NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2025 IL App (3d) 230249-U
Order filed January 14, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit, ROBIN KIAMCO, ) Du Page County, Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-23-0249 v. ) Circuit No. 21-D-1360 ) VICKIE KIAMCO, ) Honorable ) Linda E. Davenport, Respondent-Appellant. ) Robert E. Douglas, ) Judges, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Holdridge and Peterson concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: Respondent failed to present a sufficiently complete record to support her claims of error regarding the trial court’s alleged bias, treatment of her alleged disability, and findings regarding petitioner’s income. We lack jurisdiction to consider respondent’s challenges arising from the post-decree proceedings. Affirmed in part and appeal dismissed in part.
¶2 Respondent, Vickie Kiamco, appeals the trial court’s judgment for dissolution of marriage.
Respondent argues that (1) the court violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2018)) and the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
(U.S. Const., amend. XIV) by “forcing” respondent to represent herself and failing to provide her
with disability accommodations; (2) the court displayed bias against respondent; (3) the court’s
finding regarding petitioner, Robin Kiamco’s, income was against the manifest weight of the
evidence; (4) the court erred during certain post-decree proceedings when it “block[ed] and
withh[eld]” trial transcripts and fee waivers requested by respondent and modified the judgment
without jurisdiction to do so. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the court’s judgment and
dismiss the appeal in part.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The parties were married on June 12, 1999, and share two emancipated children. Petitioner
filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on July 23, 2021. Justice Linda Davenport presided over
this matter at the outset but was appointed to the Illinois Appellate Court in December 2022. Judge
Robert Douglas was subsequently assigned to her docket and presided over the trial. The common
law record is voluminous, and we recount only the portions that pertain to the issues raised on
appeal.
¶5 At the time of trial, petitioner was self-employed selling health insurance and information
technology services. Respondent was employed as a program coordinator at a non-profit. During
the marriage, the parties resided at the marital residence in Wood Dale. Petitioner moved out of
the marital residence in July 2021 and into a separate property in Wood Dale (Wood Dale
residence). The Wood Dale residence is owned by the Robert C. Kiamco Trust; Robert Kiamco is
petitioner’s father. Respondent continued to reside in the marital residence throughout trial.
¶6 Initially, respondent was represented by Beermann LLP. During this time, respondent
tendered her financial affidavit and served upon petitioner a request to produce documents and
2 interrogatories. Respondent sought temporary and interim relief in the form of an allocation of
household expenses for the marital residence, temporary maintenance, and interim and prospective
attorney fees and costs. On October 20, 2021, respondent was awarded temporary monthly
maintenance in the amount of $850; petitioner was ordered to pay the mortgage, insurance, and
real estate taxes on the marital residence; and respondent was ordered to pay the utilities associated
with the marital residence. The parties were further ordered to equally divide the cost of uncovered
medical, dental, optical, and psychological expenses. These terms were retroactive to September
1, 2021. Respondent’s motion for interim and prospective attorney fees and costs was entered and
continued to a future date.
¶7 Petitioner failed to timely respond to respondent’s request for production of documents,
prompting respondent’s November 12, 2021, motion to compel. The court ordered petitioner’s
compliance by December 7, 2021. Thereafter, respondent issued various subpoenas for records to
financial institutions. Following a pretrial conference, petitioner was ordered to produce additional
discovery responses by April 6, 2022.
¶8 On April 7, 2022, respondent filed a motion to modify the temporary order, for sanctions,
and for other relief, alleging that an “extensive analysis of [petitioner]’s discovery” revealed that
petitioner earned a “substantial gross income.” Respondent claimed that petitioner had been
“cagey” regarding his finances and tendered an inaccurate financial affidavit. That same day,
respondent also filed a petition for adjudication of indirect civil contempt, for discovery sanctions,
and for other relief, claiming, inter alia, that petitioner failed to comply with discovery. At the
presentation of these motions, petitioner was granted time to respond and respondent’s motion for
interim and prospective attorney fees and costs was, again, entered and continued.
3 ¶9 On April 20, 2022, Beermann LLP filed a motion to withdraw as respondent’s counsel,
which was granted on June 13, 2022. Respondent was granted 21 days to either retain new counsel
or file an appearance. On July 14, 2022, Chicago Advocate Legal, NFP, filed an appearance on
respondent’s behalf.
¶ 10 On August 23, 2022, petitioner filed a certificate of service enumerating 59 supplemental
discovery responses that were sent to respondent’s counsel. On September 2, 2022, Chicago
Advocate Legal, NFP, was granted leave to withdraw as respondent’s counsel. Respondent was
given 21 days to hire new counsel or file an appearance. On September 28, 2022, petitioner filed
a motion for default.
¶ 11 Also on September 28, 2022, petitioner filed a “Petition for Temporary Relief—
Contribution to Tax Liability.” Petitioner alleged that the parties filed joint income tax returns
during the marriage but that respondent self-reported to the Internal Revenue Service that they
underreported their income for prior years. As a result, the parties’ accountant prepared amended
tax returns for 2019 and 2020, as well as 2021 joint tax returns, but respondent refused to sign
them. Petitioner requested that respondent be ordered to pay the additional costs incurred by her
refusal to cooperate. On September 30, 2022, petitioner’s motions were entered and continued,
and respondent was granted an additional seven days to file her pro se appearance. Respondent
filed her pro se appearance the same day.
¶ 12 Respondent filed at least 25 motions between October 5, 2022, and December 6, 2022. Her
motions were accompanied by thousands of pages of exhibits. We detail only the motions that are
relevant to the issues raised on appeal or provide greater context for the case.
¶ 13 On October 5, 2022, respondent filed a motion titled “[Petitioner] + [petitioner] alone is
responsible for the additional money owed from his fraudulent filings to healcare.gov [sic].”
4 Respondent alleged, inter alia, that she discovered petitioner’s “tax crimes” in the spring of 2021
and, thereafter, told petitioner that she would not file joint tax returns with him. This motion was
taken with the case.
¶ 14 In a separate motion filed on October 5, 2022, respondent alleged, inter alia, that the Wood
Dale residence was purchased with marital funds and that “[petitioner] worked with his father and
his attorney to hide his ownership + to keep it out of the marital estate.” Respondent further claimed
that “[petitioner]’s father stated that he gives [petitioner] a check for any amount that he asks for
whenever he asks.” Respondent requested a sum equal to the amount of money petitioner used
towards the Wood Dale residence so she could relocate. In support, respondent listed several items
in the marital residence that were in disrepair, claimed that petitioner had made three attempts on
her life, and stated that mold in the marital residence had “an adverse effect on her breathing +
overall health.” She claimed that she needed “to relocate far from here to another state for her
health + safety.” Attached as exhibits, but not specifically referenced or otherwise explained in the
motion itself, are what purports to be several of respondent’s medical records. The documents
disclosed, inter alia, asthma and a January 2022 slip and fall incident wherein respondent hit the
back of her head, leading to post-concussive syndrome symptoms of “short-term memory loss,
confusion, inability to concentrate, loss of balance, headache, blurred vision, tinnitus and jaw
pain.” By agreement of the parties, respondent was granted leave to relocate.
¶ 15 In another October 5, 2022, motion, respondent claimed, inter alia, that petitioner “forged
tax returns” during the parties’ marriage, and that respondent “was not allowed to see, sign, or
even meet with” the accountant. Respondent further alleged that petitioner failed to disclose
transactions from his Venmo, Cash App, PayPal, eBay, and other accounts. She stated that
petitioner did not provide discovery, as he “only shared a few stand alone statements” and “only
5 shared 49 [client] invoices.” Respondent further claimed that petitioner failed to tender a business
valuation and “filed patently false financial affadavits [sic] + interrogatories.” Respondent argued
that the court should impute income to petitioner, including his “leagally [sic] obtaind [sic] gains,
*** illegally obtained gains, [and] his parents [sic] *** annual gift.” She alleged that petitioner’s
parents’ gift was in the amount of $25,000 to $50,000. Moreover, respondent claimed that
petitioner’s parents never loaned him money and that the promissory notes tendered to this effect
by petitioner were fraudulent. This motion was denied.
¶ 16 The same day, respondent filed another motion requesting that she not be held to the same
standard as an attorney. She argued that she tried to hire attorneys but that they harmed her and
“lied, deceived, withheld information, refused to file motions on her behalf.” She stated that she
was “representing herself under protest” and that she lacked “the time, health, mental capacity to
learn the law.” She argued that “[d]ue to TBI, PTSD, and a host of other ongoing heath [sic] issues,
it would be unfair” of the court to hold her to the same standard as an attorney. Respondent attached
to her motion approximately 95 pages of what appears to be confidential communications with her
attorneys. This motion was denied.
¶ 17 On October 7, 2022, respondent filed a motion requesting petitioner’s entire client list,
alleging that he failed to claim the income earned from his “ ‘cash’ clients.” Additionally,
respondent alleged that, in 2021, petitioner admitted that, with the help of the accountant, he “
‘managed the numbers’ ” for the parties’ tax returns to make them believable while obtaining the
“maximum subsidy from Healthcare.gov.” At this point, respondent consulted with a tax attorney,
obtained bank statements and copies of the tax returns, and “turn[ed] [petitioner] in.” This motion
was dismissed.
6 ¶ 18 The court entered a trial order on October 11, 2022. Discovery was to be completed by
December 1, 2022, and the parties were to exchange, inter alia, witness disclosures and exhibits
by January 10, 2023. Trial was scheduled to commence on January 11, 2023.
¶ 19 On October 25, 2022, respondent filed a motion for substitution of judge as a matter of
right, which was denied.
¶ 20 On October 27, 2022, petitioner issued several subpoenas seeking respondent’s financial
records. On November 1, 2022, petitioner filed a motion to compel discovery and for sanctions,
citing several deficiencies in respondent’s prior discovery responses. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
petition to modify temporary support and for other relief, alleging, inter alia, that respondent
withdrew $5000 from the parties’ joint bank account, leaving only $119 behind, rendering it
impossible for petitioner to pay temporary maintenance. He requested, inter alia, that his
temporary maintenance obligation be terminated or modified.
¶ 21 On December 1, 2022, the court granted petitioner’s motion to compel and outlined the
discovery respondent was to produce by December 30, 2022. Thereafter, respondent filed a motion
for substitution of judge for cause, alleging, inter alia, that the court was biased against her. In
support, she argued that her motions were “ruled on later” or denied, while the court heard
petitioner’s motions. She accused the court of participating in and escalating domestic abuse, as
well as “upping the financial abuse” and trying to make respondent homeless and bankrupt.
Moreover, respondent complained that petitioner was not ordered to turn over discovery and did
not follow orders. This motion was rendered moot by Justice Davenport’s appointment to the
Illinois Appellate Court and Judge Robert Douglas’s subsequent assignment.
¶ 22 Also on December 1, 2022, respondent filed a motion stating,
7 “I have filed motion after motion for you to make him turn over discovery. To quit abusing
us. To turn over discovery[.] To hold him accountable for his lies. You set every one aside
or deny them. Yet you go through his and award him with any thing he has asked. Why do
you only help the abuser? Why does he not have to turn over discovery?”
This motion was taken with the case.
¶ 23 On December 6, 2022, the court entered an order providing that, inter alia, “failure to
produce any exhibit in a timely manner may result in said exhibit being barred at trial.” On
December 20, 2022, and December 27, 2022, petitioner filed certificates of service outlining
various promissory notes, credit card statements, bank statements, and other financial documents
that were tendered to respondent.
¶ 24 On January 9, 2023, two days before trial, petitioner filed a motion in limine, arguing that
respondent should be barred from offering documents at trial that were not timely produced during
discovery. The same day, respondent issued several witness subpoenas and a subpoenas duces
tecum to various third parties. On January 10, 2023, petitioner filed a motion in limine to bar
testimony from undisclosed witnesses, arguing that respondent failed to timely disclose any
witnesses. He also filed a motion to quash respondent’s subpoenas, arguing that the subpoenas
duces tecum were untimely; the witness subpoenas were improperly served and respondent failed
to disclose the named individuals as witnesses; subpoenas issued to the parties’ children were
inappropriate and issued for an improper purpose; and respondent failed to provide petitioner with
proper notice of the issuance of subpoenas. All three motions were granted.
¶ 25 Trial spanned eight non-consecutive days, and respondent filed 13 additional motions
during the periods of recess, all of which were denied as untimely. At the close of trial, the parties
were ordered to submit a written closing argument and proposed judgment by April 17, 2023.
8 Petitioner timely filed his closing argument and proposed judgment; respondent did not file either.
Petitioner also filed a petition for contribution to attorney fees and costs, arguing that the expenses
were “primarily attributable to [respondent]’s improper, harassing conduct,” including her
excessive litigiousness, improper filings, meritless pleadings, failure to comply with discovery,
violation of court orders, meritless claims at trial, improper use of dissolution proceedings as a
criminal investigation tool, false testimony, hypocritical positions, and wasting of the court’s time.
¶ 26 The judgment was entered on April 28, 2023. Prior to making its findings, the court noted
that it “considered all matters of record, including but not limited to the testimony of the parties,
the documents admitted into evidence, all matters of record (including but not limited to the
thousands of pages of documents filed by [respondent]), the pleadings, admissions, and
stipulations of the parties.” We note that the record contains neither trial exhibits nor a report of
proceedings and, therefore, any reference herein to testimony or other evidence presented at trial
is derived from the judgment itself. We recount the provisions of the judgment that pertain to the
issues raised on appeal.
¶ 27 The court found that, in 2022, petitioner earned business revenue of $57,590.32 and paid
$25,310.38 in ordinary and necessary business expenses, resulting in a gross income of
$32,279.94. The court accepted the adjusted gross income reported on petitioner’s federal income
tax filings. The court found that petitioner has no other sources of income or employment, receives
no cash income, and does not trade services with anyone. The court rejected respondent’s argument
that petitioner’s income should be calculated based upon the total deposits into the parties’ bank
account, reasoning that other monies were deposited into the account as well, including
respondent’s paychecks, tax refunds, stimulus payments, and financial assistance from petitioner’s
parents. Moreover, respondent’s approach failed to consider petitioner’s ordinary and necessary
9 business expenses. The court noted that respondent failed to offer a specific figure for petitioner’s
salary; instead, she merely testified that it must be more than what appeared on the tax returns
because the bank deposits showed a larger sum.
¶ 28 The court found that respondent earned $38,725 in employment income in 2021. On the
seventh day of trial, respondent disclosed for the first time that she applied for Social Security
Disability benefits but presented no documents supporting her claim or evidencing the amount of
her anticipated benefits. Respondent did not provide any evidence to suggest that her employment
or income differed from 2021 and, therefore, the court set her income at $38,725.
¶ 29 The court identified the statutory factors as set forth in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2020)) that are to be considered when determining
whether maintenance is appropriate. The court “gave particular weight” to the income and property
of each party, including marital property apportioned and non-marital property assigned to the
party seeking maintenance; the needs of each party; the present and future earning capacity of each
party; and the standard of living established during the marriage. Id. Specifically, the court found
that “[t]he parties are the same age, have roughly equivalent earnings, and roughly equivalent
earning capacities.” The court noted that respondent claimed to have a physical disability but that
she presented no evidence apart from her own testimony to substantiate a claim of diminished
earning capacity. The court found that maintenance was not appropriate and “forever barred” each
party from receiving maintenance.
¶ 30 The court further found that respondent withdrew $28,595.69 from various marital
accounts during the pendency of the case and that, although respondent testified that she spent this
money on bills, she had no receipts to support her claim. The court found that respondent’s
explanation regarding these transactions was “not credible and not persuasive.” The court also
10 emphasized that respondent failed to voluntarily produce her bank statements; rather, they were
subpoenaed by petitioner. The court included these withdrawals in respondent’s share of the
marital assets. Moreover, the marital residence was to be listed for sale, with respondent receiving
55% of the net sale proceeds and petitioner receiving 45%.
¶ 31 The court noted that both parties testified that their 2019 and 2020 jointly filed income tax
returns contained errors that resulted in substantial tax refunds. Petitioner testified that the errors
were unintentional and that he hired a new accountant to amend the tax returns. Respondent
testified that she believed that petitioner intentionally understated his business income and that she
refused to sign any amended returns to preserve her right to assert an innocent spouse defense in
the event of an audit. It was undisputed that respondent tried to have the IRS investigate
petitioner’s “tax fraud” and contacted them several times to inquire about the status of the
investigation. To the extent petitioner oversaw the preparation of the parties’ 2019 and 2020 tax
returns and respondent withheld the appropriate amount from her paychecks each year, any
outstanding tax liabilities or refunds resulting from the amended tax returns were assigned to
petitioner.
¶ 32 Turning to the parties’ debt, the court found that, beginning in January 2021, the parties
incurred extraordinary expenses and petitioner had legitimate financial needs for which he sought
assistance from his parents. The court framed the issue as whether the assistance from petitioner’s
parents constituted a gift or a marital debt. Both parties testified that petitioner’s parents gifted
them more than $99,000 in 2021. Petitioner testified that “his parents’ generosity was exhausted”
thereafter. The court found that, as of January 2022, “each and every disbursal of funds by
[petitioner]’s parents on his behalf was accompanied by a contemporaneously executed promissory
note, signed by [petitioner] and his father, for the exact amount disbursed.” Moreover, the
11 payments were given “directly to the mortgage lender and the credit card companies or retained
by Robert Kiamco for rent on the [Wood Dale residence].” The court found that the loans totaled
$16,500 for rent for the Wood Dale residence; $32,182.28 for mortgage payments on the marital
residence; and $45,549.77 for credit cards. Reasoning that petitioner “credibly testified that he
contemporaneously signed the promissory notes, tracked the debt to his father, correlated the
amounts disbursed to the promissory notes, and that his father expects to be repaid when the marital
residence is sold,” the court found that the sums owed to Robert Kiamco were marital debts.
Furthermore, the court found that respondent had borrowed $20,000 from a friend, Maria Freeman,
and that this was also a marital debt. These debts were to be paid from the net proceeds from the
sale of the marital residence prior to distribution to the parties.
¶ 33 In ruling upon petitioner’s petition for contribution to attorney fees and costs, the court
found as follows:
“[Respondent] willfully and unnecessarily increased the cost of litigation by actions
including, but not limited to, the following: filing of excessive pleadings (at least 40 of
them), consisting of thousands of pages, most of which were without merit; improperly
filing thousands of pages of documents in violation of Supreme Court Rule 138,
necessitating the sealing and impoundment of the court file; filing of meritless pleadings
that were without any good faith basis in fact or at law; failing to comply with reasonable
discovery requests; Refusing to follow Court Orders, including the orders to produce
discovery and to list and sell the marital residence; the assertion of meritless claims at trial,
such as the claim that [the Wood Dale residence] was owed by [petitioner], despite having
no evidence to support such a claim; engaging in litigation for improper purposes, which
she explicitly acknowledged in her testimony that her goal was for [petitioner] to be
12 imprisoned; providing self-contradictory and incredible testimony regarding that parties
joint *** checking account ***, their daughter’s account at Parkway Bank ***, their son’s
UTMA account ***; and taking hypocritical positions regarding discovery production, and
generally dragging things out at trial. With regard to that last point, the Court notes that
there was absolutely no reason for this trial to have taken eight days to complete, but for
[respondent]’s wasting of the Court’s time. For example, [respondent] refused to give
straightforward answers to simple questions, resulting in countless admonitions by the
Court for her to simply answer the question and refrain from providing unsolicited
narrative; [respondent] showed up for court unprepared and disorganized, resulting in
hours of idle silence during the proceedings while she searched through her papers and
decided which subject she wanted to inquire about next; [respondent] spent great lengths
of time to prove insignificant points *** [.] Additionally, [respondent] spent half an
afternoon reading into the record an offer of proof consisting of her self-prepared
‘transcript’ [of] a Zoom meeting between the parties, their adult children, and [petitioner]’s
parents, which the Court ruled as inadmissible hearsay. The Court has had ample
opportunity to observe [respondent] and her demeanor.”
Respondent was ordered to contribute $25,000 to petitioner’s attorney fees from her share of the
net sale proceeds from the sale of the marital residence.
¶ 34 Respondent timely appealed.
¶ 35 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 36 Initially, we note that respondent utilized the form appellant brief that has been approved
by the Illinois Supreme Court. Respondent’s opening brief consists of 29 pages, although several
were left blank, and is followed by a certificate of compliance, proof of service, and appendix.
13 Thereafter, respondent appended 48 untitled, single-spaced pages of additional narrative and
argument, some of which appear to have been taken directly from her opening brief.
Respondent’s arguments on appeal are disjointed and underdeveloped. It is difficult to ascertain
which statements are intended to convey a legal challenge to the judgment or underlying
proceedings, and which are merely personal grievances against the court.
¶ 37 “A reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited
and cohesive legal arguments presented [citation], and it is not a repository into which an appellant
may foist the burden of argument and research [citation]; it is neither the function nor the obligation
of this court to act as an advocate or search the record for error [citation].” Obert v. Saville, 253
Ill. App. 3d 677, 682 (1993). A potential consequence of the failure to comply with these
requirements is the forfeiture of the arguments on appeal, although the court may choose to
nevertheless proceed to the merits of the arguments raised. In re A.H., 215 Ill. App. 3d 522, 529
(1991) (noting that this rule “is an admonishment to the parties, and not a limitation upon the
court’s jurisdiction”). We acknowledge that respondent proceeds as a self-represented litigant in
this court, as she did in the trial court. However, self-represented litigants are not excused from
compliance with these requirements. Id. at 529-30.
¶ 38 Notwithstanding the deficiencies in respondent’s opening brief, we have distilled her
central arguments to the best of our ability as follows: (1) the court violated the ADA and the
fourteenth amendment by “forcing” respondent to represent herself and failing to provide her with
disability accommodations; (2) the court displayed bias against respondent; (3) the court’s finding
regarding petitioner’s income was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (4) the court erred
during certain post-decree proceedings when it “block[ed] and withh[eld]” the trial transcripts and
14 fee waivers respondent requested and modified the judgment without jurisdiction to do so. We
address her arguments in turn.
¶ 39 A. Pre-Decree Proceedings
¶ 40 We first consider respondent’s arguments related to the pre-decree proceedings. First,
respondent contends that the court violated the ADA and the fourteenth amendment by failing to
provide her with disability accommodations and “forcing” her to represent herself. She alleges that
the court threatened her and “exacerbated her disabilities in order to sanction and discredit her.”
Second, respondent argues that the court was biased against her, claiming that the court relied upon
its longstanding relationship with petitioner’s counsel to assess credibility at trial. She claims that
the court refused to let her present evidence to contradict petitioner’s “numbers”; “copy and
pasted” petitioner’s proposed judgment into the judgment; and ignored respondent’s closing
argument and prayer for relief. Third, respondent challenges the court’s finding of petitioner’s
income as being against the manifest weight of the evidence, arguing that the court relied upon
perjured tax returns, allowed petitioner and his counsel to misrepresent facts, and erroneously
judged petitioner and his counsel as credible.
¶ 41 Prior to reaching the merits of respondent’s argument, we must determine whether she
forfeited her arguments pertaining to her alleged disability. See People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95,
106 (2008) (noting that one of the most important tasks of an appellate court when beginning the
review of a case is to determine whether any issues have been forfeited so as to prevent the
“unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources”). Petitioner contends that the issues related to
respondent’s alleged disability and need for accommodations were raised for the first time on
appeal and, therefore, forfeited.
15 ¶ 42 A claim that is not brought before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Romito v. City of Chicago, 2019 IL App (1st) 181152, ¶ 33. Where a party fails to raise an issue
before the trial court, the opposing party is deprived of the ability to appropriately respond with its
own evidence and argument, thereby weakening the adversarial process. Id. Accordingly, a claim
raised for the first time on appeal is forfeited. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Cortez, 2020
IL App (1st) 192234, ¶ 32.
¶ 43 While we are unable to locate in the record respondent’s claim that she is disabled or
required accommodations, the maintenance provision of the judgment recognizes that respondent
claimed to have a physical disability but that she produced no evidence to support a diminished
earning capacity. Thus, although the exact timing and nature of this claim remains unclear, it does
appear to have been raised and considered by the court in some capacity. The issue was not
forfeited on this basis.
¶ 44 Nonetheless, respondent failed to provide us with a complete record to substantively
address her challenges to the pre-decree proceedings.“[A]n appellant has the burden to present a
sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, and in the
absence of such a record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was
in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis. Any doubts which may arise from the
incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.” Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill.
2d 389, 391-92 (1984). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 321 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021) provides that the record
on appeal shall contain, inter alia, the entire common law record, which “includes every document
filed, judgment, and order entered and any exhibit offered and filed by any party,” as well as any
report of proceedings prepared in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323. A report of
proceedings shall include a verbatim transcript of the proceedings or, if a transcript is unavailable,
16 then a suitable alternative such as a certified bystander’s report or agreed statement of facts. Ill. S.
Ct. R. 323(a), (c)-(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 45 Here, the record contains neither a report of proceedings from any of the underlying
proceedings nor trial exhibits. We are presented only with respondent’s bare assertions without
any way to meaningfully review the evidence relied upon by the court or the court’s conduct.
Respondent failed to provide a complete record for our review, and we therefore must “presume[]
that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual
basis” and resolve all “doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record” against
respondent. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. Indeed, the judgment indicates that the court “considered
all matters of record,” including the parties’ testimony, documentary evidence, pleadings,
admissions, and stipulations. We affirm the judgment.
¶ 46 B. Post-Decree Proceedings
¶ 47 Respondent next argues that the trial court erred during certain post-decree proceedings,
and we note that all such proceedings are missing from the record entirely. Respondent argues that
the trial court erred when it “block[ed] and withh[eld]” her post-decree requests to obtain fee
waivers for the trial transcripts 1 and modified the judgment without jurisdiction to do so. In
response, petitioner contends that we are without jurisdiction to reach the merits of any post-decree
1 On November 9, 2023, following respondent’s submission of an ADA accommodation request to this court,
respondent was granted a 60-day extension to file her opening brief; provided resources for self-represented litigants;
and advised to petition the trial court for a fee waiver to obtain the transcripts necessary to pursue her appeal. The
record on appeal does not contain any post-decree proceedings, so it is unclear whether respondent filed a petition for
a fee waiver or, if she did, how the trial court ruled.
17 issue because the corresponding orders are not referenced in respondent’s notice of appeal, nor did
she file an amended notice. For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss this portion of the appeal.
¶ 48 While the deficiencies in the record certainly present an insurmountable obstacle to our
review, the more pressing issue is the jurisdictional problem created by respondent’s arguments.
Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017), a notice of appeal “shall
specify the judgment or part thereof or other orders appealed from and the relief sought from the
reviewing court.” Thus, a reviewing court’s jurisdiction is limited to a review of only the judgment
or parts thereof that are specified in the notice of appeal. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d at 104. Notwithstanding,
a notice of appeal is to be liberally construed, bearing in mind that its purpose “is to inform the
party prevailing in the trial court that the other party seeks a review of the judgment” and that
defects of form rather than substance are not fatal. Id. at 104-05. “Accordingly, notice should be
considered as a whole and will be deemed sufficient to confer jurisdiction on an appellate court
when it fairly and adequately sets out the judgment complained of and the relief sought, thus
advising the successful litigant of the nature of the appeal.” Lang v. Consumers Insurance Service,
Inc., 222 Ill. App. 3d 226, 229 (1991).
¶ 49 The judgment was entered on April 28, 2023. When prompted by the form notice of appeal
to “[l]ist the date of every order or judgment you want to appeal,” respondent included only the
date of the judgment. At no point did she file an amended notice of appeal seeking our review of
any post-decree orders. 2 Even a liberal construction of respondent’s notice of appeal fails to
2 On June 4, 2024—one day after petitioner filed his appellee brief highlighting the deficiencies in
respondent’s notice of appeal—respondent filed a motion with this court seeking to “[e]xpand this appeal to include
post-trial judgements and actions taken since the conclusion of [the trial court case number].” Attached to the motion
as Exhibit A was a 16-page screenshot of the online case history, which appears to show the titles of various record
18 counter the conclusion that it failed to “fairly and adequately set out the judgment complained of”
as being a post-decree order. The notice did not adequately notify petitioner of the nature of this
portion of the appeal. While we recognize that respondent listed the dates of 12 post-decree orders
in her opening brief, this does not cure the substantive defect found in her notice of appeal. See
Smith, 228 Ill. 2d at 105 (holding that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction where the notice of
appeal referred only to a November 10, 2004, judgment for purposes of review, but the appellant’s
brief identified a February 21, 2006, order as the judgment from which he appealed). Accordingly,
we dismiss this portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
¶ 50 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 51 For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page
County.
¶ 52 Appeal dismissed in part. Affirmed.
entries throughout the case without any further detail. Attached as Exhibit B was a purported email chain between
respondent and then-Du Page County Chief Judge Kenneth L. Popejoy. The motion was denied.