In re Marriage of Golden

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: June 18, 2025
• Docket: 24-1750
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1750 Filed June 18, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF COLT LEON GOLDEN AND HEATHER ANN GOLDEN

Upon the Petition of COLT LEON GOLDEN, Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning HEATHER ANN GOLDEN, n/k/a HEATHER ANN BOLTZ, f/k/a HEATHER ANN GIGAROA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Roger L. Sailer,

Judge.

A father appeals from a finding that his ex-spouse was not in contempt of

court for allegedly violating a dissolution decree’s visitation provisions.

AFFIRMED.

John S. Moeller of John S. Moeller, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant.

T. Cody Farrens of Tigges, Bottaro, & Lessmann, LLP, Sioux City, for

appellee.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ. 2

BULLER, Judge.

Colt Golden appeals from a finding that his ex-spouse Heather Ann Boltz1

was not in contempt for failing to provide Colt with his decreed weekday and

weekend visitation after she moved to Florida with their child. Although we

recognize it would have been better for the parties to formally modify the custody

decree before the move or this litigation, we affirm.

Colt and Heather divorced in 2013. They share one child, whom the decree

placed in the physical care of Heather, affording Colt visitation every other

weekend, every Wednesday, every other Thursday, and holidays. During the

intervening years, the parties deviated regularly from the decree’s specific

visitation schedule without conflict.

In the summer of 2024, Heather graduated nursing school and moved to

Florida with the child and her other children (not shared with Colt). Neither party

sought to modify the custody decree beforehand, and they disagreed in testimony

about whether Heather informed Colt of the planned move with the child before it

happened and whether Colt agreed the move was in the child’s best interest given

some problems the child was having in Iowa. Between the move in July and the

relevant hearing in late September, Colt and the child only really had contact by

phone.

Heather testified that she did not seek to formally modify the custody

arrangement before moving because she thought she and Colt had always gotten

1 Heather’s last name throughout some of these proceedings, including the September 2024 hearing, was Gigaroa. In subsequent filings she uses her maiden last name, Boltz. 3

along on this issue. She thought they were co-parenting well before the move and

that he had agreed the move was best for the child. She also described trying to

give Colt as much time with the child before they left for Florida as she could. And

she testified that she did not willfully violate the court’s order—it just wasn’t

practical to get the child (then age fourteen) back to Iowa for visits every other

weekend, much less the weekday visits.

In an oral ruling, the district court found Heather was not in contempt. The

court excused her noncompliance because following the decree was

“impracticable to the point where it is effectively impossible” while living in Florida,

and thus her violation of the ruling was not willful. Colt appeals,2 while Heather

declined to file an appellee’s brief.

2 A note on appellate jurisdiction: An aberration exists in our supreme court’s case

law, where a finding of “not in contempt” is reviewable by appeal and a finding of contempt is only reviewable by certiorari. See In re Marriage of Welsher, 274 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Iowa 1979) (collecting cases on both). To us, this seems suspect. It arguably conflicts with much older principles of law. See First Congregational Church of Bloomington v. City of Muscatine, 2 Iowa 69, 71 (1855) (“These authorities are conclusive, that in the absence of statute, each court of record is the sole and final judge in matters of contempt.”). It also probably conflicts with a code provision. See Iowa Code § 665.11 (2024) (“No appeal lies from an order to punish for a contempt, but the proceedings may, in proper cases, be taken to a higher court for revision by certiorari.”). We appear to be an outlier (and though arguably we do not stand entirely alone, the other jurisdictions allowing review by appeal tend to involve criminal contemnors and require the State as prosecutor to appeal). See generally R.F. Chase, Annotation, Appealability of Acquittal From or Dismissal of Charge of Contempt of Court, 24 A.L.R.3d 650 (1969). It is irreconcilable with our longstanding rule that you cannot appeal an acquittal. E.g., State v. Taft, 506 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Iowa 1993) (collecting cases). And it is bizarre that a party potentially jailed for contempt has narrower appellate remedies than a person seeking to have another found in contempt. But this is not our problem to solve, for the supreme court’s decisions bind us. State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). So, we acknowledge this weird procedural posture and review this matter as an appeal rather than by certiorari. 4

First, we confront an issue regarding standard of review. “Our review is not

de novo,” and “the decision of the trial [court] will not be lightly reversed.”

McDonald v. McDonald, 170 N.W.2d 246, 247 (Iowa 1969). And the required

quantum of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 380

N.W.2d 706, 707–09 (Iowa 1986) (considering the standard of proof). Colt seems

to suggest that, because substantial evidence could have supported a finding of

contempt, he is owed reversal. But that turns the standard of review on its head—

we review for substantial evidence to uphold the ruling, not reverse it. See id.

at 709. So, we must evaluate whether substantial evidence supported the district

court’s finding that Heather did not willfully violate the decree, understanding that

to find willfulness “requires evidence of conduct that is intentional and deliberate

with a bad or evil purpose, or wanton and in disregard of the rights of others, or

contrary to a known duty, or unauthorized, coupled with an unconcern whether the

contemner had the right or not.” Lutz v. Darbyshire, 297 N.W.2d 349, 353

(Iowa 1980).

We find adequate record support for the district court’s conclusion that there

was not proof beyond a reasonable doubt Heather was in contempt. The court, in

an advantaged position to assess believability, credited Heather’s testimony that

she did not willfully violate the court order because she thought that Colt had

agreed the move was best for the child. Although Heather should have addressed

the circumstances surrounding the move first by formal modification, the district

court did not err in finding she was not proven in contempt beyond a reasonable

doubt.