NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under 2021 IL App (4th) 200294-U March 9, 2021 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender not precedent except in the NO. 4-20-0294 th 4 District Appellate limited circumstances allowed Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the KRISTINE K. GEISER, ) Circuit Court of Petitioner-Appellee, ) McLean County and ) No. 15D384 COLBY F. GEISER, ) Respondent-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Sarah R. Duffy, ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Holder White concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding respondent failed to establish any error with respect to the trial court’s denials of his motions for a continuance and findings concerning child support and the classification and distribution of marital property.
¶2 Respondent, Colby F. Geiser, appeals from the trial court’s judgment dissolving his
marriage to petitioner, Kristine K. Geiser. On appeal, Colby argues the trial court’s (1) denial of
his motion for a continuance was an abuse of discretion, (2) findings he is obligated to Kristine for
child support in the amount of $1248 per month and for child support arrears in the amount of
$14,785.68 were an abuse of discretion, and (3) finding he owed Kristine $168,706.60 for her share
of the marital property was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In October 2011, Kristine and Colby married. They then had one child together. In
August 2015, Kristine filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. In her petition, Kristine sought
temporary and permanent care and custody for the parties’ child as well as an order requiring Colby
to pay her temporary and permanent child support. In October 2015, counsel entered an appearance
on behalf of Colby and, in February 2016, filed an answer to Kristine’s petition on Colby’s behalf.
Litigation then ensued before the trial court for about four years.
¶5 During the pretrial litigation, the trial court, after awarding Kristine temporary
decision making responsibilities for the parties’ child and the majority of parenting time, issued
orders directing Colby to make temporary child support payments to Kristine, provide Kristine
written documentation setting forth his income, pay one-half of an evaluation for the child, and
pay for a portion of attorney fees incurred by Kristine. On multiple occasions, the court found
Colby to be in indirect civil contempt for his failure to comply with these orders.
¶6 On March 11, 2019, the trial court entered a final pretrial order concerning the
allocation of parental responsibilities, which scheduled a final pretrial conference for May 2, 2019,
and a trial for May 28, 29, and 30, 2019.
¶7 On April 11, 2019, Colby’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw from the case. The
motion alleged Colby was unable to fulfill a financial obligation to counsel, substantial time and
proceedings would be required for further representation of Colby, Colby had no objection to
counsel withdrawing, and withdrawal could be accomplished without any material adverse effect
to Colby.
¶8 On May 2, 2019, the trial court commenced the final pretrial conference for the
-2- allocation of parental responsibilities. The record on appeal contains no transcripts, bystander’s
report, or agreed statement of facts from the conference. As gleaned from a docket entry, the court
received a written acknowledgement during the conference. The acknowledgment, which is
contained in the record on appeal, is signed by Colby and dated May 2, 2019. It indicates Colby
received a copy of the motion to withdraw and had no objection. The court entered an order which
allowed Colby’s counsel to withdraw, granted Colby 21 days to obtain new counsel, continued the
final pretrial conference for the allocation of parental responsibilities to May 24, 2019, and directed
Colby’s prior counsel to mail a copy of the order to Colby. That same day, Colby’s prior counsel
filed a certificate of service indicating he served a copy of the court’s order upon Colby by both
mail and e-mail.
¶9 On May 20, 2019, Colby filed a pro se appearance.
¶ 10 On May 21, 2019, Colby filed a motion for a continuance. In his motion, Colby
requested the trial court to continue the scheduled trial, in part, to allow him time to secure new
counsel.
¶ 11 On May 24, 2019, the trial court held the continued final pretrial conference for the
allocation of parental responsibilities. The record on appeal contains no transcripts, bystander’s
report, or agreed statement of facts from the continued conference. As gleaned from a docket entry,
Colby appeared at the hearing and the trial for the allocation of parental responsibilities remained
scheduled to commence on May 28, 2019.
¶ 12 On May 28, 29, and 31, 2019, the trial court held a trial for the allocation of parental
responsibilities. The record on appeal initially contained no transcripts, bystander’s report, or
agreed statement of facts from the trial. Colby later—at the same time he filed his reply brief—
-3- filed a motion to supplement the record with a portion of the transcripts from May 28, 2019, which
this court generously granted with no objection from Kristine. As gleaned from the transcripts
provided, Colby addressed his motion for a continuance immediately prior to the commencement
of the trial. Colby noted he “asked for a continuance” during the continued final pretrial conference
and the court made a “decision at that time.” Colby requested the court to “revisit your decision
and grant my request to continue” to secure counsel. Kristine, in response, noted with respect to
the continued final pretrial conference, “[t]he court heard the motion ***[,] made the
determination.” After hearing from Colby and Kristine, the court stated it considered Colby’s
comments as a “renewed” motion for a continuance and it was “once again” denying the motion.
In support of its decision, the court stated as follows:
“Just for practical purposes, your counsel filed a motion to withdraw
on April 11[,] 2019, and within that document that he filed, he
indicated that you *** had no objection to his withdrawal from [the]
case. So that means to me that as of at least April 11[,] 2019, you
were aware your counsel was getting out of the case.
Your motion to continue is not filed until the week of final
pre-trial, which is approximately or actually just at one week prior
to a three-day trial setting. It would be a different story in this
particular case if this was a relatively new matter and it had been
rushed to hearing, but I believe I mentioned on Friday, and I will
mention again for the record, this case was filed on August 10[,]
2015. It appears that you entered your appearance on October 9[,]
-4- 2015. So by my math, that’s three-and-a-half years that this case has
been pending.
Our [s]uprme [c]ourt has given me direction, as well as any
other judge hearing family matters, that we are to bring these cases
to resolution within 18 months absent a good cause, and in this
particular case, that has gone way beyond that time, and, in fact, we
have had these trial dates set for an extended period of time, as well.
Specifically, I set these trial dates on March 11[,] 2019[,] giving you
three days, three full days of the court’s time, and so one week prior
to that suggesting a motion to continue is appropriate because you
need counsel, in my mind, is not a sufficient reason to continue this
matter.”
After denying Colby’s renewed motion for a continuance, the court heard evidence and argument
concerning the allocation of parental responsibilities. The record on appeal contains no transcripts,
bystander’s report, or agreed statement of facts from that portion of the trial.
¶ 13 In June 2019, the trial court entered an allocation of judgment and parenting time
order.
¶ 14 In July 2019, the trial court entered a final pretrial order concerning the financial
issues, which scheduled a trial for August 26, 2019, with trial exhibits to be provided to the
opposing party by August 19, 2019.
¶ 15 On August 26, 2019, the trial court held a trial on the financial issues. Kristine
testified and presented approximately 100 exhibits. Colby testified and presented testimony from
-5- his fiancée, Dara White, and approximately 10 exhibits. The following is gleaned from the
testimony and exhibits presented.
¶ 16 Kristine explained obtaining discovery information from Colby had been an
arduous and drawn out process. With respect to Colby’s income for child support purposes,
Kristine believed Colby had been intentionally trying to shield or avail ownership of businesses at
which he worked—Colby Company and Clean Cut Painting and Handyman—by listing only his
fiancée as the owner. Because Colby had not provided balance sheets for the businesses, Kristine
subpoenaed bank records and then reviewed deposits and calculated estimated expenses to
determine Colby’s income between 2017 and 2019. From her review, Kristine calculated Colby
having income during that period of $108,280.89. Kristine also reviewed tax statements to
determine Colby’s income for 2013 and 2014. From her review, Kristine calculated Colby having
income of $316,582 for 2013 and $188,488 for 2014. Kristine provided a demonstrative exhibit,
exhibit No. 33, which set forth a calculation of Colby’s average income of $204,450 based upon
her other calculations. Kristine also testified about Colby’s child support arrearage totaling
$14,785.16. With respect to the classification and distribution of property, Kristine produced
exhibit Nos. 36 through 85 showing real estate valued at over $2 million and exhibit Nos. 86
through 95 showing net proceeds from the sale of some real estate at $339,413. Kristine testified
Colby failed to provide a full accounting of where the proceeds from the disposal of the real estate
had gone.
¶ 17 Colby explained he provided Kristine with all the requested discovery information.
With respect to his income for child support purposes, Colby testified 2013 and 2014 “were good
years” for his business, World Painting Company. When he and Kristine began to have marital
-6- issues, he also began to have financial issues with his business which led to its closure and him
seeking bankruptcy. In 2016, Colby started a business, Extreme Painting Professionals, with his
brother. Colby testified he was given a “standard salary” and then would “split some of the profit”
at the end of the year pursuant to a “gentleman’s agreement.” Colby eventually had a falling out
with his brother. Colby testified he had not filed his 2016 taxes because he was disputing receipt
of the income reported by his brother. After the falling out with his brother, Colby began working
as an independent sales consultant for a previous client. He began “selling extremely well,” so
much so that the company “couldn’t keep up with what I was selling, and so they asked me to
leave the company.” After leaving that company, Colby decided to start a company “together”
with his fiancée, White. The company was named Colby Company. Colby and White testified
Colby was only an employee of the company. Colby acknowledged one of the reasons he was only
an employee was because of the ongoing divorce proceedings. Colby and White testified the
company was unsuccessful. White later purchased Clean Cut Painting and Handyman, which was
financed through its seller. Colby and White testified Colby was also only an employee of that
company. Colby and White testified the company was unsuccessful. White testified Colby was
previously allowed to obtain cash from company accounts so long as it was used for business
purposes. White acknowledged Colby was allowed to use a “company card” for personal expenses
but indicated those expenses were then deducted from his salary. White testified Colby’s income
was around $35,000 to $45,000 annually. With respect to the classification and distribution of
property, Colby testified he “signed off” his interests in any real estate but did not otherwise
explain what happened to any proceeds therefrom.
¶ 18 In January 2020, the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution of marriage. In its
-7- judgment, the court initially found: “This [c]ourt does not find [Colby] and his fiancé[e], [White],
to be credible. Their testimony was evasive and not believable.” With respect to child support, the
court found:
“18. [Colby] failed to produce any meaningful exhibits
which would assist the [c]ourt in setting his child support obligation
or setting his obligation for child-related expenses. [Colby]
maintains he has no bank account and that his income is only the
wages being paid by [his] fiancé[e]’s business. This is not credible
and is a means by which [Colby] is trying to hide income and
minimize his child support obligation.
19. [Kristine] spent considerable time and effort in providing
to the [c]ourt a means by which to set [Colby’s] child support on
permanent basis. [Colby] was not cooperative in providing
information, and [Kristine] was required to piece together an
accurate amount for [Colby’s] income.
20. [Kristine’s] [e]xhibit 33 which utilizes other exhibits to
calculate an average annual income for [Colby] is adopted by this
[c]ourt.”
The court ordered Colby to pay Kristine $1248 per month for child support and $14,785.68 for
child support arrears. With respect to the classification and distribution of marital and nonmarital
property, the court initially noted: “The [c]ourt was not made *** aware of any assets that either
party claimed to be non-marital.” The court then found:
-8- “12. The only assets which are subject to division are the
proceeds from the real estate sold by [Colby] as provided in
[Kristine’s] [e]xhibits 86-95, which had total net proceeds of
$339,413.21.
13. [Colby] provided no valid explanation as to what
happened to these proceeds, which are the only assets of value in
this case.
14. As provided in [Kristine’s] [e]xhibit 99, [Colby] filed
individual bankruptcy on or about September 14, 2016. The Order
of Discharge was entered on March 9, 2017.
15. For the real estate for which [Kristine] presented the
assessed values ([Kristine’s] [e]xhibits 36-85), but for which, there
was no confirmation of continuing ownership, the [c]ourt does not
consider these properties to be assets subject to division. It is likely
these assets were surrendered in [Colby’s] bankruptcy, and if
[Colby] still retained an ownership interest which he could sell after
the bankruptcy, this [c]ourt has no doubt that he would have done
so.”
The court ordered Colby to pay Kristine $169,706.60 for one-half of the net proceeds realized from
the sale of the real estate.
¶ 19 In March 2020, counsel entered an appearance and filed a motion for
reconsideration on Colby’s behalf. In the motion, Colby argued the trial court should have
-9- determined his income for child support purposes by averaging the last two to three years as any
other years contained outdated information which did not reflect his prospective income. Colby
also argued the court erroneously divided the proceeds from the real estate listed in Kristine’s
exhibit No. 95 as those proceeds were from the sale of nonmarital real estate and erroneously
divided the proceeds from the properties listed in Kristine’s exhibit Nos. 86-94 evenly as he “only
owned one[-]half of these entities and[,] therefore, only one[-]half of the proceeds were marital
property.”
¶ 20 In May 2020, the trial court, after receiving a response from Kristine and a reply to
the response from Colby, conducted a hearing on the motion for reconsideration. The record on
appeal contains no transcripts, bystander’s report, or agreed statement of facts from the hearing.
As gleaned from a docket entry, both parties appeared with counsel via Zoom, arguments were
made by counsel, an “[o]ral ruling [was] announced,” and the motion for reconsideration was
denied.
¶ 21 This appeal followed.
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 On appeal, Colby argues the trial court’s (1) denial of his motion for a continuance
was an abuse of discretion, (2) findings he is obligated to Kristine for child support in the amount
of $1248 per month and for child support arrears in the amount of $14,785.68 were an abuse of
discretion, and (3) finding he owed Kristine $168,706.60 for her share of the marital property was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Kristine disagrees with each of Colby’s arguments.
¶ 24 A. The Denial of the Motion for a Continuance
¶ 25 Colby argues the trial court’s denial of his motion for a continuance was an abuse
- 10 - of discretion. Specifically, Colby asserts he should have been given additional time to secure new
counsel given the complexity of the issues, the absence of any prejudice to Kristine, and the
absence of any evidence suggesting the litigation had been prolonged solely due to his misconduct.
¶ 26 “Litigants do not have an absolute right to a continuance.” Somers v. Quinn, 373
Ill. App. 3d 87, 96, 867 N.E.2d 539, 548 (2007). The decision of whether grant or deny a
continuance is left to the sound discretion of a trial court. Id. A trial court’s decision to deny a
motion for a continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of LaRocque, 2018
IL App (2d) 160973, ¶ 94, 107 N.E.3d 349. A trial court abuses its discretion only when its
decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the court. Id. The denial of a motion for a continuance will not be disturbed on appeal
without a showing of prejudice to the complaining party. See In re A.F., 2012 IL App (2d) 111079,
¶ 36, 969 N.E.2d 877; DeBow v. City of East St. Louis, 158 Ill. App. 3d 27, 38, 510 N.E.2d 895,
903 (1987); Shumak v. Shumak, 30 Ill. App. 3d 188, 193, 332 N.E.2d 177, 182 (1975).
¶ 27 As an initial matter, Colby, as part of his argument suggesting the trial court’s
denial of his motion for a continuance was an abuse of discretion, argues, “[a]llowing withdrawal
of counsel 26 days before a three full day trial constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial court.”
That argument, however, presents a separate issue—whether the court erred in allowing counsel’s
withdrawal. Not only is that issue forfeited due to the failure to raise it before the trial court (see
Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Hoke, 2019 IL App (4th) 150544-B, ¶ 38, 123 N.E.3d 1271
(“[i]ssues not raised before the trial court are deemed forfeited and may not be raised for the first
time on appeal”)), it is also forfeited due to his failure to provide any meaningful argument with
citation to supporting legal authority on appeal (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)
- 11 - (“[a]rgument *** shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with
citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on”); see also Sakellariadis v.
Campbell, 391 Ill. App. 3d 795, 804, 909 N.E.2d 353, 362 (2009) (noting the failure to comply
with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) results in forfeiture)). Further, Colby agreed to the
motion to withdraw. Accordingly, we decline to consider Colby’s argument.
¶ 28 Turning to the issue properly before this court, Colby filed a written motion for a
continuance on May 21, 2019. As gleaned from the transcripts provided from May 28, 2019, the
trial court addressed and denied Colby’s motion during the May 24, 2019, continued final pretrial
conference for the allocation of parental responsibilities. Colby then requested the court to “revisit”
its decision immediately prior to the commencement of the trial for the allocation of parental
responsibilities on May 28, 2019. The court, after indicating it would entertain Colby’s comments
as a renewed motion for a continuance, denied the motion. At no other point thereafter did Colby
renew his motion for a continuance.
¶ 29 On appeal, Colby fails to identify any prejudice resulting from the trial court’s
denial of his motion for a continuance or denial of his renewed motion for a continuance. He raises
no complaint with the allocation of parental responsibilities, the subject of the May 28, 29, and 31
trial. Colby suggests he was prejudiced in that he, as a non-attorney, could not be expected to know
to renew his motion for a third time prior to the trial concerning the financial issues. A pro se
litigant is not, however, subject to a more lenient standard but rather must comply with the same
rules of procedure required of attorneys. Gillard v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 2019 IL App
(1st) 182348, ¶ 45, 143 N.E.3d 213. Absent a showing of prejudice, there is no basis to disturb the
trial court’s denial of the motion for a continuance or denial of the renewed motion for a
- 12 - continuance.
¶ 30 Prejudice aside, we also cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied the motion for a continuance or the renewed motion for a continuance. With respect to the
court’s denial of the motion for a continuance, Colby fails to provide any transcripts, bystander’s
report, or agreed statement of facts from the May 24, 2019, continued final pretrial conference
when the motion was denied. Without a sufficient record from that conference, we cannot say the
trial court’s denial was an abuse of discretion. See Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459
N.E.2d 958, 959 (1984) (“[A]n appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record
of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, and in the absence of such a record on appeal,
it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had a
sufficient factual basis.”). With respect to the court’s denial of the renewed motion for a
continuance, the court’s comments indicate it was appropriately concerned with Colby’s lack of
diligence, noting the trial had been set since March 11, 2019, Colby was aware his counsel intended
to withdraw from the case since at least April 11, 2019, and Colby had only filed his written motion
for a continuance a week prior to trial. See Merchants Bank v. Roberts, 292 Ill. App. 3d 925, 927,
686 N.E.2d 1202, 1205 (1997) (“A decisive factor is whether the party asking for the continuance
has shown diligence in proceeding with the cause.”). In addition, Colby did not provide the court
with any information or evidence concerning his attempts to obtain counsel during the 26-day
period following his counsel’s withdrawal. See Demos v. Haber, 101 Ill. App. 3d 901, 903, 428
N.E.2d 972, 973-74 (1981) (“The absence of an attorney does not give a litigant the right to a
continuance, but the diligence of the party seeking it is a critical consideration in determining
whether or not to grant a continuance.”). Under the circumstances presented, the trial court’s denial
- 13 - was not an abuse of discretion.
¶ 31 Colby’s reliance on Reecy v. Reecy, 132 Ill. App. 2d 1024, 271 N.E.2d 91 (1971),
in support of his position is unpersuasive as that case is factually distinguishable. In Reecy, the
appellate court found the trial court’s denial of the motion for a continuance filed by the plaintiff’s
newly retained counsel was an abuse of discretion where the record showed counsel had only 16
days to prepare for trial, had an extremely heavy court schedule, had been absent from the state
for seven days, wished to avail himself of certain discovery procedures, and had been ill with the
flu for several days and ordered by a doctor to be confined to bed on the date the trial was scheduled
to commence. Id. at 1026-28. Colby cites no similar facts here. Similarly, Colby’s reliance on
Duran v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 645, 325 N.E.2d 368 (1975), in support
of his position is unpersuasive as that case is factually distinguishable. In Duran, the appellate
court found the trial court’s denial of the motion for a continuance filed by the plaintiff’s counsel
was an abuse of discretion where the record showed plaintiff had been diligent in prosecuting her
case and was justified in believing she would be granted a final continuance for the purpose of
bringing in a material witness who was in delicate health from outside the country. Id. at 646-47.
Colby cites no similar facts here.
¶ 32 B. The Child Support Findings
¶ 33 Colby argues the trial court’s findings he is obligated to Kristine for child support
in the amount of $1248 per month and for child support arrears in the amount of $14,785.68 were
an abuse of discretion. Specifically, Colby argues the trial court abused its discretion by relying
solely on Kristine’s calculations of his income and failing to consider the evidence he presented
of his income and ability to pay any support obligation. Alternatively, Colby argues the court
- 14 - abused its discretion by using income information from 2013 and 2014 as that information did not
reflect his prospective income.
¶ 34 In computing any child support obligation, the first step for the trial court is to
determine each parent’s income. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(1.5)(A) (West 2014). A trial court’s factual
findings as to a parent’s income will not be reversed on appeal so long as the findings are not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Gabriel, 2020 IL App (1st) 182710,
¶ 39, 157 N.E.3d 992. The credibility and forthrightness of a parent in disclosing income is a factor
to be considered in accepting evidence of a parent’s income. In re Marriage of Karonis, 296 Ill.
App. 3d 86, 92, 693 N.E.2d 1282, 1287 (1998). In situations where income fluctuates from year to
year, income averaging is an approved method to determine a parent’s income. In re Marriage of
Garrett, 336 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1025, 785 N.E.2d 172, 177 (2003). A trial court’s decision
concerning the years of income to average to arrive at a parent’s income will not be reversed on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage of Freesen, 275 Ill. App. 3d 97, 103, 655
N.E.2d 1144, 1149 (1995) (“At least the three prior years should be used to obtain an accurate
income picture. Beyond that, however, it must be left to the discretion of the trial court, as facts
will vary in each case.”).
¶ 35 First, contrary to the argument presented, the trial court did consider the evidence
Colby presented at trial concerning his income and ability to pay. As to the evidence he presented,
Colby cites his 2018 tax return, a financial affidavit, and the testimony from him and White. Colby
did not, however, offer his 2018 tax return and the financial affidavit during the trial on the
financial issues. Accordingly, the trial court could not have erred in failing to consider such
evidence. As to the testimony presented, the judgment of dissolution of marriage makes clear the
- 15 - court considered and rejected the testimony from Colby and White, finding the witnesses were not
credible. Colby does not otherwise take issue with the court’s credibility assessments. See In re
Marriage of Walker, 386 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1042, 899 N.E.2d 1097, 1104 (2008) (“A reviewing
court will defer to a trial court’s determination of credibility because the trial court is in the best
position to observe the conduct and demeanor of witnesses.”)
¶ 36 Second, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by using income
information from 2013 and 2014. While it may be unusual for a court to rely on income information
from prior to a discharge in bankruptcy, the circumstances of this case are unique. Colby provided
little information as to the bankruptcy proceedings. Kristine testified to her belief that Colby had
been intentionally obscuring his income. The court agreed with Kristine’s assessment, finding
Colby was “trying to hide income and minimize his child support obligation.” The income
information from 2013 and 2014 was representative of the income Colby received just prior to him
being placed on notice by Kristine that she wished to have the marriage dissolved, be awarded
temporary and permanent care and custody of their child, and have an order entered requiring
Colby to pay her temporary and permanent child support. Under these circumstances, it would be
difficult to say the court abused its discretion by using income information from 2013 and 2014.
In any event, we certainly cannot make such a finding based on the record presented. Colby,
through counsel, raised the issue in his motion for reconsideration. After doing so, the court
conducted a hearing where it entertained argument by counsel and then announced an oral ruling.
Colby fails to provide any transcripts, bystander’s report, or agreed statement of facts from the
hearing. Without a sufficient record from that hearing, we cannot say the court abused its discretion
by using income information from 2013 and 2014. See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92.
- 16 - ¶ 37 As a final matter, Colby briefly argues a lower monthly child support obligation
was warranted given the distribution of marital property and child support arrearage obligation.
The issue of whether the monthly child support obligation should have been reduced given the
distribution of marital property and child support arrearage obligation was not raised before the
trial court. Accordingly, this issue is forfeited, and we decline to consider Colby’s argument. See
Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC, 2019 IL App (4th) 150544-B, ¶ 38. Similarly, Colby briefly
argues the court erroneously relied upon Kristine’s calculation of his income for 2013 as the
calculation was based upon a joint tax return which contained wages received by Kristine. The
issue of whether Kristine’s calculation of Colby’s income for 2013 was correct was not raised
before the trial court. Accordingly, this issue is forfeited, and we decline to consider Colby’s
argument. See id.
¶ 38 C. Marital Property Finding
¶ 39 Colby argues the trial court’s finding he owed Kristine $168,706.60 for the one-
half share of the marital property was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically,
Colby asserts the court erroneously divided the proceeds from the real estate listed in Kristine’s
exhibit No. 95 as those proceeds were from the sale of nonmarital real estate and erroneously
divided the proceeds from the properties listed in Kristine’s exhibit Nos. 86 through 94 evenly as
those properties were owned jointly by him and at least one other person.
¶ 40 At the trial on the financial issues, Colby made no objection to Kristine’s suggestion
the proceeds from the real estate listed in exhibit Nos. 86 through 95 were marital property, nor
did he suggest Kristine was entitled to anything less than one-half of the those proceeds. Instead,
Colby took issue with the court’s classification and distribution of the proceeds from the real estate
- 17 - for the first time in his motion for reconsideration.
¶ 41 After Colby took issue with the court’s classification and distribution of the
proceeds from the real estate listed in exhibit Nos. 86 through 95 in his motion for reconsideration,
the trial court conducted a hearing where it entertained argument by counsel and then announced
an oral ruling. Again, Colby fails to provide any transcripts, bystander’s report, or agreed statement
of facts from the hearing. Without a sufficient record from that hearing, we cannot say the court’s
finding he owed Kristine $168,706.60 for the one-half share of the marital property was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92.
¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 43 We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 44 Affirmed.
- 18 -