IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1744 Filed July 23, 2025
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JUSTIN L. HANSON AND ALLISON L. HANSON
Upon the Petition of JUSTIN L. HANSON, Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning ALLISON L. HANSON, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Rustin Davenport,
Judge.
Allison L. Hanson appeals the physical-care provision of her decree
dissolving her marriage to Justin L. Hanson. AFFIRMED.
David H. Skilton of Cronin, Skilton & Skilton, P.L.L.C., Charles City, for
appellant.
Megan R. Rosenberg of Cady & Rosenberg Law Firm, PLC, Hampton, for
appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and
Chicchelly, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Allison L. Hanson appeals the physical-care provision of her decree
dissolving her marriage to Justin L. Hanson. Upon our de novo review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Allison and Justin were married in 2012 and separated in December 2023.
Soon after their separation, Justin filed for divorce. Both parties blamed the other
for the breakdown of the marriage, citing various infidelities and alleging parental
alienation and domestic abuse. Both parties also requested physical care of their
two children: D.H., born in 2021 and M.H., born in 2013. The parties described
D.H. as “very energetic, very smart” and easy to get along with. But M.H., who
was ten years old at the time of trial, was described as having “behavioral
difficulties,” which sometimes resulted in violent outbursts. M.H. can become
aggressive when agitated, “kicking, punching, biting, and spitting.” How best to
handle these outbursts and to prevent them were sources of conflict for Allison and
Justin, with the parties disagreeing on what approach to use with M.H. Justin was
primarily responsible for the children’s mental-health therapy and prescriptions as
Allison testified she is “not a strong believer” in medication.
Justin also presented video evidence of Allison unable to manage M.H.
pre-separation. In one video, “she physically launches M.H.” and in another, “she
states that she is so distraught that she could kill M.H.” And after the parties’
separation, Allison continued to struggle with M.H. and required assistance from
Justin, which he provided. On multiple occasions, law enforcement was called,
with one incident occurring after M.H. alleged that Allison “was holding him down
and choking him.” The report was resolved after Justin took M.H. back to his 3
residence. On another occasion, the Iowa Department of Health and Human
Services investigated after M.H. was given a double dose of medication while in
Allison’s care. While the investigation determined that M.H. was safe to remain
with Allison, the department noted the parents’ “communication challenge[s]”,
describing the home as “an atmosphere of conflict.”
Trial occurred in August 2024, at which Allison described Justin as a
controlling, unstable alcoholic while Justin described her as an abusive compulsive
liar. The court did not agree with either characterization, although it questioned
Justin’s sobriety and found that his history of switching jobs “reflects poorly on his
stability.” But it also found Allison was unable to effectively parent M.H.
Accordingly, the court dissolved the parties’ marriage and granted Justin’s request
for physical care. While Allison requested trial attorney fees, the court declined to
grant either party such an award. Allison appeals both provisions.
II. Physical-Care Determination.
Allison requests physical care of the children, or in the alternative, shared
physical care.1 Our review of physical-care determinations is de novo. In re
Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Iowa 2007). In determining whether a
physical-care arrangement is appropriate, our primary consideration is always the
1 Allison also contends that the court improperly relied on certain evidence, specifically an exhibit written by M.H.’s therapist which alleged that Allison did not participate in M.H.’s therapy. After trial, Allison moved to reconsider, arguing the exhibit was disclosed late and should not have been considered by the court. The district court agreed, striking any mention of the exhibit in its ruling. But Justin also testified that Allison was invited to sessions and did not attend, which the court did consider. While Allison vaguely concludes that the court failed to “undo the harm done” by relying on the testimony instead, she provides no analysis or support for this claim; we therefore find this argument waived and do not consider it further. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3). 4
best interests of the children. Id at 695. Our “objective . . . is to place the children
in the environment most likely to bring them to health, both physically and mentally,
and to social maturity.” Id. We are often entrusted with the difficult task of selecting
which parent will have primary physical care of the children following a divorce.
See In re Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 31 (Iowa 2015) (noting the difficulty
of selection when “the children have the luxury of having two good, loving parents
and two caring and attentive step-parents who provide healthy and suitable home
environments for the children”). But there are also circumstances in which the
court must choose between two very imperfect parents. See Smith v. Smith,
No. 03-0863, 2004 WL 433906, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2004) (“Simply put,
the record reveals the trial court was faced with the unhappy task of choosing
between two immature and seriously flawed parents.”). This is one such case.
The district court aptly explained why shared physical care was not
appropriate:
Neither party contends that [the shared physical-care arrangement] has gone very well or that this is in the best interests of the children. The parties’ hostility to each other was shown to the Court regarding their negative attitudes towards each other. They do not have the ability to communicate. M.H. appears to need more stability in his life than can be provided in a shared physical care arrangement.
While the parties temporarily shared physical care before trial, several events and
altercations occurred, including a departmental child abuse assessment, M.H.’s
behavioral concerns escalating at school, and several calls to law enforcement.
Both parties also conceded that their communication difficulties were not
conducive to a shared care arrangement. We agree with the district court (and the 5
parties) that shared physical care is simply not workable under these challenging
circumstances.
When considering a physical-care arrangement, we consider the factors
established by statute. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3) (2024). While the court
expressed its “concerns about both of the parties providing the appropriate care
for the children” and further admonished them for their respective failures to
communicate, it specifically found that Justin “appears to have the superior ability
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1744 Filed July 23, 2025
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JUSTIN L. HANSON AND ALLISON L. HANSON
Upon the Petition of JUSTIN L. HANSON, Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning ALLISON L. HANSON, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Rustin Davenport,
Judge.
Allison L. Hanson appeals the physical-care provision of her decree
dissolving her marriage to Justin L. Hanson. AFFIRMED.
David H. Skilton of Cronin, Skilton & Skilton, P.L.L.C., Charles City, for
appellant.
Megan R. Rosenberg of Cady & Rosenberg Law Firm, PLC, Hampton, for
appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and
Chicchelly, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Allison L. Hanson appeals the physical-care provision of her decree
dissolving her marriage to Justin L. Hanson. Upon our de novo review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Allison and Justin were married in 2012 and separated in December 2023.
Soon after their separation, Justin filed for divorce. Both parties blamed the other
for the breakdown of the marriage, citing various infidelities and alleging parental
alienation and domestic abuse. Both parties also requested physical care of their
two children: D.H., born in 2021 and M.H., born in 2013. The parties described
D.H. as “very energetic, very smart” and easy to get along with. But M.H., who
was ten years old at the time of trial, was described as having “behavioral
difficulties,” which sometimes resulted in violent outbursts. M.H. can become
aggressive when agitated, “kicking, punching, biting, and spitting.” How best to
handle these outbursts and to prevent them were sources of conflict for Allison and
Justin, with the parties disagreeing on what approach to use with M.H. Justin was
primarily responsible for the children’s mental-health therapy and prescriptions as
Allison testified she is “not a strong believer” in medication.
Justin also presented video evidence of Allison unable to manage M.H.
pre-separation. In one video, “she physically launches M.H.” and in another, “she
states that she is so distraught that she could kill M.H.” And after the parties’
separation, Allison continued to struggle with M.H. and required assistance from
Justin, which he provided. On multiple occasions, law enforcement was called,
with one incident occurring after M.H. alleged that Allison “was holding him down
and choking him.” The report was resolved after Justin took M.H. back to his 3
residence. On another occasion, the Iowa Department of Health and Human
Services investigated after M.H. was given a double dose of medication while in
Allison’s care. While the investigation determined that M.H. was safe to remain
with Allison, the department noted the parents’ “communication challenge[s]”,
describing the home as “an atmosphere of conflict.”
Trial occurred in August 2024, at which Allison described Justin as a
controlling, unstable alcoholic while Justin described her as an abusive compulsive
liar. The court did not agree with either characterization, although it questioned
Justin’s sobriety and found that his history of switching jobs “reflects poorly on his
stability.” But it also found Allison was unable to effectively parent M.H.
Accordingly, the court dissolved the parties’ marriage and granted Justin’s request
for physical care. While Allison requested trial attorney fees, the court declined to
grant either party such an award. Allison appeals both provisions.
II. Physical-Care Determination.
Allison requests physical care of the children, or in the alternative, shared
physical care.1 Our review of physical-care determinations is de novo. In re
Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Iowa 2007). In determining whether a
physical-care arrangement is appropriate, our primary consideration is always the
1 Allison also contends that the court improperly relied on certain evidence, specifically an exhibit written by M.H.’s therapist which alleged that Allison did not participate in M.H.’s therapy. After trial, Allison moved to reconsider, arguing the exhibit was disclosed late and should not have been considered by the court. The district court agreed, striking any mention of the exhibit in its ruling. But Justin also testified that Allison was invited to sessions and did not attend, which the court did consider. While Allison vaguely concludes that the court failed to “undo the harm done” by relying on the testimony instead, she provides no analysis or support for this claim; we therefore find this argument waived and do not consider it further. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3). 4
best interests of the children. Id at 695. Our “objective . . . is to place the children
in the environment most likely to bring them to health, both physically and mentally,
and to social maturity.” Id. We are often entrusted with the difficult task of selecting
which parent will have primary physical care of the children following a divorce.
See In re Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 31 (Iowa 2015) (noting the difficulty
of selection when “the children have the luxury of having two good, loving parents
and two caring and attentive step-parents who provide healthy and suitable home
environments for the children”). But there are also circumstances in which the
court must choose between two very imperfect parents. See Smith v. Smith,
No. 03-0863, 2004 WL 433906, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2004) (“Simply put,
the record reveals the trial court was faced with the unhappy task of choosing
between two immature and seriously flawed parents.”). This is one such case.
The district court aptly explained why shared physical care was not
appropriate:
Neither party contends that [the shared physical-care arrangement] has gone very well or that this is in the best interests of the children. The parties’ hostility to each other was shown to the Court regarding their negative attitudes towards each other. They do not have the ability to communicate. M.H. appears to need more stability in his life than can be provided in a shared physical care arrangement.
While the parties temporarily shared physical care before trial, several events and
altercations occurred, including a departmental child abuse assessment, M.H.’s
behavioral concerns escalating at school, and several calls to law enforcement.
Both parties also conceded that their communication difficulties were not
conducive to a shared care arrangement. We agree with the district court (and the 5
parties) that shared physical care is simply not workable under these challenging
circumstances.
When considering a physical-care arrangement, we consider the factors
established by statute. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3) (2024). While the court
expressed its “concerns about both of the parties providing the appropriate care
for the children” and further admonished them for their respective failures to
communicate, it specifically found that Justin “appears to have the superior ability
to deal with the special needs of M.H.” In making such a finding, the court relied
on Justin’s testimony, in which he described Allison parenting as “screaming,
yelling, throwing things” and her physical restraint of M.H. by “lift[ing] his legs and
his feet up over his head” and sitting on him until “he wasn’t able to breathe for a
few seconds.” The court also relied on the video evidence depicting Allison’s
inability to handle the outbursts, which it described as “disturbing and concerning.”
While Allison attacks these credibility findings, and specifically argues that the
video evidence was misinterpreted, we give considerable deference to credibility
determinations because the court has a firsthand opportunity to hear the evidence
and view the witnesses. See In re Marriage of Berning, 745 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2007). While both parties have their faults, the record supports the court’s
finding that Justin is the parent better able to meet M.H.’s needs. Justin is able to
provide a stable routine and comfortable environment in the marital home for the
children, especially for M.H. who “does not cope well with change.” Accordingly,
we agree with the district court that it is in the children’s best interests to be placed
with Justin. 6
III. Trial and Appellate Attorney Fees.
Allison also contends the district court abused its discretion by declining to
award her trial attorney fees. We review attorney-fees determinations for an abuse
of discretion. In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 255 (Iowa 2006). But
Allison supports her argument only by stating that she was “the primary provider,”
which goes against an award of trial attorney fees. See id. (finding one party
“making more money” favors an award of attorney fees). Because the court
presumably based its determination on the parties’ incomes and expenses as
evidenced by its consideration of their financial affidavits, we see no abuse of
discretion in declining to award trial attorney fees. While the court found that Justin
made more money, he also had higher expenses, was required to pay Allison an
equalization payment in lieu of assets, and was responsible for a larger share of
the children’s medical expenses.
Finally, both parties request appellate attorney fees. Such an award is not
a matter of right but rests in our discretion. See In re Marriage of McDermott,
827 N.W.2d 671, 687 (Iowa 2013). In exercising this discretion, we consider the
needs of the party seeking appellate attorney fees, the other party’s ability to pay,
and the merits of the claims made on appeal. Id. Considering these factors, we
find that neither party is in a financial position to pay the others’ fees, so we decline
to award either party appellate attorney fees.
IV. Disposition.
Because we find that physical care with Justin is in the best interests of the
children, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.