IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1052 Filed April 9, 2025
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF TRENTON JAMES GREENFIELD AND HALEY MARIE GREENFIELD
Upon the Petition of TRENTON JAMES GREENFIELD, Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning HALEY MARIE GREENFIELD, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Patrick D. Smith,
Judge.
A mother appeals a dissolution decree placing the parties’ children in their
joint physical care. AFFIRMED.
Ryan J. Baumgartner and Elizabeth S. Longcor of Cashatt Warren Family
Law, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Jason Springer of Springer Law Firm, PLLC, Madrid, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and
Buller, JJ. 2
BADDING, Judge.
Trenton and Haley Greenfield are the parents of twin children—a boy and
girl born in 2021. In the decree dissolving their marriage, the district court granted
Trenton’s request for joint physical care of the children. Haley appeals, claiming
the children should have instead been placed in her physical care. We affirm upon
our de novo review of the record.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Trenton and Haley met while attending college in 2011. They were married
in 2015 and welcomed their twins six years later. Haley stayed at home with the
children until they were eighteen months old, while Trenton worked as a mechanic
at a local autobody shop. Although he worked during the day, Trenton helped with
changing the twins’ diapers, feeding them, and getting up with them during the
night. He also did the family’s laundry, shared cleaning duties with Haley, and
helped with other household tasks. Haley, however, said that she often felt like a
single parent because Trenton was not around very much. Trenton acknowledged
that he sometimes hung out with friends in their neighborhood when he wasn’t
working.
By August 2022, the parties had decided to divorce, but they kept living
together in the marital home with the children. Trenton moved to the basement,
and Haley stayed upstairs. Around the same time, Haley started working at a
daycare center, although it was not the same one the children attended. Wanting
to work on the marriage, Trenton started participating in a relationship coaching
service through his church. He also began taking medication to help treat his
depression. But at some point, Haley began leaving the house at night— 3
sometimes not coming home at all—without telling Trenton where she was.
Trenton suspected that she was seeing someone else.
In February 2023, Trenton petitioned for divorce. After a mediation in April,
the parties agreed in a temporary stipulation that if one of them moved out of the
marital home, they would share physical care of the children on an alternating two-
day, two-day, three-day schedule. The next month, Trenton and Haley had an
argument about their joint bank account. Trenton texted Haley and asked her to
stay somewhere else that night, but she came home around 10:00 or 11:00 p.m.
Trenton packed a bag, woke the children up, and put them in his truck to leave.
Haley went into the garage and tried to stop Trenton from leaving with the children.
She got their son out of the truck, but while she was trying to unbuckle their
daughter, Trenton put the truck into reverse. Haley—who was holding their son—
was hit by the door. Trenton stopped the truck, and the police were called. Neither
Haley nor the children were injured.
Trenton was arrested and charged with domestic abuse assault with a
dangerous weapon. A criminal no-contact order was entered, prohibiting Trenton
from having contact with Haley and the children. Haley also secured a civil
protective order against Trenton. The Iowa Department of Health and Human
Services investigated the incident and issued a founded report for denial of critical
care against Trenton. The department also investigated a report that Haley was
smoking marijuana while caring for the children. After Haley’s drug screen was
presumptively positive for THC, she admitted taking an edible on a weekend when
the children were not in her care. The report was not confirmed. 4
Trenton pled guilty to the domestic abuse assault charge and received a
deferred judgment. He was placed on probation for two years and ordered to
complete the Iowa Domestic Abuse Program, along with a parenting class. At the
beginning of June, Haley agreed to modify the no-contact orders so that Trenton
could visit the children every other Saturday and Sunday from 9:00 a.m. until
6:00 p.m. and Wednesday evenings, to be supervised by his mother or sister. That
arrangement continued until October, when the parties modified the no-contact
orders again so that they could return to the temporary joint physical care
arrangement. They also agreed to communicate through a parenting app.
At the dissolution trial in November 2023, Trenton and Haley agreed on
everything but physical care of their children. Trenton wanted to continue with joint
physical care, while Haley wanted the children placed in her physical care. Haley
testified that although Trenton was a good dad, she had always been the children’s
primary caregiver. She was also worried about whether Trenton could handle the
twins by himself and whether his depression was under control.
Trenton testified that immediately after the assault in May, he started a life
skills course through his church focused on domestic violence. He had completed
phase one of that course by trial and was ready to start phase two once it was
offered. Trenton had also started the classes for the Iowa Domestic Abuse
Program. He said the life skills course in particular had taught him how to handle
stress and deal with his emotions. Trenton testified that he was “very regretful for
what happened that night” and that he was taking “personal steps in [his] life to
make sure it doesn’t happen again.” 5
Although the district court felt this was a close case because of the domestic
abuse incident, it concluded “that maintaining the joint physical care to which the
parties agreed in the Temporary Matters Stipulation is in the children’s best
interests.” The court found that incident did “not tip the balance away from joint
physical care” because it was an isolated event that Trenton accepted
responsibility for and regretted. And while the court found Haley “provided the
lion’s share of day-to-day care for the children,” it concluded the “approximation
rule” should be given little weight because of the children’s young age. Noting both
parties were “capable of immature and selfish behavior,” the court found neither
could “credibly claim they are the better parent.” The court accordingly granted
the parties joint legal custody of the children and placed them in their joint physical
care.
Haley appeals, claiming the district court should not have: (1) overlooked
her role as the children’s primary caregiver; (2) disregarded the parties’ inability to
communicate and agree on daily matters; (3) ignored the domestic abuse; and
(4) based its physical-care decision on “perceived fairness to the parties.”
II. Standard of Review
Our review of dissolution proceedings is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907;
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1052 Filed April 9, 2025
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF TRENTON JAMES GREENFIELD AND HALEY MARIE GREENFIELD
Upon the Petition of TRENTON JAMES GREENFIELD, Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning HALEY MARIE GREENFIELD, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Patrick D. Smith,
Judge.
A mother appeals a dissolution decree placing the parties’ children in their
joint physical care. AFFIRMED.
Ryan J. Baumgartner and Elizabeth S. Longcor of Cashatt Warren Family
Law, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Jason Springer of Springer Law Firm, PLLC, Madrid, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and
Buller, JJ. 2
BADDING, Judge.
Trenton and Haley Greenfield are the parents of twin children—a boy and
girl born in 2021. In the decree dissolving their marriage, the district court granted
Trenton’s request for joint physical care of the children. Haley appeals, claiming
the children should have instead been placed in her physical care. We affirm upon
our de novo review of the record.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Trenton and Haley met while attending college in 2011. They were married
in 2015 and welcomed their twins six years later. Haley stayed at home with the
children until they were eighteen months old, while Trenton worked as a mechanic
at a local autobody shop. Although he worked during the day, Trenton helped with
changing the twins’ diapers, feeding them, and getting up with them during the
night. He also did the family’s laundry, shared cleaning duties with Haley, and
helped with other household tasks. Haley, however, said that she often felt like a
single parent because Trenton was not around very much. Trenton acknowledged
that he sometimes hung out with friends in their neighborhood when he wasn’t
working.
By August 2022, the parties had decided to divorce, but they kept living
together in the marital home with the children. Trenton moved to the basement,
and Haley stayed upstairs. Around the same time, Haley started working at a
daycare center, although it was not the same one the children attended. Wanting
to work on the marriage, Trenton started participating in a relationship coaching
service through his church. He also began taking medication to help treat his
depression. But at some point, Haley began leaving the house at night— 3
sometimes not coming home at all—without telling Trenton where she was.
Trenton suspected that she was seeing someone else.
In February 2023, Trenton petitioned for divorce. After a mediation in April,
the parties agreed in a temporary stipulation that if one of them moved out of the
marital home, they would share physical care of the children on an alternating two-
day, two-day, three-day schedule. The next month, Trenton and Haley had an
argument about their joint bank account. Trenton texted Haley and asked her to
stay somewhere else that night, but she came home around 10:00 or 11:00 p.m.
Trenton packed a bag, woke the children up, and put them in his truck to leave.
Haley went into the garage and tried to stop Trenton from leaving with the children.
She got their son out of the truck, but while she was trying to unbuckle their
daughter, Trenton put the truck into reverse. Haley—who was holding their son—
was hit by the door. Trenton stopped the truck, and the police were called. Neither
Haley nor the children were injured.
Trenton was arrested and charged with domestic abuse assault with a
dangerous weapon. A criminal no-contact order was entered, prohibiting Trenton
from having contact with Haley and the children. Haley also secured a civil
protective order against Trenton. The Iowa Department of Health and Human
Services investigated the incident and issued a founded report for denial of critical
care against Trenton. The department also investigated a report that Haley was
smoking marijuana while caring for the children. After Haley’s drug screen was
presumptively positive for THC, she admitted taking an edible on a weekend when
the children were not in her care. The report was not confirmed. 4
Trenton pled guilty to the domestic abuse assault charge and received a
deferred judgment. He was placed on probation for two years and ordered to
complete the Iowa Domestic Abuse Program, along with a parenting class. At the
beginning of June, Haley agreed to modify the no-contact orders so that Trenton
could visit the children every other Saturday and Sunday from 9:00 a.m. until
6:00 p.m. and Wednesday evenings, to be supervised by his mother or sister. That
arrangement continued until October, when the parties modified the no-contact
orders again so that they could return to the temporary joint physical care
arrangement. They also agreed to communicate through a parenting app.
At the dissolution trial in November 2023, Trenton and Haley agreed on
everything but physical care of their children. Trenton wanted to continue with joint
physical care, while Haley wanted the children placed in her physical care. Haley
testified that although Trenton was a good dad, she had always been the children’s
primary caregiver. She was also worried about whether Trenton could handle the
twins by himself and whether his depression was under control.
Trenton testified that immediately after the assault in May, he started a life
skills course through his church focused on domestic violence. He had completed
phase one of that course by trial and was ready to start phase two once it was
offered. Trenton had also started the classes for the Iowa Domestic Abuse
Program. He said the life skills course in particular had taught him how to handle
stress and deal with his emotions. Trenton testified that he was “very regretful for
what happened that night” and that he was taking “personal steps in [his] life to
make sure it doesn’t happen again.” 5
Although the district court felt this was a close case because of the domestic
abuse incident, it concluded “that maintaining the joint physical care to which the
parties agreed in the Temporary Matters Stipulation is in the children’s best
interests.” The court found that incident did “not tip the balance away from joint
physical care” because it was an isolated event that Trenton accepted
responsibility for and regretted. And while the court found Haley “provided the
lion’s share of day-to-day care for the children,” it concluded the “approximation
rule” should be given little weight because of the children’s young age. Noting both
parties were “capable of immature and selfish behavior,” the court found neither
could “credibly claim they are the better parent.” The court accordingly granted
the parties joint legal custody of the children and placed them in their joint physical
care.
Haley appeals, claiming the district court should not have: (1) overlooked
her role as the children’s primary caregiver; (2) disregarded the parties’ inability to
communicate and agree on daily matters; (3) ignored the domestic abuse; and
(4) based its physical-care decision on “perceived fairness to the parties.”
II. Standard of Review
Our review of dissolution proceedings is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907;
see also In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 537 (Iowa 2022). While we
give weight to the factual findings of the district court, especially when considering
the credibility of witnesses, we are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. 6.904(3)(g);
In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 2007). When considering
child custody, our principal consideration is the best interests of the children. Iowa 6
R. App. P. 6.904(3)(n); In re Marriage of Weidner, 338 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa
1983).
III. Analysis
Where, as here, “joint legal custody is awarded to both parents, the court
may award joint physical care to both joint custodial parents upon the request of
either parent.” Iowa Code § 598.41(5)(a) (2023). Physical care determinations
are based on the best interests of children, not “upon perceived fairness to
the spouses.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007). “The
objective of a physical care determination is to place the children in the
environment most likely to bring them to health, both physically and mentally, and
to social maturity.” Id.
In making a physical-care determination, we consider the factors set out in
Iowa Code section 598.41(3) and In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166–
67 (Iowa 1974).1 We also consider the following nonexclusive factors when
examining whether joint physical care is in a child’s best interest:
(1) “approximation”—what has been the historical care giving arrangement for the child[ren] between the two parties; (2) the ability of the spouses to communicate and show mutual respect; (3) the degree of conflict between the parents; and (4) “the degree to which the parents are in general agreement about their approach to daily matters.”
1 “The factors the court considers in awarding custody are enumerated in Iowa
Code section 598.41(3).” In re Marriage of Courtade, 560 N.W.2d 36, 37 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). “Although Iowa Code section 598.41(3) does not directly apply to physical care decisions, . . . the factors listed here as well as other facts and circumstances are relevant in determining” physical care. Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 696. 7
In re Marriage of Berning, 745 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (quoting
Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 697–99).
Starting with approximation, Haley argues that because she was “the
primary caregiver for the children since birth, this factor weighs in favor” of placing
the children in her physical care. But the “fact a parent was the primary caretaker
prior to separation does not assure he or she will be the custodial parent.” In re
Marriage of Decker, 666 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003). Trenton agreed
that for much of the marriage, Haley was the primary caregiver. But he testified
that changed shortly after the couple decided to divorce, when Haley “began being
gone most nights,” leaving him to take “care of the kids solely.” Even before that
point, the evidence shows that Trenton was an engaged and involved father. See
Watson v. Ollendieck, No. 22-1350, 2023 WL 3335602, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.
May 10, 2023) (stating the approximation factor “loses significance ‘where the
historically less-involved parent has proven to be a capable caregiver’” (citation
omitted)).
Haley claims otherwise, arguing Trenton “was unable to give any detail
regarding the care he provided for his children.” That argument is not supported
by the record. Trenton testified that he helped with the children’s daily care, and
he participated in their medical decisions. After the parties separated, Trenton
secured a more flexible job and began taking their son to some of his play therapy
appointments to help with his suspected autism diagnosis. He also testified that
when the children are in his care, they play at the park, go to dinner, and attend
local events, with Trenton trying to “spend as much time as [he] can with them.”
Trenton’s witnesses confirmed that he was active with the children. One of his 8
friends testified that “[i]t’s hard to have conversation” with Trenton when the twins
are there because “he’s pretty much focused on them.” And Trenton’s sister
testified the children “just naturally . . . gravitate to him” and “light up” when he
walks into a room. Given this evidence, we do not find the court improperly
discounted Haley’s historical role as the children’s primary caregiver.
We also disagree with Haley that the district court gave too much weight to
the temporary caretaking arrangement in discussing the approximation factor. It
is true, as Haley argues, that “[t]emporary orders awarding physical custody create
no presumption that parent is the preferred parent in a final custody decision.” In
re Marriage of Swenka, 576 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Iowa 1998). However, the court did
not place the children in the parties’ joint physical care because of their temporary
stipulation, as Haley suggests. Instead, after considering the relevant factors, the
court found maintaining that arrangement was in the children’s best interests. See
In re Marriage of Short, 373 N.W.2d 158, 160 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (finding the
district court’s “statement that there was ‘no compelling reason’ to change the
[temporary care order] merely reflected its conclusion that [the father] was the
preferred custodial parent”). We agree.
Turning to those other relevant factors, Haley argues that joint physical care
is not in the children’s best interests because the “record shows the struggle the
parties face to communicate and agree on daily matters.” But we don’t see those
struggles in the record. To be significant enough to justify a denial of joint physical
care, “a lack of ability to communicate must be something more than the usual
acrimony that accompanies a divorce.” In re Marriage of Ferguson, No. 21-0952,
2022 WL 1486508, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2022) (quoting In re Marriage of 9
Ertmann, 376 N.W.2d 918, 920 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985)). While the parties’
communication was limited because of the no-contact orders, they later modified
those orders to allow for greater communication about the children. Since then,
Trenton testified that he and Haley have been able to work together to figure out
the custody exchanges “and see what works for us.” They also worked together
to figure out the children’s immunizations and therapies for their son. This is not a
case in which the level of discord and mistrust is so high as to make joint physical
care unworkable, even considering the domestic abuse assault in May 2023. See
Watson, 2023 WL 3335602, at *4.
We recognize, as did the district court, that “[e]vidence of untreated
domestic battering should be given considerable weight in determining custody”
and that it “gives rise to a presumption against joint physical care.” Hansen, 733
N.W.2d at 698. But it’s for the court “to weigh the evidence of domestic abuse, its
nature, severity, repetition, and to whom directed.” In re Marriage of Forbes, 570
N.W.2d 757, 760 (Iowa 1997). The court weighed that evidence here, finding
the incident that resulted in Trenton being criminally charged and subject to no-contact orders was a one-time event that he recognizes was wrong and regrets. Trenton admittedly acted in anger during a time when the divorce was pending, the couple was still residing in the same house, and they were arguing about money. Trenton has taken steps through the life-skills class to better manage his emotions. The court finds Trenton was motivated to change and improve because of the criminal charges, and his desire to maintain his relationship with his children. No evidence was presented that Trenton had in the past, or has since, engaged in conduct that would be considered domestic abuse, nor does the court find Trenton presents a risk to his children’s well-being or safety.
We agree with the court’s assessment of the domestic-abuse evidence, mindful
that “the district court had the parties before it and was able to observe and 10
evaluate the parties as custodians.” In re Marriage of Roberts, 545 N.W.2d 340,
343 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).
Finally, we see no indication that the district court placed the children in the
parties’ joint physical care based on “perceived fairness between the parties,” as
Haley contends. Despite the tumultuous end to their marriage, each party
described the other as a good parent. In fact, Trenton testified Haley was a
“wonderful mother,” and he didn’t want to take time away from her. In his view,
however, the joint physical care arrangement had “been going wonderfully.” The
record supports that assessment. Placing the twins in the joint physical care of
these suitable and devoted parents will assure the children “the opportunity for the
maximum continuing physical and emotional contact with both parents” and “will
encourage the parents to share the rights and responsibilities” of raising the
children, which is in their best interests. In re Marriage of Kunkel, 555 N.W.2d 250,
253 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); accord Iowa Code § 598.41(1)(a).
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision to place the parties’
children in their joint physical care.
AFFIRMED.