:45 p.m. until Monday at 7
a.m. Each parent was to have seven consecutive days of summer parenting time which was to
include the respective parent’s weekend. The temporary order was in effect at the time of the final
hearing in the case on November 14 - 15, 2022.
¶6 Prior to trial, the guardian ad litem filed her investigative report and supplemental report.
The report addressed each of the best interest factors as set forth in section 602.7 of the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/602.7 (West 2020)). It stated, “After
having reviewed the factors above as to the allocation of parental responsibilities, and parenting
time, I believe that the parents should be jointly allocated parental responsibilities and awarded
equal parenting time.”
¶7 B. Trial
¶8 1. David Lange – First Day
¶9 The trial in this case commenced on September 14, 2022. Counsel for Kathleen called
David as an adverse witness. David testified that he and Kathleen were married on April 16, 2011.
They had two minor children, J.L. and A.L. Prior to the commencement of the dissolution
2 proceedings, Kathleen was the children’s primary caretaker and David was the family’s primary
wage earner. David agreed that Kathleen remained the primary caretaker until the court entered its
June 4, 2020, temporary order pertaining to parenting time. Before dissolution proceedings were
initiated, Kathleen always took the children to their medical appointments. However, after the
temporary order was entered, David took them a few times when they were with him.
¶ 10 David further testified that the children participated in a number of extracurricular
activities—soccer, baseball, and swimming. Kathleen enrolled them in the activities and David did
not object. He took them to a few swimming lessons. While Kathleen also always attended the
lessons to which David took them, David attended the lessons to which Kathleen took them when
he “was able to.” Both of the children mentioned to David that they wanted to participate in Cub
Scouts. However, he told them they could not do so because he wanted to do other activities with
them and they were already participating in three sports. He and the children would do activities
such as visiting State Parks.
¶ 11 David testified that the children attended a Catholic school. He took them to Sunday mass
4-5 times in the past year. He “probably” attended Wednesday mass with them sometimes, but he
was usually working so he was unable to go.
¶ 12 David testified that he and Kathleen did not share finances. They held separate bank
accounts throughout the marriage and did not have access to the other’s funds. His primary
checking account, which he had before marriage, was with Busey Bank. When asked by Kathleen’s
counsel if “the fruits of your labor while you were married” went into his this Busey account,
David answered in the affirmative.
¶ 13 David further testified that during the marriage, Kathleen loaned money to his parents. The
loans were in writing and carried interest. The funds were advanced from Kathleen’s bank account
3 which was held in only her name. David’s parents repaid the loans, with interest, to Kathleen alone.
Kathleen also loaned money to David’s company, Lange Contracting LLC. David paid off that
loan.
¶ 14 Regarding income, David testified that his accountant sorted his income into three
categories—snow removal/backhoe operations, farming, and wages. A large part of his income
each year came off his tax return as depreciation. He acknowledged that for purposes of child
support, that depreciation was included as income and was reflected in his financial affidavit.
¶ 15 David testified that the only real estate he and Kathleen owned jointly was the marital home
and farm land in Gorham, Illinois (Gorham Farm). David agreed that at the closing on the Gorham
Farm, Kathleen hesitated at entering into the transaction because she did not want to be responsible
for any shortfall on repayment.
¶ 16 David testified that between 2018 and July 2020 he bought and sold two luxury boats. He
purchased the first boat for $150,000 and sold it for $170,000. He then bought the second boat for
$190,000; he applied the $170,000 from the sale of the first boat and added $20,000. The purchase
was paid in five installments. The first installment, $20,000, was paid by him from his Busey
account to the seller. The remaining four installments were paid to the seller by his mother, but he
repaid her. He believed repayment was made through his Busey checking account. However, when
shown an exhibit of his Busey statements and questioned about where the payments were to be
found in those statements, he was unable to point to any such payments.
¶ 17 When questioned by his attorney, David confirmed that he and Kathleen always maintained
separate bank accounts and did not have access to each other’s accounts. He asserted that Kathleen
never had any involvement in the operations of his business.
4 ¶ 18 When asked by his attorney if his mother gifted $170,000 to buy a boat, David answered
in the negative. When questioned about the sizeable reduction in the balance in his Busey account
from 2019 to the present, he testified that the balance decreased because he was not “going after
the work I used to do” because he was spending more time with the children. He stated that it also
decreased because he had lost contracts for his snow removal business.
¶ 19 2. Kathleen Lange
¶ 20 Kathleen testified that she worked for Negwer, which was a door company, and its
predecessor, Lion Industries, for 18 years. Her job afforded her flexibility regarding her hours.
¶ 21 Kathleen further testified that for the 24 months preceding the commencement of
dissolution proceedings, the children were with her “99 percent of the time.” Even if David were
home, she took the children with her to do errands because David “just didn’t want to care for
them.” On the rare occasions that the children stayed with David, while Kathleen was out, she
would receive from him “four, five phone calls in an hour—what do I do? What do I do?” She got
the children ready for school and daycare and took them, even if David was at home. If David was
home, he would stay in bed until he thought Kathleen and the children were gone.
¶ 22 Kathleen asserted that the children were with her 100% of the time during the Covid
pandemic. During the pandemic, Kathleen worked from home and, at the same time, the children
did remote learning as the school was closed. David never had them during the day at that time. In
the fall of 2020, when “regular” school was back in session, she returned to the office.
¶ 23 Kathleen testified that after the 50/50 parenting time arrangement was ordered, there were
a number of issues with school. When the children were not with her, they “weren’t necessarily
doing homework.” Kathleen stated that the children were doing well in school. She believed they
were doing so well because she took the time to study with them.
5 ¶ 24 Kathleen further testified that when the children were with her, they had a set, daily routine.
They would also attend friends’ and classmates’ birthday parties, and their own sporting events.
Kathleen went to every practice and game. David would not attend on the days the children were
with Kathleen. Sometimes the children were on different teams and would have games at the same
time. Kathleen described how, when there were separate soccer games, she would stand in the
middle between their two fields so she could watch both of them. David typically stood where he
could see J.L. playing, but not A.L. Typically, David would not be near the field but would instead
be off to the side where he was looking at his phone.
¶ 25 Kathleen testified that when the children were with her, they did many activities. They
went to the Zoo, the Science Center, the Magic House, and parks. They would also go swimming,
hiking, biking, and camping.
¶ 26 Kathleen further testified that when the children returned to her after being with David,
their clothes were “dirty,” they smelled bad, and they were “starving.” Sometimes their underwear
was soiled.
¶ 27 Kathleen asserted that she put the children’s needs first. She believed that David did not
put them first, but instead put himself first. However, she did not talk negatively about him to the
children.
¶ 28 When questioned by David’s attorney, Kathleen acknowledged that other than a
disagreement over whether the children would participate in Cub Scouts, she and David agreed on
the children’s activities. She had no concerns that the children were in too many activities.
Kathleen agreed that J.L. got straight A’s in school while the June 2020 parenting time order was
in effect. A.L. was too young to have grades.
6 ¶ 29 Kathleen testified that during the marriage, in 2013, she and David purchased the Gorham
Farm. A down payment of $300,000 was made. Kathleen acknowledged that the down payment
was not made from her account. She further acknowledged, a 1031 Exchange was made when the
Gorham Farm was purchased and those funds involved the sale of property David owned prior to
the marriage. In 2021, David purchased another farm, the Tilden Farm. Kathleen was not involved
at all in the purchase of that farm.
¶ 30 Kathleen further testified that she did not dispute the current appraisal valuing the Gorham
Farm at $1,458,000. She believed that the debt on the farm was currently a little under a million
dollars. Kathleen denied that she was included on the deed and the mortgage on the Gorham Farm
only because the bank required that she be. The Gorham Farm, the marital residence, and a jon
boat were the only properties that she and David held jointly. At one point, she loaned $30,000
and $35,000 to David’s parents for a loan on their farm on which they were about to default. The
Gorham Farm was used as collateral for their loan. If David’s parents had defaulted on the loan on
their farm, she and David could have lost the Gorham Farm as a result. However, David’s parents
repaid the loans. Kathleen did not know which bank held the loan on the Gorham Farm. She did
not make any payments toward the outstanding farm loan, taxes, or insurance, from any bank
account that was in her sole name. Kathleen stated that when they bought the Gorham Farm, they
entered into the purchase jointly and “[i]f it succeeded, we both succeeded. If it failed, we both
failed.”
¶ 31 Kathleen testified that before the purchase of their marital home, she and David lived in
her “little house.” When they purchased the marital home, her previous house was rented for a
time. When it was sold, part of the proceeds paid off the existing mortgage and the rest was put
into accounts that became marital accounts that went toward the marital home. David’s name was
7 never on the mortgage for the marital home although it was on the deed. Kathleen agreed that
David had equity of $60,000 in the home, she paid him $60,000 for that equity, and he signed the
deed over to her.
¶ 32 3. David Lange – Second Day
¶ 33 On the second day of trial, David, testifying on his own behalf, confirmed that the Gorham
Farm was valued at $1,458,000 and was held jointly with Kathleen. He testified that when the farm
was purchased, he made the down payment through a 1031 Exchange from the sale of real property
that he bought in 2008 and owned pre-marriage and from the grain sold from that property. He
explained that a 1031 Exchange allows one to sell farm property and pay no capital gains taxes if
similar property is purchased within an allotted timeframe. David testified that at the closing on
the Gorham Farm, Kathleen indicated she was nervous about having a mortgage amount of over
$1,000,000 and said that she would not take care of the payments on it. He made all mortgage and
insurance payments on the Gorham Farm from his bank account while Kathleen made none from
hers.
¶ 34 David further testified that Kathleen’s name was placed on the deed to the Gorham Farm
only because First State Bank of Campbell, the bank where the loan was acquired, required that it
be included. His banker there was Gary Buch who also helped David with the purchase of his 2008
farm. He never intended to gift Kathleen his interest in the proceeds from his 2008-purchased
property and the two never discussed a gifting of the proceeds. In 2021, David purchased another
farm. However, Kathleen’s name was not on that property. For the down payment, he used the
$60,000 payout he received from Kathleen for his share of the marital home.
¶ 35 On cross-examination, David agreed that he made contributions to the checking account
held in Kathleen’s name which went to pay toward the marital home mortgage, school tuition, and
8 daycare. He made these contributions from his Busey account. He further acknowledged that he
deposited $171,000 into the Busey bank account on January 31, 2021, from the sale of a boat that
was bought during the marriage and shortly thereafter made a payment of $83,000 on the Gorham
Farm. On re-direct, David stated that he took $130,000 from the sale of the 2008 farm, deposited
it into his Busey account, and then paid that amount at the closing of the Gorham Farm.
¶ 36 4. Guardian ad litem
¶ 37 The guardian ad litem (GAL) presented her report to the court. She stated that she had
“numerous communications” with Kathleen and David. She also met a number of times with the
children via Zoom. She recently met with them in person on two occasions. Once David brought
them for a meeting and once Kathleen brought them. She also spoke with the children’s counselor,
Julie Weber, numerous times. Additionally, she reviewed the pleadings in the case as well as
documents the parties brought her.
¶ 38 The GAL indicated that the children needed the support and encouragement of both
parents. However, she did not believe that either parent should be expected to attend all of J.L. and
A.L.’s events, especially when those events occur during the other parent’s parenting time. J.L.
asked specifically to meet individually with her. He indicated to her that he liked the current
schedule.
¶ 39 The GAL recommended that the parties “be allocated joint decision-making and continue
an equal parenting time schedule.” She indicated that while Kathleen and David had “very different
parenting styles,” those differences created a balance for the children that was important for them
to have. She believed that the balance was especially beneficial to J.L.
9 ¶ 40 5. Gary Buch
¶ 41 Gary Buch, the vice president of loans at the First State Bank of Campbell Hill, testified
he was the loan officer involved in the 2013 purchase of the Gorham Farm. He was also involved
in the loans on the 2008 property.
¶ 42 Mr. Buch explained that a 1031 Exchange was the deferment of the payment of capital
gains when one sold one property and bought another property of equal or greater value. He
testified that the sale of the 2008 property and subsequent purchase of the Gorham Farm
constituted a 1031 Exchange. Mr. Buch stated that David was the one who came to him about the
purchase of the Gorham Farm and was with whom he dealt.
¶ 43 Mr. Buch testified that because David and Kathleen were married, as a matter of bank
policy, Kathleen’s signature was required on the closing documents, loan, and title to the property.
The same procedure occurred when David and Kathleen refinanced the loan on the Gorham Farm
in 2018. Mr. Buch did not recall there ever being a discussion about whether there was a way to
avoid putting Kathleen’s name on the property, either initially or at the time of refinancing. On
cross-examination, Buch confirmed that with Kathleen’s name on the deed and debt, her assets
would be at risk should a default on the loan occur.
¶ 44 6. Circuit Court’s Findings and Judgment
¶ 45 The circuit court directed the parties to submit written closing arguments and took the
matter under advisement. On November 22, 2022, the court issued its judgment of dissolution of
marriage ruling which stated, inter alia:
“The parties purchased 211 acres of farmland during the pendency of the
marriage, which was placed into joint tenancy and paid for with marital funds from
the date of purchase in 2013 to the present. The Respondent sought to be awarded
10 a portion as non-marital property for some non-marital property which was sold,
and the proceeds applied to the purchase of the land. Respondent presented
testimony from his banker who confirmed it was the bank’s requirement that
Petitioner be listed as an owner of the property. The court did not hear testimony
about Respondent trying to get a loan from a different institution that did not have
such a requirement. Petitioner testified she would be on the hook if Respondent
defaulted on the loan. Based on Respondent’s failure to rebut the presumption[,]
the funds were not a gift; the Court finds all the equity is marital.”
¶ 46 Also in its judgment, the circuit court found that the parties were functioning well under
the temporary shared parenting time order and were able to make joint decisions. It found it to be
in the children’s best interests that the parties continue to be joint decision-makers and continue to
share parenting time equally, and it made permanent the temporary order entered on June 4, 2020.
In addition to the other best interest factors set forth in section 5/602.7 of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/602.7 (West 2020)), the court noted, regarding any other
factor it found to be relevant,
“These parents have operated under a shared parenting schedule in which the
children are thriving both academically and socially. The best interest of the minor
children is paramount to the Court. Consistency and the maximum involvement of
both parents in the lives of the minor children are the express purposes of the Illinois
Dissolution of Marriage Act. The Court has weighed heavily the fact the minor
children, based upon the testimony of family, friends, neighbors, and the Guardian
ad Litem are doing well under the shared parenting time.”
Regarding decision-making, the court stated,
11 “The court reiterates its finding set forth above about decision-making. The
parties are capable of decision-making and have been doing so throughout the
pendency of this matter. *** There is no reason the parties should not be joint
decision makers in this matter.”
¶ 47 For child support, the court set forth,
“The reported income for child support purposes (which includes
depreciation) fluctuated from $142,118.00 to $39, 887.00 between 2018 and 2020
(Respondent’s Exhibits 32, 31, and 7).”
The court then found David’s income was (1) $142,118 for 2018, (2) $49,977 for 2019,
(3) $225,000 for 2020, and (4) $72,575 for 2021 up to the time of hearing. It then averaged those
amounts “to determine Respondent’s income for child support purposes is $122,417.75.” It noted
that there was “additional income that is unaccounted by Respondent’s Financial Affidavit,” based
on his purchase and sale of boats. Also on November 22, 2022, it entered its judgment of allocation
of parental responsibilities and parenting plan.
¶ 48 On December 12, 2022, David filed his motion to reconsider and on December 19, 2022,
he filed his amended motion to reconsider. The amended motion argued, inter alia, that the circuit
court erred when it denied him credit for his non-marital contribution made toward the purchase
of the Gorham Farm and found such contribution was a gift and thus part of the marital estate. It
asked the court to reconsider its finding.
¶ 49 On December 21, 2022, Kathleen filed her motion to reopen proofs and/or motion to
reconsider. It averred, in pertinent part, that between November 17, 2022, and November 20, 2022,
David’s mother wrote three checks to him that totaled $110,000 which were allegedly for
repayments of loans. It further alleged that David failed to “disclose these marital assets at any
12 time during his testimony at trial and only reflected one (1) debt on his Financial Affidavit, dated
September 7, 2022, namely a ‘personal loan’ to his parents of $35,000.00, without any
documentation.” The motion stated that all three checks, copies of which were attached to the
motion, were issued after the close of testimony at trial and before the circuit court entered its
judgment of dissolution. The motion also argued the circuit court erred when it set child support,
when it did not award primary residential parenting to Kathleen, and when it awarded David equal
parenting time. The motion requested the court to reopen proofs regarding the $110,000 David
received from his mother, and to reconsider the court’s determination of parenting time and child
support.
¶ 50 David’s response to Kathleen’s request to reopen proofs argued that David indicated in his
deposition in this case that his family owed him $50,000 for a truck purchase and no paperwork
existed regarding the debt. The response further argued that David indicated in his evidence
deposition in his parents’ divorce case that he loaned his parents $35,000 on April 2, 2015, and
again loaned them $50,000 on March 5, 2018, and that he paid a shortfall of $110,000 to $130,000
for them on an outside loan. It averred that David’s evidence deposition was in Kathleen’s
counsel’s possession prior to trial in this case and was marked by Kathleen’s counsel as a potential
exhibit, but was not offered at the conclusion of her case.
¶ 51 The circuit court conducted the hearing on the parties’ motions on March 27, 2023. David’s
counsel argued, in pertinent part, that at trial they had rebutted the presumption of gift regarding
the funds contributed to the Gorham Farm. Kathleen’s counsel argued that the court was correct at
trial when it found the funds to be a gift. The court denied David’s request to reconsider its
determination that the funds that David contributed to the purchase of the Gorham Farm from pre-
marital property were part of the marital estate and David had failed to overcome the presumption
13 that those monies were a gift to Kathleen. It stated that it had taken into consideration that it heard
testimony from only one banker from one bank while there was no evidence presented that David
had inquired at other banks where the requirement that Kathleen be included on the deed and
mortgage may not have been mandatory.
¶ 52 Regarding Kathleen’s request to reopen proofs, counsel for Kathleen argued, inter alia,
that the three checks totaling $110,000 David’s mother wrote to him were written and received
after the conclusion of the trial in September 2022 and before the judgment order was entered in
November 2022. She opined that the only mention of a potential loan to David’s mother was
$35,000 revealed in Exhibit 1 which was David’s financial affidavit. Counsel further argued that
$110,000 was “a substantial percentage of the assets of the parties.” She asked that the court either
reopen proofs or reconsider the distribution of assets in light of the $110,000 received by David
and award each of them half the amount.
¶ 53 David’s counsel argued that David disclosed that his family owed him money and Kathleen
could have presented evidence at trial about the money owed but chose not to do so. He averred
that Kathleen had no excuse for not having presented the evidence at trial months before and now
there was insufficient reason to reopen proofs on the matter.
¶ 54 The court denied Kathleen’s motion to reopen proofs. In doing so, it stated it had “taken
into consideration if there were loans, if there were not loans and how the Court divided the debts
and assets as well as calculated the child support.”
¶ 55 Counsel for Kathleen next requested that the court reconsider its decision not to designate
Kathleen as the primary residential parent and to award the parties equal parenting time and
decision-making responsibilities. She averred that the evidence was clear that Kathleen had been
the primary caretaker and decision-maker for the children throughout the marriage while David
14 did the “bare minimum” while her client “does all the rest.” David’s counsel argued that although
Kathleen may have been the children’s primary caretaker in the 24 months proceeding the filing
of the petition for dissolution, it did not “trump the fact of what went on in the 27 months following
that from June of 2020” when the temporary order awarding equal parenting time was entered. He
maintained that the court “appropriately applied the factors” and asked the court to deny the motion
to reconsider.
¶ 56 The court denied Kathleen’s motion to reconsider its order concerning parenting time. In
doing so, it noted that its written judgment order stated clearly that Kathleen was the children’s
primary caregiver for the 24 months preceding the filing of the petition for dissolution. It stated
that it considered and “weighed all of the other factors which are laid out in the Judgment of
Dissolution of Marriage and then made the decision to split the parenting time equally in this case.”
¶ 57 David filed his notice of appeal on April 28, 2023. Kathleen filed her notice of cross-appeal
on May 10, 2023.
¶ 58 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 59 A. The Gorham Farm
¶ 60 We begin our analysis by determining whether David overcame the presumption that he
made a gift to the marital estate when the proceeds of the 1031 Exchange were applied to the
purchase of the Gorham Farm. The circuit court’s “classification of property will not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re Marriage of Romano,
2012 IL App (2d) 091339, ¶ 44. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence where
the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or when the court’s findings appear to be unreasonable,
arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Id. The Act creates the presumption that all property
acquired during the marriage is marital property, regardless of the manner in which title is held.
15 In re Marriage of Hunter, 223 Ill. App. 3d 947, 951 (1992); 750 ILCS 5/503(b)(1) (West 2020).
Generally, the placing of title to non-marital property in joint tenancy “ ‘will raise a presumption
that a gift was made to the marital estate, and the property will become marital property.’ ” In re
Marriage of Vondra, 2016 IL App (1st) 150793, ¶ 14 (quoting In re Marriage of Benz, 165 Ill.
App. 3d 273, 279 (1988). The presumption can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.
Id.; In re Marriage of Rogers, 85 Ill. 2d 217, 222-23 (1981). The proponent arguing that the
property is nonmarital carries the burden of proof. Romano, 2012 IL App (2d) 091339, ¶ 45; In re
Marriage of Johns, 311 Ill. App. 3d 699, 703 (2000). The factors used to determine whether the
presumption of a gift has been overcome include (1) making of improvements, (2) payment of
taxes and mortgages, (3) occupancy of the premises as a home or business, and (4) extent of control
and management of the property. Hunter, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 952.
¶ 61 David argues that he proved by clear and convincing evidence that the non-marital
contribution he made toward the Gorham Farm was acquired by a method listed in section 503(a)
of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2022)) and
was not intended as a gift to Kathleen. He avers it was uncontroverted at trial that the proceeds
from the 1031 Exchange were his non-marital property. He further argues that the financial
relationship between the parties showed that the transfer was not intended as a gift. He opines that
the financial relationship was such that he and Kathleen maintained separate bank accounts, and
that Kathleen loaned both David and his parents’ money from her account which they repaid with
interest and she deposited the repayments into her account. David argues that Kathleen admitted
at trial that they did not commingle their accounts and neither had access to the other’s accounts
or account statements. He asserts that he is the one who submitted the loan application for the
Gorham Farm and Kathleen’s name was listed on the property only because the bank required that
16 it be so. David argues that Kathleen made no payments from any funds that she controlled toward
the debt on the Gorham Farm and did not even know the name of the bank that held the mortgage.
He avers that he solely managed and operated the property.
¶ 62 Kathleen argues that the circuit court did not err by finding that David failed to overcome
the presumption that his contribution to the purchase of the Gorham Farm was a gift. She avers
that it was undisputed at trial that during the marriage, David used approximately $250,000 in
marital income to pay the real estate taxes and loan payments on the property. She further argues
that once David deposited the funds, he commingled the funds with his earnings. Kathleen asserts
that she loaned David’s parents $65,000 for them to pay loans which were attached to the Gorham
Farm as collateral. She opines that she was present at the closing of the Gorham Farm and assumed
liability for the full amount of the loan.
¶ 63 Here, the evidence established that David made the mortgage, insurance, and tax payments
for the Gorham Farm from the Busey account that was held in his sole name. David’s testimony
established that he deposited his income during the marriage into the same Busey account.
Moreover, as he testified, he transferred money from that account to the account Kathleen held in
her sole name to pay for the marital home mortgage, tuition fees, and daycare.
¶ 64 It was undisputed that David made the tax, insurance and mortgage payments, using an
account held in his name alone. However, although the aforementioned factors are useful when
discerning intent, “they are not the exclusive criteria for determining whether or not a transfer of
property into joint tenancy is a gift.” In re Marriage of Marriott, 264 Ill. App. 3d 23, 39 (1994).
Ultimately, however, “the focal point of any discussion dealing with the presence or absence of a
gift is the intent of the alleged donor.” Id. “Donative intent is the intention on the part of the donor
17 that there be a present and irrevocable transfer of title to the subject matter of the gift.” Moniuszko
v. Moniuszko, 238 Ill. App. 3d 523, 529 (1992).
¶ 65 In their testimonies, the parties acknowledged they held separate bank accounts throughout
their marriage. The financial affidavits in the record reveal that they also titled some property
separately, i.e., their respective vehicles. However, as borne out by their testimonies, they chose
to title the marital residence, a jon boat, and the Gorham Farm in joint tenancy. As noted by
Kathleen in her testimony, she sold her pre-marital home and those funds were used for the marital
residence which, as previously noted, was placed in joint tenancy. She acknowledged those funds
were a gift to the marital estate.
¶ 66 David argues that this case should be controlled by the Hunter decision. However, we find
that case distinguishable. In Hunter, the parties disputed the classification of real estate that the
wife’s parents had deeded to her and the husband in joint tenancy, reserving themselves a life
estate. Hunter, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 948. After the wife’s father died, the wife managed and
maintained the premises by locating tenants for the property, collecting the rent, and depositing
the rent payments into her personal accounts. Id.
¶ 67 However, there was no evidence in Hunter that the property carried a mortgage. Here,
though, Kathleen’s name was on the deed and mortgage of the Gorham Farm which made her
equally liable in the event of default. In fact, she would have been liable had David’s parents
defaulted on their property because the Gorham Farm was used to secure their mortgage at one
time. As pointed out by Kathleen, had a default occurred and the Gorham Farm been foreclosed
upon, David likely would not be arguing that he should carry a bigger share of the financial
repercussions. Moreover, as pointed out by the circuit court, there was no evidence that David tried
to title and mortgage the Gorham Farm to exclude Kathleen. In fact, as the testimony revealed,
18 neither was there an attempt on David’s part to title or mortgage the Gorham Farm in his name
alone when the couple later refinanced. All these facts point to the parties’ intent that the Gorham
Farm, like the marital residence, be a joint venture. Considering all the evidence, we cannot say
that the circuit court’s finding that David failed to overcome the presumption of a gift was against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 68 B. Request to Re-Open Proofs
¶ 69 Next, we determine whether the circuit court erred when it denied Kathleen’s request to re-
open proofs pertaining to $110,000 received by David from his mother after the close of the trial
but before the judgment order was entered. This court reviews an order denying a motion to reopen
proofs for an abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Bennoon, 2014 IL App (1st) 122224, ¶ 53. “If
evidence offered for the first time in a post-trial motion could have been produced at an earlier
time, it is not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny its introduction into evidence.” In re
Marriage of Davis, 215 Ill. App. 3d 763, 776 (1991). Nonetheless, the circuit court “should
consider whether the moving party has provided a reasonable excuse for failing to submit the
additional evidence at trial, whether granting the motion would result in surprise or unfair prejudice
to the opposing party, and if the evidence is of the utmost importance to the movant’s case.” Dowd
& Dowd Ltd. v. Gleeson, 352 Ill. App. 3d 365, 389 (2004). Additionally, “greater liberty should
be allowed in reopening proofs when the case is tried before the court without a jury.” Dunahee v.
Chenoa Welding & Fabrication, Inc., 273 Ill. App. 3d 201, 210 (1995); In re Marriage of Phillips,
229 Ill. App. 3d 809, 822 (1992).
¶ 70 Kathleen argues that the circuit court erred when it denied her request to re-open proofs.
She asserts that there was no testimony by David at trial that his parents owed them $110,000, no
documents provided showing the transfer of these funds from David to his parents, and no
19 promissory notes existed. She avers the only reference to any possible outstanding loan, in the
amount of $35,000, was set forth in David’s financial affidavit. She further argues that there would
have been no surprise or prejudice to David if he claimed not to have known about these loans.
She opines that if David’s mother paid him the money as was claimed by David in his response to
the motion to re-open proofs, and there was no promissory note or obligation to pay, then the funds
received by David were presumed to be a gift. Kathleen asserts that the fund transfer was suspect.
¶ 71 David argues that Kathleen’s brief makes no reference to any testimony or exhibits
presented at trial for which this court can form a basis to consider this issue. He avers the only
information before the circuit court was that contained in David’s response to the motion to re-
open proofs wherein it was asserted that all the information sought to be admitted was in counsel’s
possession at the time of trial and, although never offered into evidence, was marked as a potential
petitioner’s exhibit by Kathleen.
¶ 72 Here, we find the factors used in a circuit court’s decision whether to reopen proofs weigh
in Kathleen’s favor. First, a review of the record shows that David only disclosed $35,000 owed
by his parents in his financial affidavit. He did not testify that his parents owed him a specific
amount of funds. Rather, he testified vaguely to monies lent to his parents over the years, but gave
no specifics, and there was no “paper trail” for those exchanges. There were no promissory notes
or other written documentation to put Kathleen on notice that David’s parents owed $110,000.
Notably, in his answer to Kathleen’s motion to reopen proofs, David’s references to his depositions
in this case and in his parents’ case about the amounts owed by his family are, at best, confusing,
and do not pinpoint a set amount of debt. Rather, they vary from $35,000 to $50,000 to $75,000 to
$110,000 to $130,000. Second, we do not see how granting the motion to reopen proofs as to the
amount received would have resulted in surprise or unfair prejudice to David. As noted by
20 Kathleen, the money was owed by David’s own family members. Third, determining whether
those funds were marital or non-marital property would consequentially affect Kathleen’s share of
marital property as the amount was significant which makes the determination of utmost
importance to Kathleen’s case. Thus, we find that the circuit court’s denial of Kathleen’s motion
to reopen proofs was an abuse of discretion. However, we make this finding only as it pertains to
reopening proofs concerning David’s receipt of the $110,000.
¶ 73 C. Child Support
¶ 74 Now we turn to the question of whether the circuit court erred when it set the amount of
child support. “The trial court has wide discretion in awarding child support and its decision will
not be reversed by a court of review absent an abuse of discretion.” Slagel v. Wessels, 314 Ill. App.
3d 330, 332 (2000).
¶ 75 Kathleen argues that the circuit court erred when it set the amount of child support based
solely on David’s tax returns. She avers the court failed to consider David’s lack of credibility
regarding his actual income. She argues the court failed to include the income he earned by buying
and selling other property, such as boats, when determining net income for child support purposes.
¶ 76 David argues that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it set child support. He
further argues that the court heard the testimony of the parties and had their tax returns and bank
statements available when determining the support order. He avers that the court’s order set forth
its findings showing that it not only took David’s income for tax purposes but used that income
and then factored back in depreciation when arriving at his net income.
¶ 77 Here, in its order, the circuit court set forth the income of each of the parties. Pertaining to
David who was self-employed and whose annual income fluctuated from $49,977 to $225,000 for
the years of 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 up to the date of trial, the court averaged those amounts
21 which is common practice. In cases such as this where income fluctuates greatly from year to year,
“[a]t least the three prior years should be used to obtain an accurate income picture.” In re
Marriage of Freesen, 275 Ill. App. 3d 97, 103 (1995). However, “the number of years to consider
generally ‘must be left to the discretion of the trial court, as facts will vary in each case.’ ”In re
Marriage of Gariel, 2020 IL App (1st) 182710, ¶ 41 (quoting Freesen, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 103).
¶ 78 In addition to averaging David’s income, the circuit court specifically noted that David
purchased and sold three boats ranging in price from $150,000 to $190,000 and that based on the
purchase and sale of the boats, additional income was unaccounted for by David’s financial
affidavit. This indicates that the court considered this additional income. Considering the court’s
averaging of David’s income and noting there to be unaccounted income from the sale of the boats,
we find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it determined child support.
¶ 79 D. Parenting Time 2 and Decision-Making
¶ 80 Kathleen argues that the circuit court erred by not awarding primary residential parenting
time and responsibilities to her. She asserts that she provided the majority of the caretaking
responsibilities for the children for the 24 months preceding the filing of the petition for dissolution
of marriage. She further argues that after the filing, she continued to take primary responsibility
for medical care, and extracurricular, religious, and school activities.
¶ 81 David argues that the circuit court did not err when it determined parenting time and
decision-making. He avers that Kathleen wants this court to focus only on the factor of who
2 This case involves the disposition of child custody or allocation of parental responsibilities and is therefore governed by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311 (eff. July 1, 2018) which provides for the accelerated disposition of these issues. However, David requested four extensions of time to file his appellant’s brief and Kathleen requested five extensions of time to file her appellee’s/cross-appellant’s brief. All requests were granted without objection. Therefore, we find good cause for issuing this disposition more than 150 days after the filing of the notice of appeal or granting of leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(1), (a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018). 22 primarily took care of the children before the filing of the petition for dissolution of marriage. He
argues that by the time the final parenting time ordered was entered, the parties had been operating
well for some 29 months under the temporary order with the same parenting time and decision-
making arrangement.
¶ 82 “An appellate court ‘will not reverse a trial court’s custody determination unless it (1) is
against the manifest weight of the evidence, (2) is manifestly unjust, or (3) results from a clear
abuse of discretion.’ ” In re Custody of G.L., 2017 IL App (1st) 163171, ¶ 24 (quoting In re B.B.,
2011 IL App (4th) 110521, ¶ 32). Under the manifest weight standard, this court will affirm the
circuit court’s ruling provided there is any basis in the record to support the circuit court’s
determination. Id.
¶ 83 At the time of the final hearing in this case, the parties had been sharing joint parenting
time and responsibilities for over two years pursuant to the temporary order. While Kathleen wants
this court to look specifically at her care for the children in the 24 months leading up to the filing
of the petition for dissolution, this is but one of several best interest factors that the court shall
consider. 750 ILCS 5/602.7(b) (West 2022).
¶ 84 The circuit court set forth in its November 22, 2022, order its reasoning for finding joint
parenting was in the children’s best interests. In fact, it listed the best interest factors as set forth
in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and set forth reasoning to the factors
relevant to the facts of this case. Id. For instance, it noted, referring to the GAL’s report, that “the
children are happy with the current temporary schedule that has been in place for years.” It further
noted that the children had “a good relationship with both parents.” The court found it undisputed
that the children were well-adjusted “to their current home, community, and school” and that it
“did not hear of any issues with the space where [David] resides.” It opined that “[t]he children
23 need the love and support of both of their parents” and “both parties have demonstrated a
willingness and ability to place the needs of the children before their own needs.” It praised the
parties for working “commendably well during this case.” It noted that the only significant
disagreement arose over the childrens’ participation in Cub Scouts. The court found that the parties
could “facilitate a relationship between the other parent and the children.” Lastly, it specifically
referred to the 29-month period of joint parenting and noted the children were thriving. It expressed
that “consistency and the maximum involvement of both parents in the lives of the minor children
are the express purposes of the Illinois Dissolution of Marriage Act.” “A court may consider the
period of time that a child has spent with a parent by virtue of a temporary custody order.” In re
Marriage of Hefer, 282 Ill. App. 3d 73, 78 (1996). It is important to maintain stability and
continuity in the environment of a young child. Hall v. Hall, 226 Ill. App. 3d 686, 690.
¶ 85 Here, the circuit court was very clear upon what bases it formulated its decision regarding
the allocation of parenting time and responsibilities. It did not rest upon only one or even a few
bases. Rather, it set forth its reasoning based upon each of the best interest factors. Here, we find
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion, the decision was not against the manifest weight
of the evidence, and it was not manifestly unjust.
¶ 86 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 87 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s order (a) classifying the entirety of
the Gorham Farm as marital property, (b) setting child support, and (c) awarding the parties’ joint
parenting time and responsibilities. We reverse the circuit order denying Kathleen’s motion to re-
open proofs pertaining to the $110,000 received by David from his mother after the close of
evidence and before entry of the judgment and remand the matter to the circuit court for a hearing
specifically and only on that issue.
24 ¶ 88 Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.