NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2025 IL App (3d) 240144-U
Order filed October 30, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, DONIELLE KINSELLA, ) Will County, Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-24-0144 v. ) Circuit No. 18-D-1016 ) MICHAEL KINSELLA, ) ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant. ) Derek W. Ewanic, ) Judge, presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Peterson and Anderson concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The circuit court properly denied respondent’s motion to modify child support. (2) The circuit court abused its discretion in granting petitioner’s request to set expenses. (3) The amount that the circuit court awarded in attorney fees was proper.
¶2 On November 19, 2021, the circuit court of Will County entered a judgment of dissolution
of marriage (dissolution judgment) between petitioner, Donielle Kinsella, and respondent, Michael
Kinsella. Following the dissolution judgment, Donielle filed a motion that contained a request to allocate expenses that she had incurred for the parties’ children, and Michael filed both a motion
to modify his child support obligation under the dissolution judgment and a petition for attorney
fees. The circuit court granted Donielle’s request to allocate the children’s expenses, denied
Michael’s motion to modify his child support obligation, and awarded Michael a portion of his
attorney fees. For the following reasons, we affirm the court’s order denying Michael’s motion to
modify child support and the award of attorney fees, and vacate in part the court’s ruling allocating
the children’s expenses.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The parties were married on June 18, 2005, and have two children: Q.K., born August 16,
2008, and M.K., born July 29, 2010. On June 18, 2018, Donielle filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage. Shortly thereafter, the circuit court entered a temporary agreed order that required the
parties to “equally divide all of [the] children’s expenses, including medical, dental, counseling,
extra-curricular activities, school expenses, etc. ***.”
¶5 On November 19, 2021, following a trial in which the parties represented themselves, the
circuit court entered the dissolution judgment and found therein that Donielle had earned $91,000
in 2020, that Michael had earned approximately $159,000 in that same year, and that the level of
income of each party was expected to continue. The court ordered Michael to pay Donielle $1,649
per month in child support. The court also found that Michael was in arrears on his payment of the
children’s expenses pursuant to the temporary agreed order and further ordered him to pay Donielle
an additional $250 per month, starting December 1, 2021, until he paid his arrearage in full. The
dissolution judgment was silent as to the allocation of the children’s future expenses.
¶6 On November 17, 2022, Donielle filed a pro se emergency motion for rule to show cause
(emergency motion) that alleged that Michael had violated the temporary agreed order by failing
2 to pay half of the $4,076.92 that she had incurred in medical and school expenses for the children
between June 8 and November 6, 2022. Attached to the motion was a document reflecting prior
written communications between the parties. In those communications, Donielle notified Michael
of the medical and school expenses that she had incurred and his obligation to pay the expenses
pursuant to “previous court orders,” and Michael responded that the dissolution judgment already
compelled him to pay a set monthly amount in basic child support, the purpose of which was “to
cover [the] future children’s expenses.”
¶7 On December 15, 2022, Michael filed a motion to dismiss the emergency motion (motion
to dismiss) and argued therein that the emergency motion failed to state a claim for relief because
it was based on the terms of the temporary agreed order, which he contended was later terminated
and superseded by the dissolution judgment. The motion to dismiss also included a request for
attorney fees.
¶8 At a subsequent hearing on June 9, 2023, Donielle withdrew her emergency motion and
presented a motion to set expenses, modify child support, and award other relief (motion for relief).
In her motion for relief, Donielle stated that the circuit court did not allocate the children’s future
expenses in the dissolution judgment, yet argued that this omission was not “final” but instead “a
curable and modifiable issue consistent with [sections 505 and 510 of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/505, 510 (West 2022))].” Donielle pointed out that
the dissolution judgment was also silent as to whether her payment of the children’s health
insurance premiums was considered in the determination of child support. Arguing that there had
been a substantial change in circumstances following entry of the dissolution judgment, Donielle
sought an award of child support that would require Michael to contribute to the children’s health
3 insurance premiums and to pay all the unreimbursed children’s expenses that had accrued (request
to set expenses).
¶9 Also during the June 9, 2023, hearing, Michael withdrew all parts of his motion to dismiss
other than his request for attorney fees. Upon leave granted by the circuit court, Michael later filed
a petition in which he sought $6,050 in attorney fees (petition for attorney fees). On July 18, 2023,
Michael also filed a motion to modify child support in which he argued that a substantial change
in circumstances had occurred following the dissolution judgment, in that his income in 2021
through 2023 was “substantially less,” whereas Donielle’s income and the children’s needs had
“stayed substantially the same.”
¶ 10 On September 22 and 25, 2023, an evidentiary hearing was held on Donielle’s motion for
relief and Michael’s motion to modify child support. At the beginning of the hearing, the parties,
who were each represented by an attorney, disputed the characterization of Donielle’s request to
set expenses. Donielle argued that the request was indeed to set expenses in the nature of child
support pursuant to section 505 of the Act and that the circuit court had intended to allocate the
expenses in the dissolution judgment but did not. Conversely, Michael argued that the request was
akin to a motion to modify the dissolution judgment pursuant to section 510 of the Act. The court
expressed that it had intended to allocate the children’s future expenses in the dissolution judgment
“but [had] inadvertently left it off,” and ultimately determined that Donielle’s request was one to
set expenses rather than a motion to modify the dissolution judgment.
¶ 11 Following preliminary discussions, Nahum Jayesinghe, Michael’s accountant, testified that
he had prepared Michael’s 2021 and 2022 federal and state income tax returns in conformity with
the applicable tax laws and based on the information that Michael had provided, such as his bank
statements, bills, past tax returns, and responses to certain questions. Jayesinghe further testified
4 that, although Michael had provided bank statements from the same bank for the last two years,
he did not know whether Michael had provided all of his banking statements from every institution
with which he banked. Additionally, Jayesinghe testified that Michael had also provided him with
a chart that Michael had created that detailed his income, source of income, and expenses, but that
Michael had not provided him with any general ledgers, profit and loss statements, or balance
sheets related to the business that he had. Jayesinghe testified that, based on the information that
Michael had provided, he believed that Michael was in the construction business and earned an
income of $61,645 in 2021 and $64,116 in 2022.
¶ 12 Donielle testified that she had generated a spreadsheet reflecting all the medical and school
expenses that she had incurred for the children since the entry of the dissolution judgment through
September 14, 2023. A copy of the spreadsheet was admitted into evidence. Donielle stated that
Michael had never responded to her requests to reimburse her for the expenses reflected on the
spreadsheet. She also acknowledged that the dissolution judgment did not allocate the children’s
future expenses and stated that Michael had “[brought this] to [her] attention” after she had first
asked him to pay for certain expenses following the dissolution judgment.
¶ 13 Michael testified that he specialized in concrete construction and had owned a construction
company “at various times throughout [his] life,” including Kinsella Custom Concrete, which he
had owned since 2014. Michael explained that the amount of time that he worked fluctuated with
the seasons, with his gross receipts being “generally down” during the winters and “up” during the
summers.
¶ 14 Michael further testified that he had prepared a financial affidavit dated June 1, 2023, that
stated that his gross receipts in 2022 were $210,825.33 (financial affidavit). Michael also testified
that he had prepared his 2021 and 2022 tax returns with Jayesinghe’s help and had provided
5 Jayesinghe with all the documents that he had, “including all bank statements, all receipts, all
compiled information as far as financials, copies of checks, carbon copies, all financials.” Michael
explained that he had reviewed these documents with Jayesinghe and truthfully answered all
Jayesinghe’s questions. As to the contents of his tax returns, Michael acknowledged that his 2021
tax return showed that his total income was $61,645 for that year and that his 2022 tax return
showed that his total income was $64,116 and his gross receipts were $200,925 for that year.
Michael explained that there was a discrepancy between the amounts in gross receipts that he had
listed in his financial affidavit and 2022 tax return because he had prepared his financial affidavit
on his own but his 2022 tax return with an accountant, Jayesinghe, who then “rechecked” the
financial affidavit. Copies of Michael’s financial affidavit and 2021 and 2022 tax returns were all
admitted into evidence.
¶ 15 On cross-examination, Michael was shown an image of the website for Kinsella Custom
Concrete. Michael acknowledged that the website showed that the company was located at 18849
South Palomino Drive, which was his former residential address, and that he “need[ed] to change
this.” Michael was also shown an image from the Illinois Secretary of State website that he further
acknowledged stated that there was an active business entity named Kinsella LLC located at 1100
Cassie Drive, Joliet, Illinois 60435 (1100 Cassie Drive). Michael explained that 1100 Cassie Drive
was the address of his parents’ residential home, where he lived because he could not afford
anything else. Michael also stated that Kinsella LLC was his father’s business and that he did not
know why the business was listed as active because his father was retired. The images of the
websites for Kinsella Custom Concrete and the Illinois Secretary of State were also admitted into
evidence.
6 ¶ 16 At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court articulated numerous findings,
including that Michael’s testimony was neither “compelling nor credible,” based on his answers
and the manner in which he testified. Specifically, the court found that Michael was argumentative
when answering “every question” asked by Donielle’s counsel. The court also found that
Michael’s answers to the questions asked by both his and Donielle’s counsel were nonresponsive,
and that the documents that he presented contradicted one another. Regarding the income of each
party, the court determined that any changes to either did not constitute a substantial change in
circumstances such as to warrant a modification of child support. Accordingly, the court denied
Michael’s motion to modify child support.
¶ 17 As to Donielle’s motion for relief, the court also denied her respective request to modify
child support, on the basis that there had been no substantial change in circumstances. With respect
to Donielle’s request to set expenses, the court stated that, “due to [its] oversight, [it] did not in the
judgment set expenses” and so it would “set those now.” The court then granted Donielle’s request
to set expenses and ordered Michael to pay 65% and Donielle to pay 35% of the children’s school
and medical expenses that had accrued since the filing of Donielle’s motion for relief.
¶ 18 Additionally, the court addressed Michael’s pending petition for attorney fees.
Specifically, the court noted that the first entry in the attached billing statement was for a telephone
conversation between Michael and attorneys at the law firm that he had retained, Mirabella,
Kincaid, Frederick & Mirabella, LLC (MKFM), regarding Donielle’s emergency motion. The
court further noted that each of the remaining entries in the billing statement were for the work
that MKFM had done. The court asked Todd Scalzo, one of the attorneys at MKFM who was
representing Michael, whether he had ever personally contacted Donielle, who had been acting
pro se at the time she filed her emergency motion, to tell her that he believed that the motion lacked
7 a good-faith basis. Scalzo responded that he had not, but pointed out that attached to the emergency
motion was a copy of the parties’ earlier communications in which Michael had said to Donielle
that the dissolution judgment did not require him to pay for the children’s expenses following the
date of the judgment.
¶ 19 During oral pronouncement of its ruling on the petition for attorney fees, the circuit court
found that “there was no reach out to [Donielle] in regard to [Michael’s] belief that the judgment
did not allow for the relief she was requesting.” The court also stated the following:
“Then I see that every other entry [following Scalzo’s initial appearance], at least
docket entry, it was [Donielle’s] fee petition was up *** and [Donielle] was present, and
her petition just kept getting continued for status. Then shortly thereafter, [Donielle] did
hire [a law] firm to represent her in June and immediately [her counsel] withdrew the
motion, petition for rule recognizing that [Donielle] did not have grounds upon which to
proceed.
So at least what I would do, what I would have awarded is maybe the initial phone
call that [Scalzo] had with [Michael] in regard to the bringing of the motion to dismiss and
the filing of the motion to dismiss itself. There was no communication with [Donielle]
before filing the motion.”
The court then awarded Michael $162.50 in attorney fees to compensate for the initial conversation
that he had with Scalzo regarding the filing of the motion to dismiss. Michael now appeals.
¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21 On appeal, Michael argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to modify child
support, granting Donielle’s request to set expenses, ordering him to pay 65% and Donielle to pay
35% of the children’s expenses, and awarding him “de minimus” attorney fees. Prior to addressing
8 the merits of Michael’s arguments, we note that no appellee brief was filed in this appeal. Because
the record is simple and the issues can be decided without the aid of an appellee brief, and because
Michael’s brief demonstrates prima facie reversible error supported by the record, we will
nevertheless decide the appeal without a brief from Donielle. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v.
Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976) (outlining when a reviewing court may
properly decide the merits of an appeal in the absence of an appellee brief).
¶ 22 A. Motion to Modify Child Support
¶ 23 Section 510 of the Act provides that a child support order may be modified upon a showing
of a substantial change in circumstances. 750 ILCS 5/510(a)(1) (West 2022). “Not all changes in
circumstances constitute a substantial change in circumstances for modification of child support
purposes.” In re Marriage of Connelly, 2020 IL App (3d) 180193, ¶ 18. Rather, a change in
circumstances warrants modification of a child support order only when equitable action by the
court is necessary to protect the children’s best interests. Id. There is typically a substantial change
in circumstances when the children’s needs, the obligor parent’s ability to pay, or both have
changed since entry of the most recent child support order. In re Marriage of Wengielnik, 2020 IL
App (3d) 180533, ¶ 13. A party seeking modification of child support must prove a substantial
change in circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. 750 ILCS 5/610.5(c) (West 2022).
¶ 24 “A trial court has wide latitude in determining whether *** a change in circumstances has
occurred,” and a reviewing court will reverse a circuit court’s finding of no substantial change in
circumstances only if that determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Wengielnik, 2020 IL App (3d) 180533, ¶ 13; In re Marriage of Armstrong, 346 Ill. App. 3d 818,
821 (2004). Further, the overall decision whether to modify an award of child support is within the
9 sound discretion of the circuit court and must not be disturbed, absent an abuse of discretion. In re
Marriage of Ross, 355 Ill. App. 3d 1162, 1166 (2005).
¶ 25 Michael argues that the circuit court’s finding that his income was $159,000 per year, rather
than an average of $62,880.50 per year in 2021 and 2022, was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Michael further argues that each of the court’s specific bases for discrediting his
evidence was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, he asserts that the record
contradicts the court’s findings that he was argumentative and that his answers were
nonresponsive. He also asserts that he provided compelling explanations for the fact that his
financial affidavit did not match his tax returns, that the website for Kinsella Custom Concrete
listed his former residence as a business address, and that the Illinois Secretary of State website
stated that Kinsella LLC was an active business located at his parents’ address.
¶ 26 In the context of appeals from decisions regarding the modification of child support, this
court has articulated that “[it] will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court regarding
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn
from the evidence.” In re Parentage of I.I., 2016 IL App (1st) 160071, ¶ 55 (internal citation
omitted). As Michael himself acknowledges, this deference “is grounded in the reality that the
circuit court is in a superior position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, determine and
weigh their credibility, and resolve conflicts in their testimony.” In re Marriage of Baumgartner,
237 Ill. 2d 468, 486-87 (2010).
¶ 27 Here, Michael’s contention that the circuit court’s bases for discrediting his evidence were
against the manifest weight of the evidence calls upon this court to improperly substitute its
judgment for that of the circuit court regarding the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to
10 be given to the evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing. Thus, we decline to resolve the
contention and will not consider it any further.
¶ 28 As to the court’s determination that Michael’s income following the dissolution judgment
remained at least $159,000 per year, we cannot say that it was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Although Jayesinghe testified that Michael’s 2021 and 2022 tax returns “fairly and
accurately” reflected Michael’s income during those years, weighing against Michael’s position
was Jayesinghe’s additional testimony that his calculations were based on the information that
Michael had provided him. As to this information, although Michael testified that he had provided
Jayesinghe all relevant documents and truthfully answered all Jayesinghe’s questions to assist him
in preparing his 2021 and 2022 tax returns, the circuit court discredited portions of Michael’s
overall testimony because it was argumentative and nonresponsive and conflicted with other
evidence that he had offered. Furthermore, Jayesinghe testified that he did not know whether
Michael had provided all his banking statements from every institution with which he banked, and
that Michael had not provided him with any general ledgers, profit and loss statements, or balance
sheets related to his business. Additionally, the financial affidavit that Michael had prepared,
which stated that he had earned $210,825.33 in gross receipts in 2022, conflicted with his tax
returns, which stated that he had earned $200,925 in gross receipts for that year.
¶ 29 Based on the nature of the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, it was not against
the manifest weight of the evidence for the circuit court to find that Michael’s income had remained
at least $159,000 per year following the dissolution judgment and had not decreased. Accordingly,
the court properly denied Michael’s motion to modify child support upon finding that there had
been no substantial change in circumstances.
¶ 30 B. Request to Set Expenses
11 ¶ 31 Michael next argues that the circuit court erred by granting Donielle’s request to set
expenses. Specifically, Michael contends that the court erred as a matter of law by resolving the
request pursuant only to section 505(a) of the Act, and not also pursuant to section 510 of the Act.
¶ 32 Section 505(a) of the Act authorizes the circuit court to order a parent obligated to support
a child of the marriage to pay a reasonable and necessary amount for support. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)
(West 2018). The section further provides that the court may order the payment of child support
during certain proceedings, including, in relevant part, those for dissolution of marriage, temporary
child support ahead of final judgment, or modification of a previous child support order pursuant
to section 510 of the Act. Id. § 505(a).
¶ 33 Here, the proceedings in which the circuit court granted Donielle’s request to set expenses
occurred only after the court had already entered both the temporary agreed order and dissolution
judgment. Thus, it cannot be said that the court granted the request in proceedings for dissolution
of marriage or temporary child support ahead of final judgment. Nor did the court have jurisdiction
to grant the request to set expenses retroactive to the date of the temporary agreed order or
dissolution judgment because more than 30 days had passed since the entry of either. See In re
Marriage of Hubbard, 215 Ill. App. 3d 113, 116 (1991) (“A court *** loses jurisdiction over a
matter once 30 days have passed after the entry of a final and appealable order.”). Consequently,
the central issue on appeal, which the parties disputed below, is whether Donielle’s request to set
expenses was essentially a motion to modify child support governed by section 510 of the Act.
¶ 34 We find two cases to be instructive as to the proper characterization of Donielle’s request
to set expenses. In the first case, Nerini v. Nerini, 140 Ill. App. 3d 848 (1986), the circuit court
issued a dissolution judgment that did not award child support and expressly retained jurisdiction
to enter future awards of child support. Nerini, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 849. Following entry of the
12 dissolution judgment, the mother filed a petition for child support, which the court granted. Id. On
appeal, the mother argued that section 510(a) did not govern her petition because the dissolution
judgment did not contain an order regarding child support and she never sought child support in
her complaint for dissolution of marriage, which meant that there was no order of child support to
be modified. Id. at 853.
¶ 35 Rejecting the mother’s arguments, the Nerini court noted that the circuit court had personal
jurisdiction over the parties when the dissolution judgment was entered, and that, in the judgment,
the circuit court had found that the mother had been solely supporting the child and that she was
entitled to sole custody of the child. Id. The Nerini court further noted that the dissolution judgment
did not order the father to pay child support and contained language that reserved jurisdiction to
enter future awards regarding child support. Id. The Nerini court found that it was “evident” from
the dissolution judgment that the circuit court “exercised its discretionary authority to set child
support by not requiring [the father] to pay child support,” and that the dissolution judgment, “by
not providing for child support where the court had jurisdiction to do so and, under the facts where
[the mother] made no request for child support, in essence, was an order not awarding [the mother]
child support ***.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 853, 856. The Nerini court thus ultimately determined
that the judgment as to child support was final despite the absence of an award of child support
and that the mother’s petition for child support had to be treated as a motion to modify child support
pursuant to section 510. Id. at 853-54.
¶ 36 In the subsequent case of Conner v. Watkins, 158 Ill. App. 3d 759 (1987), the circuit court
stated during oral pronouncement of the dissolution judgment that the issue of child support would
be reserved until the final disposition of another matter before the court, but the written dissolution
judgment was silent as to child support. Conner, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 760. Years later, the mother
13 filed a petition in which she requested child support for a timeframe that preceded her petition. Id.
at 760-61. On appeal from the circuit court’s denial of her request, the Conner court noted that the
facts before it were similar to those in the Nerini case, with “no valid distinction.” Id. at 762.
Namely, the Conner court pointed out that the dissolution judgments in both cases were devoid of
an award of child support, and stated that, “[o]bviously, any subsequent award of support would
constitute a modification of the previous judgment, thereby bringing the case within the purview
of section 510(a) ***.” Id.
¶ 37 Unlike in Nerini, in her petition for dissolution of marriage in this case, Donielle explicitly
requested awards of child support and contribution to the children’s expenses. Additionally,
although the court did reserve jurisdiction in the dissolution judgment, it reserved jurisdiction for
the sole purpose of enforcing the “term [sic] and conditions” of the judgment. However, we find
any factual differences between this case and Nerini and Conner to be insignificant. The fact
remains that, like in Nerini and Conner, the circuit court in this case never originally allocated the
payment of the children’s future medical and school expenses, which is a form of child support.
See 750 ILCS 5/505(a) (West 2018) (defining the term “child” to include “any child under age 18”
and requiring the court to consider the child’s financial, physical and educational needs when
determining child support). That Donielle requested contribution to these expenses and the court
reserved jurisdiction to enforce the dissolution judgment does not negate this omission in the
dissolution judgment. Thus, similar to the courts in Nerini and Conner, we find that, because the
dissolution judgment in this case did not award child support in the form of allocation of the
children’s medical and school expenses, Donielle’s subsequent request to allocate these expenses
was, in truth, a request to modify the original award of child support governed by section 510(a)
of the Act.
14 ¶ 38 Under section 510(a)(1) of the Act, a child support order may be modified upon a showing
of a substantial change in circumstances. 750 ILCS 5/510(a)(1) (West 2018). A child support order
may also be modified absent a showing of a substantial change in circumstances when the amount
awarded in child support differs depending on the statutory guidelines that are used, or the obligee
parent shows a need to provide for the healthcare needs of the child. Id. § 510(a)(2). A circuit
court’s decision whether to modify an award of child support may not be disturbed, absent an
abuse of discretion. Marriage of Ross, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 1166. An abuse of discretion occurs
when the ruling on the motion to modify child support is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or based
on an error of law. In re Parentage of I.I., 2016 IL App (1st) 160071, ¶ 52.
¶ 39 Here, the circuit court abused its discretion in numerous ways in allocating the children’s
school expenses. First, the court refused to characterize Donielle’s request to set expenses as a
motion to modify child support governed by section 510 of the Act, and it seems that, due to this
mischaracterization, it failed to make the relevant preliminary determinations prior to granting the
request, such as that there had been a substantial change in circumstances, or, in the absence of a
substantial change in circumstances, that the amount of child support differed depending on the
guidelines used or that the support was needed to provide for the children’s healthcare needs. See
750 ILCS 5/510(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2022). In fact, when addressing the separate portion of
Donielle’s motion for relief in which she requested a modification of child support, the court found
that there had been no substantial change in circumstances to warrant modification of the award,
and neither party now challenges this determination. Additionally, the only rationale that the court
offered prior to allocating the school expenses was that, “due to [its] oversight, [it] did not in the
final judgment set expenses pursuant to [section] 505” and so would proceed to then do so.
However, without more, the court’s inadvertence was not a sufficient basis in the law for having
15 allocated these expenses. See 750 ILCS 5/510(a) (West 2022) (articulating when an award of child
support may be modified). Thus, we find it necessary to vacate the portion of the court’s order
requiring Michael to pay 65% of the children’s school expenses.
¶ 40 Regarding the court’s allocation of the children’s medical expenses, as we earlier noted,
section 510(a)(2) authorizes a circuit court to modify an award of child support absent a substantial
change in circumstances to provide for the healthcare needs of the child. Id. § 510(a)(2). Here, it
can be inferred from the fact that the court ordered Michael to pay 65% of the children’s medical
expenses that the court credited Donielle’s evidence as to the existence of these expenses and the
children’s corresponding healthcare needs. Furthermore, because Michael does not challenge this
inferred finding regarding the children’s healthcare needs, we uphold the finding and the portion
of the court’s order allocating the children’s medical expenses.
¶ 41 As a final note, Michael also argues that the circuit court further erred by ordering him to
pay 65% and Donielle to pay 35% of the children’s medical and school expenses. Michael argues
that the percentage that the court allocated to Michael for the children’s expenses was erroneous
because the percentage was based on its incorrect finding that his income was approximately
$159,000 per year. Because we earlier found that the court properly determined Michael’s income,
we need not reach the issue of whether the percentage allocated to him for the children’s expenses
was proper.
¶ 42 C. Attorney Fees
¶ 43 Last, Michael challenges the amount that the circuit court awarded him in attorney fees. A
review of the record shows that the circuit court did not disclose the specific statute or rule under
which it awarded Michael attorney fees. However, we note that, although Michael’s motion to
dismiss requested attorney fees pursuant only to section 508(b) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/508(b)
16 (West 2018)), his subsequent petition sought attorney fees pursuant to both section 508(b) of the
Act and Illinois Supreme Court Rule (Rule) 137 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 137 (eff. July 1, 2013)).
¶ 44 “The purpose of Rule 137 *** is to prevent the filing of false and frivolous lawsuits.”
Kensington’s Wine Auctioneers & Brokers, Inc. v. John Hart Fine Wine, Ltd., 392 Ill. App. 3d 1,
15 (2009). Accordingly, Rule 137 allows a court to impose sanctions against a party for filing a
pleading that “is not well grounded in fact; that is not supported by existing law or lacks a good-
faith basis for the modification, reversal, or extension of the law; or that is interposed for any
improper purpose.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 137(a) (eff. July 1, 2013).
¶ 45 Separately, section 508(b) of the Act provides the following, in pertinent part:
“If at any time a court finds that a hearing under this Act was precipitated or conducted for
an improper purpose, the court shall allocate fees and costs of all parties for the hearing to
the party or counsel found to have acted improperly. Improper purposes include, but are
not limited to, harassment, unnecessary delay, or other acts needlessly increasing the cost
of litigation.” 750 ILCS 5/508(b) (West 2018).
¶ 46 We will not overturn a circuit court’s ruling on a motion for attorney fees pursuant to Rule
137 or section 508(b) absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Michaelson, 359 Ill. App.
3d 706, 715 (2005); Technology Innovation Center, Inc. v. Advanced Multiuser Technologies
Corp., 315 Ill. App. 3d 238, 244 (2000). A circuit court abuses its discretion where its ruling is
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by
the circuit court; or where its ruling rests on an error of law. In re Marriage of O’Malley ex rel.
Godfrey, 2016 IL App (1st) 151118, ¶ 60.
¶ 47 In considering Michael’s petition for attorney fees, the circuit court noted that Donielle
was representing herself when she first filed her emergency motion and that Scalzo, Michael’s
17 counsel at that time, had never personally contacted Donielle to tell her that he believed that her
motion was meritless. The court separately noted that the docket reflected that, during every
hearing following Scalzo’s initial appearance and the filing of Michael’s motion to dismiss, the
emergency motion “just kept getting continued for status” and the parties addressed a separate
motion filed by Donielle’s earlier counsel. Additionally, the court noted that, once Donielle
obtained new counsel, her attorney “immediately *** withdrew the [emergency] motion.” The
court then decided to award Michael attorney fees only for his conversation with Scalzo regarding
his motion to dismiss, which occurred prior to Scalzo’s initial appearance.
¶ 48 Michael now argues that the court erred by denying him the remainder of his attorney fees
because the denial was improperly based on the fact that Scalzo had never contacted Donielle to
tell her that he believed that her emergency motion was meritless. Michael argues that the
applicable law did not require Scalzo to have contacted Donielle to express this belief and that the
circuit court’s finding otherwise constituted reversible error.
¶ 49 We are aware of no governing authority that required Scalzo to have personally informed
Donielle that he believed that her emergency motion was meritless. Furthermore, although Scalzo
himself never contacted Donielle, Donielle testified during the evidentiary hearing that, when she
had first asked Michael to contribute to the children’s expenses, Michael had “[brought it] to [her]
attention” that the dissolution judgment did not allocate the children’s future expenses. An exhibit
to Donielle’s emergency motion also showed this written communication made by Michael. Thus,
even if Donielle were required to be notified regarding the merits of her emergency motion, the
evidence in the record showed that she had been notified. To the extent that the circuit court found
otherwise, it is unclear what meaningful difference it made that Michael, rather than Scalzo, was
the person who notified her.
18 ¶ 50 Nevertheless, it is well settled that we may affirm an award of attorney fees on any grounds
in the record. See, e.g., Trustees of Wheaton College v. Peters, 286 Ill. App. 3d 882, 887 (1997)
(stating on appeal from the circuit court’s denial of attorney fees that “it is well established that a
reviewing court may affirm a trial court’s decision on an issue on any basis appearing in the
record.”). As we earlier recounted, the circuit court articulated multiple bases for denying portions
of Michael’s attorney fees, one basis being that all the court hearings that followed Scalzo’s initial
appearance only involved continuing the emergency motion for status and proceedings on another
unrelated motion. Michael does not now challenge this separate basis, which we find to be valid.
See Ill. S. Ct. R. 1.5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010) (explaining that, in assessing the reasonableness of attorney
fees, the circuit court should consider the time and labor required). Consequently, we uphold the
amount that the circuit court awarded Michael in attorney fees.
¶ 51 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 52 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed in part and vacated in part.
¶ 53 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.