NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 251293-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is July 20, 2026 NO. 4-25-1293 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the (Bryon Allen Johnston, ) Circuit Court of Petitioner-Appellee, ) Rock Island County v. ) No. 24DN132 Shavonna G. Jovan-Johnston, ) Respondent-Appellant). ) Honorable ) Kathleen Ellen Mesich, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Vancil and Grischow concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion when dividing marital property equally.
¶2 Respondent, Shavonna G. Jovan-Johnston (Shavonna), appeals the trial court’s
equal division of specific marital property as part of a dissolution of marriage with her husband,
petitioner, Bryon Allen Johnston (Bryon). On appeal, Shavonna argues (1) the relevant factors
supported a 65/35 division of marital property in her favor, (2) the court failed to meaningfully
consider the relevant factors, and (3) the court’s equal division disproportionately favored Bryon.
We disagree and affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The parties were married in August 2005. Bryon filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage in August 2024. No children were born of the marriage, so the only issues were the payment of maintenance and the division of property. The matter proceeded to an evidentiary
hearing in September 2025. Prior to the hearing, the parties had filed a joint pre-trial
memorandum which narrowed the contested issues to (1) the division of certain property and
debts, (2) the allocation of Bryon’s retirement savings, (3) the allocation of the proceeds from the
sale of their home, (4) maintenance, and (5) Shavonna’s future health insurance coverage.
¶5 At the hearing, Bryon testified he was agreeable to pay maintenance in the
amount of $2,073.29 per month for 172.5 months. He proposed dividing his 401(k) retirement
plan and his current pension equally. He stated Shavonna had quit working in 2012 because she
“didn’t get along with her coworkers.” He acknowledged she received Social Security Disability
Income (SSDI) due to her multiple sclerosis. He believed Shavonna would be eligible for
Medicare. Lastly, he offered to pay her continued health insurance under the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (29 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. (2024)) through the end
of the year.
¶6 On cross-examination, Bryon agreed his monthly gross income was
approximately $8,900 with a net income of approximately $7,200. He also agreed there was
approximately $17,000 in a savings account.
¶7 Shavonna testified as an adverse party pursuant to section 2-1102 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1102) (West 2024)). She was aware she was eligible for
Medicare and had inquired about applying. She said she was permitted to earn up to $2,500 per
month without affecting her SSDI payments. She stated she had applied for various jobs but was
never hired.
¶8 Shavonna then testified on her own behalf and stated she was diagnosed with
multiple sclerosis in 2001. She said her condition had gotten worse over the last year. Her
-2- testimony noted numerous issues affecting her ability to sustain various activities for long
periods of time, which, in turn, affected her ability to work. She said she had a GED.
¶9 Following testimony, Bryon argued the marital property should be divided
equally. Shavonna argued for a “65/35” division of the house proceeds and other disputed assets.
¶ 10 Following evidence and arguments from the parties, the trial court stated:
“This is an 18-year marriage. It should be split down the
middle 50/50.
I do not see how or why [Shavonna] could not do
something for some sort of income. Do something with the
humane society, maybe; get a job watching someone’s animals; get
a job as a greeter at Walmart. I don’t know.
But I—I have a real problem listening to someone say that
they absolutely cannot work, period. I don’t think that that is the
case.”
¶ 11 The trial court subsequently ordered the marital assets be distributed as follows:
the parties were to split equally the equity of their home, a bank account containing $17,000, and
Bryon’s retirement accounts. Additionally, the court awarded Shavonna $2,073.29 per month for
172.5 months in maintenance.
¶ 12 This appeal followed.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, Shavonna argues the trial court abused its discretion when it divided
the marital property equally rather than in just proportions pursuant to section 503(d) of the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2024)).
-3- ¶ 15 The Act states marital property shall be divided in “just proportions” and provides
a list of relevant factors for the trial court to consider. Id. We review a trial court’s distribution of
marital property for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of DeRossett, 173 Ill. 2d 416, 422
(1996). “In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in dividing marital property,
this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless no reasonable person
would adopt the position of the trial court.” In re Marriage of Oden, 394 Ill. App. 3d 392, 397
(2009).
¶ 16 Shavonna argues the section 503(d) factors weighed against equal division of
marital assets. Specifically, she argues the evidence showed a stark inequality between Bryon’s
net monthly income of $7,284.58 and her sole income from SSDI of $463. She also notes the
evidence showed her worsening health and long absence from the workforce demonstrated she
had a diminished opportunity for future employment and income.
¶ 17 She also contends the trial court failed to make a case-specific analysis pursuant
to section 503(d). She claims the court’s reference to the length of the marriage and defaulting to
equal distribution of assets failed to show the court’s meaningful engagement with the statutory
factors. She claims the court’s decision discounted her disability, extended workforce absence,
negligible income, substantial expenses, and diminished prospects for future earnings.
¶ 18 Finally, she argues the equal division of marital property disproportionately
favored Bryon. She, again, points to the disparity between her income and Bryon’s in light of his
ability to continue building his earning and retirement savings.
¶ 19 Regarding Shavonna’s first argument that the section 503(d) factors weighed
against an equal (50/50) division of marital property, we disagree. She references section 503(d)
of the Act, which enumerates 12 relevant factors. However, on appeal, she only mentions two:
-4- “the duration of the marriage” and “the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of
income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties.” 750
ILCS 5/503(d)(4), (8) (West 2024). These factors were not only considered but explicitly
mentioned by the trial court.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 251293-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is July 20, 2026 NO. 4-25-1293 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the (Bryon Allen Johnston, ) Circuit Court of Petitioner-Appellee, ) Rock Island County v. ) No. 24DN132 Shavonna G. Jovan-Johnston, ) Respondent-Appellant). ) Honorable ) Kathleen Ellen Mesich, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Vancil and Grischow concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion when dividing marital property equally.
¶2 Respondent, Shavonna G. Jovan-Johnston (Shavonna), appeals the trial court’s
equal division of specific marital property as part of a dissolution of marriage with her husband,
petitioner, Bryon Allen Johnston (Bryon). On appeal, Shavonna argues (1) the relevant factors
supported a 65/35 division of marital property in her favor, (2) the court failed to meaningfully
consider the relevant factors, and (3) the court’s equal division disproportionately favored Bryon.
We disagree and affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The parties were married in August 2005. Bryon filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage in August 2024. No children were born of the marriage, so the only issues were the payment of maintenance and the division of property. The matter proceeded to an evidentiary
hearing in September 2025. Prior to the hearing, the parties had filed a joint pre-trial
memorandum which narrowed the contested issues to (1) the division of certain property and
debts, (2) the allocation of Bryon’s retirement savings, (3) the allocation of the proceeds from the
sale of their home, (4) maintenance, and (5) Shavonna’s future health insurance coverage.
¶5 At the hearing, Bryon testified he was agreeable to pay maintenance in the
amount of $2,073.29 per month for 172.5 months. He proposed dividing his 401(k) retirement
plan and his current pension equally. He stated Shavonna had quit working in 2012 because she
“didn’t get along with her coworkers.” He acknowledged she received Social Security Disability
Income (SSDI) due to her multiple sclerosis. He believed Shavonna would be eligible for
Medicare. Lastly, he offered to pay her continued health insurance under the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (29 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. (2024)) through the end
of the year.
¶6 On cross-examination, Bryon agreed his monthly gross income was
approximately $8,900 with a net income of approximately $7,200. He also agreed there was
approximately $17,000 in a savings account.
¶7 Shavonna testified as an adverse party pursuant to section 2-1102 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1102) (West 2024)). She was aware she was eligible for
Medicare and had inquired about applying. She said she was permitted to earn up to $2,500 per
month without affecting her SSDI payments. She stated she had applied for various jobs but was
never hired.
¶8 Shavonna then testified on her own behalf and stated she was diagnosed with
multiple sclerosis in 2001. She said her condition had gotten worse over the last year. Her
-2- testimony noted numerous issues affecting her ability to sustain various activities for long
periods of time, which, in turn, affected her ability to work. She said she had a GED.
¶9 Following testimony, Bryon argued the marital property should be divided
equally. Shavonna argued for a “65/35” division of the house proceeds and other disputed assets.
¶ 10 Following evidence and arguments from the parties, the trial court stated:
“This is an 18-year marriage. It should be split down the
middle 50/50.
I do not see how or why [Shavonna] could not do
something for some sort of income. Do something with the
humane society, maybe; get a job watching someone’s animals; get
a job as a greeter at Walmart. I don’t know.
But I—I have a real problem listening to someone say that
they absolutely cannot work, period. I don’t think that that is the
case.”
¶ 11 The trial court subsequently ordered the marital assets be distributed as follows:
the parties were to split equally the equity of their home, a bank account containing $17,000, and
Bryon’s retirement accounts. Additionally, the court awarded Shavonna $2,073.29 per month for
172.5 months in maintenance.
¶ 12 This appeal followed.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, Shavonna argues the trial court abused its discretion when it divided
the marital property equally rather than in just proportions pursuant to section 503(d) of the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2024)).
-3- ¶ 15 The Act states marital property shall be divided in “just proportions” and provides
a list of relevant factors for the trial court to consider. Id. We review a trial court’s distribution of
marital property for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of DeRossett, 173 Ill. 2d 416, 422
(1996). “In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in dividing marital property,
this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless no reasonable person
would adopt the position of the trial court.” In re Marriage of Oden, 394 Ill. App. 3d 392, 397
(2009).
¶ 16 Shavonna argues the section 503(d) factors weighed against equal division of
marital assets. Specifically, she argues the evidence showed a stark inequality between Bryon’s
net monthly income of $7,284.58 and her sole income from SSDI of $463. She also notes the
evidence showed her worsening health and long absence from the workforce demonstrated she
had a diminished opportunity for future employment and income.
¶ 17 She also contends the trial court failed to make a case-specific analysis pursuant
to section 503(d). She claims the court’s reference to the length of the marriage and defaulting to
equal distribution of assets failed to show the court’s meaningful engagement with the statutory
factors. She claims the court’s decision discounted her disability, extended workforce absence,
negligible income, substantial expenses, and diminished prospects for future earnings.
¶ 18 Finally, she argues the equal division of marital property disproportionately
favored Bryon. She, again, points to the disparity between her income and Bryon’s in light of his
ability to continue building his earning and retirement savings.
¶ 19 Regarding Shavonna’s first argument that the section 503(d) factors weighed
against an equal (50/50) division of marital property, we disagree. She references section 503(d)
of the Act, which enumerates 12 relevant factors. However, on appeal, she only mentions two:
-4- “the duration of the marriage” and “the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of
income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties.” 750
ILCS 5/503(d)(4), (8) (West 2024). These factors were not only considered but explicitly
mentioned by the trial court. The court did not believe Shavonna was incapable of performing
work. A reviewing court affords great deference to the trial court’s superior position to assess the
credibility of witnesses. See In re Marriage of Lonvick, 2013 IL App (2d) 120865, ¶ 33 (stating
the trial court is afforded great deference because of its superior position to judge the credibility
of witnesses for determining the best interest of the child for child custody).
¶ 20 Shavonna’s second argument contends the trial court failed to meaningfully
engage with the relevant factors from section 503(d) and, in fact, discounted her disability,
which, she argues, weighs in her favor. We note the relevant factors are not required to be “given
equal weight, so long as the balance struck by the court is reasonable under the circumstances.”
In re Marriage of Miller, 231 Ill. App. 3d 480, 487 (1992). Shavonna’s contention appears to
suggest one factor be given substantially more weight. We find the court appropriately
considered her disability and potential for future earnings. The record does not reveal the court
failed to consider all of the relevant factors. “While a trial court must consider all relevant factors
before exercising its discretion in distributing marital property, it need not make specific findings
as to each of the factors set forth in section 503(d).” In re Marriage of Benz, 165 Ill. App. 3d
273, 288 (1988).
¶ 21 Lastly, Shavonna argues the trial court’s equal distribution disproportionately
favored Bryon due to the disparity in his monthly income and her poor prospects for future
earnings. The court was required to balance the relevant factors and divide the marital property
in just proportions. We have already found the court did so. The fact that Bryon’s earnings after
-5- the marriage are significantly more than Shavonna’s does not change the findings. Indeed, had
the court divided the marital property as Shavonna requested, Bryon’s post-marriage earnings
would still be significantly more than hers. Therefore, we find the trial court’s division of marital
property was not an abuse of discretion.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
-6-