2021 IL App (2d) 190652-U No. 2-19-0652 Order filed March 2, 2021
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ARTURO HURTADO, JR., ) of Du Page County. ) Petitioner-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 16-D-459 ) ) Honorable HEATHER HURTADO, ) Neal W. Cerne & ) Robert E. Douglas, Respondent-Appellee. ) Judges, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Schostok concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Part of appeal pertaining to petitioner’s untimely successive post-judgment motion dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; in addition, petitioner failed to show that dissolution judgment was void under section 2-1401; finally, petitioner’s appellate briefs were borderline incomprehensible, violated multiple Supreme Court Rules, and demonstrated that this appeal was taken in bad faith; judgment affirmed in part, sanctions imposed.
¶2 In this post-dissolution appeal, petitioner Arturo Hurtado, Jr., raises a number of challenges
to the dissolution judgment, portions of which favor his former wife, respondent Heather Hurtado.
As we will explain, part of this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Furthermore, on the 2021 IL App (2d) 190652-U
issue of Arturo’s petition for relief from judgment, we take issue with a number of Arturo’s
counsel’s strident and unprofessional statements, and his failure to file an appellate brief that
conforms to Supreme Court Rules. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the portion of the
judgment that is properly before us and impose sanctions.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Arturo and Heather Hurtado were married in July 2002, and their marriage resulted in four
children. In March 2016, Arturo filed for dissolution citing irreconcilable differences. Custody and
visitation issues were mostly resolved by agreement, but financial matters remained unresolved.
¶5 Between August and December of 2017, a ten-day trial was held before Honorable Neal
W. Cerne. Judge Cerne requested that the parties file written closing arguments; Heather did so,
while Arturo did not. On February 27, 2018, Judge Cerne entered a 13-page, single-spaced
judgment resolving property distribution, including dissipation owed by Arturo, and an award of
maintenance and child support to Heather. Relevant here, the judgment stated that the fair market
value of the marital home was $320,000; that there was a balance of $111,648 on the primary
mortgage; and that there was another mortgage—a balance of a $72,700 on a home equity line of
credit, or HELOC. At the time of the judgment, Arturo was unemployed, so the amounts owed
were reserved pending his new employment. Beginning in March 2018, Arturo’s sixth attorney
entered his appearance and sought and received several extensions to file a post-judgment motion
to reconsider. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2016).
¶6 On May 8, 2018, Arturo filed his final amended motion to reconsider. The motion generally
alleged that the court erred in finding dissipation and further erred by finding there was an
additional mortgage on the marital home. The motion noted that an exhibit referenced for the
HELOC was actually a receipt for a child support payment, an apparent error.
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¶7 At a hearing on the motion, the court agreed that Arturo had paid back approximately
$10,000 so that he only owed around $30,000 and, so, the judgment would be modified
accordingly. On the subject of the “additional” mortgage, Heather’s counsel explained that “[t]here
is one mortgage, if you add what the amounts are in your ruling, it’s the equivalent of the [one]
mortgage.” The court replied, “Well, that's what I thought but I know I saw -- I know I saw two
debts. One was one eleven and the other one was -- I forgot the exact--[.]” At which point Arturo’s
counsel interrupted the court and began to dispute what the trial evidence was. Counsel eventually
agreed that the combined mortgages were essentially listed as a single mortgage on both parties’
financial affidavits, with a combined balance around $180,000, but counsel further argued that the
court’s “error” was compounded by Heather’s failure to declare as marital “two hundred and some
thousand in non-marital property”—which was a reference to an inheritance Heather received from
her grandfather.
¶8 The court noted that there were numerous deficiencies in Arturo’s presentation of evidence,
which forced the court to infer and impute income as necessary. The court also noted that the
inconsistent scheduling of trial dates over the course of several months led to a “hodgepodge
presentation” that often “made no sense.” The court further noted that Arturo failed to file a closing
argument, which might have shed some light on gaps in the evidence. After the agreed
modification of the $10,000 in dissipation, the court denied the remainder of Arturo’s motion to
reconsider.
¶9 On February 10, 2019, nearly a year after the entry of the judgment, Arturo (through new
counsel, Gary N. Foley, who is also Arturo’s appellate counsel) filed a combined motion to
reconsider (735 ILCS 5/2-1203) and a petition to vacate the judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West
2016)). The combined petition dispensed with the distinction between marital and non-marital
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property and asserted that the trial court erroneously awarded 95.7% of maintenance and assets to
Heather, leaving Arturo with only 4.3% of the estate. The motion asserted that the “Judgement
[sic] [was] erroneous and unconscionable on it’s [sic] face, but was also arbitrary and capricious
throughout.” The motion suggested that the only explanation for the court’s “errors” was “the
mixing of facts from another case and or [sic] based on a lump sum maintenance award that was
clearly not appropriate where the court also awarded future [m]aintenance to be paid by Arturo
despite Arturo being unemployed without cause seems to also be arbitrary and capricious under
the unusual circumstances in this convoluted case.” (Emphasis removed.) Throughout the motion,
it was alleged that Arturo had been a victim of fraud and a “mutual mistake of fact” perpetrated by
both the court and by Heather’s counsel. More specifically, the motion alleged that the HELOC
artificially deflated the value of the marital home, and that a section of the judgment, which
referred to Heather having worked as a part-time makeup artist was inconsistent with evidence that
she held a degree in communications and had also worked in marketing. In one truly bizarre
paragraph, counsel wrote as follows:
“There is an old expression that ‘pigs get fat, and hogs get slaughtered’ and in looking at
the Judgment and the clearly erroneous facts and conclusions, as well as some of the
apparent arbitrary and capricious findings coupled with some of the recent pleadings filed
by the Respondent it would appear that that old adage appears to ring true here.”
It is unclear who precisely is the target of counsel’s scattershot invective, but as we address below,
it is clear that counsel’s comments were both unbecoming and unprofessional.
¶ 10 By the time the motion was filed, on February 13, 2019, again nearly a year after the
judgment, the motion was docketed before the Honorable Robert Douglas. Upon receipt of the
motion, Judge Douglas bifurcated the pleading and referred the motion-to-reconsider portion (735
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ILCS 5/2-1203) to Judge Cerne, who was now sitting in a different courtroom.
¶ 11 The opening to the hearing before Judge Cerne on May 8, 2019, generated one of the more
memorable transcripts in this court’s collective memory. At the outset of the hearing, Arturo’s
counsel offered Judge Cerne the opportunity to voluntarily recuse himself. Counsel explained that
he would have filed a motion, but he felt the allegations in the combined motion to reconsider or
vacate were “enough for your Honor to consider whether or not you were going to voluntarily
recuse yourself before I file a motion to recuse which would cost my client time and money.”
Judge Cerne stated that in the absence of a motion—particularly as he was the trial judge and had
already heard one motion to reconsider—he would not be voluntarily recusing and saw no reason
he could not continue with the case. Instead, Judge Cerne determined that he had no jurisdiction
to consider Arturo’s untimely, successive post-trial motion, and returned the case to Judge
Douglas.
¶ 12 On June 25, 2019, the matter came before Judge Douglas for status on the motion to vacate
(735 ILCS 5/2-1401) and several additional unrelated post-judgment matters. Following
arguments by counsel, Judge Douglas stated the following:
“Mr. Hurtado in [one] response requested specific relief from this court in asking
for a sua sponte ruling on the underlying [§ 2-1401] petition today, and I’m going to give
you that relief which you requested, Mr. Foley [(Arturo’s counsel)]. The court has -- as I
said, has reviewed the underlying judgment -- excuse me, has reviewed the [§ 2-1401], in
addition to the pleadings that are up today, and, once again, [§ 2-1401] is to correct fraud
committed by one party or the other or if there was a mutual mistake by both parties.
In reading your [§ 2-1401], every single mistake that you allege was made by Judge
Cerne, not by the parties. The mistakes of a judge are -- in a trial judgment, are the purview
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of that judge in a motion to reconsider and, if a motion to reconsider is denied, the purview
of the Appellate Court to decide whether he abused his discretion or incorrectly applied
facts presented at the trial.”
Judge Douglas stated that he could not simply presume Judge Cerne had erred, or reopen the
judgment, on nothing more than Arturo’s say-so that there was a 62%-38% split of assets or that
the split was inequitable. Judge Douglas concluded that Arturo’s assertions were procedurally
improper under § 2-1401 and denied the motion with prejudice. The court also included immediate
appealability language under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).
¶ 13 On July 23, 2019, Arturo filed a notice of appeal listing both the May 8, 2019, judgment
from Judge Cerne, which denied his motion to reconsider (§ 2-1203), and the June 25, 2019,
judgment from Judge Douglas, which denied the motion to vacate (§ 2-1401).
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 A. Jurisdiction
¶ 16 We first address our jurisdiction, which we have a duty to consider and to dismiss an
appeal, or a portion of an appeal, when jurisdiction is lacking. Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial
Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 251 (2010). We turn first to Arturo’s attempt to challenge Judge Cerne’s
May 8, 2019, denial—that would be Judge Cerne’s second denial—of Arturo’s post-trial motion
(§ 2-1203). After the dissolution judgment was filed on February 27, 2018, the trial court granted
Arturo four extensions to file his post-trial motion and yet another extension to amend his pleading.
The amended motion was promptly heard and (with the exception of an agreed $10,000
modification to the dissipation judgment) denied on June 5, 2018. The trial court may grant
extensions to file a post-judgment motion (In re Estate of Andre T., 2018 IL App (1st) 172613, ¶
36); however, 30 days after the motion is ruled upon, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case
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and no further post-judgment motions may be entertained (id. ¶¶ 36-37).
¶ 17 There is no authority for a party to file a successive post-trial motion, over one year after
the entry of the judgment, and nearly a year after the initial post-trial motion has already been ruled
upon. Cf. 735 ILCS 5/2-1203. Although there was no written order entered denying Arturo’s
belated, successive motion to reconsider, we dismiss the portion of this appeal challenging Judge
Cerne’s May 8, 2019, denial of the motion as we have no jurisdiction to hear it.
¶ 18 That said, we do have jurisdiction to hear Arturo’s appeal from Judge Douglas’s denial of
Arturo’s § 2-1401 petition. Arturo’s notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of that judgment
and, despite the inclusion of Rule 304(a) language in the order, that appeal is plainly cognizable
under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), which provides for interlocutory appeals
from judgments granting or denying relief under § 2-1401.
¶ 19 Prior to the filing of merits briefs in this case, Heather filed a motion requesting sanctions
on the basis that we lack jurisdiction over the entire appeal. We took that motion with the case. As
we have explained, we do have jurisdiction to review the denial of Arturo’s § 2-1401 petition.
Accordingly, the motion is denied. We will address an additional request for sanctions.
¶ 20 B. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401
¶ 21 While we have jurisdiction to review Judge Douglas’s ruling on Arturo’s § 2-1401 petition,
we nevertheless affirm the court’s judgment. A § 2-1401 petition can present either a factual or
legal challenge to a final judgment or order, and the nature of the challenge presented dictates the
proper standard of review. Warren County Soil & Water Conservation District v. Walters, 2015
IL 117783, ¶ 31. When a § 2-1401 petition presents a fact-based challenge, it must allege facts to
support (1) the existence of a meritorious defense, (2) due diligence in presenting this defense to
the trial court, and (3) due diligence in filing the petition. Id. ¶ 37 (citing Smith v. Airoom, Inc.,
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114 Ill. 2d 209, 220-21 (1986)). “The question of whether relief should be granted lies within the
sound discretion of the circuit court” and “a reviewing court will reverse the circuit court’s ruling
on the petition only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing Airoom, 114 Ill. 2d at 221).
On the other hand, when a § 2-1401 petition presents a purely legal challenge to a judgment, such
as a claim that the earlier judgment was void, the standard of review is de novo. Id. ¶ 47.
¶ 22 Here, Arturo’s petition is clearly directed at disputing the facts underlying the judgment,
which would implicate an abuse-of-discretion standard. However, under any standard of review,
we agree with the trial court that Arturo’s § 2-1401 motion failed to allege circumstances that
would warrant the reopening of a judgment.
¶ 23 “Consistent with the strong judicial policy favoring finality of judgments, * * * a section
2-1401 petition is not to be used as a device to relitigate issues already decided or to put in issue
matters which have previously been or could have been adjudicated.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Stolfo v. KinderCare Learning Centers, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 142396, ¶ 29 (quoting
Hirsch v. Optima, Inc., 397 Ill. App. 3d 102, 110 (2009)). Grounds for relief under § 2-1401 have
traditionally included fraud and mutual mistake of fact, among others. In re Marriage of Hamm-
Smith, 261 Ill. App. 3d 209, 214 (1994). As the trial court perceptively noted, none of the grounds
alleged in Arturo’s motion are applicable. For example:
“A ‘mutual mistake of fact’ exists for purposes of the reformation of a written instrument,
when the contract has been written in terms which violate the understanding of both parties.
[Citation.] Because the parties did not enter into a written agreement or claim the terms of
an agreement were not what they had intended, the mutual mistake argument, as a basis for
relief, is not applicable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of Miller, 363
Ill. App. 3d 906, 913 (2006).
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As the judgment here was not a marital settlement agreement, nor was it based on a stipulation
between the parties, a claim of mutual mistake of fact is simply inapplicable. Cf. In re Marriage
of Breyley, 247 Ill. App. 3d 486, 491 (1993) (petitioner alleged sufficient facts to show mutual
mistake where written marital settlement agreement did not reflect the parties’ actual agreement
regarding child support and child custody).
¶ 24 Similarly, Arturo has failed to show fraud, or to allege any fact for that matter, that would
have prevented the entry of the judgment. At the hearing on Arturo’s initial motion to reconsider
before Judge Cerne, Arturo’s counsel agreed in open court that both parties had listed the home’s
two mortgages as a single mortgage on their respective financial statements. No evidence was
presented at trial or in Arturo’s § 2-1401 motion that contradicted the parties’ assertion about the
financial statements. In other words, there is nothing that disproves the parties’ statements at the
post-judgment hearing or disproves a fact that was consequential to the judgment itself. In light of
the foregoing, we determine that Arturo is judicially estopped from attempting to change his
position from his attorney’s statement at the first post-judgment hearing regarding the balance and
configuration of the note(s). See Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶¶ 38-39 (discussing judicial
estoppel); see also Smolinski v. Vojta, 363 Ill. App. 3d 752, 756 (2006) (holding that husband could
not collaterally attack judgment under § 2-1401 on issue that was fully raised before the trial court
and could have been raised on direct appeal regardless of whether he sought one).
¶ 25 Additionally, as to the question of whether Heather ever worked as a part-time make-up
artist, we note that there are obvious gaps in the trial record, which Arturo neither addresses nor
explains. On one date, for example, the entire morning portion of Arturo’s testimony is missing.
There are also references to Arturo’s pension and stock plans that appear to have been discussed
in greater detail at some point previously, but that discussion is not included in the record. To put
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it simply, we cannot say with any certainty that the record submitted to this court refutes the “make-
up artist” portion of the judgment, let alone that the judgment was procured by fraud. See Foutch
v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 393 (1984) (appellant bears burden of presenting sufficient record on
appeal and where record is incomplete it will be presumed that the judgment was in conformity
with the law and was properly supported by evidence). Furthermore, we are compelled to note that
Arturo’s briefs are bereft of any cogent argument that these issues, which were raised nearly a year
after the entry of the judgment, were brought to the trial court’s attention with any discernable
diligence.
¶ 26 As we explain in greater detail below, the remainder of Arturo’s arguments are forfeited
for lack of development, and the trial court’s denial of Arturo’s § 2-1401 motion is affirmed.
¶ 27 C. Sanctions
¶ 28 As noted earlier, Heather filed two requests for sanctions in this appeal. Heather’s first
request was filed prior to briefing. We took that motion with the case and denied it above. Supra
¶ 19. Heather’s second request for sanctions was made in her appellee’s brief and is based on
Arturo’s opening brief. Specifically, Heather asserts that this appeal was not taken in good faith,
that it was dilatory, and that it was frivolous. Arturo’s counsel devoted five pages of his reply brief
to his attempt to explain why he should not be sanctioned.
¶ 29 Rule 375(b) authorizes reviewing courts to impose appropriate sanctions on any party or
the attorney or attorneys of the party when an appeal itself is frivolous or when it has been brought
for an improper purpose, i.e., to harass the opposing party or to needlessly drive up the cost of
litigation. Thompson v. Buncik, 2011 IL App (2d) 100589, ¶ 21. “An appeal is frivolous where ‘it
is not reasonably well grounded in fact and not warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.’ ” Raymond W. Pontarelli Trust v.
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Pontarelli, 2015 IL App (1st) 133138, ¶ 33 (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) ). The
determination that an appeal is frivolous or taken for an improper purpose is an objective test: “an
appeal will be found to be frivolous if a reasonable prudent attorney would not in good faith have
brought such an appeal, or the appeal conduct will be found to be improper if a reasonable prudent
attorney would not have engaged in such conduct.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 375, Committee Comments
(adopted Aug. 1, 1989).
¶ 30 Arturo’s appellate briefs before this court leave us with the firm conviction that the purpose
of this appeal was to harass Heather and delay the inevitable resolution of this case. Arturo’s
opening 57-page brief (we granted him leave to file in excess of 50 pages) does not arrive at its
argument section until page 42. The pages that precede it are replete with inaccuracies, citations
to incorrect parts of the record, and laden with argument, all in violation of Supreme Court Rule
341(h)(6) (eff. May 25, 2018).
¶ 31 The argument section of Arturo’s brief is more troubling. A reviewing court is entitled to
have the issues before it clearly defined with relevant authority cited and cohesive arguments
presented. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380, ¶ 10. In line with
those principles, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) requires an appellant’s
brief to include “[a]rgument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons
therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” An appellant violates
Rule 341(h)(7) when he or she fails to elaborate on an argument, fails to cite persuasive authority,
or fails to present well-reasoned argument. See People ex rel. Illinois Department of Labor v.
E.R.H. Enterprises, 2013 IL 115106, ¶ 56. Thus, allegations that are vague or that are merely listed
in the appellant’s brief without explanation or analysis do not satisfy Rule 341(h)(7); nor do
citations that merely point to irrelevant authority. Id.; Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 369
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(2010).
¶ 32 The argument heading for Arturo’s principal contention on appeal is as follows:
“Whether The Existence Of Multiple Material False Facts And Conclusions From A
Previous Judge Cerne Divorce Judgment Contained In This Divorce Judgment, Coupled
With The Multiple Clearly Erroneous, Biased, Inaccurate, & Unconscionable Findings Of
Fact And Conclusions Of Law Present In The Feb. 27, 2018 Judgment, Have Resulted In
Such A Clearly Unconscionable Distribution Of Non-Marital And Marital Assets And
Prospective 164[-]Month Maintenance Award To Justify Granting Arturo’s Feb. 11, 2019
[§ 2-]1401 Motion Based On The Appellate Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction To Set Aside Or
Vacate A Clearly Unconscionable Judgment That Resulted From Clear Errors And Abuse
Of Discretion By Judge Cerne Who Refused To Hear Three Separate 1203 Motions And
A [§ 2-]1401 Motion Requesting Him To Vacate And/Or Modify His Clearly Defective
Judgment And Post Decree Rulings Where The [§ 2-]1401 & [§2-] 1203 Motions Were
Filed Greater Than 30 Days After His June 5, 2018 Order But Were Not Ever Actually
‘Heard’ By Judge Cerne[.]”
While that 155-word “sentence” is unwieldy, what is far worse is the paragraph that follows. We
have omitted record citations, but otherwise, what follows is a copy of pages 43 through 44 of that
brief:
“In this case, at a minimum, Judge Cerne acted arbitrarily, unfairly, capriciously,
and unreasonably, and ignored recognized principles of law by including facts and
conclusions from a different divorce case in the Judgment in this case. Furthermore,
the Judgement [sic] and post [-] Judgment rulings were clearly not based on the
evidence from the trial, as some of the false facts contained in the Judgment were
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absolutely from a prior divorce case Judge Cerne arbitrarily and unreasonably chose
to use as a template in this Divorce case. Unfortunately, Judge Cerne also then
absolutely refused to acknowledge, or attempt to rectify, his clear errors in any
cognizable way despite being given three separate opportunities to do so, had he
merely bothered to show some judicial integrity and actually bother[ed] to read and
allow argument on the allegations in the three separate [§ 2-]1203 Motions he
instead chose to summarily deny without explanation on three separate occasions.
Additionally, there were a plethora of clearly arbitrary, erroneous, capricious,
unfair, and unreasonable findings and conclusions contained in the clearly defective
Judgment besides the multiple false facts and conclusions from a different divorce
Judgment making the Judgment clearly and absolutely Unconscionable on it’s [sic]
face ***.” (Emphasis added.)
These repetitive conclusory statements, impugning the integrity of the trial court, fail to engage
honestly with the bases for the trial court’s rulings. They reflect poorly on counsel and they are
not well taken.
¶ 33 In addition, during the briefing in this appeal, another matter arose that calls for comment.
In the appellee’s brief, Heather’s counsel noted that Arturo had failed to file a transcript of the
June 25, 2019, hearing before Judge Douglas—i.e., the hearing on Arturo’s § 2-1401 petition,
which is the primary judgment Arturo sought to challenge in this appeal. In the absence of the
transcript, Heather asked that we affirm Judge Douglas’s order, citing Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-
92. Two weeks after Heather’s brief was filed, Arturo filed a motion to supplement the record with
11 missing transcripts, and although he did not specifically seek leave to file the June 25, 2019,
transcript, it was nevertheless included in one of the supplements counsel filed.
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¶ 34 Arturo’s counsel then filed a reply brief with the following opening line: “ ‘Power tends to
corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.’ John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, 1st Baron
Acton, 13th Marquess of Groppoli, Letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton, April 5, 1887. Transcript
of, published in Historical Essays and Studies, edited by J. N. Figgis and R. V. Laurence (London:
Macmillan, 1907).” Things did not improve from there. The reply brief continued to attack the
integrity of Judges Cerne and Douglas.
¶ 35 We note that in light of Arturo’s claims, we have carefully reviewed this record, which is
over 5000 pages, and found that the trial court judges uniformly acted with the patience and
diligence that we expect of them. The same cannot be said for Arturo’s current counsel who was
quarrelsome, unprofessional, and downright uncivil. Counsel has failed to accurately recite the
bases for the trial court’s decisions, and so has failed to meaningfully address the decisions counsel
would have us overturn on appeal.
¶ 36 “This court does not mean to discourage attorneys from zealously representing their clients
or from bringing appeals that have even arguable merit.” First Federal Savings Bank of Proviso
Township v. Drovers National Bank of Chicago, 237 Ill. App. 3d 340, 347 (1992). That said, there
is no arguable merit to this appeal. Moreover, the misrepresentation of facts in the record coupled
with counsel’s strident assertions make the manner of this appeal’s prosecution highly improper.
We agree with Heather that Rule 375(b) sanctions are warranted. We direct Heather to file a
statement of reasonable expenses and attorney fees associated with this appeal within 14 days.
Arturo’s appellate counsel shall have seven days to file a response. We will thereafter file an order
determining the amount of sanctions that will be imposed upon Arturo’s appellate counsel. See
Gilkey v. Scholl, 229 Ill. App. 3d 989, 994 (1992).
¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION
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¶ 38 For the reasons stated, we dismiss a portion of this appeal, and we affirm the judgment of
the circuit court of Du Page County and impose sanctions.
¶ 39 Affirmed in part and dismissed in part; sanctions imposed.
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